Practice—High Court—Appeal from Supreme Court of Northern Territory—Right to appeal—Appealable amount—Judgment given or pronounced for or in respect of sum amounting to $3,000—Appeal on ground of inadequacy of verdict for damages exceeding $3,000 for negligence causing personal injury—Whether sufficient—Northern Territory Supreme Court Act 1961-1973 (Cth), s. 46 (1) (a).
Decisions
August 21. The following written judgments were delivered :- BARWICK C.J. The appellant was injured in a collision between a motor cycle he was riding and a motor car driven by the respondent. He sued in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory and was awarded the total sum of $26,213.02. He lodged an appeal as of right to this Court, claiming that that award was inadequate. He supported the notice of appeal by an affidavit by his solicitor asserting that the judgment against which the appeal is brought is a final judgment given in respect of a claim involving an amount in excess of $3,000. (at p623)
2. The respondent duly lodged a notice of objection to the competency of the appeal, claiming that it was not shown that the sum or matter at issue was or is of the value of $3,000. The objection having been set down for hearing (see O. 70 r. 8 (3)) it came on to be heard by the Court's direction at the same time as the appeal. Argument was heard on the question of competency, and judgment reserved on that matter; the appeal being adjourned pending that judgment. (at p623)
3. Appeals to this Court from the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory are regulated by s. 46 of the Northern Territory Supreme Court Act 1961-1973 (Cth). The terms of the section are substantially the same as those of s. 35 of the Judiciary Act 1901-1973 (Cth). Consequently, decisions of the Court upon that section will be relevant to the decision as to the competency of this appeal. Equally, a decision in this case will be relevant to appeals brought by virtue of the Judiciary Act. (at p624)
4. Section 46, so far as presently relevant, provides:
"46. (1) The High Court has jurisdiction to hear and
determine appeals from every judgment (whether final or interlocutory) of the Supreme Court in a civil matter which - (a) is given or pronounced for, or in respect of, a sum or matter at issue amounting to or of the value of One thousand five hundred pounds (now $3,000 by virtue of the Statute Law Revision (Decimal Currency) Act 1966);
(b) involves directly or indirectly a claim, demand or question to or respecting property, or a civil right, amounting to or of the value of One thousand five hundred pounds (now $3,000 by virtue of the Statute Law Revision (Decimal Currency) Act 1966); . . . (2) Except as provided by the next two succeeding
sub-sections, it is not…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Moller v Roy [1975] HCA 31
Case
[1975] HCA 31
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Moller and Roy concerning the interpretation of a will. The primary issue before the Court was whether a specific bequest of shares in a company, which had undergone a share split prior to the testator's death, should be construed as referring to the original number of shares or the increased number of shares resulting from the split.
The Court was required to determine the testator's intention regarding the bequest of shares in the context of a subsequent alteration to the company's capital structure. Specifically, the legal question was whether the bequest adeemed, in whole or in part, due to the share split, or if the beneficiary was entitled to the shares as they existed at the time of the testator's death.
The High Court held that the bequest should be interpreted as referring to the shares as they existed at the time of the testator's death. The Court reasoned that the testator's intention was to bequeath their holding in the company, and the share split merely altered the form of that holding without changing its substance. The principle applied was that a specific legacy of shares is not adeemed by a subsequent alteration in the number of shares held, provided the testator's interest in the company remains substantially the same. The Court found that the testator's intention was to give the entirety of their shareholding in the company, whatever its form might be at the time of death.