YIC Industrial Pty Ltd v Spa Investments Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

YIC Industrial Pty Ltd & Anor v Spa Investments Pty Ltd & Ors [2020] QSC 378

PARTIES:

YIC INDUSTRIAL PTY LTD
(ACN 139 276 627)
(first plaintiff/respondent)
RORY ANN QUINN (a bankrupt)

(second plaintiff/respondent)

v
SPA INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
(ACN 134 314 631)
(first defendant/applicant)
PIONEER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ACN 128 784 725)
(second defendant/applicant)
GALL STANDFIELD & SMITH SOLICITORS (a firm)

(third defendant/applicant)

FILE NO:

BS No 5692 of 2020

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

18 December 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 August 2020

JUDGE:

Davis J

ORDERS:

1.   Judgment for the defendants on the claim.

2.   The parties will be heard on the question of costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS – where the plaintiffs brought proceedings to set aside a judgment of this court which they allege was obtained by fraud – where the defendants apply for summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the basis that the proceeding is an abuse of process and/or no cause of action is shown – where, in the alternative, the defendants apply to strike out the statement of claim – whether there is a proper evidentiary basis from which fraud could be inferred – whether the proceeding has any real prospect of success – whether there should be summary judgment for the defendants

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – ACTION TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT OR ORDER – WHERE FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OR SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS ­– where the plaintiffs brought proceedings to set aside a judgment of this court which they allege was obtained by fraud – whether there were two related companies with the same name, one of which was deregistered at the relevant time – where what is effectively pleaded is that by a conspiracy between the defendants the previous proceedings have been prosecuted at trial and defended on appeal in the name of a deregistered company based on security documents bearing the name of the deregistered company – whether there is any evidentiary basis to find that the judgment was obtained by fraud

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 5, r 211, r 292, r 293, r 388, r 667

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552, cited
AKS Investments Pty Ltd v Gazal [2015] QSC 247, cited
AMA v CDK [2009] QSC 287, followed
Argus Administration Pty Ltd v Caldwell & Anor [2018] QSC 281, cited
Bishopsgate Insurance Australia Ltd v Commonwealth Engineering (NSW) Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 429, cited
Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218, cited
Bush v National Australia Bank Ltd (1992) 35 NSWLR 390, cited
Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq)

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 378
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In YIC Industrial Pty Ltd v Spa Investments Pty Ltd, the plaintiffs sought to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud against them. The defendants, Spa Investments Pty Ltd and Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd, sought summary judgment against the plaintiffs, arguing that the proceeding was an abuse of process and that there was no real prospect of success. The third defendant, a firm of solicitors, was also involved as it had acted for the first and second defendants in the proceedings that led to the judgment. The plaintiffs' claim was based on an allegation that the defendants had conspired to use the name of a deregistered company, Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd ACN 073 498 905, to obtain the judgment. The court had to determine whether there was a proper evidentiary basis for inferring fraud and whether the proceeding had any real prospect of success.

The court examined the legal principles governing the setting aside of judgments obtained by fraud. It noted that such proceedings are rare due to the strong policy promoting finality in the determination of disputes. The court referred to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, which allow for the setting aside of orders obtained by fraud. The court also considered the principles established in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) and other relevant cases. It concluded that while fraud is an exceptional ground for setting aside a judgment, it was necessary to examine whether the plaintiffs had a proper evidentiary basis for their claim of fraud.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not provided any evidence to support their claim that the judgment was obtained by fraud. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to use the name of a deregistered company to obtain the judgment, but the court found no evidence to support this claim. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had not raised this issue in the original proceedings, which would have been an appropriate time to do so. Therefore, the court concluded that the proceeding had no real prospect of success and granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants. The court also ordered that the parties would be heard on the question of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment for the defendants on the claim.

2. The parties will be heard on the question of costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The defendants seek summary judgment[1] against the plaintiffs who sue seeking to set aside a judgment of this court which they allege was obtained by fraud. That judgment was given in favour of the first and second defendants. The third defendant is a firm of solicitors who acted for the first and second defendants when they were plaintiffs in the proceedings which resulted in the judgment now under attack. They are alleged to be parties to the fraud.[1] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 293.Background to the dispute A Mr Anderson controlled Spa Investments Pty Ltd (the first defendant) which I will call “Spa”. A Mr Stefanowicz controlled two companies, both called “Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd”. The first bore Australian Company Number (ACN) 073 498 905. For convenience, I will refer to this as “Pioneer Company 1”. The second is the present second defendant. It bears ACN 128 784 725. I shall refer to that company as “Pioneer Company 2”. Pioneer Company 1 was incorporated in April 1996. On 5 December 2007, it changed its name to “ACN 073 498 905 Pty Ltd”. It was deregistered in June 2008. Pioneer Company 2 was incorporated on 5 December 2007 with the name “Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd” and having ACN 128 784 725. It remains a registered company. YIC Industrial Pty Ltd (YIC), the present first plaintiff, acquired land in Yeppoon. On 21 October 2009, YIC entered into a written agreement (the loan agreement) to borrow $3,500,000 on security of a mortgage over the Yeppoon land (the mortgage). The present second plaintiff, Ms Rory Quinn and her husband Mr John Watson Quinn, guaranteed the loan by written guarantees dated 21 October 2009 (the guarantees). In the loan agreement, the mortgage and the guarantees, the lender appeared as Spa and Pioneer Company 1. In other words, Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd appeared as “Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd ACN 073 498 905”. However, by October 2009, when the loan agreement was signed, Pioneer Company 1 was deregistered. Pioneer Company 2 was trading. It is common ground that the company which actually advanced the money was Pioneer Company 2. Mr Lester Gall, solicitor of Gall Standfield & Smith (the third defendant), acted for Spa and Pioneer Company 2 in the advance to YIC. The mortgage was lodged for registration on 21 October 2009 and registered in the Freehold Land Register.[2][2] Land Title Act 1994, Part 2, Division 2. In March 2010, another company controlled by Mr and Mrs Quinn, namely Quinnco Pty Ltd (Quinnco), was seeking to borrow $12,630,000 from a company, Angas Securities Limited (Angas). Mr Brett Ahern was the Queensland Operations Manager for Angas and Mr Quinn dealt with him in relation to the loan to Quinnco. The loan from Angas was approved but conditionally upon a mortgage being taken over the Yeppoon land owned by YIC. The Angas mortgage would be a second mortgage ranking behind the mortgage registered in favour of Spa and Pioneer Company 1.[3][3] At this stage the mortgagee was described as using Pioneer Company 1’s ACN.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Both Mr and Mrs Quinn have sworn that it was not until March 2020 that they became aware that they had given guarantees to a deregistered company. The current proceedings were commenced on 27 May 2020.Fraud as a ground to challenge a perfected judgment In issue here is the power of the court to set aside its own perfected orders. Apart from challenge by way of statutorily provided appeal, the circumstances in which a judgment may be challenged are few. This reflects the well-established policy promoting finality in the determination of disputes.[15][15] Burrell v The Queen (2008) 238 CLR 218 at 223, [16]. Equity has long recognised a jurisdiction to set aside perfected judgments and orders in limited circumstances.[16] Fraud is one of those exceptional circumstances. This is now reflected in r 667 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR) which provides, relevantly:[16] Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165 at 187, [43] and [44].“667 Setting aside(1)The court may vary or set aside an order before the earlier of the following—(a) the filing of the order;(b) the end of 7 days after the making of the order.(2)The court may set aside an order at any time if—(a) the order was made in the absence of a party; or(b) the order was obtained by fraud; or(c) the order is for an injunction or the appointment of a receiver; or(d) the order does not reflect the court’s intention at the time the order was made; or(e) the party who has the benefit of the order consents; or(f) for a judgment for specific performance, the court considers it appropriate for reasons that have arisen since the order was made. …” Rule 667 is one of a number of rules granting or recognising jurisdiction to set aside or correct a perfected judgment or order. Rules 388 and 668 also fall into this category. In Wentworth v Rogers (No 5),[17] Kirby P (as his Honour then was),[18] sitting in the New South Wales Court of Appeal, performed an extensive analysis of the principles governing the setting aside of judgments obtained by fraud. His Honour’s judgment has been followed and applied in Queensland.[19] There is nothing to suggest that r 667 extends the principles there explained. In AMA v CDK,[20] Applegarth J accepted that the principles applying to the inherent jurisdiction and the principles relevant to the application of the rule are the same.[21][17] (1986) 6 NSWLR 534.[18] With whom Hope and Samuels JJA agreed.[19]Johns v Cosgrove [2002] 1 Qd R 57 at 94; SEQ Tourism Projects Pty Ltd v Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 310 (proceedings related to the present case); AKS Investments Pty Ltd v Gazal [2015] QSC 247; NEPV Solar Pty Ltd (in liq) v White & Anor [2014] QSC 215.[20] [2009] QSC 287.[21] See [21]. Application can be made, not only to set aside a final judgment, but also to set aside other orders of the court which would include interlocutory orders. [22] When a final judgment is sought to be set aside, there is no existing proceeding (it having been finalised by the judgment) so it is appropriate to commence a new proceeding seeking the relief.[23] That is what has occurred here. Probably, r 667 provides an alternative procedure allowing the application to be filed in the concluded proceedings. Nothing turns on that here.[22] Moller v Roy (1975) 132 CLR 622 at 625.[23]McDonald v McDonald (1965) 113 CLR 529 at 533, Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 at 538 and Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165 at 182-183, [32].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established