SEQ Tourism Projects Pty Ltd v Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

SEQ Tourism Projects Pty Ltd v Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 310

PARTIES:

SEQ TOURISM PROJECTS PTY LTD ACN 609 024 599

(Plaintiff)

v
PIONEER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 128 784 725

(First Defendant)

SPA INVESTMENTS PTY LTD ACN 134 314 631

(Second Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS 3193 of 2020

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

2 October 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 May 2020

JUDGE:

Brown J

ORDER:

The order of the Court is:

1.   That proceeding number 3193 of 2020 is stayed unless and until proceeding number 5692 of 2020 is determined or until further order.

2.   The costs of the application are reserved.

3.   Liberty to apply is granted upon three business days’ notice

4.   The application is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

CATCHWORDS:

ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – ISSUE ESTOPPEL – OTHER PARTICULAR CASES – where judgment entered in favour of defendants in previous proceedings – where claim of sale of undervalue unsuccessful – where plaintiff not a party – where cause of action brought by plaintiff on basis of second mortgage claims sale at undervalue – whether plaintiff privy in interest of plaintiff by counterclaim based on legal interest in separate proceedings – whether plaintiff should be estopped from bringing proceedings

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – OTHERWISE ABUSE OF PROCESS – where previous proceedings claimed defendants sold property at undervalue – where plaintiff not involved in previous proceedings – where sole director and shareholder of plaintiff personally involved in previous proceedings – where sole director and shareholder of plaintiff acquired second mortgage shortly after previous proceedings commenced – where cause of action similar to previous proceeding – where plaintiff offered undertaking not to proceed until previous proceeding set aside – whether proceedings an abuse of process

Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 88

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 16, r 171

BHP Billiton (Olympics Dam) Corporation Pty Ltd v Steuler Industriewerke GmbH [2009] VSC 322, considered
Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (2018) 264 CLR 165, considered
Ramsay v Pigrim (1968) 118 CLR 271, considered
Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing (2015) 236 CLR 507, considered
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, considered

COUNSEL:

A Morris QC with L Jurth for the Plaintiffs

M Martin QC with D Ferraro for the Defendants

SOLICITORS:

Direct access for the Plaintiffs

Gall Standfield & Smith for the Defendants

Introduction

  1. A statement of claim has been filed by SEQ Tourism Projects Pty Ltd (SEQ) against each of the defendants by which it claims, as an assignee of a second mortgage of a property known as the “Pineapple Patch”, that the defendants sold the property at an undervalue on 21 March 2014 (SEQ Proceedings). The statement of claim was filed but not served. However, it…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 310
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SEQ Tourism Projects Pty Ltd v Pioneer Australia Pty Ltd, the plaintiff sought to bring proceedings against the defendants based on a claim that a property was sold at undervalue. The defendants argued that the plaintiff was estopped from bringing the proceedings, either by judgment or by issue estoppel, due to a previous proceeding where the plaintiff was not a party. The defendants further contended that the proceedings were an abuse of process. The court had to determine whether the plaintiff was privy in interest to a party in the previous proceeding and whether the proceedings constituted an abuse of process.

The court examined whether the plaintiff had a legal interest in the outcome of the previous proceeding, which would establish it as a privy in interest. The court found that the plaintiff had an economic interest in the proceedings but not a legal one. It was held that the plaintiff's interest in the surplus from the sale of the property, after the first mortgagee had been paid, did not amount to a legal interest sufficient to establish privity in interest. Additionally, the court held that the proceedings did not constitute an abuse of process because the plaintiff was not privy in interest to a party in the previous proceeding and the issues were not identical.

The court stayed the proceedings unless and until the previous proceeding was determined or until further order. The costs of the application were reserved, and liberty to apply was granted upon three business days’ notice. The application was adjourned to a date to be fixed.

The final orders of the court were that proceeding number 3193 of 2020 is stayed unless and until proceeding number 5692 of 2020 is determined or until further order. The costs of the application are reserved, liberty to apply is granted upon three business days’ notice, and the application is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The order of the Court is:

1. That proceeding number 3193 of 2020 is stayed unless and until proceeding number 5692 of 2020 is determined or until further order.

2. The costs of the application are reserved.

3. Liberty to apply is granted upon three business days’ notice

4. The application is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The alternative basis raised by the defendants is that even if the plaintiff was not the privy of YIC and Mrs Quinn, the SEQ Proceedings would constitute an abuse of process. It contends that to re-litigate the same issue, which has been the subject of the YIC Proceedings would be unjustifiably oppressive to the defendants and would clearly bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In that regard, it relied upon the fact that the SEQ Proceedings raise the same issue as previously litigated in relation to the sale of Pineapple Patch at an undervalue and that Mr Quinn, the guiding mind of SEQ, was involved in the previous proceedings. Mr Quinn was the guarantor of the first mortgage granted by YIC but was not joined in the proceedings because he was the subject to a Part X arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). According to the evidence of Mr Reynolds, Mr Quinn was integrally involved in the YIC Proceedings through providing instructions and in the conduct of those proceedings.Consideration There is undoubtedly a parallel in the statement of claim in the SEQ Proceedings and the counterclaim in the YIC Proceedings insofar as both proceedings raise an issue for determination whether the Pineapple Patch was sold by the first and second defendants at an undervalue. Findings were made that the Pineapple Patch was not sold at an undervalue after evidence was led in the YIC Proceedings. There is a coincidence of issues in relation to the proceedings. That is not really the subject of dispute in this application, although SEQ’s Counsel points to the fact that these proceedings are against the Registered Pioneer not the Deregistered Pioneer. In order to successfully raise an issue estoppel, SEQ would have to be a privy of YIC. That was again considered by the plurality in Tomlinson, it recognised that there were two bases upon which a party could be privy in interest with a party to an earlier legal proceeding. Relevant to this case, SEQ might have a legal interest in the outcome of the earlier proceeding which was represented by, in this case YIC, or that YIC has some legal interest in the outcome of the later proceeding which was represented by SEQ.[19] The interest of the privy must be a legal interest with an economic or other interest in the outcome of the proceedings being insufficient.[20] If that legal interest is absent, the influence that, in this case, SEQ as the assignee of the second mortgage would have over the conduct of the earlier proceeding is irrelevant even if it amounts to control. In the present case, while the SEQ would have an economic interest in the outcome of the YIC Proceedings, its entitlement to be paid the surplus after all amounts were paid to the first mortgagee is an economic interest rather than a legal one. [19]Tomlinson at [33].[20]Tomlinson at [35]. The applicants refer to s 88(1)(c) PLA which directs the selling mortgagee, after obtaining its entitlement out of the proceeds of sale to apply the surplus in “payment of any subsequent mortgages or encumbrances”. Section 88(1)(c) PLA has been described as a provision intended to provide the machinery for giving effect to the priorities otherwise legally established.[21] The first mortgagee is directed, after obtaining his or her entitlement out of the proceeds, to apply the surplus in payment of any subsequent mortgages and encumbrances. It is to be read in a manner consistent with the equitable duty of the first mortgagee to account to puisne mortgages as trustee for any surplus.[22] The first and second mortgages, however, are separate and distinct, even when the first mortgage has been transferred in favour of a second mortgagee.[23] I am not persuaded that the relationship arising out of s 88(1)(c) PLA does relevantly create a privy of interest between the mortgagor, namely YIC and the second mortgagee. While there is no doubt that the second mortgagee would have an economic interest in proceedings brought by the mortgagor based on a sale at an undervalue, s 88(1)(c) does not establish a legal interest between them. [21]Rockett v Moneycorp Securities Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 258 at [15] and [16], referring to the decision of de Jersey J in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Evans [1992] 2 Qd R 230.[22]Property Law and Practice Qld at PLA.88.540; See also Boefinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 269 at [35], referring to Charles v Jones where Kay J stated that the balance in the first mortgagee is a trustee of the balance for the persons beneficially interested.[23]Huizhong Investment Group Pty Ltd v Westpac Corporation Ltd & Ors [2019] NSWSC 524 at [110] – [111].