AKS Investments Pty Ltd v Gazal

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

AKS Investments Pty Ltd v Gazal [2015] QSC 247

PARTIES:

AKS INVESTMENTS PTY LTD ACN 078 821 173, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE SMITH FAMILY TRUST

(plaintiff)

v
ADAM GAZAL

(defendant)

FILE NO:

11443 of 2014

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Civil Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

28 August 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 March 2015

JUDGE:

Daubney J

ORDERS:

1.    The plaintiff’s application for a stay of the proceeding is dismissed.

2.  There be judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff.

3.  The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs (including
     the costs of the application for a stay and the costs of the
     summary judgment application) to be assessed on the
     standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PROCEDURE UNDER UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND PREDECESSORS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – where the defendant in the proceeding applies for summary judgment – where the plaintiff in the proceeding seeks to set aside an earlier judgment – where the plaintiff seeks to set aside an earlier judgment on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud – where the defendant is alleged to have knowingly given untruthful evidence – whether pursuant to rule 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) there be judgment against the plaintiff – whether the plaintiff has a real prospect of succeeding in the claim to set aside the primary judgment – whether, in the alternative, proceedings in Supreme Court number 11443 of 2014 be permanently stayed.

CRIMINAL LAW – GENERAL MATTERS – OTHER GENERAL MATTERS – STAY OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS PENDING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS – where the plaintiff seeks an order for a temporary stay of proceedings – where the sole director of the plaintiff company has criminal proceedings pending connected with engagement of the defendant after the result of the earlier judgment – whether pursuant to rules 367 and 658 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) this procedure be stayed until the conclusion of pending criminal proceedings.

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 293

Agar & Others v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552

AKS Investments Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank & Anor [2012] QSC 223

AKS Investments Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank & Anor (No 2) [2012] QSC 282

Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130

Coldham-Fussell & Others v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 82 ACSR 439

Hip Foong Hong v H Neotia & Co [1918] AC 888

Johns v Cosgrove [2002] 1 Qd R 57

McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd [1948] VLR 496

Meek v Fleming [1961] 2 QB 366

Monroe Schneider Associates Inc & Anor v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) (1992) 37 FCR 234

Tombling v Universal Bulb Co Ltd [1951] WN 247

Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534

COUNSEL:

W Sofronoff QC and P Tucker for the plaintiff
L Kelly QC and A Pomerenke QC for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Merthyr…

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Details
Case
[2015] QSC 247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

AKS Investments Pty Ltd sought to set aside a judgment obtained against them by Gazal, alleging fraud. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The primary issue before the court was whether AKS Investments Pty Ltd could set aside the judgment obtained by Gazal on the grounds of fraud, specifically whether Gazal knowingly provided untruthful evidence. Additionally, the court had to decide if the proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of related criminal proceedings against the sole director of AKS Investments Pty Ltd.

The court examined the established legal principles regarding the setting aside of judgments on the basis of fraud. It noted that while perjury alone is not typically sufficient to warrant such relief, there may be exceptional cases where proof of perjury could justify setting aside a judgment. The court referred to the principles outlined in Cabassi v Vila and Wentworth v Rogers (No 5), which emphasize the need for stringent requirements beyond mere allegations of perjury. The court further considered the principle that fraud cases stand on a different footing compared to other 'fresh evidence' cases, as noted in Johns v Cosgrove.

The court concluded that AKS Investments Pty Ltd did not have a real prospect of succeeding in their claim to set aside the primary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff had not established the special circumstances required to set aside the judgment based on fraud. Additionally, the court dismissed the application for a stay of the proceedings pending the outcome of related criminal proceedings, ruling that the requirements for such a stay had not been met. Consequently, judgment was entered in favour of Gazal, and AKS Investments Pty Ltd was ordered to pay Gazal's costs.

ORDERS:
1. The plaintiff’s application for a stay of the proceeding is dismissed.
2. There be judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff.
3. The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs (including
the costs of the application for a stay and the costs of the
summary judgment application) to be assessed on the
standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff’s application for a stay of the proceeding is dismissed.

2. There be judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff.

3. The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs (including

the costs of the application for a stay and the costs of the

summary judgment application) to be assessed on the

standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Cabassi v Vila,[31] Williams J said (excluding footnotes):[32]“In Charles Bright & Co. Ltd. v. Sellar the Court of Appeal pointed out that actions to set aside a judgment on the ground of fraud do not invite the court to re-hear upon the old materials, but ‘fresh facts are brought forward, and the litigation may be well regarded as new and not appellate in its nature, because not involving any decision contrary to the previous decision of the High Court.’ I have been unable to find any case in which a judgment has been set aside where the only fraud alleged was that the defendant or a witness or witnesses alone or in concert had committed perjury. In fact the court has said that except in very exceptional cases perjury is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a judgment (See Flower v. Lloyd; Baker v. Wadsworth, but in view of the allegation in the statement of claim that the evidence did deceive and fraudulently mislead the court I shall assume the plaintiff could establish such special circumstances.” (emphasis added)[31] (1940) 64 CLR 130.[32] At 147-148. In Wentworth v Rogers (No 5), Kirby P said:[33]“Fourthly, although perjury by the successful party or a witness or witnesses may, if later discovered, warrant the setting aside of a judgment on the ground that it was procured by fraud, and although there may be exceptional cases where such proof of perjury could suffice, without more, to warrant relief of this kind, the mere allegation, or even the proof, of perjury will not normally be sufficient to attract such drastic and exceptional relief as the setting aside of a judgment: Cabassi v Vila (at 147, 148); Baker v Wadsworth (1898) 67 LJQB 301; Everett v Ribbands (at 145, 146). The other requirements must be fulfilled. In hard fought litigation, it is not at all uncommon for there to be a conflict of testimony which has to be resolved by a judge or jury. In many cases of contradictory evidence, one party must be mistaken. He or she may even be deceiving the court. The unsuccessful party in the litigation will often consider that failure in the litigation has been procured by false evidence on the part of the opponent and the witnesses called by the opponent. If every case in which such an opinion was held gave rise to proceedings of this kind, the courts would be even more burdened with the review of first instance decisions than they are. For this reason, and in defence of finality of judgments, a more stringent requirement than alleged perjury alone is required.” (emphasis added)[33] At 539. See also Monroe Schneider Associates Inc v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd at 242. In Johns v Cosgrove,[34] Thomas JA, with whom de Jersey CJ and McMurdo P agreed, said:“[95]The authorities suggest, however, that it will be a rare case where a party who was shown to have been privy to fraud which has misled the court in proceedings resulting in a judgment in that party’s favour will be permitted to retain the benefit of the judgment. It was observed in McCann v. Parsons that ‘there was never any hesitation at common law to use the power to grant a new trial, once it appeared from further evidence that the verdict had been obtained by putting forward a false case’. As all the members of the court acknowledged in McDonald above, fraud cases stand on a different footing to other ‘fresh evidence’ cases.” (citations omitted).[34] [2002] 1 Qd R 57.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.