Winn v Brian Ward and Partners Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Winn v Brian Ward & Partners Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1520

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to file notice of appeal out of time – consideration of different principles relevant where decision is substantive or interlocutory in character

Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) ss 24 and 25
Federal Court Rules O 52

Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1980) 147 CLR 246 cited
Cubillo v Commonwealth (2001) 112 FCR 455 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 applied
Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Limited (2006) 154 FCR 554 referred to
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 applied
Merit Protection Commissioner v Nonnenmacher (1999) 86 FCR 112 cited
Newcrest Mining (WA) Limited v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 40 FCR 507 cited
Ogawa v University of Melbourne (No 2) [2004] FCA 1275 cited
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 applied

JULENE WINN v BRIAN WARD & PARTNERS PTY LTD
VID 682 OF 2007

GORDON J
2 OCTOBER 2007
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 682 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

JULENE WINN
Applicant

AND:

BRIAN WARD & PARTNERS PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

GORDON J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 OCTOBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended application dated 2 August 2007 is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 682 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

JULENE WINN
Applicant

AND:

BRIAN WARD & PARTNERS PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

GORDON J

DATE:

2 OCTOBER 2007

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This proceeding is the latest between the applicant (“Ms Winn”) and the respondent (“Brian Ward”).  Since 2005, various proceedings between the two parties have been heard, or are presently filed in, the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (“the VMC”), the Supreme Court of Victoria, the Federal Magistrates’ Court (“the FMC”) and, of course, the Federal Court of Australia.  The substantive issues giving rise to those proceedings are connected and have a long and unfortunate history. 

  2. On 11 July 2007, McInnis FM determined three applications brought by Ms Winn against Brian Ward, namely:

    (1)       an application to set aside a costs order of $1,500 (“the costs order”) made by Registrar Mussett against Ms Winn in her application to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Brian Ward, a notice which had been set aside by consent:  Winn v Brian Ward & Partners Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 1090 (“the Costs Decision”);

    (2)       an application that McInnis FM disqualify himself from determining the application relevant to the Costs Decision and hearing the application relevant to the decision described at (3) below on the basis of the Magistrate’s previous employment 30 years earlier by Brian Ward and the manner in which the…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1520
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Winn v Brian Ward and Partners Pty Ltd involves a dispute between Ms Winn and Brian Ward and Partners Pty Ltd, which relates to a bankruptcy notice and subsequent legal costs. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether Ms Winn was entitled to leave to file and serve a notice of appeal out of time in relation to a costs decision, and whether she was entitled to leave to appeal decisions regarding a stay and bias.

The court found that Ms Winn was not entitled to leave to file a notice of appeal out of time in relation to the costs decision because no special reasons were shown for the delay. Furthermore, the court determined that neither the stay decision nor the bias decision involved any doubt, let alone sufficient doubt, and no substantial injustice would be caused to Ms Winn if leave to appeal these decisions was not granted. Consequently, leave to appeal these decisions was also denied.

The court dismissed the amended application dated 2 August 2007 and ordered Ms Winn to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, which are to be taxed in default of agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended application dated 2 August 2007 is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below:(1) in relation to the Costs Decision, I would not grant Ms Winn leave to file and serve the notice of appeal under O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules. No special reasons were shown;(2) in relation to the Stay Decision and the Bias Decision, I would not grant Ms Winn leave to appeal under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) (“the Federal Court Act”). Neither decision is attended with any doubt, let alone sufficient doubt and further, no injustice, let alone substantial injustice to Ms Winn has been shown if leave were not granted.BACKGROUND On 2 May 2007, Ms Winn applied to the FMC for a review of orders made by Registrar Mussett on 12 April 2007 setting aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Brian Ward (“the substantive application”). The effect of the Registrar’s orders was to relieve Ms Winn of the burdens attached to her status as the debtor in bankruptcy proceedings. The Registrar required, however, that Ms Winn pay Brian Ward’s costs fixed at $1,500. The bankruptcy notice related to a debt for legal costs of approximately $6,600 (“the debt”) incurred in connection with legal services provided by Brian Ward to Ms Winn. Approximately 2 years ago, on 26 October 2005, Brian Ward had filed a complaint in the VMC seeking repayment of the debt. In advance of the hearing before the VMC, Ms Winn sought a stay of the hearing on the basis that the complaint contravened s 106(1) of the Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) (“the Legal Practice Act”), which provision had been repealed in advance of the VMC proceeding by Part 8.1 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic). Ms Winn did not appear at the hearing of the proceeding before the VMC on 2 October 2006 and judgment was entered for Brian Ward for the amount of debt (“the VMC judgment”). A series of events followed the VMC judgment. On 9 March 2007, Brian Ward served a bankruptcy notice on Ms Winn in relation to the debt. A solicitor of Brian Ward (“Ms Phillips”) received an email on 15 March 2007 from Ms Winn which asserted the VMC judgment was unenforceable on the basis of the alleged breaches of the Legal Practice Act. Ms Winn requested Brian Ward to discontinue the proceedings in bankruptcy against her by further email dated 21 March 2007. Brian Ward subsequently undertook not to proceed with the bankruptcy notice on the basis that Ms Winn had applied for a re-hearing of the VMC proceeding. Ms Winn served a copy of that application on Brian Ward on 28 March 2007 and the re-hearing application took place before the VMC on 11 April 2007. At the commencement of the re-hearing application, the VMC judgment was set aside by consent on the basis that Ms Winn pay Brian Ward’s costs. Ms Winn was ordered to pay costs of $1,276. This event is significant. The setting aside of the judgment debt on which the bankruptcy notice was based took away the foundation of the bankruptcy notice before the FMC. In an affidavit sworn by Ms Phillips dated 25 May 2007 and filed in the FMC, Ms Phillips deposed to the fact that Counsel for Brian Ward had told Ms Winn on the same day as the rehearing before the VMC (11 April 2007), that Brian Ward would withdraw its bankruptcy notice on the basis that no order be made as to costs and Ms Winn declined this offer. Ms Winn submitted before me from the bar table that she heard the offer of consent to withdraw the bankruptcy notice but did not hear the offer in relation to costs. The affidavits filed by Ms Winn in the FMC sought to challenge a number of aspects of the affidavits filed by Ms Phillips in that court, including her affidavit of 25 May 2007. None of the affidavits filed by Ms Winn sought to challenge the conversation on 11 April 2007 which I have just described.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GORDON J
The principles governing the granting of leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment are different from those relevant to an application under O 52 r 15(2) for leave to file a notice of appeal after expiry of the 21 day time limit. Costs Decision As noted above, the application before the Court is an application for leave to file a notice of appeal out of time. It was common ground that any notice of appeal was required to be filed by 4.30 pm on 1 August 2007. During the course of the oral argument and in a memorandum provided to the Court following the hearing on 25 September 2007, Ms Winn submitted that she had, in fact, filed but not served the notice of appeal on time. Despite being invited to file evidence to support the contention that a copy of the notice of appeal had been filed within the time specified by the Federal Court Rules, no documentary material in an admissible form was provided to the Court. The Court file records the receipt at 16.04 pm on 1 August 2007 of the application for extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal. The facsimile header read “page 2”. There is no record of page 1. Ms Winn handed to the Court a copy of a facsimile transmission record she held which purports to record that 21 pages were sent by facsimile to a facsimile number attached to the Victorian Registry of the Federal Court at 16.04 pm on 1 August 2007. Ms Winn submitted from the bar table that the facsimile (of 21 pages) recorded as having been sent at 16.04 pm comprised the application for leave to appeal and an unsworn affidavit which exhibited a draft of the notice of appeal. Whether the pages were received by the Court at 16.04 pm and, if so, what the 21 pages consisted of, I cannot and need not resolve. Even if evidence was provided to the Court that established that at 16.04 pm on 1 August 2007 a copy of an unsworn affidavit together with a copy of a draft notice of appeal was provided to the Court with the application for leave to appeal out of time, it would not constitute the institution of proceedings by way of appeal in this Court. O 52 r 12 provides that an appeal is instituted by filing a notice of appeal in the appropriate registry: cf Griffiths v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Limited (2006) 154 FCR 554. That did not occur. In the circumstances, I will proceed to determine the application for leave to file a notice appeal out of time. Leave to file out of time a notice of appeal in relation to the Costs Decision requires “special reasons”: O52 r 15(2). In Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 (applying Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-49), the Full Court summarised the principles to be applied (at [6]) as follows:“1.applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an "acceptable explanation for the delay"; it must be "fair and equitable in the circumstances" to extend time; 2.action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished; 3.any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension; 4.however, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and 5.the merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GORDON J

Full text does not contain this section.