Owen-Pearse v Lander Land Company Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Owen-Pearse v Lander Land Company Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 2077

File number: WAD 69 of 2018
Judge: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 20 December 2018
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for extension of time for review of decision of Registrar dismissing winding up application - no evidence as to delay - merits of the application - where no arguable case

CORPORATIONS - winding up - failure to comply with statutory demand - whether service of demand and winding up application abuse of process - where claim not quantified - where numerous statutory demands issued - merits of winding up application if hearing de novo proceeds - where company has no other debts due and payable

CORPORATIONS - winding up - period for determination of winding up application prescribed by s 459R of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - where period expired prior to proposed review - no application for extension of time - whether expiry renders review of decision of Registrar futile - whether slip rule applies

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 459A, 459C, 459E, 459G, 459P, 459R, 459S, 467, 1322, Pt 5.4

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 35A

Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 (Cth) r 16.1

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05

Cases cited:

2020 Construction Systems Pty Ltd v Dryka & Associates Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 22

Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 728

Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans & Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 57; (2007) 69 NSWLR 374

Coates Hire Operations Pty Ltd v D-Link Homes Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1279

Cottrell v Nicholls (Trustee) in the matter of Cottrell (Bankrupt) [2004] FCA 102

Createc Pty Ltd v Design Signs Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 85; (2009) 71 ACSR 602

David Grant & Co Pty Ltd (receivers appointed) v Westpac Banking Corporation [1995] HCA 43; (1995) 184 CLR 265

DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd v Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 603; (1995) 131 ALR 213

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v 24 x 7 Direct Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 157

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] FCA 623; (2013) 304 ALR 319

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bayconnection Property Developments Pty Limited [2012] FCA 363

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clyne [1984] FCA 383; (1984) 4 FCR 156

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v De Simone Consulting Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 548

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Revolve Limited [2012] FCA 555

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Soiland (In Liq) [2010] FCA 168

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v T.D. Preece Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1365

Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 943; (1995) 61 FCR 385

Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 131; (2013) 216 FCR 375

Fortuna Holdings Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 2077
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Owen-Pearse filed an application for review of the Registrar's decision to dismiss his winding-up application against Lander Land Company Pty Ltd. The primary issue before the court was whether the application for an extension of time should be granted. The court also had to decide whether the winding up application and statutory demand were an abuse of process and whether the company was solvent.

The court found that the application for an extension of time was not supported by any evidence as to why it was delayed. The court noted that the merits of the review application were considered, and it was concluded that Owen-Pearse had no prospect of succeeding in obtaining a winding up order. The court found that the Demand and the winding up application were part of an armoury used to impose pressure on the company to make a payment, and that the company's solvency was not in dispute. The court concluded that if an extension of time were granted, Owen-Pearse had no prospect of success, and the Registrar's decision would be affirmed. The application for an extension of time was dismissed, and costs were reserved.

The final orders were that the application for an extension of time was dismissed, and costs were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for extension of time dismissed.

2. Costs reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing, Mr Owen‑Pearse was in a position to fully address the merits of the review application, as was the company. Both had also filed written submissions addressing the merits.The evidenceThe company The affidavits on behalf of the company were sworn by Mr Laurence Pace. The following matters reflect his evidence. The company is a private family company. It was incorporated in August 2013 and its sole director and shareholder at that time was Mr Charles Lander. According to public company records, Mr Lander was born in 1925. The company was incorporated for the purpose of acquiring land, developing it and selling it at a profit. In 2013 Mr Lander asked Mr Pace to assist him in raising finance against one of his properties. Mr Pace is a professional company director and also operates a business in partnership with Mr Lindsay Linfoot. Mr Pace was unable to secure finance for Mr Lander at that time due to Mr Lander's age. Mr Pace has provided services to the company continuously since 2016. Mr Lander died in January 2017 and Mrs Win Lander, his widow, and Mr Pace became the executors of Mr Lander's estate. Mrs Lander was born in 1938. She became a director of the company in March 2017 at a time when she was around 78 years old. Mr Pace became a director on 22 January 2018 in order to assist Mrs Lander. The estate remains the sole shareholder. Mr Pace met Mr Owen‑Pearse through Mr Pace's involvement in the company (there is some dispute on the evidence as to when that was, but nothing turns on it). According to Mr Pace, Mr Lander had told him that he (Mr Lander) met Mr Owen‑Pearse in around 2010 and that he had performed odd jobs on Mr Lander's farm in return for room and board. During that period Mr Lander and Mr Owen‑Pearse became friends and Mr Owen‑Pearse had indicated that he wished to become involved in some of Mr Lander's business dealings. In around 2013 Mr Lander proposed to purchase a property referred to as 'Stennett Street' and Mr Owen‑Pearse assisted Mr Lander to obtain finance and provided some plans to renovate the property. Mr Pace said that Mr Lander told him the agreement between him and Mr Owen‑Pearse was that profit from the project would be equally shared once the Stennett Street project was complete. Mr Pace also deposes to his concerns about a number of matters, including Mr Owen‑Pearse's alleged use of funds of the company, proposed projects for which Mr Owen‑Pearse suggested utilising Mr Lander's properties as security, loans he took from Mr Lander, and his suspicion that Mr Owen‑Pearse was taking advantage of Mr Lander as Mr Lander was elderly and frail. Mr Pace also alleged that Mr Owen‑Pearse physically assaulted him (Mr Pace). At one point (after Mr Owen‑Pearse personally served the Demand on Mrs Lander), Mrs Lander obtained an interim violence restraining order against Mr Owen‑Pearse. Mr Owen‑Pearse denies such allegations. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to attempt to resolve those disputed matters and I simply note that it is clear that the relationship between Mr Owen‑Pearse on the one hand and Mrs Lander and Mr Pace on the other has been strained (to say the least) for some years, as was the relationship between Mr Owen‑Pearse and Mr Lander before his death.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It seems to me that the Demand and commencement of the winding up application were part of an armoury utilised to impose pressure upon Mr Lander and later Mrs Lander to make a payment. This included:(a)serving multiple and conflicting statutory demands claiming different sums by different creditors;(b)issuing those demands on elderly directors of the company without providing any useful information at all that explained the manner by which the sum claimed was calculated;(c)failing to explain which of Credex or Mr Owen‑Pearse was a creditor for the claimed sum of $59,576 and how that amount was due, when the underlying debt of $114,000 was previously said to be due to Credex;(d)failing to do so despite sending letters to Mrs Lander and having the opportunity to provide such information;(e)providing only the 8 April 2016 letter to Mrs Lander and not the withdrawal letter: it can be inferred such step was taken to lead Mrs Lander to believe he was authorised to act as 'general manager' and so entitled to some type of payment;(f)utilising a threating tone in correspondence to Mr Lander - for example, his reference to the 'day of reckoning'; and(g)threatening to lodge a caveat over land that was owned personally by Mr Lander or his estate and was not company property.Conclusion on merits For the above reasons, if an extension of time were granted, I consider that Mr Owen‑Pearse has no prospect of succeeding in obtaining a winding up order, and the registrar's decision would be affirmed. In the alternative to dismissal, an injunction may have issued refraining any further reliance on the winding up application. I add that I am conscious of the limitations on the task of assessing the prospects of success of a review application when determining an extension of time application. In this case, it has been necessary to go into some detail in order to assess the merits of the review application and in circumstances where the outcome is a refusal of the extension.Solvency In the alternative to its abuse of process defence, the company asserts it is solvent. It is open to the company to prove solvency taking into account s 459C(3) of the Corporations Act and without obtaining leave under s 459S, because solvency is not a ground on which it could have relied in an application to set aside the statutory demand: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v 24 x 7 Direct Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 157 at [10] (Gordon J). The evidence provided by Mr Pace in his capacity as director of the company included special purpose financial reports for the period 1 July 2017 to 31 December 2017 and updated for the period 1 July 2017 to 7 March 2018, prepared by a firm of certified practising accountants, AS Turner & Associates Pty Ltd. The balance sheet as at 31 December 2017 showed net assets of $845,082.60, including current assets of $777,131.22 and non‑current assets of $67,951.38, including a claim against Mr Owen‑Pearse for loans of $67,000. The main asset is described as 'WIP - Stennett St'. The balance sheet showed total liabilities of $1,587,961.29 made up of:(a)unsecured loan from Mr Lander - $1,357,946.66(b)secured loan from ASF Custodians Pty Ltd - $230,014.63

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The majority formed a different view. Bennett J said:[54]Justice Emmett, at [48], identified a problem arising from the fact that no order extending the currency of the petition under s 52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act had been made prior to the period of 12 months from the presentation of the petition. On his Honour's view, by reason of s 52(4), the petition had lapsed.[55]There are two opposite approaches which might be taken to the resulting problem.[56]The first is to start with s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides:A creditor's petition lapses at the expiration of:(a)subject to paragraph (b), the period of 12 months commencing on the date of presentation of the petition; or(b)if the Court makes an order under subsection (5) in relation to the petition - the period fixed by the order;unless, before the expiration of whichever of those periods is applicable, a sequestration order is made on the petition or the petition is dismissed or withdrawn.[original emphasis][57]On this approach, a sequestration order was made before the expiration of the relevant period. The subsection is therefore no bar to the application of the law at the hearing de novo which may proceed to the making of a fresh sequestration order.[58]The second approach is to start, as did Emmett J, with r 20.03 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (‘the Federal Magistrates Court Rules') which provides that the review of an exercise of power by a registrar must proceed by way of a hearing de novo. As the hearing is de novo, it must proceed on the basis that no sequestration order has been made. As Emmett J pointed out at [48], the result is that the petition is "stale". It lapsed as more than 12 months had expired since the presentation of the petition.[59]The question is which of these approaches is correct.[60]It is apparent that the second approach gives rise to an anomaly. It is unlikely that the Legislature or the rule-making authority intended the result that an appeal from the correct making of a valid sequestration order within time would necessarily have to result in a decision to make no sequestration order, merely because the time between hearing and appeal was such as to render the appellate hearing more than 12 months after the date of the petition. The anomaly is well illustrated by the facts of this case.[61]One way of reading the provisions to avoid the anomaly is to read r 20.03 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules as meaning that one proceeds as if no sequestration order had been made for all purposes except the application of s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. The distinction between a de novo hearing and other forms of appeal concerns evidence and the relevance of the correctness of the order below. It is not concerned with time limits. Bearing in mind the possibility of reading the two provisions together in this manner and bearing in mind the anomalous result produced by the other construction, it appears to me that the first approach is to be preferred.[62]It follows that a sequestration order can be made on the de novo hearing of an appeal from a sequestration order notwithstanding that more than 24 months have elapsed since the filing of the petition.