FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Owen-Pearse v Lander Land Company Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 2077
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 2077
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the application for an extension of time was not supported by any evidence as to why it was delayed. The court noted that the merits of the review application were considered, and it was concluded that Owen-Pearse had no prospect of succeeding in obtaining a winding up order. The court found that the Demand and the winding up application were part of an armoury used to impose pressure on the company to make a payment, and that the company's solvency was not in dispute. The court concluded that if an extension of time were granted, Owen-Pearse had no prospect of success, and the Registrar's decision would be affirmed. The application for an extension of time was dismissed, and costs were reserved.
The final orders were that the application for an extension of time was dismissed, and costs were reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for extension of time dismissed.
2. Costs reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The majority formed a different view. Bennett J said:[54]Justice Emmett, at [48], identified a problem arising from the fact that no order extending the currency of the petition under s 52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act had been made prior to the period of 12 months from the presentation of the petition. On his Honour's view, by reason of s 52(4), the petition had lapsed.[55]There are two opposite approaches which might be taken to the resulting problem.[56]The first is to start with s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides:A creditor's petition lapses at the expiration of:(a)subject to paragraph (b), the period of 12 months commencing on the date of presentation of the petition; or(b)if the Court makes an order under subsection (5) in relation to the petition - the period fixed by the order;unless, before the expiration of whichever of those periods is applicable, a sequestration order is made on the petition or the petition is dismissed or withdrawn.[original emphasis][57]On this approach, a sequestration order was made before the expiration of the relevant period. The subsection is therefore no bar to the application of the law at the hearing de novo which may proceed to the making of a fresh sequestration order.[58]The second approach is to start, as did Emmett J, with r 20.03 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (‘the Federal Magistrates Court Rules') which provides that the review of an exercise of power by a registrar must proceed by way of a hearing de novo. As the hearing is de novo, it must proceed on the basis that no sequestration order has been made. As Emmett J pointed out at [48], the result is that the petition is "stale". It lapsed as more than 12 months had expired since the presentation of the petition.[59]The question is which of these approaches is correct.[60]It is apparent that the second approach gives rise to an anomaly. It is unlikely that the Legislature or the rule-making authority intended the result that an appeal from the correct making of a valid sequestration order within time would necessarily have to result in a decision to make no sequestration order, merely because the time between hearing and appeal was such as to render the appellate hearing more than 12 months after the date of the petition. The anomaly is well illustrated by the facts of this case.[61]One way of reading the provisions to avoid the anomaly is to read r 20.03 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules as meaning that one proceeds as if no sequestration order had been made for all purposes except the application of s 52(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. The distinction between a de novo hearing and other forms of appeal concerns evidence and the relevance of the correctness of the order below. It is not concerned with time limits. Bearing in mind the possibility of reading the two provisions together in this manner and bearing in mind the anomalous result produced by the other construction, it appears to me that the first approach is to be preferred.[62]It follows that a sequestration order can be made on the de novo hearing of an appeal from a sequestration order notwithstanding that more than 24 months have elapsed since the filing of the petition.