FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
G & J Gears Australia Pty Ltd v Brobo Group Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 330
CORPORATIONS - review of registrar’s decision pursuant to s 35A(6) of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – application made pursuant to s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to set aside statutory demand – whether offsetting claim existed – application to extend time for compliance with statutory demand after registrar’s order extending time had expired – Court had no authority to set aside statutory demand or extend time for compliance after time for compliance had expired
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – request for leave to amend notice of motion to include application to restrain winding up proceedings on the basis of an abuse of process – whether Court had authority to restrain an alleged abuse of process of another court – interlocutory injunction application to restrain use of intellectual property – no serious question to be tried – balance of convenience did not favour grant of injunction
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459E , s 459F, s 459
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 35A(6)Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1997) 25 ACSR 675 referred to
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 discussed
Livestock Traders International Pty Ltd v Bui (1996) 22 ACSR 51 followed
Graywinter Management Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 22 ACSR 636 referred to
Shakespeares Pie Co Australia Pty Ltd v Multipye Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1201 referred to
Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v CranswickPremium Wines Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 877 referred to
Vista Commercial Construction Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 25 ACSR 285 referred to
Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Dyer (1997) 15 ACLC 302 referred to
Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159 referred to
Cottrell v Wilcox [2001] FCA 866 referred to
Energy Equity Corporation Ltd v Sinedie Pty Ltd [2001] WASCA 419 referred to
David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 referred to
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 distinguished
Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund (1996) 14 ACLC 1703 referred to
Meadowfield Pty Ltd v Gold Coast Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2001] WASCA 360 referred to
Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 542 referred to
Chase Manhattan Ltd v OsctyPty Ltd (1995) 17 ACSR 128 referred to
Intag Microelectronics Pty Ltd v AWA Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 284 referred to
Deangrove Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2001) 37 ACSR 465 referred to
Perpetual Plantations of Australia Ltd v United Tree Farmers Ltd (1993) 10 ACSR 82 referred to
Shanefield Pty Ltd v McLaren [1999] QSC 366 referred to
Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275 referred to
Hunter v Leahy (1999) 91 FCR 214 referred to
Burton v President, &c., of the Shire of…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 330
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the court had jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief sought by G & J Gears and whether leave should be granted to amend the notice of motion to include this relief. The court also needed to determine whether the statutory demand against G & J Gears could be set aside.
The court held that there was no utility in reviewing the registrar’s decision to deny the setting aside of the statutory demand as the time for compliance had expired, rendering the review nugatory. The court noted that once the time for compliance with the statutory demand had passed, it had no power to extend the time further. The court further held that the application for interlocutory injunctive relief was dismissed, and the application for leave to amend the notice of motion was refused. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to both the interlocutory relief application and the leave application.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the applications made by G & J Gears, finding that the relief sought could not be granted due to the expiration of the time for compliance with the statutory demand. The court also refused leave to amend the notice of motion and ordered G & J Gears to pay the respondents’ costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for interlocutory injunctive relief made by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the notice of motion dated 7 March 2006 be dismissed.
2. The application for leave to amend the notice of motion dated 7 March 2006 in order to include a further application for injunctive relief to restrain the respondents from proceeding with a winding up application be refused.
3. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to both the aforementioned application for interlocutory relief and the leave application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
Brobo also contended, for the reasons referred to below, that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief that G & J Gears desired to seek by way of amendment to its notice of motion in proceeding 1033 and that the court should not grant leave to amend. Again for the reasons set out below, it further argued that, if leave were granted, the application would nonetheless fail. CONSIDERATION For the reasons stated below, I would dismiss the motion to review the registrar’s decision and to set aside the statutory demand primarily on the basis that there is no utility in such review. The Court has no power to extend the time for compliance with the statutory demand because the time for compliance has expired. G & J Gears is deemed to be insolvent because it has failed to comply with the demand within the time required, as extended by the registrar. A review of the registrar’s decision is therefore nugatory. Section 459F(2) provides that, where application is made under s 459G to set aside a statutory demand, the “period for compliance with [the] statutory demand” is, if the Court “makes an order that extends the period for compliance with the demand”, the period specified in the order of the Court (s 459F(2)(a)(i)); or “otherwise … the period beginning on the day when the demand is served and ending 7 days after the application under s 459G is finally determined or otherwise disposed of [(s 459F(2)(a)(ii))]”. The word “otherwise” in s 459F(2)(a)(ii) is a “laconic” expression of the condition that none of the conditions in s 459F(2)(a)(i) has been fulfilled: see Livestock Traders International Pty Ltd v Bui (1996) 22 ACSR 51 (“Livestock Traders”) at 53. Once one of these conditions in s 459F(2)(a) is fulfilled – here, by the registrar’s making of the order extending the time for compliance – then s 459F(2)(a)(ii) can have no operation. Jenkinson J reached the same conclusion in Livestock Traders where, as in this case, a registrar of the Court dismissed an application to set aside a statutory demand and extended the time for compliance with the demand. There was no compliance with the demand within the extended time, although there was an application on foot to review the registrar’s decision. His Honour held at 53, that “once an exercise of the power to extend the period for compliance has occurred no operation is left to subpara 459F(2)(a)(ii)” of the Corporations Law as it then was. This provision is identical to s 459F of the Corporations Act. His Honour said, also at 53, that “[t]he use of the word ‘otherwise’ in that subparagraph … compels that conclusion”. I agree. Upon G & J Gears’ application, the Court would have had power to extend time further at any time after the registrar made the order extending time until the expiry of that time. It would have been open to the company to have made such an application before the end of this period had there been grounds, but it did not do so: see Equuscorp at 701 per French, Kiefel and Sundberg JJ; Graywinter Management Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 22 ACSR 636 at 638 per Finn J; Shakespeares Pie Co Australia Pty Ltd v Multipye Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1201 (“Shakespeare Pie”) at [7] per Barrett J; Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v CranswickPremium Wines Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 877 (“Australian Beverage Distributors”) at [12] per Barrett J; and Livestock Traders at 54. Once the time for compliance has passed, however, the Court has no such power.