Chase Manhattan Bank Australia Ltd v Oscty Pty Ltd
[1995] FCA 255
•19 APRIL 1995
CATCHWORDS
CORPORATIONS - winding up - application to set aside statutory demand - whether offsetting claim - requirement that Court be "satisfied" of existence of a "genuine" claim by way of counter claim, set-off or cross-demand - creditor serving demand, as mortgagee entering into put-and-call option in respect of mortgaged properties - whether company has a claim before put option or call option is exercised - necessity for offsetting claim to be quantifiable in money terms - whether Court has power to extend time allowed for making of application to set aside - whether "defect" in statutory demand - statutory demand relating to two or more debts - whether statutory demand must specify the separate debts and the amounts of them - whether "substantial injustice" caused if statutory demand not set aside.
Corporations Law ss 459E, 459H and 459J.
Johnson v AGC (Advances) Limited (unreported, Lockhart J, 21 May 1992).
Scanhill Pty Ltd v Century 21 Australasia Pty Ltd (1993) 12 ACSR 341.
Rohalo Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v R P Scherer SpA (1994) 15 ACSR 347.
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK AUSTRALIA LIMITED v OSCTY PTY LIMITED
No NG 3582 of 1994
Lindgren J
Sydney
19 April 1995
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No NG 3582 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION )
IN THE MATTER OF: OSCTY PTY LIMITED
AUSTRALIAN COMPANY NUMBER: 008 574 838
BETWEEN:
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ACN 001 531 586)
Applicant
AND:
OSCTY PTY LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM:Lindgren J
PLACE:Sydney
DATE:19 April 1995
MINUTE OF ORDERS
THE COURT:
Orders that the respondent's motion brought by notice of motion filed on 24 March 1995 be dismissed.
Orders that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the motion.
Directs that the proceedings be listed at 2.00 pm on Thursday 20 April 1995 for the making of consequential orders.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No NG 3582 of 1994
GENERAL DIVISION )
IN THE MATTER OF: OSCTY PTY LIMITED
AUSTRALIAN COMPANY NUMBER: 008 574 838
BETWEEN:
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ACN 001 531 586)
Applicant
AND:
OSCTY PTY LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM:Lindgren J
PLACE:Sydney
DATE:19 April 1995
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
By its further amended application filed on 22 February 1995, the applicant ("Chase") applies for orders that the respondent ("Oscty") be wound up and that John P Smith of Messrs Horwath & Horwath be appointed as liquidator of Oscty. Chase applies in its capacity as a creditor of Oscty under s 459P of the Corporations Law ("the Law") and asks the Court to exercise the power given to it by s 459A to order Oscty as an insolvent company to be wound up in insolvency.
Chase seeks to invoke the statutory presumption of insolvency provided for in sub-s 459C (2) of the Law by reason of Oscty's failure to comply with a statutory demand which was served on it on 12 September 1994 on behalf of Chase. The statutory demand bore date 9 September 1994 and asserted that Oscty owed Chase $8,340,888.73. The 21 day period allowed for compliance with the statutory demand expired on 3 October 1994. At that time the demand was still in effect and Oscty had not complied with it. Accordingly, subject to the possibility referred to below as to an extension of the time for Oscty's applying for an order setting aside the demand, Oscty is, by the operation of sub-s 459F (1) of the Law, taken to have failed to comply with the demand on 3 October 1994, and since this was during the period of three months ending on the day on which Chase's application was filed (the application was filed on 10 November 1994), the statutory presumption of insolvency provided for in sub-s 459C (2) of the Law has been activated.
On 22 March 1995, Oscty filed a "Notice of Intention to Appear at Hearing and of Grounds of Opposition to a Winding Up Application" and an affidavit verifying that notice. The only ground of opposition stated in the notice was that the statutory demand was "not a valid statutory demand within the meaning of the Corporations Law".
By a notice of motion filed on 24 March 1995, Oscty has sought the following substantive relief:
"2.An order pursuant to Section 1322 (4) (d) of the Corporations Law extending the period for instituting a procedure [sic] under Section
459G of the Corporations Law.
3.An order pursuant to Section 459G setting aside the Section 459E demand dated 9 September, 1994."
It is this motion which is currently before the Court and to which these reasons relate. Although it was not appropriate that Oscty's application be made by motion in the winding up proceedings (see Order 71 r 36B of the Federal Court Rules), Chase took no point as to this.
FACTS
It is convenient to set out the facts in the form of a chronology.
10 May 1990
By an agreement in writing of this date Chase agreed to provide to Oscty financial accommodation up to an amount of $7,250,000.00. The financial accommodation was in fact provided. Chase took as security the following:
(a)A mortgage dated 25 May 1990 registered number Z62149 over "The Exchange Hotel" at 34-36 Oxford Street Sydney being the land the subject of folio identifier 15/6064;
(b)a mortgage dated 25 May 1990 registered number Z62150 over an adjoining commercial property at 38-46 Oxford
Street Sydney being the land the subject of certificate of title vol 13897 folio 203;
(c)a personal guarantee dated 23 May 1990 by Barrington Thomas Tilley ("Tilley");
(d)a "charge" dated 23 May 1990 from Elizabeth Carolyn Court over liquor licence number 102224 in respect of The Exchange Hotel.
The term of the facility was 36 months from the date of draw-down. The loan was to be fully drawn within 60 days from 10 May 1990. The evidence does not show when the loan was drawn down. Oscty undertook to pay $97,258.30 each month as interest followed by a thirty sixth "balloon" payment of $7,347,829.19.
15 April 1992
By a deed of variation of this date, the amount of the facility was increased to $7,882,213.53.
17 June 1992
The South Sydney City Council ("the Council") issued what has been referred to in the case as a "fire safety order" in respect of the mortgaged properties. It was not in dispute that the notice required performance of work on the mortgaged properties and that compliance with the notice would necessitate substantial expenditure.
16 February 1993
Tilley became bankrupt.
13 October 1993
As at this date Oscty had defaulted in repaying principal and was also in arrears in payment of interest to the extent of $142,266.21. Oscty has not made payments to Chase since this time, although Chase has received rents from the mortgaged properties (see below).
18 October 1993
Chase appointed a receiver in respect of the mortgaged properties.
19 October 1993
The receiver gave notice to the tenants of the mortgaged properties to pay rent to him.
December 1993
Chase took possession of the mortgaged properties.
20 December 1993
The solicitors for the Council wrote to Oscty referring to the fire safety order and to the fact that some of the work which it required remained outstanding. The letter called for provision of a written undertaking by 10 January 1994 that the outstanding work would be completed on or before 10 February 1994, in default of which, according to the letter, injunction
proceedings would be commenced in the Land and Environment Court seeking orders that Oscty comply with the outstanding aspects of the fire safety order.
April 1994
Chase set about selling the mortgaged properties. Chase expended $28,136.40 in advertising and otherwise promoting a sale of them. It obtained a valuation report of "Valuation Services" of the property at 38-46 Oxford Street as at 29 April 1994 in a sum of $3,600,000.00. It had previously (as at 22 December 1992) obtained a valuation of Manenti, Quinlan & Associates Pty Ltd of the freehold of The Exchange Hotel in a sum of $1,800,000.00. Those amounts totalled $5,400,000.00.
Chase engaged Metro Commercial Property Services (Mr Kurt Braune) to call for and receive tenders for the properties. That firm received four "tenders" in April 1994. Because they assumed some importance in the case, I set them out as follows:
A tender from Western Districts Loan and Finance Co Pty Ltd ("Western Districts") of $7,125,000.00 subject to:
"A.There being no outstanding notices affecting the premises as at settlement.
B.Satisfactory solution to roof overflow problem which tenants state exist.
C.Satisfactory Structural Engineer's Report.
D.Termite, Borer, White Ant Report.
E.Inspection and approval of all leases.
F.Settlement 4 months."
That tender was made on the letterhead of Messrs H M Symonds & Britten, the solicitors for Western Districts.
A tender from Fobeca Pty Limited which merely said:
"Fobeca would like to express interest in a acquiring the above property on Oxford Street for the sum of $6 million."
(iii)A handwritten letter from Heston Pty Ltd indicating that the writer would be pleased:
"to sit down and negotiate a contract ... based on the following criteria;
1/Purchase Price $7,000,000.00
2/Deposit $100,000.00
c/Settlement minimum six months, subject to satisfactory strata approval and partial release/discharge,
d/All Audinance [sic] 70 items being completed and approved by vendor prior to settlement."
A tender dated 22 April 1994 from Newstead Finance Pty Limited, signed by Paul Veron ("Veron"), on the following terms:
"(1)Purchase price $7 million.
(2)Deposit 10% of purchase price, payable as follows:-
(a)$350,000 on exchange of contracts;
(b)a further $350,000 paid on the vendor attending to work required by any Fire Notices.
(3)The purchaser is to have the right to apply for a Strata Plan of Subdivision of the property 38-46 Oxford St and the vendor will give all consents and do all things reasonably required by the purchaser to effect strata approval.
(4)The vendor not to require the purchaser to settle for 180 days from exchange of contracts.
(5)The vendor will consent to the registration of the strata plan and shall if required grant partial discharges to the purchaser of any lot or the hotel as requested by the purchaser."
Chase discovered by search, that Thomas Geoffrey Cahill ("Cahill") who was a director of Oscty was a director of Western Districts, and that 1616 of the 1617 issued shares in the capital of Western Districts were held by Jamtac Pty Ltd, a company which had been dissolved on 22 May 1984. Peter John Carden ("Carden"), a second vice president of Chase, gave evidence that he distrusted Cahill and because of this and the other matters to which I have just referred, issued instructions that Chase would not deal with Western Districts.
18 April 1994
The bankrupt Tilley told Carden that he represented a potential purchaser. Carden told him that tenders had not yet closed, that Chase had rejected an offer of $7.5 million, that indications pointed to a sale price in excess of $8 million, that Chase was hoping for in excess of $8.5 million, and that gross rentals exceeded $1 million per year. Carden gave evidence that in fact individuals at Metro Property Services had told him several times prior to his discussion with Tilley that they expected that the sale price would exceed $8 million but had not told him that Chase might get a price in excess of $8.5 million, although he (Carden) was hoping for such a figure in order that the debt might be paid out in full.
29 April 1994
In the event, negotiations took place between Chase and Veron and individuals associated with him. As a result, a "Put & Call Option Agreement" of this date was entered into, under which two companies associated with Veron and others were given, in consideration of payment of a premium of $362,500.00 to Chase, an option to purchase the properties for $7,250,000.00. The call option was exercisable by 29 April 1995 (but not before 29 October 1994), in default of which exercise Chase had an option exercisable by 29 May 1995 to compel the companies to purchase the properties at that price. The Put & Call Option Agreement included an undertaking by Chase to carry out the outstanding work under the fire safety order to the satisfaction of the Council. As well, Chase acknowledged that the companies would be entitled to apply to the Council for approval of a strata subdivision of the properties and undertook to execute instruments and documents required to assist for that purpose.
12 September 1994
The statutory demand was served.
28 September 1994
Oscty's solicitors, Caruana Kay & Barry ("CK&B") wrote to Chase's solicitors, Heidtman & Co ("Heidtman") in relation to the statutory demand, asking whether the properties had been sold and if so, the sale price, and when settlement was due to take place. As well, the letter requested copies of statements relating to Oscty's loan accounts for the preceding 14 months.
29 September 1994
CK&B wrote a letter to Mr Cahill a copy of which is, for convenience, annexed to these reasons and Marked "A".
29 September 1994
Heidtman replied advising that the properties were "under contract by virtue of a Put & Call Option Agreement dated 29 April, 1994". The letter advised that "the sale price" was $7,250,000.00 and that settlement was due to take place within six weeks of either the purchaser's or Chase's exercising the call option or put option as the case might be. The letter advised that the call option was exercisable up to 29 April 1995 and the put option "after 30 April 1994, up to 30 May 1995" (this was an error - the dates mentioned in the Put & Call Option Agreement were 29 April 1995 and 29 May 1995).
The letter pointed out that since $8,340,888.73 was outstanding as at 30 August 1994 (the amount mentioned in the statutory demand) there would clearly be a shortfall. The letter also enclosed copies of "the relevant statements for the loan account" covering the period from 1 July 1993 to 30 June 1994.
8 November 1994
CK&B again wrote to Heidtman, a letter, a copy which is, for convenience, annexed to these reasons and marked "B". This letter was never formally answered although the information sought in it has been provided to Oscty in the course of these proceedings.
10 November 1994
Chase's application commencing these proceedings was filed.
24 November 1994
Chase's application was served on Oscty.
10 February 1995
On the return of the application on this date before Registrar Sexton, Cahill purported to appear for Oscty and said that Oscty did not oppose the application to wind up but merely objected to the appointment of the liquidator nominated in Chase's application.
February 1995
By this time, the work necessary to cause the properties to comply with the notice issued by the council was completed at a cost to Chase of some $300,000.00.
22 March 1995
Oscty filed and served the "Notice of Intention to Appear at Hearing and of Grounds of Opposition to a Winding Up Application" and affidavit verifying referred to earlier. Mr Newton, solicitor of Heidtman, telephoned Mr Barry, solicitor of CK&B, inquiring as to the nature of the dispute raised by Oscty, and Mr Barry told him that Oscty disputed the validity of the statutory demand on the ground that it did not specify each debt claimed. As well, Mr Barry said that it was not disputed that Oscty was indebted to Chase in an amount of the order of $8 million.
24 March 1995
Chase's application was before the Court for the second time. Oscty's notice of motion was filed in court. On this date, for the first time, Oscty made complaint in relation to the Put & Call Option entered into by Chase. Oscty had seen the Put & Call Option Agreement for the first time only on 24 March 1995.
29 April 1995
The call option will expire on this date.
29 May 1995
The put option will expire on this date.
ISSUES
The issues raised by Oscty's notice of motion are as follows:
Does the Court have power to extend the period of 21 days after service of the statutory demand in which a company may apply to the Court under s 459G of the Law for an order setting aside the statutory demand?
If so, should the time be extended in the present case from 3 October 1994 to the date on which Oscty's notice of motion was filed, namely 24 March 1995.
If so, should an order be made setting aside the statutory demand.
Towards the end of the hearing before me, counsel for Chase said that his instructions were not to contest that the Court had the power referred to in (1) above. Whether the Court does have that power has been the subject of conflicting decisions. In particular, there is a conflict between decisions of two intermediate appellate courts, namely the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Cavetina Pty Ltd v Synthetic Dyeworks Industries Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 274 and that of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 15 ACSR 771. On 30 March 1995, the day prior to the hearing before me, the issue was considered afresh by Santow J in Sydar Pty Ltd v K Simmonds Finance Pty Ltd, unreported, NSW/Santow J (Eq Div 1320/95).
I find it convenient to deal first with the third issue raised above.
Should the statutory demand be set aside?
Sections 459H and 459J of the Law set out the grounds on which the order sought by Oscty setting aside the statutory demand may be made. Oscty relies on both of these sections. For the purposes of s 459H, Oscty says that it has an offsetting claim against Chase arising out of a breach of duty by Chase in connection with its entering into the Put & Call Option Agreement. For the purposes of s 459J, it says that there is a defect in the statutory demand in that the statutory demand relates to two or more debts owed by Oscty to Chase, but fails, as required by sub-s 459E (2) (according to the submission), to specify the individual debts. I will deal with these grounds raised by Oscty separately and in turn.
Section 459H - counter claim, set-off or cross-demand
The statutory demand described the indebtedness of Oscty to Chase as follows:
"Description of the debt Amount of the debt
The balance of account pursuant
to a loan by Chase AMP Bank
Limited (now the Chase Manhattan
Bank Australia Limited) to Oscty
Pty Limited by Agreement contained
in Letter of Offer dated 10th day
of May, 1990 and accepted by the
company in 22 May, 1990 the amount
of the debt calculated to 30
August, 1994. $8,340,888.73"
Oscty does not dispute the existence or amount of this indebtedness to Chase. Sub-s 459H (2) requires that I calculate "the substantiated amount" of the demand in accordance with the formula, "Admitted total - Offsetting total". Here, the "Admitted total" is $8,340,888.73. For the purpose of the formula, in the present case the "Offsetting total" means the amount of the offsetting claim propounded by Oscty if I am satisfied that it has such offsetting claim, and if I am not so satisfied, a nil amount.
Sub-sections 459H (3) and (4) provide for what is to happen if the substantiated amount is less than the statutory minimum ($2,000.00), and if it is at least as great as the statutory minimum, respectively. If the substantiated amount is less than the statutory minimum, the Court is required to set aside the demand. If it is at least as great as the statutory minimum, the Court may make an order varying the demand as specified in the order and declaring the demand to have had
effect as so varied, as from the date when the demand was served on the company. These various provisions emphasise that only a claim which is capable of being quantified as an amount of money can qualify as an "offsetting claim". The language counter claim, set-off or cross-demand (even if it does not arise out of the same transaction or circumstances as a debt to which the demand relates) are of the widest import and are not limited to a claim of a kind which would have afforded a defence to an action by the person who served the statutory demand to recover the amount referred to in it.
The definition of the expression "offsetting claim" is found in sub-s 459H (5) as follows:
"'Offsetting claim' means a genuine claim that the company has against the respondent by way of counter claim, set-off or cross-demand (even if it does not arise out of the same transaction or circumstances as a debt to which the demand relates); ..."
The references in s 459H to the Court's being "satisfied" that there is a "genuine" dispute, and "satisfied" that the company has a "genuine" claim against the person who served the demand on it, have been the subject of judicial consideration: see, for example, Mibor Investments Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1993) 11 ACSR 362 (Vic/Hayne J) at 366-367; Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601 (Qld/Thomas J) at 605-606; Scanhill Pty Ltd v Century 21 Australasia Pty Ltd (1993) 12 ACSR 341 (FCA/Beazley J)
("Scanhill") at 356-357; Kalamunda Meat Wholesalers Pty Ltd v Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 525 (FCA/Hill J) at 526-527; Chadwick Industries (South Coast) Pty Ltd v Condensing Vaporisers Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 37 (FCA/Lockhart J); Hamilhall Pty Ltd (in liq) v A T Phillips Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 247 (FCA/Branson J); Rohalo Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd v R P Scherer SpA (1994) 15 ACSR 347 (FCA/Lindgren J) ("Rohalo"). Their meanings have been illuminated by analogies found in applications for injunctions to restrain the commencement, advertisement or prosecution winding up of proceedings pre-dating the enactment of s 459G (Scanhill), and in the opposing of a notional application by the person who served the statutory demand for summary judgment against the company for the debt the subject of the demand (Rohalo). Consistently with these cases, I ask whether Oscty has satisfied me that there is a "serious question to be tried" or an "issue deserving of a hearing" as to whether it has a claim against Chase.
The only basis propounded for an offsetting claim was Chase's having entered into the particular Put & Call Option Agreement. It was not submitted that it lay outside chase's power as mortgagee to enter into that agreement, but that it had breached a general law duty owed by it to Oscty in entering into the particular Put & Call Option Agreement. But the options may never be exercised. I raised this matter with counsel for Oscty and it was put that:
" ... the damages are certainly not clear at this time. The damage will crystallise on or after 29 April. But ... there has been a breach of fiduciary duty in which damages are still to crystallise." (transcript 98)
I suggested to counsel that s 459H was concerned with offsetting claims in amounts of money (which he appeared to accept) and that in order to have the statutory demand set aside in toto, as sought, Oscty would have to propound a counter claim, set-off, or cross-demand for an amount exceeding $8,340,888.73.
In the way in which the case was conducted, there was no evidence before me of the market value of the properties, although there was evidence that both parties had obtained "valuations" as at various dates and had had states of belief as to the value of the properties.
I am not satisfied on the existing evidence that Oscty has a genuine claim against Chase in an amount exceeding $8,340,888.73 or any amount. The position is akin to that dealt with by Lockhart J in Johnson v AGC (Advances) Limited, unreported 21 May 1992 in which his Honour had to deal with a claim against a mortgagee of a property which it was alleged had been sold by the mortgagee in breach of a duty of care to obtain the best possible price. His Honour said this:
"Even if the respondent owed the duties asserted by the applicant and breached them, it is impossible to say on the evidence before me that
they are quantifiable to any figure, even a broad and inexact one. It is also impossible to say that any counter-claim or cross demand he may have equals or exceeds the sum of $13,262,658.36. If there was a fair case adduced by the applicant in this proceeding that could enable a finding to be made of a quantified loss of the kind which he must establish, I would so hold ... But I cannot make this finding. There are so many variables that may come in to the question of quantification of loss once liquidators and receivers are appointed to a company, no permissible finding of the kind contended for by the applicant could be made by the Court." (at 16-17)
I do not find it necessary to embark upon a discussion of the question of the correct formulation in Australia of the nature of the duty owed by a mortgagee in exercising its power in relation to the mortgaged properties. On the basis of the evidence before me I am not satisfied even on a prima facie basis and even on an assumption in favour of Oscty that Chase owed it a duty to obtain the highest price available in the market, that Chase breached that duty by entering into the Put & Call Option Agreement.
Section 459J - defect in the statutory demand
This brings me to Oscty's contention that the statutory demand should be set aside under s 459J of the Law because I should be satisfied that there is a defect in the demand. Oscty refers to sub-s 459E (2) of the Law which provides relevantly as follows:
"459E (2)The demand:
(a)........ ........ ........ .....;
(b)if it relates to 2 or more debts - must specify the total of the amounts of the debts; and
(c)........ ........ ........ ......;
(d)........ ........ ........ ......;
(e)must be in the prescribed form (if any); and
(f)........ ........ ........ ......."
The prescribed form is Form 509H which contains a schedule and footnote as follows:
"SCHEDULE
Description of the debt Amount of the debt
(indicate if it is a
judgment debt, giving
the name of the court and
the date of the order).
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
*Total Amount
........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .....*Delete if not applicable"
I referred to the question of the proper construction of paras 459E (2) (a) and (b) of the Law in Chippendale Printing Co Pty Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 13 ACLC 229 at 243-244. As in that case, I do not find it necessary to choose between the two possible constructions of those paragraphs which I there discussed. There are two reasons why I do not find it necessary to do so. First, in my opinion on the evidence there is only one debt to which the statutory demand in this case relates, and that is the debt arising under the loan facility agreement as amended. Oscty did not suggest any other source of its obligation to pay the amount of the statutory demand which, as I said earlier, it did not dispute was owing. Oscty's case for saying that the statutory demand related to two debts arises from the fact that Heidtman supplied to CK&B loan statements issued by Chase for the period 1 July 1990 to 26 March 1995 which bore two different account numbers.
There was a business loan account number 50 101-5278 showing a "security address" of "38-46 Oxford Street Darlinghurst NSW 2010" and a separate business loan account number 50 102-7359 showing a "security address" of "34-36 Oxford Street Sydney NSW 2000". Whatever may be the explanation for this, so far as the evidence goes it is no more than an internal housekeeping arrangement within Chase's organisation.
The second reason why the statutory demand should not be set aside under s 459J is that I may order that it be set aside under that section only if I am satisfied that because of a defect in the demand "substantial injustice will be caused unless the demand is set aside". Oscty did not point to any such substantial injustice. It is difficult to understand how there could be any: Oscty does not dispute its indebtedness to Chase in the amount the subject of the statutory demand under the loan facility agreement referred to in the statutory demand.
CONCLUSION
In the result, because of my conclusion on the third issue raised by the case, it is not necessary for me to consider the first and second issues raised.
There will be an order that Oscty's motion brought by its notice of motion filed on 24 March 1995 be dismissed with costs. The parties are not agreed as to the consequences of that result, and the proceedings will be listed within a day or two for submissions to be made in that respect.
I certify that this and the preceding 21 pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Lindgren.
Associate:
Dated:27 April 1995
Heard: 31 March 1995
Date of
receipt of
last submission: 5 April 1995
Place: Sydney
Decision: 19 April 1995
Appearances: Mr C R Newlinds of counsel instructed by Heidtman & Co solicitors, appeared for the applicant.
Mr G Moore of counsel instructed by Messrs Caruana Kay & Barry solicitors, appeared for the respondent.
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