Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal [2025] FCA 558  

File number(s): VID 642 of 2025
Judgment of: MEAGHER J
Date of judgment: 21 May 2025
Date of publication of reasons: 28 May 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interlocutory applications – Injunctions – Abuse of process
CONTEMPT OF COURT – Whether past or apprehended future conduct of respondents could constitute contempt of Court – Whether injunctions should be granted restraining forms of communication by respondents
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgement and orders – Variation of orders – Correction of orders – Slip rule
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s75

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31, 37AF(1)(b), 37AG(1)(a)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 24, 39B, 55A, 55B, 55D, 64, 78

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 2.28, 2.29, 2.32(3), 6.01, 29.03, 39.05, 39.05(h)

Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic)

Legal Profession Uniform Law (Vic)

Cases cited:

APLA Ltd  & Ors v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales & Anor (2005) 224 CLR 322

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia S.R.L. (No 4) (2012) 298 ALR 251

Basetec Services Pty Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2015) 236 FCR 432

Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618

Colman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1

Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 123

G & J Gears Australia Pty Ltd v Brobo Group Pty Ltd (2006) 229 ALR 638

Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520

Registered Clubs Association of New South Wales v Stolz (No 2) (2021) 157 ACSR 465

Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc & Anor (2011) 217 FCR 238

Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150

Unions NSW& Ors v State of New South Wales (2019) 264 CLR 595

Y and Z v W (2007) 70 NSWLR 377

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 61
Date of hearing: 21 May 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: MS K Foley SC appeared with Mr Mukerjea
Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for the Respondents: The Respondents appeared in-person

ORDERS

VID 642 of 2025
BETWEEN:

VICTORIAN LEGAL SERVICES BOARD

Applicant

AND:

MR SHIVESH KUKSAL

First Respondent

MS LULU XU

Second Respondent

MR PETER ANSELL

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MEAGHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2025

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

Orders 1 and 2 below are made upon the applicant’s undertaking to:

(a)submit to such order (if any) as the Court may consider to be just for the payment of compensation (to be assessed by the Court or as it may direct) to any person (whether or not that person is a party) affected by the operation of Orders 1 and 2 or any continuation (with or without variation) of those orders;…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the Victorian Legal Services Board v Kuksal, the Federal Court of Australia addressed two interlocutory applications filed by the Victorian Legal Services Board against the respondents, Mr Kuksal, Mr Ansell and Ms Xu. The applications sought various forms of injunctive relief, including to restrain the respondents from engaging in conduct that would intimidate or harass the Board in relation to legal proceedings, as well as orders to remove certain information from public availability. The Court was required to determine whether the applicants had established a prima facie case or a serious question to be tried and whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunctions sought.

The Court found that the applicants had demonstrated a prima facie case for the relief sought, as the evidence indicated a real risk that the respondents would engage in conduct that could obstruct the due administration of justice. The Court also concluded that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunctions, as the potential harm to the applicants if the injunctions were not granted significantly outweighed any harm to the respondents. Consequently, the Court made interim orders restraining the respondents from publishing certain allegations and from communicating threats to engage in such conduct, as well as orders to remove and prevent the re-publication of certain material. Additionally, the Court made orders to treat certain documents as confidential and prohibited their publication, and also prohibited the publication of information that could reveal the identities of certain individuals.

The Court's decision was based on well-established principles concerning interlocutory injunctions, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to correct errors, and the need to prevent potential contempt of court and obstruction of justice. The orders made were intended to preserve the status quo until the substantive proceedings could be determined, thereby avoiding potential injustice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act) and r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), until the hearing and determination of the applicant’s interlocutory application filed in this proceeding on 21 May 2025 (Interlocutory Application) or further order, the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents are restrained from:

(a) uploading, disclosing, disseminating or otherwise publishing or causing to be published, the ‘Flitner Allegations’ (as defined in the applicant’s concise statement filed in this proceeding) or any part of them; and

(b) communicating to the applicant, its officers, employees or agents (including its legal representatives), whether directly or indirectly, any threat to engage in conduct the subject of Order 1(a) above.

2. Pursuant to s 23 of the Act and r 1.32 of the Rules, until the hearing and determination of the Interlocutory Application or further order, the respondents (or any of them), their officers, servants, employees and agents shall remove any matter or material uploaded, disclosed, disseminated or otherwise published or made available for publication by the respondents, their officers, servants, employees or agents, which contains, records or refers to the Flitner Allegations (or any part of them) or their substance and, refrain from re-uploading, re-disclosing, re-disseminating or re-publishing such matter or material.

3. Pursuant to r 2.32(3) of the Rules, the following documents in the proceeding are to be treated and marked confidential and shall not be available for inspection by any person not a party to this proceeding:

(a) the Confidential Annexure to the applicant’s concise statement filed in this proceeding;

(b) the Confidential Annexure JRH-2 to the affidavit of Jared Robert Heath affirmed 21 May 2025 and filed in this proceeding;

(c) the Confidential Annexure JRH-3 to the affidavit of Jared Robert Heath affirmed 21 May 2025 and filed in this proceeding;

(d) any document filed with the Court that exhibits, attaches or contains the documents referred to in Orders 3(a) and 3(b) above or refers to or records the substance of those documents; and

(e) any document filed with the Court that contains, records or refers to the substance of the Flitner Allegations.

4. Pursuant to ss 37AF(1)(b) and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, until the hearing and determination of the Interlocutory Application or further order, publication of the Flitner Allegations (or any part of them) and of any document referred to in Order 3 above is prohibited.

5. Pursuant to ss 37AF(1)(a) and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, until the hearing and determination of the Interlocutory Application or further order:

(a) the person referred to in paragraph [1] of the Confidential Annexure to the applicant’s concise statement filed in this proceeding shall be referred to in connection with this proceeding and in any documents filed in this proceeding only by the pseudonym ‘Person 1’;

(b) the person referred to in paragraph [6] of the Confidential Annexure to the applicant’s concise statement filed in this proceeding shall be referred to in connection with this proceeding and in any documents filed in this proceeding only by the pseudonym ‘Person 2’; and

(c) publication of any information tending to reveal the identities of Person 1 or Person 2 is prohibited.

6. Pursuant to r 10.24 of the Rules, the applicant is permitted to effect service on the respondents of the following documents in this proceeding by email at the respondents’ last known email addresses (being: shivesh@wizdomjournal.com; peter@wizdomjournal.com; and lulu@wizdomjournal.com):

(a) the originating application;

(b) the concise statement;

(c) this interlocutory application; and

(d) the affidavit of Jared Heath affirmed 21 May 2025 and its exhibits.

7. Service pursuant to Order 6 above is taken to have been effected by the emails from Jared Robert Heath of Corrs Chambers Westgarth sent to each of the respondents at 11:23am AEST and 12:18pm AEST and 12:19pm AEST on 21 May 2025.

8. Pursuant to r 2.32(3) of the Rules, until the hearing and determination of the Interlocutory Application or further order, the affidavit of Lulu Xu affirmed 13 May 2025 and filed in proceeding VID 222/2025 together with its exhibits/annexures (Xu Affidavit) shall be treated and marked confidential and shall not be available for inspection by any person not a party to this proceeding.

9. Pursuant to ss 37AF(1)(b) and 37AG(1)(a) of the Act, until the hearing and determination of the Interlocutory Application or further order, any information contained within or derived from the Xu Affidavit is prohibited.

10. Costs in the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

All parties appeared remotely. The applicant’s counsel and instructing solicitor appeared by audio-visual link. Mr Kuksal and Ms Xu appeared by audio-visual link. Mr Ansell appeared by telephone. From time to time the audio was compromised.BACKGROUND In the first interlocutory application, the applicant is the Victorian Legal Services Board, and in the second interlocutory application, the first applicant is also the Victorian Legal Services Board. The Victorian Legal Services Board regulates the Victorian legal profession and exercises powers and functions under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic) and the Legal Profession Uniform Law(Vic) contained in its Schedule 1. The applicant and respondents are engaged in various litigation arising out of actions taken by the applicants in relation to the respondents with respect to the operation of legal practices. As a result of costs orders made in proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, which were not satisfied, the applicant has sought sequestration orders against the respondents. That matter is VID222/2025 and is hereafter described as the bankruptcy proceedings. The application in that matter came before the Court on 15 May 2025 and on 19 May 2025 Bennett J delivered judgement and made orders as follows: THE COURT ORDERS THAT:1.The proceeding be transferred to the docket of another judge of the Federal Court of Australia as soon as is reasonably practicable. The respondents dispute that the debts are owing on a number of bases which do not need to be traversed in this judgement. In the bankruptcy proceedings, the applicants sought orders pursuant to rr 2.28, 2.29, 2.32(3), 6.01 and 29.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), and ss 37AF(1)(b) and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act) on 21 May 2025. The other matter is that of VID642/2025, to be known, for the purpose of this judgement, as the conduct proceedings. In that matter, the applicant is the Victorian Legal Services Board and the respondents are Mr Kuksal, Mr Ansell and Ms Xu. That matter was commenced by originating application, filed 21 May 2025, seeking the following relief: A.Injunctions (interim, interlocutory and permanent) restraining the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents from:i.engaging in conduct that is calculated or has a tendency to intimidate, harass or otherwise bring improper pressure to bear on the applicant (including its officers, employees or agents including its legal representatives) in respect of the conduct of any legal proceeding, such as to deter them from prosecuting, defending, acting in or giving evidence in any legal proceeding or influencing their evidence in any legal proceeding;ii.alternatively to A(i) above, uploading, disclosing, disseminating or otherwise publishing or causing to be published, any matter, content, statement, threat or allegation that is calculated to intimidate, harass or otherwise bring improper pressure to bear on the applicant (including its officers, employees or agents including its legal representatives) in respect of the conduct of any legal proceeding, such as to deter them from prosecuting, defending, acting in or giving evidence in any legal proceeding or influencing their evidence in any legal proceeding; andiii.without limiting A(i) [alternatively, A(ii)] above, communicating to the applicant, its officers, employees or agents (including its legal representatives), whether directly or indirectly, any threat to engage in conduct the subject of A(i) [alternatively, A(ii)] above.B.Alternatively to A., injunctions (interim, interlocutory and permanent) restraining the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents from:i.uploading, disclosing, disseminating or otherwise publishing or causing to be published, the ‘Flitner Allegations’ (as defined in the Concise Statement) or any part of them; andii.communicating to the applicant, its officers, employees or agents (including its legal representatives), whether directly or indirectly, any threat to engage in conduct the subject of B(i) above.C.A mandatory injunction requiring the respondents, their officers, servants, employees and agents to remove any matter or material uploaded, disclosed, disseminated or otherwise published or made available for publication by the respondents, their officers, servants, employees or agents, which contains, records or refers to the Flitner Allegations (or any part of them) or their substance.D.Orders that:i.the affidavit of Lulu Xu affirmed 13 May 2025 and filed in proceeding VID 222/2025 (Xu Affidavit) be removed from the Court’s file in that proceeding;ii.the Victorian District Registrar place, or cause to the placed, the Xu Affidavit in a sealed envelope marked “VID 222/2025, Victorian Legal Services Board and Commissioner v Kuksal and Ors, Affidavit of Lulu Xu Affirmed 13 May 2025 removed from court file. Not to be opened or made available for inspection by the public other than by leave of the Court”;iii.the envelope referred to in D(ii) above be sealed and stored by the Victorian District Registrar in the Victorian District Registry in a manner and location as decided by the Victorian District Registrar; andiv.the respondents file and serve forthwith in proceeding VID 222/2025 a redacted version of the Xu Affidavit (Redacted Xu Affidavit) with the following pages redacted in their entirety (references are to the red page numbering in the top right-hand corner of each page of the Xu Affidavit): 209 to 221, 243 to 255.E.Costs.F.Such further or other relief as the Court sees fit.(Emphasis in original.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 39.05 of the Rules enables the Court to vary orders once entered, and reads as follows: 39.05 Varying or setting aside judgment or order after it has been enteredThe Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:(a) it was made in the absence of a party; or(b) it was obtained by fraud; or(c) it is interlocutory; or (d) it is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; or(e) it does not reflect the intention of the Court; or(f) the party in whose favour it was made consents; or(g) there is a clerical mistake in a judgment or order; or(h) there is an error arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission. In this context, r 39.05(h) of the Rules is relevant. It reflects the common law “slip rule”, previously dealt with by a predecessor (O 35, r 7) of r 39.05(h) of the Rules: Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 123; [2012] FCA 1404 at [4]. The statements by Gilmour J at [6] – [7] of Mammoet Australia are useful: In Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385 at 389 (Elyard Corporation), Lockhart J stated, citing Milson v Carter [1893] AC 638 at 640, that O 35, r 7 “reflects the inherent or implied jurisdiction of a superior court of record ‘at any time to correct an error in a decree or order arising from an accidental slip or omission’”. Section 5(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act) provides that the Court, being the Federal Court, is a superior court of record.In Elyard Corporation, Lockhart J at 389-392 stated as follows:The rule [O 35, r 7 of the 1979 Rules] is very wide in its scope; but is not available as a matter of course: Shaddock at [597] [sic].Courts have an inherent or implied jurisdiction to amend judgments which do not correctly state what was actually decided and intended. Indeed, after a decree or order has been passed and entered a court will not, unless by consent, permit it to be altered without a rehearing, except in cases of mistakes or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions.. . .The slip rule applies where the proposed amendment is one upon which no real difference of opinion can exist. It does not apply where the amendment is a matter of controversy; nor does it extend to mistakes that are the consequence of a deliberate decision: see Arnett v Holloway [1960] VR 22; Re Army and Navy Hotel (1886) 31 Ch D 644 and Ivanhoe Gold Corporation Ltd v Symonds (1906) 4 CLR 642.The slip rule may be invoked irrespective of whether the order has been drawn up, passed and entered: Milson v Carter at 640; Fritz v Hobson (1880) 14 Ch D 542 at 560; Shaddock at 594-595 per Mason ACJ, Wilson and Deane JJ; Gould v Vaggelas (1985) 157 CLR 215 and Tak Ming Co Ltd v Yee Sang Metal Supplies Co [1973] 1 WLR 300; [1973] 1 All ER 569.It is well settled that the application of the slip rule is not confined to giving effect to the intention of the judge at the time when the court's order was made, or judgment given. It extends to the intention which the Court would have had, but for the failure that caused the accidental slip or omission: Symes v Commonwealth (1987) 89 FLR 356. The rule also extends to permit the correction of an order or decree where the omission results from the inadvertence of a party’s legal representative: Fritz v Hobson at 561-562; Chessum & Sons v Gordon [1901] 1 KB 694; Tak Ming Co Ltd at 304; Shaddock per Mason ACJ, Wilson and Deane JJ; and Gould v Vaggelas at 274-275.. . .An exercise of the power of the court under the slip rule is ultimately to avoid injustice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the circumstances, and for the reasons that follow, I made interim orders. CONSIDERATION The test for the grant of an interlocutory injunction is well-established. It requires that the applicant show that there is a prima facie case or serious question to be tried: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 at [65], quoting Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622 – 623. Whether there is a serious question to be tried involves the Court being satisfied that the applicant has a sufficient case to justify the preservation of the status quo. The Court must also consider the balance of convenience as between the parties, that is, whether the harm suffered if the injunction is not granted outweighs the harm the respondent will suffer if it is: O’Neill at [65], quoting Beecham at 622 – 623. It is also well-established that the two issues are not considered in isolation; they are “related inquiries”: Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc & Anor (2011) 217 FCR 238; [2011] FCAFC 156 at [52] – [74]. At [31] of Basetec, White J helpfully summarised relevant principles which appeared in Y and Z v W, as follows: Leighton put at the forefront of its submissions the prospect that Mr Figallo will commit a contempt of court unless restrained from doing so. It placed considerable reliance upon Y and Z v W [2007] NSWCA 329; (2007) 70 NSWLR 377 and, in particular, the statement by Ipp JA of the following principles:(1)The court has jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining a threatened contempt of court; (2)Misusing the court’s processes, at least when other parties are thereby prejudiced, may amount to a contempt; (3)It is a contempt of court to obstruct the due administration of justice by attempting to induce a settlement of an action by improper threats or intimidation; (4)The bringing of improper pressure on a party to collateral proceedings amounts to a contempt of court (involving the obstruction of the due administration of justice) irrespective of whether or not the pressured party is, in fact, deterred from litigating; (5)In a contempt involving obstruction of the administration of justice, the plaintiff must prove, according to the criminal standard of proof, that the material in question has, as a matter of practical reality, a tendency to interfere with the course of justice in a particular case. While the applicant relied on Basetec as an example of the framing of orders in cases of this kind, that case also refers to a number of principles relevant to these circumstances. Basetec involved litigation between the applicant, Basetec Services Pty Ltd an environmental engineering business and the respondent, Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd: Bastec at [1] – [3]. Basetec’s sole director, secretary and ultimate shareholder was Mr Charles Figallo, who had disclosed information to “numerous persons” which had been shared during a confidential mediation between the “Leighton side”, Mr Figallo, his son Mr Paul Figallo and Basetec’s in-house solicitor in relation to proceedings which had been commenced by Basetec Services against Leighton: Basetec at [3], [5], [8] – [9] and [11]. At [10] of Basetec, White J stated that the respondent sought the injunctions in order to: …restrain Mr Figallo from engaging in two kinds of actions: first, placing improper pressure on it to settle the action, by communicating threats to publish material disparaging the conduct of Leighton and its officers, employees and agents in the proceedings, and by making personal threats to individuals employed by it; and, secondly, from disseminating information communicated in the course of the mediation or on a without prejudice basis or otherwise in connection with attempts to settle the proceedings.