FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tony Innaimo Transport Pty Ltd v Skyroad Logistics Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1134
File number: ACD 15 of 2018 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 3 August 2018 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application by plaintiff to wind up the defendant under ss 459A and 459P of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) in circumstances where the plaintiff served a statutory demand and the defendant did not seek to set it aside within the specified time – where defendant seeks leave under s 459S of the Act to oppose the plaintiff’s winding-up application on the ground that it is solvent and disputes the debt in the statutory demand – whether sufficient evidence for Court to be satisfied of materiality requirement – whether discretionary factors weigh against grant of leave – Held: leave granted Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 459A, 459C, 459G, 459P, 459S
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 2.25(3)
Cases cited: Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 728
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; 247 CLR 345
Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Paliflex Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 15; 149 FLR 179
Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Begonia (1993) 11 ACSR 609
Gillion Pty Limited (Trustee) v Wet Fix Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1424
Grant Thornton Services (NSW) Pty Ltd v St George Wholesale Distributors Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1777
In the matter of Vangory Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 546
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Soundwave Festival Pty Ltd v Altered State (W.A.) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 466
Spencer v Neo Rock Pty Ltd ACN 110 874 283 (In Liquidation) [2009] FCA 845
Date of hearing: 27 July 2018 Registry: Australian Capital Territory Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 55 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr J E Hartley Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Meyer Vandenberg Lawyers Counsel for the Defendant: Mr S W Trewavas Solicitor for the Defendant: FC Lawyers ORDERS
ACD 15 of 2018 BETWEEN: TONY INNAIMO TRANSPORT PTY LTD (ACN 166 497 847)
Plaintiff
AND: SKYROAD LOGISTICS PTY LTD (ACN 606 973 237)
Defendant
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave be granted pursuant to s 459S(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to the defendant to oppose the plaintiff’s winding-up application on the ground that the defendant disputes the debt in the statutory demand attached to the originating process.
2.Costs of the application for leave be costs in the cause.
3.The parties should seek to agree orders for the future conduct of the proceedings. If they are unable to do so they have liberty to apply on the giving of 72 hours’ notice and the Court will schedule a…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1134
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence provided by both parties, focusing on the materiality requirement for leave under section 459S. Skyroad argued that it was solvent and disputed approximately $250,000 of the total debt claimed by TIT. TIT, on the other hand, asserted that Skyroad had not raised any genuine dispute prior to the statutory demand being served. The court considered the evidence of the financial positions of both Skyroad and Skyroad Investments, the parent company, as presented by the respective expert witnesses. The court found that Skyroad had satisfied the materiality requirement based on the evidence presented by Mr Dinoris, despite TIT’s preference for Mr Senatore’s evidence. The court concluded that the conduct of Skyroad or its solicitors did not warrant withholding leave and that no other discretionary factors precluded granting leave.
Consequently, the court granted leave for Skyroad to oppose TIT’s winding-up application on the ground that it disputes the debt claimed in the statutory demand. The court also ordered that the costs of the application for leave be costs in the cause and directed the parties to seek agreement on the future conduct of the proceedings, with the option to apply for a case management hearing if an agreement could not be reached.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted pursuant to s 459S(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to the defendant to oppose the plaintiff’s winding-up application on the ground that the defendant disputes the debt in the statutory demand attached to the originating process.
2. Costs of the application for leave be costs in the cause.
3. The parties should seek to agree orders for the future conduct of the proceedings. If they are unable to do so they have liberty to apply on the giving of 72 hours’ notice and the Court will schedule a case management hearing.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Hogan was not required for cross-examination. Consideration and determination The threshold issue is whether Skyroad Logistics has established materiality. In considering this matter I apply the narrow view as outlined above. If Mr Dinoris’s evidence is accepted, the materiality requirement is satisfied. As noted above, TIT urged the Court to prefer Mr Senatore’s evidence. Mr Senatore’s analysis resulted in him concluding that Skyroad Logistics is insolvent if it were to pay the demanded amount of $448,385.43 and that it was “likely” to be insolvent if it were to pay the alleged amount of $194,296.29 (see page 17 of his Report). Mr Senatore explained that this qualification in respect of payment of the alleged amount depended upon whether or not Skyroad Logistics continued to receive funding from Skyroad Investments and its shareholders, as Mr Senatore makes clear at p 4 of his Report. In re-examination Mr Senatore explained why he considered the financial position of Skyroad Investments to be “pretty fragile”. He said that its net asset position was only $30,000 if Skyroad Logistics was excluded from that calculation. He said that Skyroad Investments had limited cash at bank and that, in these circumstances, if it were to inject money into Skyroad Logistics it itself would need an injection of capital. It should be noted that, under schedule 3, clause 1.10.1 of the Shareholders Deed of Agreement dated 1 November 2016, the capital and loans made to Skyroad Investments are to continue via loans and transfers to Skyroad Logistics and that this provides the funding of cashflows for Skyroad Logistics. Skyroad Logistics has the burden of satisfying the Court that the materiality requirement is satisfied. This issue largely turns on whether or not the Court accepts Mr Dinoris’s evidence in circumstances where he was not required for cross-examination and TIT was content to rely upon Mr Senatore’s criticisms of aspects of Mr Dinoris’s report. Mr Dinoris’s report is based on unaudited financial information. The same may be said, of course, with respect to Mr Senatore’s report. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the Court is dealing with an application for leave under s 459S and not an application under s 459P that Skyroad Logistics be wound up. In the latter case, it is established that, because of the presumption of insolvency (see s 459C(2)(a)), to discharge its onus of proving solvency the Court should ordinarily be presented with the “fullest and best” evidence of the company’s financial position (see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Begonia (1993) 11 ACSR 609 at 617 per Hayne J). Moreover, in that context, it has been said that unaudited accounts and unverified claims of ownership or valuation are not ordinarily probative of solvency, nor are bald assertions of solvency arising from a general review of the accounts, even if made by qualified accountants (see Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 728 at [44] per Weinberg J).