Tony Innaimo Transport Pty Ltd v Skyroad Logistics Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tony Innaimo Transport Pty Ltd v Skyroad Logistics Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1134

File number: ACD 15 of 2018
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 3 August 2018
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application by plaintiff to wind up the defendant under ss 459A and 459P of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) in circumstances where the plaintiff served a statutory demand and the defendant did not seek to set it aside within the specified time – where defendant seeks leave under s 459S of the Act to oppose the plaintiff’s winding-up application on the ground that it is solvent and disputes the debt in the statutory demand – whether sufficient evidence for Court to be satisfied of materiality requirement – whether discretionary factors weigh against grant of leave – Held: leave granted
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 459A, 459C, 459G, 459P, 459S

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 2.25(3)

Cases cited:

Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 728

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; 247 CLR 345

Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Paliflex Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 15; 149 FLR 179

Commercial Union Assurance Company of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 389

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Begonia (1993) 11 ACSR 609

Gillion Pty Limited (Trustee) v Wet Fix Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1424

Grant Thornton Services (NSW) Pty Ltd v St George Wholesale Distributors Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1777

In the matter of Vangory Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 546

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Soundwave Festival Pty Ltd v Altered State (W.A.) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 466

Spencer v Neo Rock Pty Ltd ACN 110 874 283 (In Liquidation) [2009] FCA 845

Switz Pty Ltd v Glowbind Pty Ltd (2000) 155 FLR 282

Date of hearing: 27 July 2018
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr J E Hartley
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Meyer Vandenberg Lawyers
Counsel for the Defendant: Mr S W Trewavas
Solicitor for the Defendant: FC Lawyers

ORDERS

ACD 15 of 2018
BETWEEN:

TONY INNAIMO TRANSPORT PTY LTD (ACN 166 497 847)

Plaintiff

AND:

SKYROAD LOGISTICS PTY LTD (ACN 606 973 237)

Defendant

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave be granted pursuant to s 459S(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to the defendant to oppose the plaintiff’s winding-up application on the ground that the defendant disputes the debt in the statutory demand attached to the originating process.

2.Costs of the application for leave be costs in the cause. 

3.The parties should seek to agree orders for the future conduct of the proceedings.  If they are unable to do so they have liberty to apply on the giving of 72 hours’ notice and the Court will schedule a…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Tony Innaimo Transport Pty Ltd (TIT) sought to wind up Skyroad Logistics Pty Ltd (Skyroad) under sections 459A and 459P of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) after serving a statutory demand for an amount of $448,385.43. Skyroad, however, did not seek to set aside the statutory demand within the stipulated 21-day period. Instead, Skyroad applied for leave under section 459S of the Act to oppose TIT’s winding-up application, claiming that it was solvent and disputed the debt claimed in the statutory demand. The central legal issues before the court were whether Skyroad had established the materiality requirement for leave to be granted and if any discretionary factors weighed against granting such leave.

The court examined the evidence provided by both parties, focusing on the materiality requirement for leave under section 459S. Skyroad argued that it was solvent and disputed approximately $250,000 of the total debt claimed by TIT. TIT, on the other hand, asserted that Skyroad had not raised any genuine dispute prior to the statutory demand being served. The court considered the evidence of the financial positions of both Skyroad and Skyroad Investments, the parent company, as presented by the respective expert witnesses. The court found that Skyroad had satisfied the materiality requirement based on the evidence presented by Mr Dinoris, despite TIT’s preference for Mr Senatore’s evidence. The court concluded that the conduct of Skyroad or its solicitors did not warrant withholding leave and that no other discretionary factors precluded granting leave.

Consequently, the court granted leave for Skyroad to oppose TIT’s winding-up application on the ground that it disputes the debt claimed in the statutory demand. The court also ordered that the costs of the application for leave be costs in the cause and directed the parties to seek agreement on the future conduct of the proceedings, with the option to apply for a case management hearing if an agreement could not be reached.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted pursuant to s 459S(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to the defendant to oppose the plaintiff’s winding-up application on the ground that the defendant disputes the debt in the statutory demand attached to the originating process.

2. Costs of the application for leave be costs in the cause.

3. The parties should seek to agree orders for the future conduct of the proceedings. If they are unable to do so they have liberty to apply on the giving of 72 hours’ notice and the Court will schedule a case management hearing.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

TIT urged the Court to apply the narrow view unless satisfied that Perram J was clearly wrong in Grant Thornton. I propose to adopt that course because I am not satisfied that Perram J was clearly wrong. The evidence Both parties are in the transport industry. They have had a business relationship from around August 2016. On 1 November 2016 they entered into a Shareholders Deed of Agreement. Their business relationship involved TIT being, in effect, a subcontractor to Skyroad Logistics. Skyroad Logistics had contracts with third parties (including DHL and Singapore Airlines) to transport goods. Skyroad Logistics outsourced some of this work to TIT. The DHL goods were moved between Melbourne and Sydney, the Singapore Airlines goods were moved from Coolangatta to Sydney and TIT also did local deliveries for Skyroad Logistics, transporting goods dropped off at TIT’s Sydney depot by Skyroad Logistics. TIT issued invoices to Skyroad Logistics and, between September 2016 and December 2017, many, but not all, those invoices were paid by Skyroad Logistics. The relationship then soured and the parties were negotiating the end of that arrangement in early 2018. On 23 February 2018, TIT served a statutory demand on Skyroad Logistics in the amount of $448,385.43, being the total of outstanding tax invoices which were attached to the statutory demand. Skyroad Logistics had 21 days after the statutory demand was served to seek to have it set aside under s 459G of the Act. There was an exchange of correspondence between the parties concerning some of the tax invoices annexed to the statutory demand. There is some evidence which indicates that from about May 2017 Skyroad Logistics had queried TIT’s methodology and invoice practices. As will shortly emerge, TIT denies that Skyroad Logistics raised any dispute prior to 23 February 2018. As part of the business arrangement, TIT was allowed access to Skyroad Logistics’s accounting system to enter invoices but a dispute arose when Skyroad Logistics learned that TIT was submitting and approving its own invoices. Skyroad Logistics undertook an internal audit of the invoices annexed to the statutory demand. That audit showed that of the total debt:(a)$254,089.24 was disputed by Skyroad Logistics as involving overcharging; and(b)$194,296.19 was agreed. The statutory demand was served when the parties were negotiating the terms of terminating their previous business relationship. A particular feature of this case is that Skyroad Logistics does not dispute the entire amount of the debt which is the subject of the statutory demand. The amount which is disputed is approximately $250,000. It is important to bear this figure in mind in determining whether Skyroad Logistics has established the threshold requirement of materiality for the purposes of its application under s 459S. The circumstances surrounding Skyroad Logistics’s failure to file an application to have the statutory demand set aside may be summarised as follows:·as noted above, the statutory demand was served on Skyroad Logistics on 23 February 2018;·on 1 March 2018, Skyroad Logistics’s solicitors wrote to TIT’s solicitors with a view to trying to resolve the disputed debt and to avoid unnecessary legal proceedings;·on 7 March 2018, Skyroad Logistics’s solicitors sent a letter to TIT’s solicitors in which the dispute was particularised;·on 8 March 2018, Skyroad Logistics’s solicitors wrote to TIT’s solicitor providing further particulars of the disputed debt;·on 13 March 2018, TIT’s solicitors wrote to Skyroad Logistics’s solicitors denying that there was a genuine dispute in relation to the debt and claimed that no dispute had been raised by Skyroad Logistics prior to 23 February 2018;·Skyroad Logistics’s solicitors attempted to email unsealed copies of the application to have the statutory demand set aside and the two supporting affidavits to TIT’s Queensland agents at approximately 5:18 pm on 16 March 2018 but the attempt was unsuccessful because of the bulk of the documents. The agents were advised that copies would be served personally on the morning of Monday, 19 March 2018; ·a solicitor acting for Skyroad Logistics (Ms Natalie Tuson) swore two affidavits in which she outlined the steps surrounding the preparation of the legal documentation to have the statutory demand set aside and her office’s attempts to file that material electronically on 16 March 2018. Her evidence relating to the preparation of the documentation starts at 3:30 pm on that day, when Mr Anthony Clark from Skyroad Logistics came to her office to execute his affidavit (which was 308 pages in length). Ms Tuson deposed that at approximately 3:55 pm, after various amendments had been made to Mr Clark’s affidavit and he was reviewing it for execution, she executed her affidavit dated 16 March 2018, as well as the application itself bearing the same date. She deposed that a paralegal commenced scanning the relevant documents and commenced the online lodgement of the application on the Court’s eLodgment website at approximately 3:55 pm but because of the bulk of the documents the process took longer than expected. It was not until 4:40 pm on 16 March 2018 that all the documents were uploaded to the Court’s website (i.e. ten minutes late). Ms Tuson was not required for cross-examination; ·on 19 March 2018, Skyroad Logistics’s solicitors were told that the Federal Court Registry would not process the application and supporting affidavits because the last date for filing was 16 March 2018 and, pursuant to r 2.25(3)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (2011 FCRs), a document which is electronically filed must be received by 4:30 pm otherwise it is deemed to be filed on the next business day; and·On 23 March 2018, Ms Tuson emailed the Registry and withdrew the application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to all these matters, I do not accept TIT’s submission that the conduct of Skyroad Logistics or its solicitors warrants leave being withheld. Nor do I consider that there is any other discretionary reason why leave should not be granted. Conclusion For these reasons, Skyroad Logistics should have leave pursuant to s 459S of the Act to oppose TIT’s winding up application on the ground that it disputes the debt claimed in the statutory demand. The parties should seek to agree orders for the future conduct of the proceeding. If they are unable to agree such orders, I will schedule a case management hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Hogan was not required for cross-examination. Consideration and determination The threshold issue is whether Skyroad Logistics has established materiality. In considering this matter I apply the narrow view as outlined above. If Mr Dinoris’s evidence is accepted, the materiality requirement is satisfied. As noted above, TIT urged the Court to prefer Mr Senatore’s evidence. Mr Senatore’s analysis resulted in him concluding that Skyroad Logistics is insolvent if it were to pay the demanded amount of $448,385.43 and that it was “likely” to be insolvent if it were to pay the alleged amount of $194,296.29 (see page 17 of his Report). Mr Senatore explained that this qualification in respect of payment of the alleged amount depended upon whether or not Skyroad Logistics continued to receive funding from Skyroad Investments and its shareholders, as Mr Senatore makes clear at p 4 of his Report. In re-examination Mr Senatore explained why he considered the financial position of Skyroad Investments to be “pretty fragile”. He said that its net asset position was only $30,000 if Skyroad Logistics was excluded from that calculation. He said that Skyroad Investments had limited cash at bank and that, in these circumstances, if it were to inject money into Skyroad Logistics it itself would need an injection of capital. It should be noted that, under schedule 3, clause 1.10.1 of the Shareholders Deed of Agreement dated 1 November 2016, the capital and loans made to Skyroad Investments are to continue via loans and transfers to Skyroad Logistics and that this provides the funding of cashflows for Skyroad Logistics. Skyroad Logistics has the burden of satisfying the Court that the materiality requirement is satisfied. This issue largely turns on whether or not the Court accepts Mr Dinoris’s evidence in circumstances where he was not required for cross-examination and TIT was content to rely upon Mr Senatore’s criticisms of aspects of Mr Dinoris’s report. Mr Dinoris’s report is based on unaudited financial information. The same may be said, of course, with respect to Mr Senatore’s report. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the Court is dealing with an application for leave under s 459S and not an application under s 459P that Skyroad Logistics be wound up. In the latter case, it is established that, because of the presumption of insolvency (see s 459C(2)(a)), to discharge its onus of proving solvency the Court should ordinarily be presented with the “fullest and best” evidence of the company’s financial position (see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Begonia (1993) 11 ACSR 609 at 617 per Hayne J). Moreover, in that context, it has been said that unaudited accounts and unverified claims of ownership or valuation are not ordinarily probative of solvency, nor are bald assertions of solvency arising from a general review of the accounts, even if made by qualified accountants (see Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 728 at [44] per Weinberg J).