FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Compton v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 106
Appeal from: Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207 File number: NSD 1578 of 2015 Judges: SIOPIS, KATZMANN AND MOSHINSKY JJ Date of judgment: 17 August 2016 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – creditor’s petition – creditor’s petition based on failure to comply with bankruptcy notice requiring payment of judgment debt – judgment debtor contended that court of bankruptcy should ‘go behind’ judgment – principles applicable to ‘going behind’ a judgment – where petitioning creditor accepted that there was an “open question” whether any debt owing Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), s 56(2)(a)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 43, 52
Cases cited: Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans (2005) 3 ABC(NS) 712; [2005] FCA 978
Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Evans v The Heather Thiedeke Group Pty Ltd (unreported; Full Federal Court; 28 September 1990)
Ex parte Lennox; In re Lennox (1885) 16 QBD 315
In re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83
In re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 663
In re Hawkins; Ex parte Troup [1895] 1 QB 404
Joossé v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 137 FCR 576
Katter v Melham (No 2) (2014) 319 ALR 646
Olivieri v Stafford (1989) 24 FCR 413
Petrie v Redmond (1942) 13 ABC 44
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Adrian Compton [2015] NSWSC 163
Udovenko v Mitchell (1997) 79 FCR 418
Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480
Date of hearing: 6 May 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 81 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Cotman SC and Mr A Di Francesco Solicitor for the Appellant: Pavuk Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Newlinds SC and Mr J Hynes Solicitor for the Respondent: MinterEllison ORDERS
NSD 1578 of 2015 BETWEEN: ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON
Appellant
AND: RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGES:
SIOPIS, KATZMANN AND MOSHINSKY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
17 AUGUST 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to appeal be granted.
2.The appeal be treated as instituted and heard instanter.
3.The appeal be allowed.
4.Orders 1 and 2 of the orders made on 3 December 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a)The separate question (raised by the interim application filed 8 July 2015) whether the Court should ‘go behind’ the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales upon which the creditor’s petition is based, be determined in the affirmative.
(b)The interim application otherwise be dismissed.
(c)The costs of the interim application be reserved.
5.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to…
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 106
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the court of bankruptcy has the discretion to 'go behind' a judgment to determine if a debt is genuinely owed, and if so, under what circumstances this discretion should be exercised. The court needed to consider the principles established in previous cases such as Corney v Brien and Wren v Mahony, and apply these to the facts of the case.
The court concluded that the discretion to 'go behind' a judgment is not limited to cases of fraud, collusion, or miscarriage of justice, as previously suggested. Instead, the court recognised that the discretion could be exercised in a broader range of circumstances, but in this case, the circumstances did not warrant such action. The court found that while there was an open question regarding the accuracy of the calculations regarding the debt, the judgment creditor had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant revisiting the judgment. The court held that the circumstances had not been sufficiently compelling to justify exercising the discretion, even if it had been available.
The final orders of the court granted leave to appeal, treated the appeal as instituted and heard immediately, allowed the appeal, and set aside the previous orders, reserving the costs for later determination. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs for the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal be granted.
2. The appeal be treated as instituted and heard instanter.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. Orders 1 and 2 of the orders made on 3 December 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a) The separate question (raised by the interim application filed 8 July 2015) whether the Court should ‘go behind’ the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales upon which the creditor’s petition is based, be determined in the affirmative.
(b) The interim application otherwise be dismissed.
(c) The costs of the interim application be reserved.
5. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
6. If either party seeks a variation of orders 4(c) or 5 above, written notice be given to the Court and the other party within two (2) business days.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The starting point for the consideration of these issues is the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and first s 43, which deals with the jurisdiction to make a sequestration order:43 Jurisdiction to make sequestration orders(1) Subject to this Act, where:(a)a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy; and(b)at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor:(i) was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia;(ii)had a dwelling-house or place of business in Australia;(iii)was carrying on business in Australia, either personally or by means of an agent or manager; or(iv)was a member of a firm or partnership carrying on business in Australia by means of a partner or partners or of an agent or manager;the Court may, on a petition presented by a creditor, make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.(2)Upon the making of a sequestration order against the estate of a debtor, the debtor becomes a bankrupt, and continues to be a bankrupt until:(a)he or she is discharged by force of subsection 149(1); or(b) his or her bankruptcy is annulled by force of subsection 74(5) or 153A(1) or under section 153B. Section 52 of the Act relevantly provides: 52 Proceedings and order on creditor’s petition(1)At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of:(a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);(b)service of the petition; and(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.…(2)If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:(a)that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or(b)that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;it may dismiss the petition. As we have already observed, it is well established that, by reason of the matters referred to in s 52(1) and (2), the Court has power to ‘go behind’ a judgment upon which a petitioning creditor relies to see whether there is, in ‘truth and reality’, a debt owing. We interpolate that some judgments refer to s 52(1) (or the comparable provision of the former Act, namely s 56(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth)) as the source of the power (for example, Corney v Brien at 347), while others refer to s 52(2) (for example, Wren v Mahony at 232 per Menzies J); see Colvin C, “Assailing a Judgment Relied Upon in a Bankruptcy Notice” (1986) 2 Australian Bar Review 164 at 169. In In re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 663, Lord Esher MR said (at 636):The Court of Bankruptcy can go behind the judgment, and can inquire whether, notwithstanding the judgment, there was a good debt. In so doing, the Court of Bankruptcy does not set aside the judgment. If I may use the expression, the Court goes round the judgment, and inquires into the subject matter.