Compton v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Compton v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 106

Appeal from: Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2015] FCA 1207
File number: NSD 1578 of 2015
Judges: SIOPIS, KATZMANN AND MOSHINSKY JJ
Date of judgment: 17 August 2016
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – creditor’s petition – creditor’s petition based on failure to comply with bankruptcy notice requiring payment of judgment debt – judgment debtor contended that court of bankruptcy should ‘go behind’ judgment – principles applicable to ‘going behind’ a judgment – where petitioning creditor accepted that there was an “open question” whether any debt owing
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), s 56(2)(a)

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 43, 52

Cases cited:

Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans (2005) 3 ABC(NS) 712; [2005] FCA 978

Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Evans v The Heather Thiedeke Group Pty Ltd (unreported; Full Federal Court; 28 September 1990)

Ex parte Lennox; In re Lennox (1885) 16 QBD 315

Goyan v Motyka [2009] FCA 776

In re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83

In re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 663

In re Hawkins; Ex parte Troup [1895] 1 QB 404

Joossé v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 137 FCR 576

Katter v Melham (No 2) (2014) 319 ALR 646

Olivieri v Stafford (1989) 24 FCR 413

Petrie v Redmond (1942) 13 ABC 44

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Limited v Adrian Compton [2015] NSWSC 163

Udovenko v Mitchell (1997) 79 FCR 418

Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480

Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212

Date of hearing: 6 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 81
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Cotman SC and Mr A Di Francesco
Solicitor for the Appellant: Pavuk Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Newlinds SC and Mr J Hynes
Solicitor for the Respondent: MinterEllison

ORDERS

NSD 1578 of 2015
BETWEEN:

ADRIAN JOHN COMPTON

Appellant

AND:

RAMSAY HEALTH CARE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Respondent

JUDGES:

SIOPIS, KATZMANN AND MOSHINSKY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

17 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal be granted.

2.The appeal be treated as instituted and heard instanter.

3.The appeal be allowed.

4.Orders 1 and 2 of the orders made on 3 December 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)The separate question (raised by the interim application filed 8 July 2015) whether the Court should ‘go behind’ the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales upon which the creditor’s petition is based, be determined in the affirmative.

(b)The interim application otherwise be dismissed.

(c)The costs of the interim application be reserved.

5.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Compton v Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd involves a creditor’s petition based on the failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice requiring payment of a judgment debt. The judgment debtor, Compton, contends that the court of bankruptcy should examine the underlying circumstances of the judgment to determine if any debt was truly owed. Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd, the judgment creditor, contests this contention, asserting that there was no basis to review the judgment. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the court of bankruptcy has the discretion to 'go behind' a judgment to determine if a debt is genuinely owed, and if so, under what circumstances this discretion should be exercised. The court needed to consider the principles established in previous cases such as Corney v Brien and Wren v Mahony, and apply these to the facts of the case.

The court concluded that the discretion to 'go behind' a judgment is not limited to cases of fraud, collusion, or miscarriage of justice, as previously suggested. Instead, the court recognised that the discretion could be exercised in a broader range of circumstances, but in this case, the circumstances did not warrant such action. The court found that while there was an open question regarding the accuracy of the calculations regarding the debt, the judgment creditor had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to warrant revisiting the judgment. The court held that the circumstances had not been sufficiently compelling to justify exercising the discretion, even if it had been available.

The final orders of the court granted leave to appeal, treated the appeal as instituted and heard immediately, allowed the appeal, and set aside the previous orders, reserving the costs for later determination. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs for the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be treated as instituted and heard instanter.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. Orders 1 and 2 of the orders made on 3 December 2015 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) The separate question (raised by the interim application filed 8 July 2015) whether the Court should ‘go behind’ the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales upon which the creditor’s petition is based, be determined in the affirmative.

(b) The interim application otherwise be dismissed.

(c) The costs of the interim application be reserved.

5. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

6. If either party seeks a variation of orders 4(c) or 5 above, written notice be given to the Court and the other party within two (2) business days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As recorded in the reasons of the primary judge (at [10]), senior counsel for Ramsay Health Care did not put in issue the proposition that the factual details in the affidavits resulted in the calculations undertaken in the table; what was not accepted on behalf of Ramsay Health Care was the factual accuracy or reliability of those details. Further, the primary judge recorded (at [11]) that senior counsel for Ramsay Health Care accepted that:(i)the table was basically correct down to the line disclosing the amount payable to Ramsay Health Care in the sum of $20,881,015;(ii)the indebtedness of Mr Compton was for an amount less than the judgment amount; and(iii)it was an “open question” as to whether the calculations set forth with respect to “offsets”, “rebates” and the like were factually correct.The decision of the primary judge The primary judge described the proceeding before the Supreme Court and noted that quantum had not been in dispute (at [7]-[9]). After setting out the reconciliation table and the position of Ramsay Health Care in relation to the table (discussed above), his Honour said that the primary line of opposition pursued on behalf of Ramsay Health Care was that, in the circumstances, the discretion to ‘go behind’ the Supreme Court judgment was not enlivened or, alternatively, as a matter of discretion, the Court ought not do so (at [11]). The primary judge noted that the evidence filed in this Court included the affidavit of Mr Hirner and an affidavit of Ms Stevis stating that Ramsay Health Care owed MediChoice at least $2,449,000 (at [12]). He also noted that a number of investigations and inquiries as to the competing claims had been conducted and were still being conducted. His Honour discussed, at [13]-[16], the principles to be applied, referring to the decisions of Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 and Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212, and setting out passages from Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137 at 147-148 per Davies, Lockhart and Neaves; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans (2005) 3 ABC(NS) 712; [2005] FCA 978 at [17]-[22] per Hely J; and Katter v Melham (No 2) (2014) 319 ALR 646 at [69]-[73], [77]-[79] per Wigney J. In paragraphs [17]-[26], his Honour set out his reasons for concluding that the Court should not ‘go behind’ the judgment of the Supreme Court. There were two alternative reasons, namely:(a)the circumstances in which the discretion should be exercised had not been enlivened; and(b)even if that conclusion were erroneous, as a matter of discretion, the Court ought not do so. In paragraph [18], his Honour said that it would be a mistake to construe the phrase, “fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice” (referred to by Fullagar J in Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 at 356-357) as artificially confining the circumstances in which the discretion to ‘go behind’ a judgment may be exercised. He said that the manner in which Fullagar J expressed himself should not be construed as an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which the discretion may be enlivened, as recognised by Wigney J in Katter at [70].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The starting point for the consideration of these issues is the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and first s 43, which deals with the jurisdiction to make a sequestration order:43 Jurisdiction to make sequestration orders(1) Subject to this Act, where:(a)a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy; and(b)at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor:(i) was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia;(ii)had a dwelling-house or place of business in Australia;(iii)was carrying on business in Australia, either personally or by means of an agent or manager; or(iv)was a member of a firm or partnership carrying on business in Australia by means of a partner or partners or of an agent or manager;the Court may, on a petition presented by a creditor, make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.(2)Upon the making of a sequestration order against the estate of a debtor, the debtor becomes a bankrupt, and continues to be a bankrupt until:(a)he or she is discharged by force of subsection 149(1); or(b) his or her bankruptcy is annulled by force of subsection 74(5) or 153A(1) or under section 153B. Section 52 of the Act relevantly provides: 52 Proceedings and order on creditor’s petition(1)At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of:(a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);(b)service of the petition; and(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.…(2)If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:(a)that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or(b)that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;it may dismiss the petition. As we have already observed, it is well established that, by reason of the matters referred to in s 52(1) and (2), the Court has power to ‘go behind’ a judgment upon which a petitioning creditor relies to see whether there is, in ‘truth and reality’, a debt owing. We interpolate that some judgments refer to s 52(1) (or the comparable provision of the former Act, namely s 56(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth)) as the source of the power (for example, Corney v Brien at 347), while others refer to s 52(2) (for example, Wren v Mahony at 232 per Menzies J); see Colvin C, “Assailing a Judgment Relied Upon in a Bankruptcy Notice” (1986) 2 Australian Bar Review 164 at 169. In In re Fraser; Ex parte Central Bank of London [1892] 2 QB 663, Lord Esher MR said (at 636):The Court of Bankruptcy can go behind the judgment, and can inquire whether, notwithstanding the judgment, there was a good debt. In so doing, the Court of Bankruptcy does not set aside the judgment. If I may use the expression, the Court goes round the judgment, and inquires into the subject matter.