Kimber v The Owners Strata Plan No 48216 (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kimber v The Owners Strata Plan No 48216 (No 2) [2018] FCA 406

File number: NSD 562 of 2016
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 27 March 2018
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Where applicant claimed bankruptcy notice was invalid pursuant to s 41(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – Where applicant notified the respondent within the time permitted that she disputed the validity of the bankruptcy notice on the grounds that it was overstated – Where respondent had not accounted for the amount paid for levies in accordance with the applicant’s instructions – Whether the bankruptcy notice was overstated – Ground not made out.

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Where applicant claimed Court should go behind the judgment and set aside the bankruptcy notice – Where applicant did not appeal the judgment – Where applicant was unrepresented – Where judgment was obtained after a contested hearing – Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to go behind the judgment – Ground not made out.

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Where applicant claimed that she had a cross-claim, set-off or cross demand – Where applicant did not explain why the claim was not raised in the proceeding that resulted in the judgment to which the bankruptcy relates in her application to this Court – Whether applicant had counter-claim, set-off or cross-claim pursuant to ss 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that was equal to or exceeds debt claimed in bankruptcy notice – Ground not made out.

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Where applicant claimed that the issue and service of the bankruptcy notice constituted an abuse of process – Whether bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process – Whether the bankruptcy notice was issued for a collateral purpose or to place undue pressure on the applicant – Ground not made out.

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Whether the registrar’s order discharging the extension of time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice should be set aside

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40(1)(g), 41(5), 41(7)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 35A, 43

Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) rr 2.02, sch 1

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 1.34

Cases cited:

APX Projects Pty Limited v The Owners – Strata Plan No. 64025 (2015) 108 ACSR 515; [2015] NSWSC 1250

Brunninghausen v Glavanics [1998] FCA 230

Conway v Jackson (2001) 107 FCR 201

Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343

Coshott v Prentice, in the matter of Coshott (No 2) [2016] FCA 1531

Ebert v The Union Trustee Company of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346

Guss v Johnstone (2000) 171 ALR 598; [2000] HCA 26

HWY Rent Pty Ltd v HWY Rentals (in liq) (No 2) [2014] FCA 449

Killoran v Duncan [1999] FCA 1574

Kimber v Owners Strata Plan No 48216 [2016] FCA 1090

Kimber v The Owners Strata Plan No. 48216 [2016] NSWSC 1397

Kimber v The Owners Strata Plan No. 48216 [2017] FCA 364

Kimber v The…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 406
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kimber v The Owners Strata Plan No 48216 (No 2) involved a dispute between Ms Kimber, the applicant, and the Owners Corporation, the respondent. Ms Kimber contested the validity of a bankruptcy notice issued against her, claiming it was overstated and constituted an abuse of process. The dispute was heard and determined in the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the bankruptcy notice was overstated, if the court should exercise its discretion to set aside the judgment, whether Ms Kimber had a cross-claim, set-off, or cross-demand that could be considered, and if the bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process. The court needed to decide if the registrar's order discharging the extension of time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice should be set aside.

The court examined the evidence and found that Ms Kimber had not successfully demonstrated that the bankruptcy notice was overstated. The court also determined that it should not exercise its discretion to set aside the judgment as Ms Kimber had not appealed the original judgment and was unrepresented. Furthermore, Ms Kimber failed to explain why her cross-claim was not raised in the previous proceeding, leading the court to conclude that she did not have a valid cross-claim, set-off, or cross-demand. The court found that the bankruptcy notice was not an abuse of process, as it was not issued for a collateral purpose or to place undue pressure on Ms Kimber.

ORDERS:
1. The order made on 4 May 2016 is set aside.
2. Pursuant to s 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the time for compliance with bankruptcy notice 188465 issued on 19 February 2016 is extended to 3 April 2018.
3. The amended interlocutory application filed on 11 July 2016 is otherwise dismissed.
4. Ms Kimber is to pay 40% of the respondent's costs of the amended interlocutory application, as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Set aside Order 2 made on 4 May 2016.

2. Pursuant to s 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) extend the time for compliance with bankruptcy notice 188465 issued on 19 February 2016 to the applicant to 3 April 2018.

3. The amended interlocutory application filed on 11 July 2016 be otherwise dismissed.

4. The applicant pay 40% of the respondent’s costs of the amended interlocutory application as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 25 May 2009 default judgment was entered against Ms Kimber in the Local Court Proceeding for $952.31(Default Judgment). An affidavit sworn by Daniel Radman, solicitor for the Owners Corporation, on 15 April 2009 in support of the application for the Default Judgment recorded that at the time of commencement of the Local Court Proceeding, Ms Kimber owed $1,932.22 to the Owners Corporation. It also recorded that since commencement of the proceeding, payments had been made by Ms Kimber in the sum of $1,778.07 and that, as at the date of swearing of his affidavit, the amount owing was:Current amount owing $154.15Interest under s.79(2) of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 $52.14Filing fees $154.00Service fees $33.00Solicitors (sic) fees $559.02TOTAL $952.31 Ms Kimber filed a notice of motion dated 27 August 2013 seeking to set aside the Default Judgment and “[t]hat the proceeding be discontinued and the court judgement (sic) be removed annulled expunged”. Ms Kimber’s affidavit filed in support of the notice of motion annexed a number of communications which took place between early 2009 and early 2011 and reflected, among other things, that:·on 11 March 2009 Ms Kimber requested that Strata Choice update her mailing address; ·on 13 March 2009 Martin Rudelle Greig of Strata Choice informed Ms Kimber that the records would be updated and also noted, in relation to Ms Kimber’s query about the “levying of contributions”, that Ms Kimber had said that she had been made aware of the outstanding debt in October and that “[a]s no payment was received a decision was made on 19/11/08 to forward [her] account for debt recovery pursuant to Section 80(1) of the Strata Scheme Management 1996”; ·as at October 2009, despite her earlier request, Ms Kimber’s address had not been updated and as a result a levy notice had been returned to Strata Choice;·on 7 September 2010 Strata Choice informed Ms Kimber that, as at that date, she had no outstanding debts to the Owners Corporation and had paid all contributions from June 2009 onwards;·on 14 October 2010 Mr Radman requested that Ms Kimber sign and return consent orders that had been sent to her after which Grace Lawyers would “sign and lodge them with the court”, noting that “[o]nce processed by the Court the default judgment will be removed/annulled/expunged”; and·on 14 February 2011 Mr Radman sent a further email addressing concerns raised by Ms Kimber about her change in address stating that “the Statement of Claim was deemed served prior to [Ms Kimber] providing Strata Choice … with [her] new change of address” and noting that the Owners Corporation would only consent to orders to set aside the Default Judgment in the form provided. On 10 October 2013 the Local Court ordered that the Default Judgment be set aside; that Ms Kimber file a defence; and that the costs of Ms Kimber’s application be costs in the cause. On 7 November 2013 Ms Kimber filed a defence to the statement of claim in the Local Court Proceeding which had been filed some four years earlier. I would infer that she did so in order to comply with the orders made on 10 October 2013 although, given the passage of time, the level of indebtedness, if any, between Ms Kimber and the Owners Corporation had changed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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