Coshott v Prentice, in the matter of Coshott (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Coshott v Prentice, in the matter of Coshott (No 2) [2016] FCA 1531

File numbers: NSD 258 of 2016
NSD 473 of 2016
Judge: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 16 December 2016
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – applications to set aside bankruptcy notices – “counter-claim, set-off or cross demand” pursuant to ss 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – supplementary ground raised that the capacity in which the bankruptcy notice was issued was confusing and misleading so as to render bankruptcy notice invalid – held: applications to set aside bankruptcy notices dismissed with costs

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where applications to set aside bankruptcy notice claimed “counter-claim, set-off or cross demand” in the form of costs orders which were assigned by a first deed “jointly” – whether applications to set aside were valid due to want of mutuality – where second deed by the same assignors as first deed sought to re-assign the benefit of the costs orders “jointly and severally”– held: second deed was ineffective because the benefit of costs orders had already been assigned – where third deed sought to assign the benefit of costs orders from assignors “jointly” to assignees “jointly and severally” – where third deed brought into existence after expiry of time to file applications to set aside bankruptcy notices – requirements of a valid application to set aside a bankruptcy notice pursuant to ss 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – held: applications to set aside not valid due to want of mutuality and therefore not ‘bona fide’, ‘real’ or ‘effective’ “counter-claim, set-off or cross demand” – held: third deed filed too late to be able, even if effective, to cure invalid applications to set aside bankruptcy notices

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where applications to set aside bankruptcy notices sought to enlarge the grounds upon which applications were made after the expiry of the period to file the application – requirements of supporting affidavit under Bankruptcy Rules 2005 (Cth) and Bankruptcy Rules 2016 (Cth) – held: no freestanding right or entitlement to litigate later advanced additional grounds in support of an application to set aside bankruptcy notice – held: if leave may be given to enlarge grounds that should not be lightly countenanced, should only be granted for meritorious grounds and in accordance by analogy with principles on leave to amend pleadings

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – whether “counter-claim, set-off or cross demand” pursuant to ss 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) was equal to or exceeded debts claimed in the bankruptcy notices – where “counter-claim, set-off or cross demand” was the benefit of costs orders for which taxation process had not been completed – where bills of costs arising from costs orders of poor quality – held: unable to be satisfied “counter-claim, set-off or cross demand” was any particular amount and therefore unable to be satisfied it was equal to or exceeded debts claimed in bankruptcy notices

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY –

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1531
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Coshott v Prentice, in the matter of Coshott (No 2), involved applications by James and Ljiljana Coshott to set aside bankruptcy notices issued to them. The applications were based on purported "counter-claims, set-off, or cross demands" under sections 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The legal issues before the court included whether the bankruptcy notices were validly set aside due to the lack of mutuality in the offsetting claims, whether the applications to set aside were made in a timely manner, and whether the Court had the power to extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice. The court also considered whether the certificates of taxation required separate entry as an order of the Court and if electronically filed and issued certificates of taxation were valid.

The court found that the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices were invalid due to the lack of mutuality in the offsetting claims, rendering them not 'bona fide','real' or 'effective'. Additionally, the court held that the third deed, which sought to assign the benefit of the costs orders, was filed too late to cure the invalid applications. The court further found that the applications to set aside were not valid due to the want of mutuality and, therefore, not a "counter-claim, set-off or cross demand" equal to or exceeding the debts claimed in the bankruptcy notices. The court also determined that there was no freestanding right or entitlement to litigate later advanced additional grounds in support of an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice. However, the court did find that it had a general power to extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice under section 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act, which is not constrained by section 41(7). The discretionary factors weighed in favour of making an order to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notices.

In conclusion, the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices were dismissed with costs. The court made an order to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notices until the date of the judgment. The court also held that certificates of taxation did not require separate entry as an order of the Court and that electronically filed and issued certificates of taxation were valid and enforceable.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application to set aside bankruptcy notice number BN 187141 addressed to Ljiljana Coshott be dismissed with costs.

2. The time for compliance with bankruptcy notice number BN 187141 addressed to Ljiljana Coshott be extended pursuant to s 41(6A)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to the date of this judgment.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Counsel for Prentice did not contend that the 6 May 2016 Deed could not in theory be effective in achieving its assignment purpose in the abstract, but rather relied upon this coming too late and being beyond the scope of the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices, because it purported to create a new right well after the applications had been made to set them aside and well after the original time for compliance with the bankruptcy notices had expired. Oral evidence as to the Deeds Both James and Ljiljana were compelled to be called in both cases and made available for cross-examination pursuant to a request made under s 166 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). However in the result that evidence tended to confirm that the deeds of assignment were genuine and accordingly that evidence does not need to be considered further as I have proceeded upon that basis in the absence of any submission on behalf of Prentice to the contrary. This issue may need to be revisited if any of the three deeds are sought to be relied upon in answer to a creditor’s petition. The grounds of application and grounds of objectionPrentice’s grounds of objection to the applications In each of the proceedings, Prentice filed a notice under r 2.06 of both versions of the Bankruptcy Rules stating grounds of objection to the applications. The terms of each of those notices are reproduced below, which are directed to the validity of the applications and the absence of a basis for concluding that the offsetting claims equalled or exceeded the bankruptcy debts. A further ground of objection for each application was “There is no evidence of the Applicant to support the Application”. This point was overtaken by events in that both James and Ljiljana were compelled to be and ultimately were cross-examined. Accordingly this ground of opposition will not be considered further.In the matter of: James Coshott1.The Registrar extended the time for compliance under Section 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966 without power as the Application is predicated on Section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966. 2.To the extent that the Application is founded under Section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966: a)There is no identified cross claim, set-off or cross demand between the Applicant and the Respondent which satisfies the requirements of the subsection; b)The costs the subject of the alleged cross claim, set-off or cross demand having been assigned as alleged, have not been taxed by a Registrar of the appropriate Court and are not capable of being the subject of a claim as asserted; c)There is no evidence that any liquidated debt sought to be set-off is greater than or exceeds the judgment debt the subject of the Bankruptcy Notice. d)The costs the subject of the alleged cross claim, set-off or cross demand having been assigned as alleged, have not been the subject of an estimate having been made by a Registrar; e)The quantum of the costs the subject of costs orders in Federal Circuit Court proceedings SYG 2055/2013 have not been taxed or quantified but is less than the amount due in the Bankruptcy Notice; f)The quantum of the costs the subject of costs orders in Federal Court proceedings NSD 786/2015 have not been taxed or quantified but is less than the amount due in the Bankruptcy Notice; g)The costs in NSD 1412/2009 have been the subject of taxation in the sum of $576,018 and this taxation has been the subject of lengthy and detailed objections by the Applicant. The quantum of the matters in paragraphs (d) and (e) have not been finalised, but is likely to be much less than the judgment in the Bankruptcy Notice. h)The costs the subject of the alleged cross claim, set-off or cross demand having been assigned as alleged, have not been otherwise the subject of an assessment by a Registrar and therefore are not quantified or accepted by the Respondent; In the matter of: Ljiljana Coshott1.There is no mutuality of dealings between the parties to the Bankruptcy Notice and the asserted Deeds of Assignment. 2.To the extent that the Application is founded under Section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966: a)There is no identified cross claim, set-off or cross demand between the Applicant and the Respondent which satisfies the requirements of the subsection; b)The costs the subject of the alleged cross claim, set-off or cross demand having been assigned as alleged, have not been taxed by a Registrar of the appropriate Court and are not capable of being the subject of a claim as asserted; c)There is no evidence that any liquidated debt sought to be set-off is greater than or exceeds the judgment debt the subject of the Bankruptcy Notice. d)The costs the subject of the alleged cross claim, set-off or cross demand having been assigned as alleged, have not been the subject of an estimate having been made by a Registrar; e)The quantum of the costs the subject of costs orders in Federal Circuit Court proceedings SYG 2055/2013 have not been finally taxed but a preliminary quantification is less than the amount due in the Bankruptcy Notice; f)The quantum of the costs the subject of costs orders in Federal Court proceedings NSD 786/2015 have not been taxed or quantified but is less than the amount due in the Bankruptcy Notice; g)The costs in NSD 1412/2009 have been the subject of taxation in the sum of $576,018 and this taxation has been the subject of lengthy and detailed objections by the Applicant. This sum is due and payable by the Applicant. The quantum of the matters in paragraph (d) have not been finalised, but the preliminary quantification is less than the judgment in the Bankruptcy Notice. h)The costs in NSD 2016/2013 have been the subject of taxation in the sum of $77,300, which is due and payable by the Applicant. i)The costs the subject of the alleged cross claim, set-off or cross demand having been assigned as alleged, have not been otherwise the subject of an assessment by a Registrar and therefore are not quantified or accepted by the Respondent; 3.The second Amended Deed of Assignment purports to assign the chose in action which had been assigned in the first Deed of Assignment and was therefore not available to form part of the Amended Deed of Assignment. James’ and Ljiljana’s grounds of argument

Decision

Reasons for decision

For completeness I should also address a further point raised in support of the offsetting claim. Despite the written grounds expressly referring to the three deeds as constituting the offsetting claim and nothing more, senior counsel for Ljiljana nonetheless sought to re-open a point in later written submissions first raised in initial written submissions concerning a statement of claim by which she sues Prentice for breach of duty. Not only was this not listed as one of the grounds of argument reproduced above, it is a bare statement of claim. A statement of claim is not evidence of anything: Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCA 223; sub nom Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 51 at [52]-[53] and also the single judge decision in Massih v Esber [2008] FCA 1452; (2008) 250 ALR 648 at 651-2 [18]. In my view, reliance should never have been placed on that statement of claim and it should not have been pressed in submissions. Accordingly, it is rejected as any basis to impugn Ljiljana’s bankruptcy notice. To the extent that there is any power to grant leave to rely upon an additional ground not referred to in the application, not referred to in the supporting affidavit and not referred to in the enlarged grounds which I permitted the applicants to make submissions about, such leave is, in any event, refused. For completeness, I note in any event that the proceedings brought by that statement of claim were, on 13 December 2016, discontinued by leave mid-trial with indemnity costs ordered against Ljiljana. Conclusion on the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices As none of the six questions have been resolved in favour of James or Ljiljana, each of their applications must be dismissed with costs. Collateral relief: power to extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice and exercise of such a power As noted above, senior counsel for both James and for Ljiljana submitted that there was a general power to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice contained in s 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act. Counsel for Prentice submitted that there was no such general power, and that in any event the s 41(6A) power was constrained by s 41(6C). The existence of the power and its exercise was argued on behalf of James and Ljiljana to facilitate the enlargement of the scope of the applications to set aside the bankruptcy notices to encompass the 6 May 2016 Deed (the third deed), which arguably created a mutual offsetting claim to the bankruptcy debts, although as I have found, too late. For the reasons detailed further below I am of the view that this Court does have a general power to extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice, being a power that is not constrained by s 41(7) in its application to offsetting claims. However, in my opinion, the exercise of that power does not enable an invalid application to set a bankruptcy notice aside to be retrospectively validated because of the clearly limited way in which s 41(7) is expressed. The question that must therefore be considered is the basis for finding that such a general power exists, and whether any of the circumstances in this case are such that it should be exercised.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established