Prentice v Fewin Pty Ltd, in the matter of Prentice

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prentice v Fewin Pty Limited, in the matter of Prentice [2017] FCA 490

File number(s): NSD 2014 of 2016
Judge(s): BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 11 May 2017
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application to set aside bankruptcy notice – “counter-claim, set-off or cross demand” pursuant to ss 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – requirement that bankruptcy notice debt and offsetting claim be mutual – whether absence of mutuality overcome by equitable right of set-off – whether proceedings an abuse of process – whether the interests of justice require setting aside of the bankruptcy notice
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30(1), 40(1), 41(5), 41(6A), 41(6C), 41(7)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 39.31, 39.35, 40.32

Cases cited:

Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201

Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1884; (2001) 115 FCR 253

Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (No 4) (1982) 42 ALR 703

Coshott v Prentice (No 2) [2016] FCA 1531

Doherty v Murphy [1996] 2 VR 553

Hill v Ziymack (1908) 7 CLR 352

Lentini; Ex parte Lentini v CSR Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 363

Murphy v Zamonex Pty Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 439

Rawson v Samuel (1841) 41 ER 451

Re Briggs; Ex parte Briggs v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (WA) (1986) 12 FCR 310

Re Judd; Ex parte Pike (1924) 24 SR (NSW) 537

Re Last; Ex parte Butterell (1994) 124 ALR 219

Re V P Developments Ltd; Penwith District Council v V P Developments Ltd [2005] EWHC 259 (Ch); [2005] BCLC 607

Rozenbes v Kronhill (1956) 95 CLR 407

Seller v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 865; (2011) 282 ALR 80

St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Spalla (2000) 181 ALR 682

Stec v Orfanos [1999] FCA 457

Williams v Spautz (1991) 174 CLR 509

Derham R, Derham on the Law of Set-Off (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2003); (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 2010)

Heydon J, Leeming M, Turner P, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (5th ed, LexisNexis, 2015)

Date of hearing: 12 April 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 64
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Johnson
Solicitor for the Applicant: O’Neill Partners Commercial Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr O Jones
Solicitor for the Respondent: Comino Prassas

ORDERS

NSD 2014 of 2016

IN THE MATTER OF MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE

BETWEEN:

MAXWELL WILLIAM PRENTICE

Applicant

AND:

FEWIN PTY LIMITED ACN 051 132 453

Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Bankruptcy notice no. BN 208109 issued on 28 October 2016 and served on the applicant on 9 September 2016 be set aside.

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

3.Leave be granted to the applicant to seek a lump sum costs order by filing and serving…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 490
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Prentice, an individual, sought to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by Fewin, a company, on the grounds that Fewin had not paid him certain debts. The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, which had to determine whether the offsetting claim made by Prentice could be considered under sections 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The court needed to decide if the claim for set-off met the requirement of mutuality, which means that both the debt claimed in the bankruptcy notice and the offsetting claim must be claimed by the parties in the same right. Prentice argued that even though the debt and set-off were not mutually claimed, an equitable right of set-off should be recognised. Alternatively, Prentice claimed that the use of a bankruptcy notice in this case constituted an abuse of process or a proper basis for the Court to intervene in the interests of justice.

The court concluded that the bankruptcy notice must be set aside, as allowing it to proceed would exceed the proper use of the bankruptcy process. The court found that the application had sufficient merit to engage the automatic extension under section 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, and therefore Prentice was entitled to an extension of time to comply with the bankruptcy notice. The court also granted Prentice leave to seek a lump sum costs order according to a timetable given with the reasons. The final orders included setting aside the bankruptcy notice, ordering Fewin to pay Prentice's costs, and providing Prentice with leave to seek a lump sum costs order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Bankruptcy notice no. BN 208109 issued on 28 October 2016 and served on the applicant on 9 September 2016 be set aside.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

3. Leave be granted to the applicant to seek a lump sum costs order by filing and serving written submissions of no more than 5 pages in length and any affidavit evidence in support within 7 days or such longer period as the Court allows.

4. If any application is made by the applicant for a lump sum costs order, the respondent be permitted to file and serve written submissions of no more than 5 pages in length and any affidavit evidence in support within 7 days of service of the applicant’s evidence and submissions.

5. Any such application for a lump sum costs orders be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

A key issue in these proceedings is whether Mr Prentice’s offsetting claim meets the requirement of “mutuality” as derived from ss 40(1)(g) and 41(7) of the Bankruptcy Act; namely, that the bankruptcy notice debt and offsetting claim must be claimed by the parties in the same right. Fewin submits that the required “mutuality” does not exist, because the costs order on which the bankruptcy notice is based imposes a personal obligation on Mr Prentice, while his set-off is claimed in his capacity as a trustee in bankruptcy. Notwithstanding this distinction, Mr Prentice submits that the bankruptcy court should recognise an equitable right of set-off, having regard to the indemnity from trust Mr Prentice may claim in meeting his personal obligation to Fewin. Alternatively, Mr Prentice asserts that the use of a bankruptcy notice in all the circumstances is designed to force him to pay Fewin despite it owing more than it is owed, either constituting an abuse of process, or a proper basis for the Court to intervene in the interests of justice.Key events and evidence The bankruptcy notice was issued on 28 October 2016 and served by email on Mr Prentice on 9 November 2016. The present application was filed within time on 22 November 2016. The judgment debt the subject of the bankruptcy notice is an order of 1 September 2016 by Brereton J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales that Mr Prentice pay Fewin’s fixed costs of $16,500, Fewin having succeeded in applying to set aside a creditor’s statutory demand served by Mr Prentice on the company. By service of his statutory demand on 12 April 2016, Mr Prentice had sought payment of his costs as ordered by Perry J on 14 November 2015 and assessed to be $25,000 pursuant to a certificate of taxation issued by a Registrar of this Court on 20 January 2016. Although Brereton J has not yet published his ex tempore reasons for his decision, it is understood by the parties that the statutory demand was set aside on the basis of his Honour’s finding that the certificate of taxation issued was not signed by the Registrar in accordance with r 40.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and was therefore defective. Mr Prentice’s asserted offsetting claim is said to arise by reason of the same debt unsuccessfully sought to be paid by way of his statutory demand, being the $25,000 due pursuant to Perry J’s cost order as taxed. That debt is said to have crystallised beyond doubt when, subsequent to Brereton J’s decision, the certificate of taxation for $25,000 was reissued on 8 September 2016 – bearing the Registrar’s signature on its face – and served on the solicitors for Fewin the following day. Further to the 8 September 2016 certificate of taxation for $25,000, Mr Prentice also gave evidence of a number of other debts owed to him by Fewin arising from proceedings in this Court or in the Federal Circuit Court, being:(1)an unpaid order for costs in Federal Circuit Court proceeding SYG2055/2013 on 8 December 2015 in the amount of $2,000;(2)an unpaid order for costs in Federal Court proceeding NSD917/2014, in respect of which a certificate of taxation was issued on 12 February 2016 in the amount of $12,200; and(3)an unpaid order for costs in Federal Court proceeding NSD916/2014, in respect of which a certificate of taxation was issued on 12 February 2016 in the amount of $11,255.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Either way, there was a valid and effective extension of time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice up to the date of this judgment.Conclusion The bankruptcy notice must be set aside with costs. As I am concerned that the costs of this application are already excessive relative to the amounts involved, Mr Prentice has leave to seek a lump sum costs order according to a timetable given with these reasons. If that is sought, the application and any response on behalf of Fewin will be dealt with on the papers as provided in response to that timetable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This Court should not allow bankruptcy proceedings to continue as an abuse of process or to be misused below that threshold and thereby be a vehicle for injustice. The competing debts should be reconciled as to the net amount owing, having regard to the legal capacity of Mr Prentice as debtor and the indemnity he is entitled to. In those circumstances, allowing the bankruptcy notice to proceed would allow the metes and bounds of the proper use of the bankruptcy process to be exceeded. Having regard to the interests of justice, it would therefore also have been appropriate to exercise the Court’s discretion to set aside the bankruptcy notice. Valid extension of time in which to comply with the bankruptcy notice, either by orders of the court made under s 41(6A) or by the automatic operation of s 41(7) The proper engagement of the automatic extension by operation of s 41(7) depended upon the advancement of a sufficiently arguable case at the time of filing the application and supporting affidavit. Having regard to the unusual circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the application had sufficient merit in respect of the asserted offsetting claim to properly engage s 41(7) and thereby give Mr Prentice the benefit of the automatic extension. That conclusion is open even though that aspect of the application failed. In relation to the Court-ordered extension of time to comply with the bankruptcy notice, being a succession of orders made pursuant to s 41(6A), there can be no issue as to the validity of the application because it has been successful and was in any event sufficient for s 41(6A). Either way, there was a valid and effective extension of time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice up to the date of this judgment.Conclusion The bankruptcy notice must be set aside with costs. As I am concerned that the costs of this application are already excessive relative to the amounts involved, Mr Prentice has leave to seek a lump sum costs order according to a timetable given with these reasons. If that is sought, the application and any response on behalf of Fewin will be dealt with on the papers as provided in response to that timetable.