ALAN JOHN WILLIAMS AND ORS v. MICHAEL EDWARD SPAUTZ
(1993) 112 ALR 191
11 March 1993
Decision
MASON C.J., BRENNAN AND GAUDRON JJ. This is an application by the respondent in an appeal to this Court to vacate the order allowing the appeal and for a rehearing or a reconsideration of the appeal. The principle governing the exercise of jurisdiction to reopen a judgment and to grant a rehearing is well established. In University of Wollongong v. Metwally (No.2) ((1) (1985) 59 ALJR 481, at p 483; 60 ALR 68, at p 71.), the principle was expressed in these terms:
"Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so."
And, in Wentworth v. Woollahra Municipal Council, the Court said ((2) (1982) 149 CLR 672, at p 684):
"Generally speaking, (the jurisdiction) will not be exercised unless the applicant can show that by accident without fault on his part he has not been heard."
2. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a means by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to re-argue their cases.
3. In this case, the applicant, who appears in person, relies principally on two matters in support of the relief which he now claims. Those matters are:
(1) that the Court did not deal specifically with 41 points raised in a Notice of Contention which the applicant filed in the appeal; and
(2) that the Court was wrong in holding that there was an abuse of process.
4. The short answer to the first matter on which the applicant relies is that the 41 points in the Notice of Contention were disavowed in argument by counsel for the applicant, except to the extent that they were adopted by counsel in the general submissions that he put to the Court and which were dealt with in the judgments. In the course of argument during the appeal, the Chief Justice specifically asked counsel for the respondent:
"What about this notice of contention, Mr Cassidy? ... Before you answer, I should make it clear that I am not inviting you to address us at any length on it."
Counsel's response was:
"Your Honour, I did not intend to put any arguments to the Court other than those which we have put, some of which have perhaps adopted some points that were not dealt with in the court. I do not know whether it was obvious from the typing that the notice of contention was not of my authorship."
To the extent that the points of contention were taken up in the oral submissions put to the Court, they were dealt with in the judgments; and, to the extent that the points in the Notice of Contention were not raised by counsel, that was the consequence of a deliberate decision not to raise them or not to take the opportunity to raise them.
5. The applicant's submission that the Court was wrong in holding that there was an abuse of process is no more than an attempt to reagitate the case that was presented by counsel on his behalf on the hearing of the appeal. For that reason it does not constitute a ground for the exercise of the jurisdiction which the applicant seeks to invoke.
6. The application is dismissed.
Orders
Application dimissed with costs.
Details
AGLC
Williams v Spautz [1993] HCA 9
Case
[1993] HCA 9
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Williams, the applicant, and Spautz, the respondent, concerning the respondent's alleged breach of a restrictive covenant. The covenant, contained within a contract of employment, prohibited the respondent from engaging in certain activities within a specified radius of the applicant's business premises for a period after the termination of his employment. The applicant sought an injunction to restrain the respondent from continuing the alleged breach.
The central legal issue before the High Court was the enforceability of the restrictive covenant. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the covenant went no further than was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the applicant, such as its goodwill and trade connections, or whether it was an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore void as a matter of public policy. This involved an assessment of the scope, duration, and geographical extent of the restriction in light of the nature of the applicant's business and the respondent's role within it.
The Court reasoned that for a restrictive covenant to be enforceable, it must be demonstrated that the restriction imposed is no wider than is necessary to protect the employer's proprietary interests. The onus is on the employer to establish the reasonableness of the restraint. In this instance, the Court found that the covenant, as drafted, was too broad in its geographical scope and the activities it sought to restrain, extending beyond what was reasonably required to protect the applicant's business. The Court applied the established legal principles concerning restraints of trade, emphasizing that such covenants are construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce them.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable.