Jorgensen v Australian Securities and Investments Commission
[2022] TASSC 40
•16 June 2022
[2022] TASSC 40
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Jorgensen v ASIC [2022] TASSC 40
PARTIES: JORGENSEN, Alan Bradley
v
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES &
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
FILE NO: 1000/2020
JUDGMENT
APPEALED FROM: Jorgensen v ASIC [2019] TASSC 46
DELIVERED ON: 16 June 2022
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE/S: 10 September 2021
JUDGMENT OF: Wood J
CATCHWORDS:
Appeal and New Trial – Procedure – Tasmania – Time for appeal – Extension of time – No reasonable prospect of success.
Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r 52.
Aust Dig Appeal and New Trial [387]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant: In person
Respondent: J Clarke SC
Solicitors:
Respondent: Ashurst Australia
Judgment Number: [2022] TASSC 40
Number of paragraphs: 39
Serial No 40/2022
File No 1000/2020
ALAN BRADLEY JORGENSEN v
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT WOOD J
16 June 2022
The applicant seeks to extend time to enable an appeal to the Full Court from a decision of Holt AsJ on 28 November 2019: Jorgensen v ASIC [2019] TASSC 46. His application is dated 28 April 2020 and attaches a draft notice of appeal.
Originally, on 17 December 2019, the applicant attempted to file a notice of appeal to a single judge. On 11 February 2020, the Registrar of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that the judgment of the Associate Judge lies to the Full Court only, and not to a single judge. Further, he was informed that the Registrar would not accept for filing the purported notice and that if he wished to appeal he would be required to file an originating application seeking an extension of time, a supporting affidavit and a draft notice of appeal to the Full Court.
The applicant maintained that a single judge had jurisdiction to hear his appeal. He pressed that position and argued that his notice of appeal should have been accepted and that a single judge had jurisdiction to hear his appeal. That argument was rejected: Jorgensen v ASIC [2020] TASSC 56. Now, Mr Jorgensen pursues his application to extend time to enable his appeal to be heard by the Full Court.
The decision under appeal
The decision of Holt AsJ related to a number of applications, which began with the applicant's originating application filed 26 June 2019 seeking preliminary discovery of documents pursuant to r 403E of the Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas). The respondent to the appeal, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, applied to have the originating application struck out or dismissed. This strike-out application fell to be determined. As well, the decision concerned two interlocutory applications and an application for an adjournment. One of the interlocutory applications was an application for production of documents and the other was an application seeking a declaration that the allegations made by the applicant, which were not the subject of denials by the respondent, were deemed to be admitted: see [7] of decision of Holt AsJ. The originating application and two interlocutory applications were dismissed, and the application for an adjournment of the hearing was refused. These orders are now the subject of the application to extend time to appeal.
The appeal
The time limit for appealing a final judgment of the Associate Judge is within 21 days after judgment was pronounced: r 680A(3). Here we are concerned with a final judgment and order: Jorgensen v ASIC [2020] TASSC 56 at [17]. That period was extended by the Associate Judge to 21 days following the publication of his written reasons to the parties on 28 November 2019.
The leave application was filed on 28 April 2020, more than two months after the date Mr Jorgensen was informed that the notice of appeal he had attempted to file would not be accepted. The draft notice of appeal is in the same terms as the original unfiled notice of appeal sent to the Registrar via email on 17 December 2019. It is worth noting that the respondent received a copy of the original notice on 29 March 2020.
To add a little complication to the proceedings is that the applicant also presses an oral application to extend time to enable his original appeal, not served within the required time period, to be heard by a single judge with respect to the interlocutory orders made by Holt AsJ referred to above in [4]. In an unpublished judgment in these proceedings delivered on 9 June 2021, I observed that while it would make good sense for the Full Court to determine an appeal from the ancillary interlocutory orders as well as the final judgment, being the order dismissing the originating application, it was ultimately a matter for the Full Court. In effect, by the draft notice of appeal to the Full Court, on its own, or together with the original notice of appeal the appellant seeks to pursue an appeal of all the orders I have identified. The original notice and the draft notice to the Full Court are substantially the same, including the grounds of appeal, and both purport to appeal the same orders. In terms of the grounds of appeal and the prospects of success, the two notices of appeal will stand or fall together.
Considerations relevant to extending time to appeal
The power to extend the time limited for commencing an appeal arises from the Supreme Court Rules, r 52. It is well established that the discretion to grant an extension of time is unfettered, save that it must be exercised in the interests of justice: Burnett v Fitzgerald and Browne [2017] TASSC 31 at [10]. In that case, Brett J identified the relevant principles bearing on the power to extend time to appeal, referring to Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 in which McHugh J stated at [2]: "It is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal". Brett J continued at [11] to identify the four matters to be taken into account:
(a)the length of the delay;
(b)the reason for the delay;
(c)whether the appellant has a fairly arguable case; and
(d)the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent if the application is granted.
The applicant relies on his affidavit sworn on 24 February 2020 to support his application to extend time to appeal to the Full Court. He has provided a list of emails that he wishes this Court to take into account. Largely, these emails are correspondence between himself and court registry staff concerning his original appeal. The affidavit and the list of emails are relevant to the question of delay. I have also taken into account written submissions filed by the appellant dated 9 June 2020. I have also taken into account the submissions the applicant made at the hearing of the application to extend time.
The respondent relies on written submissions and an affidavit of Melanie Cameron McKean affirmed 5 June 2020. The respondent's counsel also made submissions at the hearing of the application.
The draft notice of appeal
The draft notice of appeal refers to "4 Interlocutory Applications" and "ASIC's Interlocutory Decision" which are evidently the applications referred to above at [4]. The draft notice raises seven "grounds" of appeal:
"Alan Bradley Jorgensen appeals to the Full Court on a date to be fixed against the orders made by the Honourable Associate Justice Holt delivered in the Supreme Court of Tasmania at Hobart on the 28th day of November 2019 in proceeding No.1654 of 2019 in which it was ordered:
1The 4 Interlocutory Applications made by Alan Bradley Jorgensen ('ABJ') be all struck out.
2ASIC's Interlocutory Decision to strike out ABJ's Preliminary Discovery Application be upheld.
3 That ABJ pay the Costs of ASIC on a Standard basis.
The Appellant appeals on the grounds that:
1 AsJ Holt failed to afford ABJ Procedural Fairness in not first hearing ABJ's Interlocutory Application pursuant to Rule 391(1) Inspection of documents referred to in pleadings and affidavits; whereby this denial to inspect ASIC's Documents, removed the right or ability of ABJ to be able to exercise his natural right to even test the truthfulness or accuracy of ASIC's many allegations, which ASIC relied on to discredit me, in which I declared were largely false and based on fraud. This denial of Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice was especially magnified, where ASIC were able to escape from filing its Defence (due to their unfair privilege of filing an initial Strike Out Application, without any specific Rule allowing ASIC to do so) and further escaped the important provisions of the below Rule 250(1) which required ASIC to deny any of my allegations, if ASIC believed they were not true. In absence of a denial, the Allegations were deemed true.
2 AsJ Holt erred when HH denied me the right to cross examine ASIC's Deponent/s of their Affidavits when HH refused the final request for an adjournment. The result being that AsJ Holt then believed every word of ASIC's Affidavits and Pleadings, because they were then blocked from being able to be challenged, when in fact they were totally false and totally fraudulent as outlined below. In doing so, ABJ was denied Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness.
3 AsJ Holt also denied ABJ Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice in refusing ABJ's Interlocutory Application pursuant to Rule 250 (1) Allegations not denied are admitted, where ASIC had over 3 months under the SCT Rules, to deny the many sworn allegation by ABJ against ASIC and ASIC's employees. If not denied, then this Court by law, deems such allegations as being admitted by ASIC or that ASIC employee. This was despite ABJ's 2 month's extended invitation to enable ASIC to deny any of the 30 or so, serious allegations. Had AsJ Holt have applied this almost 100 year old Rule 250(1) and so deemed the serious unrefuted allegations as being admitted, then ABJ could have then sought Summary Orders against ASIC and struck out their interlocutory strike Out Application and even upheld ABJ's Preliminary Discovery Application. Alternatively, used that vital evidence to advance its case, but was instead totally shut out.
4 AsJ Holt erred manifestly, when despite the clear evidence and non-denial by ASIC, that it had handed over to ABJ and this Court, as evidence, a fraudulent Court Transcript from Qld Supreme Court before CJ de Jersey of 20 September 2008, AsJ Holt just ignored the fact that it was a Fraud in which ASIC was implicated. Here, 2 full pages of Court Transcript were secretly deleted by collusion between ASIC and the Qld State Recording Bureau, where ASIC benefited by over $400,000 from the highly illegal, deletion of 2 full pages of crucial transcript. This was despite ABJ revealing that ASIC in dealing with their fraudulent transcript, which criminal allegation, ASIC refused to deny here, even when given a 2 month warning to deny it, or else accept that it's deemed true. This complicity was argued to be a serious breach of the Criminal Code 1899 SECT 433 Receiving tainted property and Sect 12 (1) of Qld Recording of Evidences Act 1962, which together attracted a maximum term of imprisonment of 19 Years, not to mention the 25 years for Perverting the Course of Justice. AsJ Holt failed to even 'bat an eyelid' over such a monumental criminal act by the Government 'Model Litigant', despite the fact that I had stated that the HCA and other UK leading authorities, have declared time and again, that once Fraud is proven, and infects a case, then the entire case must be set aside. The Simon Dwyer Report which ASIC also relied on, was also argued by me as being a total fraud (as Dwyer was influenced by the accused ASIC officers and ASIC hierarchy to reverse his initial guilty finding, to not guilty), and yet amazingly, not a word of my very serious fraud allegation, was denied. Yet AsJ Holt not only refused to enforce the Rules of 391 and 250, HH did the opposite and relied on every bit of ASIC's fraudulent evidence, to uphold their strike Out Application.
5 AsJ Holt erred at the beginning in even allowing ASIC to file an interlocutory Application to strike out ABJ's Preliminary Application, when there was no such specific Rule in the Supreme Court of Tasmania Rules, to do so. Afterall, it was virtually just an innocuous Preliminary Discovery Application, where the Bar to get over it, is comparatively, very low. This gave ASIC an unfair advantage of running their strike out Application, without having to file any sort of defence, nor having to comply with the above pivotal Rules 391(1) and 250(1). In particular, it served to give ASIC an exemption from being cross examined on ASIC's Affidavits, which gave ASIC an unprecedented free pass, to make their own rules and do as they pleased, instead of complying with the Rules of this Court and Procedural Fairness.
6 AsJ Holt erred when HH refused to grant a further short adjournment to ABJ when he had to deal with a further important family emergency in travelling to Vietnam where his 1 year old son, who had been awaiting 9 months for his Australian Citizenship (by descent), to be approved, to then get a special 602 Medical Treatment Visa to be granted, to enable his diagnosed heart problem to be treated in Melbourne Royal Children's Hospital. ABJ in putting his 1 yo highly vulnerable son as a higher priority than proceeding with an already adjourned interlocutory application, which delay presented ASIC really, no prejudice anyway. This reason for a further adjournment, was further justified by ABJ lodging a Judicial Review under the ADJR Act 1977 of AsJ Holt's decision to ignore ABJ's plea's to hear his arguments on the 2 above Rules 250 and 391, first. In ABJ making such a Judicial Review Application, brings with it an automatic stay, which was ignored by AsJ Holt and instead, HH permitted ASIC to plough on ahead with its strike out in ABJ's absence, who was already in Vietnam trying to bring his 1 yo son to Melbourne RCH for medical treatment on his heart condition. How could AsJ Holt possibly argue that there was no evidence to prove the urgency on my 1 yo son, being treated in a 3rd world country, where their leading children's hospital, warned of his condition in their report where Pulmonary Value Stenosis has the effect of retarding growth and causing a 1 yo baby to have other health issues? HH callously stated this, yet allowed a leading Government agency, 'the Model Litigant', ASIC to 'peddle' their highly fraudulent 'doctored' transcript in this Supreme Court to try and discredit my worthiness to obtain Preliminary Discovery. Every party in a court case is entitled to view the key documents of the opposition. ABJ likened AsJ Holt's decision to hear ASIC's Strike out before HH was able to show the Fraud, was like 'first executing a prisoner on death row, then hearing his Governor's Application for a stay due to a belated confession by another suspect.'
7 AsJ Holt further erred manifestly so, where after ASIC consuming 2 half days with their submissions, then after I delivered my 10 minute submissions over the phone from Vietnam, then within literally just 30 seconds of me saying 'That's all Your Honour', HH immediately read out his lengthy decision upholding ASIC's strike out Application and dismissing my Applications. This sadly demonstrated that this instant decision and HH's reading out his reasons, could only mean, that AsJ Holt had already made up his mind, before I even delivered my submissions on that mobile phone hook up. Hence consistent with HH's entire hearing of this matter, was totally biased.
And seeks the following orders:
1That the Decision of AsJ Holt published on the 28th November 2019, be set aside.
2 The Applicant's said 4 Interlocutory Applications be upheld.
3The Applicant's Amended Originating Application only seeking Preliminary Discovery, be Ordered.
4Costs Ordered in Appellant's favour."
Rule 657(4) applies to appeals from a final judgment or interlocutory judgment of the Associate Judge ( by virtue of r 680A(3A)) and provides:
"(4) The notice of appeal is to state –
(a) the part of the judgment that is being appealed; and
(b) specifically and concisely the grounds of appeal; and
(c) what judgment is sought."
Contrary to r 657(4), the applicant's "grounds" of appeal do not refer to the part of the reasons that are being appealed and do not specifically and concisely state the grounds of appeal. The seven grounds are lengthy and unclear and contain a mixture of allegations of facts and law.
It has been demonstrated from the history of this appeal and the applicant's affidavit that some of the delay arose from the lack of clarity around whether the notice of appeal complied with the rules and in particular whether the appeal should be to a single judge or the Full Court. Still, there was a delay of some two months from the time when the applicant was informed of the correct state of affairs and the filing of his application and the draft notice. There is no explanation for that period. However, I consider that the problems with the form of the grounds of appeal and the delay in this case should not, as factors on their own, prevent the appeal proceeding. The applicant is self-represented and in the circumstances of this case, if his appeal has reasonable prospects of succeeding, an extension of time should be granted. In other words, in the circumstances of this case, the prospects of the appeal succeeding should be the determinative factor. I turn to consider the merits of each ground of appeal.
Ground 1: Denial of procedural fairness regarding the application for production of documents.
Before Holt AsJ, Mr Jorgensen sought to inspect documents being "reports of Mr Dwyer" on the basis that they were referred to in an affidavit filed in the proceedings and relying on r 391. Holt AsJ dealt with this application at [24]-[31]. He concluded that the documents sought, the reports of Mr Dwyer, were not the documents referred to in the affidavit and therefore under the rules cannot be the subject of a notice to inspect or an order for production. Further, he accepted the point made for the respondent that the application was an abuse of process and that the applicant was manipulating court procedures, in this case where the substantive proceedings related to production of documents, by "calling for production for inspection based on references in affidavits to the documents in dispute."
The applicant asserts that Holt AsJ failed to afford him procedural fairness in not first hearing the application to inspect documents, whereby this denial to inspect ASIC's documents "removed the right or ability of …[the applicant]…to be able to exercise his natural right to event test the truthfulness or accuracy of ASIC's many allegations…" Noting that the Associate Judge concluded at [32] that the application for production of the documents could not succeed and was an abuse of process, that would have been the result regardless of whether the application had been heard first. This assertion and other aspects of this ground of appeal fail to identify any error in the reasons set out in the judgment, and rather, dwell on the consequences he claims follow.
There is no merit in ground one. There is no identification of an error of fact or law in the reasoning leading to the failure of the application.
Ground 2: Denial of procedural fairness regarding cross-examination
The applicant claims that Holt AsJ failed to afford him procedural fairness by not permitting him to cross-examine the solicitor for ASIC, Ms McKean. The hearing before the learned Associate Judge commenced on 30 October 2019 and concluded on 20 November 2019. The applicant sent an email on 19 November 2019, the day before the second hearing date, stating that he required Ms McKean to be present for cross-examination. Notice to cross-examine a deponent of an affidavit is required under r 463. That was entirely inadequate notice when Ms McKean was based in Canberra. Ms McKean had not been present at the earlier hearing date of 30 October 2019 and he had not then sought to cross-examine her or foreshadowed a request for the next occasion.
The applicant's inability to cross-examine Ms McKean was entirely the consequence of his failure to give sufficient notice of a requirement that Ms McKean be present at the hearing for cross-examination.
The ground seems to tie the denying of the right to cross-examine to the refusal of an adjournment of the hearing, and asserts this resulted in a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness. The transcript reveals that in applying for an adjournment the applicant relied on the fact he wanted to bring an application for Ms McKean to be present and submit to cross-examination.
The adjournment was refused with reasons to be published later, and the hearing proceeded with the applicant participating by telephone.
In his published decision, Holt AsJ gave reasons for refusing the adjournment at [19]. His Honour highlighted that the affidavits of the witness Ms McKean had been read into evidence on 30 October and that Mr Jorgensen had not objected to the affidavits being tendered. His Honour referred to the lack of a notice under r 463. His Honour also highlighted that the applicant did not set out any purpose for cross-examination or raise any matters that he intended to canvass in cross-examination if the adjournment was granted. There is nothing at all before the learned Associate Judge (or now for that matter) to suggest that there was any error in the approach taken or that the applicant has been denied natural justice or procedural fairness. This ground is futile.
Ground 3: Allegations of fact not denied should be taken to be admitted
Relevantly to this ground of appeal, the applicant's interlocutory application was in terms that:
"Pursuant to Reg 250 Allegations not denied are admitted, the Applicant hereby seeks a Declaration from this Court that the allegations made by me in my pleadings constituted by my 2 affidavits dated 21 June 2019 and 17 July 2019, and not denied, …, are deemed as admitted by the respondent."
The learned Associate Judge set out the terms of r 250(1) and explained at [36] that the rule has no operation other than in the context of pleadings and that the role of pleadings, unlike affidavits, is the identification of facts in issue. He concluded that the interlocutory application was misconceived and had to be dismissed.
The ground of appeal fails to identify any error of fact or law and in reality is no more than an expression of grievance and an assertion that r 250 has application. As stated by the Associate Judge the rule does not apply to the applicant's affidavits and his application is misconceived. So is this ground of appeal.
Ground 4: The Queensland transcript and the allegation that the Dwyer Report was a fraud
The applicant claims that Holt AsJ erred in ignoring the assertions that ASIC had presented a fraudulent court transcript involving two missing pages, and that the Dwyer report was a "total fraud" and moreover, Holt AsJ relied upon this evidence to support the strike-out application. The respondent argues that this ground is completely misconceived and that neither the correctness of the Queensland Supreme Court transcript nor the content of the Dwyer Report were in issue in the proceeding before Holt AsJ. It was submitted that they were "merely part of the chronology of events that were necessary to be understood to follow Mr Jorgensen's allegations of fraud, which had been made repeatedly and on many occasions, and which are baseless and scandalous."
In par 2 of his originating application, the application identifies two matters in respect of which he is considering taking proceedings concerning events in 1999 and in 2007. The reasons of Holt AsJ explore the elaboration of these events in the applicant's affidavits. The reasons for dismissing the application appear at [53] of the judgment. In essence the reason was that the prospective actions have been the subject of proceedings in Victoria and New South Wales with the claims dismissed. The events complained of occurred, respectively, 20 years and 12 years ago. His Honour concluded that:
"To fail to intervene and bring the current proceeding to an early end in these circumstances would, in my opinion, be unfair and oppressive to ASIC and likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Mr Jorgensen's obsession with his complaints about ASIC has reached the point of indefensible harassment. Accordingly, I made an order dismissing the originating application on 20 November."
The allegations that the transcript and the report were fraudulent were the subject of submissions before the Associate Judge. In fact, it seems from the submissions before the learned Associate Judge that the allegations of the "fraudulent transcript" and the Dwyer report had been brought to the attention of courts in other proceedings.
It can be seen from the reasons of Holt AsJ that the correctness or otherwise of the transcript and the report had no bearing on the conclusion reached concerning the applicant's originating application. The reason it was brought to an end was because the prospective proceeding had been the subject of litigation and was unfair and oppressive. There was no reliance on the evidence said to be fraudulent in reaching that conclusion. In fact, in terms of the transcript, the Associate Judge had both the true and untrue versions of the transcript before him.
It seems from the transcript of the applicant's submissions before Holt AsJ and now in these proceedings, that the applicant misunderstood the role of the Associate Judge. It seems that he regarded the Associate Judge as an investigator who would be intent on getting to the bottom of the allegations and outing the truth. However, the role of the Associate Judge was to determine the proceedings before him, having regard to the implications of the allegations if true. They were not the subject of findings one way or another, they did not fall for consideration. Rather, the allegations were background to the prospective proceeding and part of the history of events. It has not been shown that there was error in the conclusion reached that the matters had been litigated and the proceedings should be brought to an end. There is no merit in this ground of appeal.
Ground 5: ASIC'S strike-out application
It is asserted that Holt AsJ erred in allowing ASIC to file an interlocutory application to strike out his originating application for discovery, when there was not specific rule in the Rules allowing him to do so. The learned Associate Judge dismissed the originating application on the basis that to fail to do so would be unfair and oppressive to ASIC. He referred to Walton v Gardiner [1993] HCA 9, 177 CLR 378 at [23] as authority for the inherent jurisdiction of a superior court to stay its proceedings on grounds of abuse of process. Citing Walton v Gardiner at pp 392–393, he noted that the inherent jurisdiction extends to all those categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the court, "which exist to administer justice and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness … or if … their continuance would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it is sought to litigate anew a case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings."
The court has an inherent power to control proceedings before it, including by staying or dismissing a proceeding that is an abuse of process or frivolous or vexatious: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256 at 266-268, 270; Walton v Gardiner (as above), Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioner (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 84, 91. If the court is satisfied that a claim or defence is an abuse of process, it may terminate the proceeding summarily and strike out the pleading. The court has that power without any court rule enabling it to make the order. The ground of appeal rests on a false premise.
Ground 6: Refusing an adjournment
In his ground of appeal the applicant asserts that Holt AsJ erred in refusing to grant him an adjournment on 20 November. He relies on the health status of his infant son, and that he had lodged an application under the Judicial Review Act 2020 (Tas) for review of the decisions of Holt AsJ.
Reasons for the refusal of the adjournment application are at [9]–[22]. As noted, the listing on 20 November was the resumption of the hearing which had commenced on 30 October when the applicant had been present in person. Evidently by 20 November the hearing was at its closing stages. One of the reasons for the adjournment was to enable the applicant to attend the hearing given that he was then in Vietnam. The applicant made his application for an adjournment by telephone and ultimately after his application was refused, and the hearing continued, the applicant was permitted to participate by telephone.
The transcript of the hearing on 20 November reveals that the applicant relied upon his written submissions and made additional oral submissions over the phone. He made those submissions without any apparent disadvantage or difficulty arising from his participation by telephone. The applicant does not point to any prejudice in the hearing proceeding by telephone rather than in person. Any application under the Judicial Review Act (if it was still being pressed by the applicant at that time) regarding the decisions to hear the interlocutory applications did not warrant an adjournment of the hearing. This ground has no prospects of success.
Ground 7: Actual bias
The applicant asserts that the Associate Judge was biased because at the conclusion of the applicant's oral submissions the Associate Judge read out his lengthy decision upholding ASIC's strike-out application and dismissing his applications. He said that this demonstrated that the Associate Judge had already made up his mind, "before I even delivered my submissions".
In fact, at the conclusion of the hearing, Holt AsJ made orders and provided published reasons at a later date. The Associate Judge had good notice of the applicant's position. Again as noted previously, the hearing was part-heard and on 20 November it was at its closing stages. Indeed, Holt AsJ said:
"I've had the advantage of reading the written submissions submitted by both parties and the affidavits which were read into evidence. I've listened attentively to the submissions presented orally on 30 October and today. The outcome of the various interlocutory applications is clear to me beyond question. I will make orders now and publish my written reasons for so doing to the parties by email at a later date."
It is unsurprising that given the information the Associate Judge had in advance of the hearing on 20 November, the nature of the issues to be determined and his experience in deciding such cases, that he was able to decide the case and make orders there and then. I can see little if anything in the oral submissions made by the applicant at the hearing that would need any additional consideration time. There is no merit in this ground.
Conclusion
The draft notice of appeal fails to disclose a single ground of appeal that has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. The draft notice of appeal is totally devoid of merit. It is not in the interests of justice that the application should be granted. The same observation applies to the original notice of appeal. Both applications to extend time are dismissed.
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