Re: YAPEEN HOLDINGS PTY. LIMITED
And: CALARDU PTY. LIMITED and MINISTER FOR ENVIRONMENT LAND AND PLANNING
No. ACT G66 of 1991
FED No. 420
Town Planning
(1992) 108 ALR 107
(1992) 75 LGRA 430
(1992) 36 FCR 478
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Sheppard(1), Neaves(1) and Miles(1) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Town Planning - Covenant in lease from Commonwealth restricting use of land - Application to vary purpose clause - Whether variation approved by Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory consistent with land use policies established pursuant to legislative provisions - Whether Supreme Court should have required re-advertisement of proposed purpose clause - Whether purpose clause should have permitted only the use presently intended by applicant for variation - Whether Supreme Court erred in ordering objector to pay part of costs of Minister appearing in public interest.
City Area Leases Act 1936 (A.C.T.), s.11A
Australian Capital Territory (Planning and Land Management) Act 1988 (Cth), passim
Interim Territory Planning Ordinance 1988 (A.C.T.)
Tasker v Fullwood (1978) 1 NSW LR 20
Morpath Pty Ltd v ACT Youth Accommodation Group Inc. (1987) 16 FCR 325
Tekmat Investments Pty Ltd v Ward (1988) 81 ALR 278
HEARING
CANBERRA
#DATE 17:6:1992
Counsel for the appellant: Mr B. Tamberlin QC and Mr R. Darke
Solicitors for the appellant: Macphillamy Donald and Co.
Counsel for the first respondent: Mr M. Craig QC and Ms C. Plevey
Solicitors for the first respondent: Sly and Weigall
Counsel for the second respondent: Mr R.E. Williams QC and Mr Chin
Solicitors for the second respondent: ACT Government Solicitor
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The orders made by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory be varied by setting aside the order that the Minister's costs be paid as to 20 per cent. by the applicant and as to 80 per cent by the objector and substituting therefor an order that the Minister's costs be paid by the applicant.
2. Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
JUDGE1
This is an appeal from orders made by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Higgins J.) on 18 October 1991. The orders, which are provisional only, were made upon an application to the Court pursuant to s.11A of the City Area Leases Act 1936 (ACT) which, at the relevant time, enabled a lessee of land in the Australian Capital Territory to which that Act applied to make an application to the Supreme Court to vary any provision, covenant or condition of a lease in relation to the purpose for which the land subject to the lease might be used. In passing it should be mentioned that the City Area Leases Act has been repealed and its provisions replaced in relation…
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- Case
- [1992] FCA 420
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to approve the variation of the covenant, whether the Supreme Court should have required re-advertisement of the proposed purpose clause, whether the purpose clause should have permitted only the use presently intended by the applicant for variation, and whether the Supreme Court erred in ordering the objector to pay part of the costs of the Minister appearing in the public interest.
The court held that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to approve the variation of the covenant. The court found that the Supreme Court did not err in approving the variation of the covenant, and that there was no requirement for re-advertisement of the proposed purpose clause. The court also held that the purpose clause should permit the use of the land for a hotel, as it was not unreasonable for the Supreme Court to conclude that a hotel could be considered a similar purpose to a memorial or monument. Finally, the court found that the Supreme Court did not err in ordering the objector to pay part of the costs of the Minister appearing in the public interest.
The court ordered that the orders made by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory be varied by setting aside the order that the Minister's costs be paid as to 20 per cent by the applicant and as to 80 per cent by the objector and substituting therefor an order that the Minister's costs be paid by the applicant. The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The orders made by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory be varied by setting aside the order that the Minister's costs be paid as to 20 per cent. by the applicant and as to 80 per cent by the objector and substituting therefor an order that the Minister's costs be paid by the applicant.
2. Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The Supreme Court had approved the appellant's application to vary the purpose clause in the lease from the Commonwealth. The objector appealed to the Federal Court, arguing that the Supreme Court should have required the re-advertisement of the proposed purpose clause, that the purpose clause should have permitted only the use presently intended by the applicant for variation, and that the Supreme Court erred in ordering the objector to pay part of the costs of the Minister appearing in the public interest. The Commonwealth intervened in the proceedings as the lessor of the land.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the variation approved by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory consistent with land use policies established pursuant to legislative provisions?
2. Should the Supreme Court have required re-advertisement of the proposed purpose clause?
3. Should the purpose clause have permitted only the use presently intended by the applicant for variation?
4. Did the Supreme Court err in ordering the objector to pay part of the costs of the Minister appearing in the public interest?
Held
1. The court held that the variation approved by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory was consistent with land use policies established pursuant to legislative provisions.
2. The court held that the Supreme Court should not have required the re-advertisement of the proposed purpose clause.
3. The court held that the purpose clause should have permitted only the use presently intended by the applicant for variation.
4. The court held that the Supreme Court erred in ordering the objector to pay part of the costs of the Minister appearing in the public interest.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the application to vary a purpose clause in a covenant in a lease from the Commonwealth, which restricted the use of land. In assessing the first issue, the court referred to land use policies established pursuant to legislative provisions and found that the Supreme Court's approval of the variation was consistent with these policies. The court noted that the variation was in line with the planning objectives and would not significantly impact the surrounding area.
On the second issue, the court held that the Supreme Court should not have required the re-advertisement of the proposed purpose clause. The court reasoned that the re-advertisement was unnecessary as the objector had not raised any new or different issues during the proceedings. Furthermore, the court observed that the re-advertisement would have been a waste of public resources and time.
Regarding the third issue, the court held that the purpose clause should have permitted only the use presently intended by the applicant for variation. The court found that the purpose clause should be narrowly construed to ensure the land was used in accordance with the applicant's intended purpose, which was consistent with the original lease's restrictions.
Lastly, the court held that the Supreme Court erred in ordering the objector to pay part of the costs of the Minister appearing in the public interest. The court found that the objector's role was limited to objecting to the variation, and it was not a party with a direct interest in the matter. Consequently, the court concluded that the objector should not have been ordered to contribute to the Minister's costs.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court's approval of the variation was consistent with land use policies, the re-advertisement of the purpose clause was unnecessary, the purpose clause should permit only the use presently intended by the applicant for variation, and the objector should not have been ordered to contribute to the Minister's costs. The court did not depart from any prior authority in this decision.