Federal Court of Australia
Alhalek v Quintiliani trading as Kells Lawyers [2020] FCA 1272
File number: NSD 336 of 2020 Judgment of: mARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 7 September 2020 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – application to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether the applicant has a counter-claim, set off or cross demand – whether the judgment underlying the bankruptcy notice will be set aside – whether the bankruptcy notice constitutes an abuse of process – where there was no evidence that the judgment underlying the bankruptcy notice was served – where applicant claims he was solvent – whether time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice should be extended – application dismissed Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30, 40(1)(g), 41 Cases cited: Coshott v Prentice, in the matter of Coshott (No 2) [2016] FCA 1531
Glew v Harrowell, in the matter of Glew [2003] FCA 373; (2003) 198 ALR 331
Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; (2000) 171 ALR 598
Royal v Nazloomian, in the matter of Royal [2019] FCA 555
Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666
Seller v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 865; (2011) 282 ALR 80
Sharpe v W H Bailey & Sons Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 921; (2014) 317 ALR 738
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 99 Date of hearing: 10 August 2020 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr M Sibley of MDW Law Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr M Micevski of Kells Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 336 of 2020 BETWEEN: MR KYLED ALHALEK
Applicant
AND: MARIO QUINTILIANI, PETER CHODAT, DAVID POTTS, AMY HARPER, MICHAEL HATFIELD AND PAUL MAGANINO T/AS KELLS LAWYERS
Respondents
order made by:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 SEPTEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The amended application filed on 22 July 2020 be dismissed.
2.Pursuant to s 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), extend the time for compliance with bankruptcy notice BN 248915 issued on 19 March 2020 to the applicant to 14 September 2020.
3.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J
On 19 March 2020 bankruptcy notice BN 248915 was issued by the Official Receiver to the applicant, Kyled Alhalek (Bankruptcy Notice). Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Notice, Mario Quintiliani, Peter Chodat, David Potts, Amy Harper, Michael Hatfield and Paul Maganino trading as Kells Lawyers (Kells) seek payment of the amount of $21,738.24 from Mr Alhalek.
By amended application filed on 22 July 2020 Mr Alhalek seeks an order setting aside the Bankruptcy Notice or, in the alternative, extending the time for compliance with it.
Background
Costs assessment application
As is evident, Kells is a law firm. Mario Quintiliani, a partner of Kells, formerly acted for Mr Alhalek, having been retained on or about 6 February 2018 to represent him in two proceedings in the Local Court…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1272
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the bankruptcy notice constituted an abuse of process, whether there was evidence that the judgment underlying the bankruptcy notice would be set aside, and whether the applicant had a counter-claim, set off or cross demand. The court considered whether the Bankruptcy Notice was issued in bad faith or as a means of pressuring the applicant to pay the debt. The court also assessed the applicant’s financial position and whether there was any evidence that the judgment underlying the bankruptcy notice would be set aside. Finally, the court considered whether the applicant had any counter-claim, set off or cross demand that could be set against the debt.
The court found that there was no evidence that the judgment underlying the bankruptcy notice would be set aside. The court also found that the Bankruptcy Notice was not an abuse of process, as Kells had attempted to garnishee the applicant’s bank accounts and had not employed any other meaningful form of execution. The court further found that the applicant did not have any counter-claim, set off or cross demand that could be set against the debt. The court held that the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was not made out. However, the court extended the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice to 14 September 2020 and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs.
In summary, the court dismissed the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice but extended the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended application filed on 22 July 2020 be dismissed.
2. Pursuant to s 41(6A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), extend the time for compliance with bankruptcy notice BN 248915 issued on 19 March 2020 to the applicant to 14 September 2020.
3. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Alhalek submits that he will be successful in the Judicial Review Proceeding and will have the Determination set aside. On the assumption that he is successful in the Judicial Review Proceeding, he also submits that, if his subsequent review is successful, the debt underpinning the Bankruptcy Notice will change, the Bankruptcy Notice will be invalid and therefore it should be set aside.Consideration Mr Alhalek acts for himself in the Judicial Review Proceeding. Little weight can be given to his assertion that he will be successful in that proceeding. But even if I was to accept that to be so, success in that proceeding will result in the quashing of the Determination and the remittal of the application for an extension of time to bring the Review Application to a different decision-maker. That is, the matter will be remitted to re-determine the extension of time application. It is only if Mr Alhalek is successful in obtaining an extension of time that the Review Application will proceed and the costs assessment reconsidered. Thereafter, it is only if the costs assessor accepts some or all of Mr Alhalek’s grounds in his Review Application that the Costs Certificate which underpins the Costs Judgment will change and thus the amount due to Kells will change. There is no evidence before me, other than Mr Alhalek’s own opinion that he will be successful in achieving a reduction in the assessed costs, of Mr Alhalek’s prospects of obtaining an extension of time within which to bring his Review Application, or the likelihood of Mr Alhalek’s grounds of review achieving some measure of success in reducing the assessed amount of Kells’ costs and, if so, the likely quantum of that reduction. The contention that there will be a variation of the Costs Certificate and thus a variation or setting aside of the Costs Judgment is mere speculation. In those circumstances it is not possible to conclude that the Judicial Review Proceeding and, if successful, the applications that will or may follow will lead to a setting aside or variation of the Costs Judgment such that the Bankruptcy Notice should be set aside. This ground is not made out.Does the Bankruptcy Notice constitute an abuse of process? The third ground relied on by Mr Alhalek to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice is that it is an abuse of process. Mr Alhalek submits that, while Kells attempted to garnishee two bank accounts, they were accounts which he no longer used or in which he had minimal funds. He contends that at no stage after obtaining the Costs Judgment did Kells write to him to ascertain whether he had alternative bank accounts with funds sufficient to satisfy the debt, such as his account held at the NAB. Mr Alhalek submits that it was unreasonable for Kells to draw the inference that he was insolvent as a corollary of the insufficiency of funds in bank accounts known by Kells to be in his name and that the Court should refuse to draw that inference on that basis. Mr Alhalek submits that despite issuing two garnishee notices, both of which were unsuccessful, Kells did not attempt any other meaningful form of execution including, for example, issuing an application for examination or a letter of demand. Mr Alhalek says, had Kells issued an application for examination or a letter of demand, he would have responded and Kells may then have properly determined his true financial position and may have agreed suitable payment terms with him. Mr Alhalek submits that in circumstances where Kells did not employ meaningful execution methods or exhaust those methods, beyond a meagre unsuccessful attempt to garnishee obsolete bank accounts, the Court should draw an inference, akin to that drawn in Royal v Nazloomian, in the matter of Royal [2019] FCA 555 (Nazloomian) at [74], that Kells issued the Bankruptcy Notice with the intention of pressuring him.