FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barton v Malcolm Johns Legal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 166
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 166
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal centred on whether the primary judge erred in finding insufficient evidence of a counter-claim. The key legal issue was whether the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in relation to Mr Barton’s cross-claim. The appeal court reviewed the relevant case law, particularly Guss v Johnstone, which emphasised the need to evaluate the strength and merit of the counter-claim. The court assessed Mr Barton’s arguments regarding the misappropriation of trust funds and the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by Mr Johns. The appeal court found that Mr Barton failed to demonstrate how certain allegations gave rise to a counter-claim or how the primary judge erred in dismissing the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.
The appeal court held that the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion. The court found that Mr Barton did not sufficiently explain how certain allegations constituted a counter-claim under section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court also noted that the onus was on Mr Barton to demonstrate the existence of a counter-claim. The appeal court concluded that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court ruled that the primary judge’s decision was correct and that Mr Barton failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the primary judge. The dismissal of the appeal affirmed the primary judge’s exercise of discretion and the dismissal of the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The decision whether a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand is of the relevant kind necessarily involves an evaluation on the part of the primary judge as to the strength of the claim.Consideration In his written submissions, Mr Barton identified the following allegations in the cross claim concerning Mr Johns as significant:·Mr Johns was a linked credit provider;·Mr Johns misappropriated trust account monies totalling $56,000;·Mr Johns made misrepresentations totalling $1.5 million that induced Mr Barton to sign a document referred to as the “Smits Deed”;·Mr Johns made misrepresentations that induced Mr Barton to sign a deed of settlement with the “A3F investors”;·Mr Johns breached his fiduciary duties to Mr Barton and contravened the Legal Profession Act2004 (NSW). Mr Barton did not explain how Mr Johns’ position as a linked credit provider, separately from the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, gave rise to a counter-claim in his favour, or how the primary judge had erred in failing to address this aspect of the cross claim. In the absence of any explanation of Mr Barton’s case on this issue, I am not satisfied that there was any appellable error on the part of the primary judge concerning this issue. In his written submissions, Mr Barton contended that the primary judge erred because responses had not been filed by Mr Johns, MJL, Roberts Fund and Mr Smits to Mr Barton’s allegations in the Robert Funds proceedings, and because Mr Johns had not admitted matters disclosed in a notice to admit facts and authenticity of documents. This submission cannot be accepted. The onus falls on Mr Barton to demonstrate the existence of a counter-claim within the meaning of s 40(1)(g): cf Glew v Harrowell [2003] FCA 373; (2003) 198 ALR 331 at [8]. In any event, no adverse inference can be drawn against MJL from the acts or omissions of other parties, and no adverse inference can be drawn against MJL for failing to respond to a cross claim that MJL applied to have struck out.Alleged misappropriation of trust funds I have considered the evidence identified in Mr Barton’s first submissions, which referred to the following matters:(a)In late March 2011, Mr Johns borrowed $150,000 from the Larden-Smiths, who were clients of Mr Johns;(b)On 4 April 2011 Mr Johns sent Mr Barton an email saying that “we have to pay $50,000 back to the Welsh Estate which I will pay out of the balance of $52,080.48”;(c)The amount of $52,080.48 was the amount remaining from the loan of $150,000 after certain other payments were made;(d)Mr Johns as trustee of the Welsh estate filed a cross claim in the Roberts Fund proceeding against Mr Barton claimed an amount of $180,000, and made no reference to the repayment of $50,000;(e)By email dated 15 September 2011, Mr Jones told Mr Barton that Roberts Fund had agreed to increase its loan to him, and that the additional funds should be applied to various debts including an amount of $6,000 for a surveyor;(f)There was a variation of a mortgage to reflect the increased loan from Roberts Fund; (g)In October 2012, Mr Barton received a bankruptcy notice “as the surveyor…had not been paid the $6,000”;(h)On 12 October 2012, Mr Barton “had issued a bank cheque for $8,684.88…in payment for survey work on the Nanima subdivision land pursuant to the invoice issued prior to 15 September 2011”.