Barton v Malcolm Johns Legal Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barton v Malcolm Johns Legal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 166

Citation: Barton v Malcolm Johns Legal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 166
Appeal from: Barton v Malcolm Johns Legal Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 1287
Parties: NATHANIAL KELBURN DUNBAR BARTON v MALCOLM JOHNS LEGAL PTY LTD
File number(s): NSD 760 of 2014
Judge(s): GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 6 March 2015
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application for review of decision to dismiss application to set aside a bankruptcy notice – where primary judge decided not to dismiss creditor’s petition and to make sequestration order – discretion to set aside bankruptcy notice – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30(1), 43, 52(2) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30, 40(1)(g), 41(7), 43, 52
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 91
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 24, 25(1AA)
Legal Profession Act2004 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 14.28
Cases cited: Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174
Batistatos v Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256
Brunninghausen v Glavanics [1998] FCA 230
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1994) 217 ALR 251
Cain v Whyte [1932] HCA 6; (1933) 48 CLR 639
Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] FCAFC 84
Clapham v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2013] FCAFC 84
Commonwealth Bank v Pattison [2012] FCA 1397
Dixon v Barton [2011] NSWSC 1525
Dynamic Hearing Pty Ltd v Poliaris Communications Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 135; (2011) 273 ALR 696
Ebert v Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd [1960] HCA 50; (1960) 104 CLR 346
Ex parte Esanda Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 61; (1980) 30 ALR 77
Glew v Harrowell [2003] FCA 373; (2003) 198 ALR 331
Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; (2000) 171 ALR 598
House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Khouzame v All Seasons Air Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1319
Killoran v Duncan [1999] FCA 1574
Lindholdt v Merritt Madden Printing Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 260
Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427
Minister of State for Home Affairs v Siam Polyethylene Co Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 106
Narain v Euroasia (Pacific) Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1352
PNJ v R [2009] HCA 6; (2006) 252 ALR 612
Re Athans; Ex parte Athans (1991) 29 FCR 302 at 310; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2003] FCAFC 274; (2003) 133 FCR 487
Re Briggs; Ex Parte Briggs v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 12 FCR 310
Re Dolman; Ex parte Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd (1967) 10 FLR 384
Re Gould; Ex parte Skinner (1983) 72 FLR 393
Re Lentini; Ex parte Lentini v CSR Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 363
Re Schmidt; Ex parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 111
Rogers v R [1994] HCA 42; (1994) 181 CLR 251
Rose v Meriton Apartments…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 166
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Barton v Malcolm Johns Legal Pty Ltd (No 2) involved an appeal against a decision to dismiss an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice. The appellant, Mr Barton, represented himself and submitted written and oral arguments. The dispute had a long history, including litigation dating back to 2000, with Mr Barton borrowing substantial sums to fund legal proceedings. The respondent, Malcolm Johns Legal Pty Ltd (MJL), was Mr Barton’s solicitor until 2012. In 2013, MJL, acting as trustee of the Welsh estate, filed a cross-claim against Mr Barton. Mr Barton filed a cross-claim in return, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty by MJL and its principal, Mr Johns. The primary judge dismissed the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice, leading to the appeal.

The appeal centred on whether the primary judge erred in finding insufficient evidence of a counter-claim. The key legal issue was whether the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in relation to Mr Barton’s cross-claim. The appeal court reviewed the relevant case law, particularly Guss v Johnstone, which emphasised the need to evaluate the strength and merit of the counter-claim. The court assessed Mr Barton’s arguments regarding the misappropriation of trust funds and the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by Mr Johns. The appeal court found that Mr Barton failed to demonstrate how certain allegations gave rise to a counter-claim or how the primary judge erred in dismissing the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

The appeal court held that the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion. The court found that Mr Barton did not sufficiently explain how certain allegations constituted a counter-claim under section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. The court also noted that the onus was on Mr Barton to demonstrate the existence of a counter-claim. The appeal court concluded that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court ruled that the primary judge’s decision was correct and that Mr Barton failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the primary judge. The dismissal of the appeal affirmed the primary judge’s exercise of discretion and the dismissal of the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Barton appeared in person at the hearing of this appeal. In addition to his oral submissions, Mr Barton submitted two sets of written submissions, being submissions filed on 8 October 2014 (“first submissions”) and submissions entitled “submissions in reply” dated 7 November 2014 (“second submissions”). Background to the appeal There is a very long history of disputation and litigation that precedes this appeal, reaching back to as early as November 2000. MJL was Mr Barton’s solicitor from about June 2009 until at least October 2012. During that time, Mr Barton borrowed substantial amounts to fund his involvement in litigation. There were several lenders including, it appears, clients or associates of MJL. One action was a claim against Mr Barton in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (“Supreme Court”) concerning the consequences of the discharge of mortgages securing loans of $450,000 made to Mr Barton. Mr Barton was unsuccessful in those proceedings: Dixon v Barton [2011] NSWSC 1525 (“Dixon”). In those proceedings, Mr Barton was represented by Mr Cotman SC and Mr Hyde of counsel. Ward J found that the mortgages had been discharged as a result of a mistake on the part of the plaintiffs’ solicitor and that it was unconscionable for Mr Barton to seek to take advantage of the mistaken discharge of the mortgages. Her Honour made orders requiring, among other things, that Mr Barton execute mortgages to stand as security for the payment of the $450,000 together with interest and costs. According to Mr Barton’s first submissions, in July 2013, Roberts Fund Pty Ltd (“Roberts Fund”) commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking relief against several parties including Mr Barton (“Roberts Fund proceeding”). The orders sought include an order for a judicial sale of Mr Barton’s property. Documents tendered by Mr Barton in the FCC (including his cross claim, referred to below) suggest that Roberts Fund is one of the clients of MJL who lent money to Mr Barton. Another client of MJL which appears to have lent money to Mr Barton was the estate of the late Edith Welsh (“Welsh estate”). In August 2013 Malcolm Johns (the principal of MJL), acting in his capacity as trustee of the Welsh estate filed a cross claim in the Roberts Fund proceeding against Mr Barton seeking repayment of $180,000 plus interest pursuant to two mortgages dated, respectively, 5 November and 23 December 2010. Mr Barton filed his defence in the Roberts Fund proceeding in September 2013, as well as his defence to the Welsh estate cross claim and his own cross claim (“Mr Barton’s cross claim”). As least as subsequently amended, Mr Barton’s cross claim seeks relief against numerous parties including Mr Johns and MJL. In February 2014, Mr Barton filed an amended cross claim in the Roberts Fund proceeding. In that document, Mr Barton made serious allegations against MJL and Mr Johns including that MJL breached its fiduciary duties to Mr Barton. The precise alleged breaches are difficult to identify but appear to encompass procuring Mr Barton to borrow money from clients of MJL or Mr Johns, inducing Mr Barton to incur legal costs and misappropriating monies borrowed by Mr Barton.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The primary judge concluded that there was no counter-claim set off or cross demand within paragraph 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act.Ground 2 of the notice of appeal: failure to find sufficient evidence of a counter-claim Ground 2 reads:His Honour erred in not finding that there was sufficient evidence filed to support [specified paragraphs of Mr Barton’s cross claim], some of which were prima facie maintainable upon uncontested terms and as no Defence had been been filed by the respondent to the [cross claim] and leave had not been granted to file a defence out of time.Relevant law In Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; (2000) 171 ALR 598, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ, in their joint judgment, considered the discretion in relation to a debtor’s counterclaim, set-off or cross demand of the kind referred to in s 40(1)(g). Their Honours stated at 606:[38] The nature of the exercise [of the discretion] is well established by a long line of authority.[39] In Vogwell v Vogwell [(1939) 11 ABC 83 at 85], Latham CJ said, in relation to a corresponding provision:[T]he authorities show that the matter to which the court looks is this, – whether it is just that the claim should be determined before the bankruptcy proceedings are allowed to continue; in other words, whether it is a claim which it is proper and reasonable to litigate.[40] The state of satisfaction referred to in s 40(1)(g), and s 41(7), involves weighing up considerations as to the legal and factual merit of the claim relied upon by the debtor, and the justice of allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go ahead or requiring them to await the determination of the claim The decision whether a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand is of the relevant kind necessarily involves an evaluation on the part of the primary judge as to the strength of the claim.Consideration In his written submissions, Mr Barton identified the following allegations in the cross claim concerning Mr Johns as significant:·Mr Johns was a linked credit provider;·Mr Johns misappropriated trust account monies totalling $56,000;·Mr Johns made misrepresentations totalling $1.5 million that induced Mr Barton to sign a document referred to as the “Smits Deed”;·Mr Johns made misrepresentations that induced Mr Barton to sign a deed of settlement with the “A3F investors”;·Mr Johns breached his fiduciary duties to Mr Barton and contravened the Legal Profession Act2004 (NSW). Mr Barton did not explain how Mr Johns’ position as a linked credit provider, separately from the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, gave rise to a counter-claim in his favour, or how the primary judge had erred in failing to address this aspect of the cross claim. In the absence of any explanation of Mr Barton’s case on this issue, I am not satisfied that there was any appellable error on the part of the primary judge concerning this issue. In his written submissions, Mr Barton contended that the primary judge erred because responses had not been filed by Mr Johns, MJL, Roberts Fund and Mr Smits to Mr Barton’s allegations in the Robert Funds proceedings, and because Mr Johns had not admitted matters disclosed in a notice to admit facts and authenticity of documents. This submission cannot be accepted. The onus falls on Mr Barton to demonstrate the existence of a counter-claim within the meaning of s 40(1)(g): cf Glew v Harrowell [2003] FCA 373; (2003) 198 ALR 331 at [8]. In any event, no adverse inference can be drawn against MJL from the acts or omissions of other parties, and no adverse inference can be drawn against MJL for failing to respond to a cross claim that MJL applied to have struck out.Alleged misappropriation of trust funds

Decision

Reasons for decision

The mere fact that Mr Barton was given leave to re-plead does not demonstrate that he has a fair chance of success or a prima facie case on the cross claim.Judgment debt The judgment debt relates to unpaid counsel fees rendered by Mr Cotman SC and Mr Hyde. The FCC judge found that the counsel’s fees were incurred in connection with a possible appeal against the decision in Dixon. Mr Barton confirmed this at the hearing of the appeal. According to Mr Barton’s first submissions, the costs were incurred (or allegedly incurred) pursuant to a costs agreement dated 19 September 2011. MJL commenced the Local Court proceedings which gave rise to the judgment debt in September 2013. Mr Barton’s defence to the Local Court proceedings was struck out in his absence on 16 January 2014. On that occasion, MJL’s application for summary judgment was listed for hearing on 13 February 2014. On 7 February 2014, Pembroke J in the Supreme Court refused an application by Mr Barton to remove the Local Court proceedings to the Supreme Court to join them with the Roberts Fund proceeding. The transcript of the hearing before Pembroke J shows that his Honour formed the view that, rather than permit the transfer, it would be more convenient to leave Mr Barton to his right to apply for a stay of any judgment made in the Local Court. Mr Johnson, appearing for MJL and Malcolm Johns said to Pembroke J, in response to the suggestion that this might be the more convenient approach:Yes, that is exactly our position and we would make it clear that obviously any judgment wouldn’t be treated as to preclude him maintaining any cross-claim in the Supreme Court. After hearing from Mr Barton about his application to have the Local Court proceedings addressed with the Roberts Fund proceeding, Pembroke J said:So I just think that that is one clear matter which, having started regularly in the Local Court, should remain there and should be determined there and if, for some reason on closer inspection, once there is a judgment against you, if that is to happen, there is a reasonable argument that the judgment should be stayed until you can have determined your various money claims against Malcolm Johns’ firm and the many other cross-defendants, they you can apply. But at the moment I don’t see the justice in transferring the Local Court proceedings to the Supreme Court and holding up the resolution of that rather simple claim pursuant to the costs agreement, for counsel’s fees. When asked by Pembroke J whether Mr Barton had a substantive defence to the Local Court claim, Mr Barton referred to his cross claim. Pembroke J then said:I’m not going to decide today whether they are sufficient for a defence. The magistrate will do that, if that is what you rely upon, but it doesn’t seem to me at first blush that they amount to a defence. You might have a cross-claim, which is different from a defence, which is why I say to you that if a judgment is given against you for $26,000, you may be able to say “Well, I want a stay of the judgment while I prosecute my claim for damages for a greater amount than the $26,000”. I think, for that reason Mr Barton, I propose to refuse the application for transfer…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The decision whether a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand is of the relevant kind necessarily involves an evaluation on the part of the primary judge as to the strength of the claim.Consideration In his written submissions, Mr Barton identified the following allegations in the cross claim concerning Mr Johns as significant:·Mr Johns was a linked credit provider;·Mr Johns misappropriated trust account monies totalling $56,000;·Mr Johns made misrepresentations totalling $1.5 million that induced Mr Barton to sign a document referred to as the “Smits Deed”;·Mr Johns made misrepresentations that induced Mr Barton to sign a deed of settlement with the “A3F investors”;·Mr Johns breached his fiduciary duties to Mr Barton and contravened the Legal Profession Act2004 (NSW). Mr Barton did not explain how Mr Johns’ position as a linked credit provider, separately from the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, gave rise to a counter-claim in his favour, or how the primary judge had erred in failing to address this aspect of the cross claim. In the absence of any explanation of Mr Barton’s case on this issue, I am not satisfied that there was any appellable error on the part of the primary judge concerning this issue. In his written submissions, Mr Barton contended that the primary judge erred because responses had not been filed by Mr Johns, MJL, Roberts Fund and Mr Smits to Mr Barton’s allegations in the Robert Funds proceedings, and because Mr Johns had not admitted matters disclosed in a notice to admit facts and authenticity of documents. This submission cannot be accepted. The onus falls on Mr Barton to demonstrate the existence of a counter-claim within the meaning of s 40(1)(g): cf Glew v Harrowell [2003] FCA 373; (2003) 198 ALR 331 at [8]. In any event, no adverse inference can be drawn against MJL from the acts or omissions of other parties, and no adverse inference can be drawn against MJL for failing to respond to a cross claim that MJL applied to have struck out.Alleged misappropriation of trust funds I have considered the evidence identified in Mr Barton’s first submissions, which referred to the following matters:(a)In late March 2011, Mr Johns borrowed $150,000 from the Larden-Smiths, who were clients of Mr Johns;(b)On 4 April 2011 Mr Johns sent Mr Barton an email saying that “we have to pay $50,000 back to the Welsh Estate which I will pay out of the balance of $52,080.48”;(c)The amount of $52,080.48 was the amount remaining from the loan of $150,000 after certain other payments were made;(d)Mr Johns as trustee of the Welsh estate filed a cross claim in the Roberts Fund proceeding against Mr Barton claimed an amount of $180,000, and made no reference to the repayment of $50,000;(e)By email dated 15 September 2011, Mr Jones told Mr Barton that Roberts Fund had agreed to increase its loan to him, and that the additional funds should be applied to various debts including an amount of $6,000 for a surveyor;(f)There was a variation of a mortgage to reflect the increased loan from Roberts Fund; (g)In October 2012, Mr Barton received a bankruptcy notice “as the surveyor…had not been paid the $6,000”;(h)On 12 October 2012, Mr Barton “had issued a bank cheque for $8,684.88…in payment for survey work on the Nanima subdivision land pursuant to the invoice issued prior to 15 September 2011”.