Tov-Lev v Lowbeer (No 2)

Case [2014] FCA 379


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tov-Lev v Lowbeer (No 2) [2014] FCA 379

Citation: Tov-Lev v Lowbeer (No 2) [2014] FCA 379
Appeal from: Lowbeer v Tov Lev [2013] FCCA 1813
Parties: RABBI DR SAMUEL TOV-LEV, DAVID CLIFFE AND JOSEPH DE VARDA v JOHN LOWBEER
File numbers: NSD 84 of 2014
NSD 130 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 11 March 2014
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Cases cited: Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 applied
Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1952) 72 WN (NSW) 250 applied
Banque Commerciale SA (En Liquidation) v Akhil Holdings Limited (1990) 169 CLR 279 applied
Boles v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 183 ALR 239 referred to
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 applied
Bulic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (2007) 5 ABC (NS) 122 applied
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466 referred to
Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 applied
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
De Varda and Tov-Lev v The Board of Directors of The Strathfield and District Hebrew Congregation Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1377 referred to
De Varda and Tov-Lev v The Board of Directors of The Strathfield and District Hebrew Congregation [2013] NSWSC 920 referred to
De Varda v Austin Legal Solicitor [2013] NSWSC 1919 referred to
Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 18 applied
Lowbeer v Tov Lev [2013] FCCA 1813 referred to
McIntosh v Shashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 applied
Papps; Ex parte Tapp (1997) 78 FCR 524 referred to
Penn-Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt (No 2) [1964] 2 QB 647 referred to
Petrie v Redmond [1943] St R Qd 71 applied
Re Bedford;   Ex parte H C Sleigh (Queensland) Pty Ltd (1967) 9 FLR 497 applied
Re Frank; Ex parte Piliszky (1987) 16 FCR 396 referred to
Re Raymond; Ex parte Raymond (1992) 36 FCR 424 referred to
R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14 applied
Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134 applied
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 applied
Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212 applied
Date of hearing: 11 March 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 88
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellants appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondent: Austin Legal

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 84 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

RABBI DR SAMUEL TOV-LEV, DAVID CLIFFE AND JOSEPH DE VARDA
Appellants

AND:

JOHN LOWBEER
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MARCH 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the respondent's costs.

3.Any stay of the sequestration orders against the appellants, including that ordered by Wigney J on 5 February…

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AGLC
Tov-Lev v Lowbeer (No 2) [2014] FCA 379
Case
[2014] FCA 379
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Tov-Lev v Lowbeer (No 2) concerned a dispute between the appellants, Tov-Lev, and the respondent, Lowbeer, regarding the sequestration orders made against the appellants. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, with the appeal and application for annulment being dismissed. The appellants argued that the sequestration orders were improperly made, and that the court should exercise its discretion to annul the bankruptcy order in their favour. However, the court found that the appellants had not provided any material to support their claims, and that they had deliberately chosen not to present evidence regarding their solvency.

The court considered the legal issues of whether the sequestration orders were properly made, and whether the appellants were entitled to the exercise of the court's discretion to annul the bankruptcy order. The court found that the sequestration orders were correctly made, as there was no evidence to suggest that the appellants could pay their debts as and when they fell due. Furthermore, the court held that the appellants were not entitled to the exercise of the court's discretion to annul the bankruptcy order, as they had not joined their trustee and had not provided any evidence to support their claims.

The court dismissed both the appeal and the application for annulment, and ordered that any existing stay of the operation of the sequestration orders be vacated. The court also ordered that the appellants pay the respondent's costs. The decision highlights the importance of providing evidence and material to support claims in court proceedings, and that the court will not exercise its discretion to annul bankruptcy orders without proper justification.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent's costs.

3. Any stay of the sequestration orders against the appellants, including that ordered by Wigney J on 5 February 2014, be vacated.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent's costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is nothing before me to suggest that the sequestration orders ought not to have been made by the trial judge against the appellants. Indeed, I am satisfied that those orders were properly made. Nor is there any reason to suggest that the appellants are entitled to the exercise of the discretion to annul the bankruptcy order in their favour. By not joining their trustee, they have not enabled the Court to have any material from the trustee as to what his or her costs are, or information from the trustee as to whatever financial investigations as to the appellants’ affairs that he or she has made. This is not a case in which there is any evidence to suggest that the appellants were able to pay their debts as and when they fell due. They have chosen not to put material before the Court twice, despite a clear warning by the trial judge as disclosed in his reasons for judgment that, he having raised the question of their solvency, they deliberately chose not to put material before him on that topic. They have put no material before me as to their financial positions. Conclusion For these reasons, I am of opinion that both the appeal and application for annulment must be dismissed with costs. Any existing stay of the operation of the sequestration orders must be vacated.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Lowbeer gave evidence that he had not been paid any money, and that Caunt and Lowbeer had only received the $13,635.12 in respect of the costs. He understood that Caunt and Lowbeer, from which he had retired in mid-2011, had incurred all of the legal costs the subject of the assessment under which the 2013 costs order had been assessed. I accept Mr Lowbeer’s evidence.Consideration – should the trial judge have restored the subpoenas? The trial judge made an error in dismissing the application to review the registrar’s orders setting aside the subpoenas on the basis that he found. I am satisfied that the subpoenas were sought for the purposes of obtaining evidence to support the appellants’ notices of opposition, which his Honour was determining. However, in my opinion, the subpoenas were incapable of achieving that result. It is not a legitimate forensic purpose to allow a subpoena to be issued or called on in the speculative hope that they could prove an unparticularised claim. It is not appropriate for a subpoena to be used to support a mere fishing expedition: Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1952) 72 WN (NSW) 250 at 254 per Owen J, with whom Street CJ and Herron J agreed. But it may be that where it appears to be “on the cards” that documents would materially assist a person in the litigation, a proper and sufficient forensic purpose for allowing the subpoena to be called on can be established: see R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14 at 18A-B per Hunt J, with whom Carruthers and Grove JJ agreed; Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 414 per Gibbs CJ: and see also at 454-456 per Brennan J. Ordinarily, where documents of a corporation are sought in a subpoena to produce documents, the subpoena should be addressed to its proper officer: Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 153 CLR 134 at 139-140 per Gibbs CJ, 146 per Mason J (applying Penn-Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt (No 2) [1964] 2 QB 647 at 661-664 per Lord Denning MR), 151 per Wilson J. That did not occur here. Rather, the persons to whom the four subpoenas to produce were issued were not persons who ordinarily would have possession of the documents sought, although that was a possibility. Mr Lowbeer said that all of Caunt and Lowbeer’s records had been subpoenaed in the Supreme Court proceedings in 2011. Those records may or may not have produced some of the material related to company records and payment for audit or other work in the lengthy period concerned. However, it is unlikely that that subpoena would have picked up any payment in respect of the 2013 costs orders, which were assessed after the subpoenas were issued. The form of the subpoenas issued in the Federal Circuit Court was defective. At no point did the appellants subpoena either of the companies, Caunt and Lowbeer Pty Ltd or Caunt and Lowbeer Audit Pty Ltd, in whose possession one might have expected any relevant documents to be found that may have related to payment in respect of the costs the subject of the 2013 costs order. Instead, they subpoenaed Mr Lowbeer, who had retired from his employment with those companies in June 2011. The appellants made no attempt to explain, and gave no explanation for, their failure to subpoena those two companies for the relevant records. Presumably those companies would have been able to produce any documents that might have supported the case of the appellants.