Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 18

Citation: Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 18
Appeal from: Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 564
Parties: LOUISE FRANCIS v EGGLESTON MITCHELL LAWYERS PTY LTD (ACN 131 952 942) and GESS MICHAEL RAMBALDI AND ANDREW REGINALD YEO (AS TRUSTEES OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF LOUISE FRANCIS)
File number: VID 695 of 2013
Judge(s): RARES, FLICK AND BROMBERG JJ
Date of judgment: 7 March 2014
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – appeal from refusal by primary judge to annul a sequestration order pursuant to s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether petitioning creditor was a person entitled to enforce a final judgment and deemed to be a creditor pursuant to s 40(3)(d) by reason of an assignment of the judgment debt – whether the order relied upon by the petitioning creditor was a “final judgment or order” – whether primary judge erred in finding that debtor had failed to establish that she was solvent at the time of the making of the sequestration order – whether discretion to annul would have been exercised in debtor’s favour – appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 40(1)(g), 40(3), 40(3)(d), 41, 41(3)(a), 43, 153B, 153B(1), 154(1)(b), 178, 306
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic)
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 63.11(1)
Cases cited: Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9
Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers [2011] FMCA 805
Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 485
Bulic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited [2007] FCA 307
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571
Re Macks; Ex parte Saint (2000) 204 CLR 158
DMW v CGW (1982) 151 CLR 491
Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1983) 48 ALR 545
Autron Pty Ltd v Benk (2011) 195 FCR 404
Worchild v The Drink Nightclub (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 224 ALR 339
Sandell v Potter (1966) 115 CLR 666
Re Sarina; Ex parte Wollondilly Shire Council (1980) 32 ALR 596
Date of hearing: 18 February 2014
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 53
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Shirrefs
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Wilmoth Field Warne
Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: Mr P Fary
Solicitor for the Second and Third Respondents: Mendelsons Lawyers Pty Ltd

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 695 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

LOUISE FRANCIS
Appellant

AND:

EGGLESTON MITCHELL LAWYERS PTY LTD (ACN 131 952 942)
First Respondent

GESS MICHAEL RAMBALDI AND ANDREW REGINALD YEO (AS TRUSTEES OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF LOUISE FRANCIS)
Second and Third Respondents

JUDGE:

RARES, FLICK AND BROMBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 MARCH 2014

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd, the appellant, Francis, sought to appeal the decision of the primary judge to refuse annulment of a sequestration order under s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The dispute centred around whether the petitioning creditor, Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd, was entitled to enforce a final judgment and was therefore deemed to be a creditor under s 40(3)(d) of the Act by virtue of an assignment of the judgment debt. Furthermore, it was contested whether the order relied upon by the petitioning creditor was a "final judgment or order." The court was also required to determine whether the primary judge had erred in finding that Francis had not established that she was solvent at the time of the making of the sequestration order. Lastly, the court had to consider whether the discretion to annul would have been exercised in Francis's favour. The appeal was dismissed.

The court had to address several legal issues, including whether the petitioning creditor was a creditor under s 40(3)(d) of the Act and whether the order relied upon by the petitioning creditor was a final judgment or order. The court also had to consider whether the primary judge had erred in finding that Francis had failed to establish that she was solvent at the time of the making of the sequestration order. Lastly, the court had to determine whether the discretion to annul would have been exercised in Francis's favour.

The court found that the petitioning creditor was indeed a creditor under s 40(3)(d) of the Act, as they were entitled to enforce a final judgment and had been assigned the judgment debt. The court also found that the order relied upon by the petitioning creditor was a final judgment or order. Regarding the solvency of Francis, the court held that the primary judge had not erred in finding that Francis had not established that she was solvent at the time of the making of the sequestration order. Finally, the court determined that the discretion to annul would not have been exercised in Francis's favour.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondents' costs of the appeal. Additionally, the second and third respondents' costs in the administration of the estate of the appellant, under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), include the costs, charges, expenses and remuneration of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

3. The second and third respondents’ costs in the administration, under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), of the estate of the appellant include the costs, charges, expenses and remuneration of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

For present purposes the following provisions of ss 40, 41, 43 and 153B of the Act are relevant to the issues arising in the appeal, namely:40(1) A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy in each of the following cases: … (g)if a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order, being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed, has served on the debtor in Australia or, by leave of the Court, elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act and the debtor does not: …comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he or she has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the final order, as the case may be, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that he or she could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained;…(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(g):…(d)a person who is for the time being entitled to enforce a final judgment or final order for the payment of money shall be deemed to be a creditor who has obtained a final judgment or final order;…41(3) A bankruptcy notice shall not be issued in relation to a debtor: (a)except on the application of a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order within the meaning of paragraph 40(1)(g) or a person who, by virtue of paragraph 40(3)(d), is to be deemed to be such a creditor; …43(1) Subject to this Act, where: (a) a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy; and (b) at the time when the act of bankruptcy was committed, the debtor: (i) was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia; …the Court may, on a petition presented by a creditor, make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor. …153B (1)If the Court is satisfied that a sequestration order ought not to have been made or, in the case of a debtor's petition, that the petition ought not to have been presented or ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver, the Court may make an order annulling the bankruptcy. (Emphasis added). Tracey J helpfully summarised a number of principles relevant to the exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s 153B in Bulic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited [2007] FCA 307 at [12] including the following: Section 153B(1) and its predecessors have been considered in many decisions of this and other Courts. These authorities establish a number of relevant propositions. They are:…(2)An applicant who seeks an annulment of his or her bankruptcy “carries a heavy burden”. It is incumbent on an applicant “to place before the Court all relevant material with respect to his or her financial affairs so that the Court may be properly informed and may make a judgment that is based on the actual circumstances of the applicant”: Re Papps; Ex parte Tapp (1997) 78 FCR 524 at 531.(3)In determining whether or not a sequestration order “ought not to have been made” the Court is not confined to a consideration of whether the order should have been made on the facts known to the Court at the time at which it was made. The Court must take account of facts, known at the time at which the sequestration order was made and at which it determines an annulment application, even if those facts were not before the Court at the time at which the sequestration order was made: Boles v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 183 ALR 239 at 243; Re Raymond; ex parte Raymond (1992) 36 FCR 424 at 426.(4)A sequestration order “ought not to have been made” if, on the facts known at the time of the annulment application, the Court would have been bound not to make the sequestration order: Re Frank; ex parte Piliszky (1987) 16 FCR 396.…(6)If the Court is so satisfied, it is not precluded from annulling the bankruptcy because the bankrupt had not sought to have the default judgment set aside or failed to oppose the creditor’s petition or failed to seek a review of the sequestration order: Re Raymond; ex parte Raymond (1992) 36 FCR 424 at 426.(7)The power conferred on the Court by s 153B(1) is discretionary in nature. Even if persuaded that the sequestration order ought not to have been made, the Court can, in appropriate circumstances, decline to annul the bankruptcy: Boles v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 183 ALR 239 at 243.(8)Considerations which may have a bearing on the exercise of discretion include unexplained delay in the making of the application, whether or not the applicant is solvent, whether or not the applicant has made full disclosure of his or her financial affairs and a failure by the bankrupt to oppose the creditor’s petition and attend the hearing at which the sequestration order was made: Re Williams (1968) 13 FLR 10 at 24–5; Boles at 247; Re Papps; ex parte Tapp (1997) 78 FCR 524 at 531; Rigg v Baker (2006) 155 FCR 531 at 548 [79] (per French J); Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCA 1115 at [7]. Additional considerations are collected in D. A. Hassall, “Annulment of Bankruptcy and Review of Sequestration Orders” (1993) 67 ALJ 761 at 766.Was the petitioning creditor, in fact, a creditor?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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