Dunell v Kerr
[2021] FedCFamC2G 87
•29 September 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Dunell v Kerr [2021] FedCFamC2G 87
File number(s): BRG 63 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE EGAN Date of judgment: 29 September 2021 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – application for annulment of bankruptcy – failure by applicant to adduce any evidence of his solvency, either at the time of the making of the sequestration order, or at the time of the filing of the application for annulment of the bankruptcy – more than two (2) year delay in the filing of the application for annulment – scandalous allegations of fraud against Trustee ordered to be struck out – application entirely unmeritorious – application dismissed Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 104, 153B
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), r 15.16(1)(a)
Cases cited: Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 18
Papps v Tapp (1997) 78 FCR 524
Mulhern v Pearce (No 2) [2014] FCA 805
Szepesvary v Weston [2018] FCAFC 224
Sgro v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd (2015) 91 NSWLR 325
Sims v Suda Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 281
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 21 Date of last submission/s: 27 September 2021 Date of hearing: 27 September 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Dunell appearing in person on his own behalf Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J. Shaw of Piper Alderman Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: Mr S. Webster Solicitor for the Second and Third Respondents: Bartley Cohen ORDERS
BRG 63 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2) BETWEEN: WARREN JOHN DUNELL
Applicant
AND: DAVID JOHN KERR
First Respondent
PHIL KAUNITZ
Second Respondent
AIMEE MUNDT
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE EGAN
DATE OF ORDER:
29 SEPTEMBER 2021
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1.The Amended Application filed on 2 June 2021 be dismissed.
2.The Trustee’s reasonable costs and outlays be paid from the net proceeds of the Applicant’s bankrupt estate.
3.Paragraphs 12 and 18 of the Applicant’s affidavit filed on 2 June 2021 be struck out pursuant to the provisions of r. 15.16(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE EGAN:
Introduction
On 22 September 2017, judgment was entered against the applicant in the Supreme Court of Queensland, in favour of Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (‘ANZ’), in the amount of $292,295.75, plus interest in the amount of $7,575.66.
The judgment debt has to date not been paid by the applicant to ANZ, nor has the applicant appealed the judgment of the Supreme Court.
On 6 February 2018, a bankruptcy notice was duly served upon the applicant in reliance upon the judgment debt. By reason of the applicant’s non-compliance with such bankruptcy notice, a creditor’s petition was filed on 16 August 2018.
On 17 October 2018, Registrar Buckingham ordered that the estate of the applicant be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
On 5 November 2018, the applicant sought review of the sequestration order under the provisions of s. 104 of the Act. That application for review was dismissed by order of His Honour Judge Vasta on 14 January 2019. [1] The applicant did not seek to appeal His Honour’s order.
[1] Order of Judge Vasta at p. 11 of Annexure ‘AM-1’ to the Affidavit of Ms Mundt filed on 29 March 2021.
On 18 February 2021, more than two (2) years after the dismissal of the review application by order of His Honour Judge Vasta, the applicant filed an Originating Application seeking the annulment of his bankruptcy.
On 2 June 2021, the applicant filed an Amended Application seeking annulment of the bankruptcy pursuant to the provisions of s. 153B of the Act. Section 153B of the Act relevantly provided as follows:
“(1) If the Court is satisfied that a sequestration order ought not to have been made or, in the case of a debtor's petition, that the petition ought not to have been presented or ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver, the Court may make an order annulling the bankruptcy.
(2) In the case of a debtor's petition, the order may be made whether or not the bankrupt was insolvent when the petition was presented.
(3) The trustee must, before the end of the period of 2 days beginning on the day the trustee becomes aware of the order, give to the Official Receiver a written certificate setting out the former bankrupt's name and bankruptcy number and the date of the annulment.”
Applicant’s Allegations in Support of Application for Annulment and Responses Thereto
At [4] – [12] inclusive and [15] – [18] inclusive of the applicant’s affidavit filed on 2 June 2021, the applicant made the following allegations:
“[4] I have never been provided with any material evidence of the Respondents' alleged beneficial interest in the interest of my security and I sincerely believe that no such evidence exists.
[5] I have never been provided with any material evidence from the Respondents that demonstrates that I am not the creditor and underwriter of the security and interest and I sincerely believe that no such evidence exists.
[6] I have never been provided with any material evidence from the Respondents that refutes and/or denies that Securities are certificates and bonds or that banks only purchase securities and never lend anything in relation to the securities. I sincerely believe that no such evidence exists.
[7] I have never been provided with any material evidence from the Respondents to demonstrate that the bank or lawyers have a person of significant control or Beneficial owner with a minimum of 25% shares (for insurance/Liability), as required under section 169 of the Corporations Act 2001 and as expressly required by the Anti Money Laundering Financing Rules 2007, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to underpin their claim to the security and interest. I sincerely believe that no such evidence exists.
[8] Further, pursuant to Chapter 1 of the Anti Money Laundering Financing Rules 2007 and s229 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, there is the requirement for a claimant to have standing in that they must be a person of significant control or the beneficial owner. It is the Claimant's onus to demonstrate they hold liability in relation to this security and interest.
[9] I submit the Respondents are not the beneficial owners or persons of significant control and therefore they do not have standing to bring their claim before the Court. Exhibit "WJD-1" pages 1 to 3 to my Affidavit is a true and correct copy of a search of the Register confirming there are no persons of significant control or beneficial owner for Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation Limited.
Exhibit "WJD-1" pages 39 to 55 is a true and correct copy of ASIC's Person of Significant Control/Beneficial Owner Search, relating to Bakst Leasing Pty Ltd (formerly Kemp Strang Lawyers).
[10] I have never been provided with any material evidence from the Respondents that refutes and/or denies that they are making a beneficial claim to the interest of the security with unclean hands and in bad faith and I sincerely believe that no such evidence exists.
[11] The Trustee has not provided a validated and verifiable full accord of the accounts in relation to the security and interest as requested by DSAR/lnformation request dated 17 September 2020 thus there has been no evidence provided to demonstrate that the Trustee is not conspiring to conceal a material fact. The Trustee's obligation is to the Trust and to look out for the beneficial interest, That means that any Chose in Action (Claim) must be made by the Trustee and in claiming that position would create a Title Perfection Event and collapse the Trust and that means the particulars of the claim would be malversation by all parties involved in the Trust. Exhibit "WJD-1" pages 57 to 58 is a true and correct copy of DSAR/ Information request sent 17 September 2020
[12] I submit that due to the failure to bring forth the evidence of this fraudulent contract, deed of assignment/deed of novation requested from Aimee Mundt on 7 September 2018, Aimee Mundt and the Trustee have conspired via fraudulent omission and fraudulent concealment against the Court. This brings in interrogatories omissions propounded to plaintiff (creditor). Failing to comply with particulars of a claim would be malversation under pre action protocol and litigation in Law. Exhibit "WJD-1" page 56 is a true and correct copy of DSAR/ Information request sent 7 September 2018.
…
[15] I bring before the Court a number of Data Subject Access Requests (DSAR)/ Information Requests under the Privacy Act 1988 and Data Protection Act 2018, sent to the trustee and the relevant lawyers. These requests have not been responded to appropriately by any party which is a requirement of the Trustee under section 70-56 of the Bankruptcy act 1966. Exhibit "WJD-1" pages 56 to 58 are a true and correct copy of these requests.
[16] It is my belief that the Trustee has failed, deliberately or negligently, to perform on his obligations to undertake a complete audit of all parties to the alleged bankruptcy including the bank and the lawyers involved.
[17] Further, I reiterate that there is evidence to provide that there is no person of significant control or beneficial owner to the claim.
[18] The information I have provided thus far proves that criminal charges should be brought against the bank, the lawyers and the Trustee for aiding and abetting and for colluding and conspiring fraud.”
At [12] – [24] of the written submissions filed on behalf of the first respondent on 2 September 2021, the applicant’s claims against him were succinctly summarised and addressed as follows:
“Alleged fraud
12. In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his First Affidavit, the Bankrupt deposes:
11. The Trustee has not provided a validated and verifiable full accord of the accounts in relation to the security and interest as requested by DASR/Information request dated 17 September 2020 thus there has been no evidence provided to demonstrate that the Trustee is not conspiring to conceal a material fact. The Trustee’s obligation is to the Trust and to look out for the beneficial interest, That means that any Chose in Action (Claim) must be made by the Trustee and in claiming that position would create a Title Perfection Event and collapse the Trust and that means the particulars of the claim would be malversation by all parties involved in the Trust.
12. I submit that due to the failure to bring forth the evidence of this fraudulent contract, deed of assignment/deed of novation requested from Aimee Mundt on 7 September 2018, Aimee Mundt and the Trustee have conspired via fraudulent omission and fraudulent concealment against the Court.
13. Respectfully, the complaint is impossible to understand. The ‘DASR/Information request’ referred to by the Bankrupt is exhibited at pages 57 and 58 of the First Affidavit. Again, respectfully (and as deposed to by the Trustee), this letter is impossible to understand (it could perhaps be described as somewhere between a request and complaint under the Australian Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as well as the Data Protection Act 2018 which appears to be legislation in the United Kingdom).
14.There is no evidence to support the Bankrupt’s complaint (let alone ‘cogent’, ‘clear’ or ‘strict’ evidence that is required to support a serious allegation of fraud). The complaint has no basis.
Alleged failure to conduct ‘audit’
15.In paragraph 16 of his First Affidavit, the Bankrupt deposes, ‘it is my belief that the Trustee has failed, deliberately or negligently, to perform on [sic] his obligations to undertake a complete audit of all parties to the alleged bankruptcy including the bank and the lawyers involved.’
16.The duties of a Trustee are set out in section 19 of the Act. The standards for a registered trustee are set out in Division 42 of the Rules. Neither the duties in the Act nor the standards in the Rules require the Trustee to undertake ‘a complete audit of all parties to the alleged bankruptcy’ whether they be the petitioning creditor or the lawyers acting for the petitioning creditor. The complaint has no basis.
Alleged contempt of court
17.In paragraph 9 of his Second Affidavit, the Bankrupt ‘submits’ that the Trustee has ‘committed contempt of Court as he has failed to provide a full statement of the Bankrupts [sic] account as ordered on the [sic] 8 July 2021 by omitting this very important material evidence.’
18. On 8 July 2021, this Court ordered the Respondents to disclose any material that meets the description within items 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the Bankrupt’s Submissions (Order).
19.Item 3 of the Submissions was described as ‘Full statement of the Bankrupts (sic) account. (Trustee to provide)’. The description by the Bankrupt is vague. Notwithstanding, the Trustee filed and served an affidavit of documents disclosing approximately 700 pages of bank statements for nine bank accounts (including four accounts with ANZ) concerning the Bankrupt for periods between February 2013 and March 2021.
20. The Bankrupt did not seek to inspect any of the disclosed documents.
21.The Trustee has disclosed all documents that could meet the description and has complied with the Order. The complaint has no basis.
Other grounds
22.In paragraphs 7 to 10 of the First Affidavit (as well as the Submissions) the Bankrupt appears to complain that ANZ cannot be ‘the creditor’ or ‘have standing to bring their claim before the Court’.
23. Although difficult to understand, it appears the bases for the complaint is that ANZ does not have ‘a person of significant control or beneficial owner’. In his First Affidavit, the Bankrupt deposes as follows:
7. I have never been provided with any material evidence from the Respondents to demonstrate that the bank or lawyers have a person of significant control or Beneficial owner with a minimum of 25% shares (for insurance/Liability), as required under section 169 of the Corporations Act 2001 and as expressly required by the Anti Money Laundering Financing Rules 2007, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to underpin their claim to the security and interest. I sincerely believe that no such evidence exists.
8. Further, pursuant to Chapter 1 of the Anti Money Laundering Financing Rules 2007 and s229 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, there is the requirement for a claimant to have standing in that they must be a person of significant control or the beneficial owner. It is the Claimant’s onus to demonstrate they hold liability in relation to this security interest.
24. It would appear the Bankrupt has misunderstood the application (and relevance) of the provisions to which he refers.”
(footnoted omitted)
At [23] of the written submissions filed on behalf of the second and third respondents on 2 September 2021, the applicant’s claims against them were succinctly summarised and addressed as follows:
“23.The applicant’s arguments do not seriously put in issue his financial position. To the extent that the applicant’s arguments can be understood, the applicant appears to make allegations:
(a)That he has not been provided with evidence of his interests in his securities. It is not clear what this allegation is directed to, but it is for the applicant to prove that the sequestration order should not have been made. The second and third respondents rely on affidavits of documents that demonstrate their compliance with disclosure obligations in these proceedings.
(b) That the respondents “are not beneficial owners or persons of significant control” for various unclear reasons. It is not clear what this allegation is directed to. The second and third respondents are solicitors who acted for the ANZ in the bankruptcy proceedings. They have never claimed to have any beneficial interests in the applicant’s security and they are not creditors in the applicant’s bankrupt estate.
(c) About various types of alleged impropriety including unclean hands, bad faith, “conspiring to conceal a material fact”, and a “failure to bring forth the evidence of this fraudulent contract, deed of assignment/deed of novation”. None of these unparticularised assertions go anywhere. The further contention that “Aimee Mundt and the Trustee have conspired via fraudulent omission and fraudulent concealment against the Court” has been addressed and directly refuted by the second and third respondents. The applicant has therefore not come close to discharging the heavy onus he bears in establishing these assertions.
(d)Involving the purported operation of equitable title and assignments. It is not clear what this allegation is directed to, but nothing contained in the submissions made provides a basis to doubt that a debt is owing to the ANZ.
(e)Involving failures to respond to information requests. Leaving aside whether these allegations have any substance, they would not, in any event, affect the validity of the sequestration order against the applicant.
(f)That the trustee has failed to undertake a complete audit of all parties including the bank and the lawyers involved,35 and failed to provide material, information and evidence. Those allegations are directed to the first respondent only but it is difficult to understand how they could support an annulment.”
Relevant Principles
In Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 18 at [16], the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (per Rares, Flick and Bromberg JJ) set out the principles relevant to the exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s. 153B of the Act as follows:
“[16]Tracey J helpfully summarised a number of principles relevant to the exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s 153B in Bulic v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited [2007] FCA 307 at [12] including the following:
Section 153B(1) and its predecessors have been considered in many decisions of this and other Courts. These authorities establish a number of relevant propositions. They are:
…
(2)An applicant who seeks an annulment of his or her bankruptcy “carries a heavy burden”. It is incumbent on an applicant “to place before the Court all relevant material with respect to his or her financial affairs so that the Court may be properly informed and may make a judgment that is based on the actual circumstances of the applicant”: Re Papps; Ex parte Tapp (1997) 78 FCR 524 at 531.
(3)In determining whether or not a sequestration order “ought not to have been made” the Court is not confined to a consideration of whether the order should have been made on the facts known to the Court at the time at which it was made. The Court must take account of facts, known at the time at which the sequestration order was made and at which it determines an annulment application, even if those facts were not before the Court at the time at which the sequestration order was made: Boles v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 183 ALR 239 at 243; Re Raymond; ex parte Raymond (1992) 36 FCR 424 at 426.
(4)A sequestration order “ought not to have been made” if, on the facts known at the time of the annulment application, the Court would have been bound not to make the sequestration order: Re Frank; ex parte Piliszky (1987) 16 FCR 396.
…
(6)If the Court is so satisfied, it is not precluded from annulling the bankruptcy because the bankrupt had not sought to have the default judgment set aside or failed to oppose the creditor’s petition or failed to seek a review of the sequestration order: Re Raymond; ex parte Raymond (1992) 36 FCR 424 at 426.
(7)The power conferred on the Court by s 153B(1) is discretionary in nature. Even if persuaded that the sequestration order ought not to have been made, the Court can, in appropriate circumstances, decline to annul the bankruptcy: Boles v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2001) 183 ALR 239 at 243.
(8)Considerations which may have a bearing on the exercise of discretion include unexplained delay in the making of the application, whether or not the applicant is solvent, whether or not the applicant has made full disclosure of his or her financial affairs and a failure by the bankrupt to oppose the creditor’s petition and attend the hearing at which the sequestration order was made: Re Williams (1968) 13 FLR 10 at 24–5; Boles at 247; Re Papps; ex parte Tapp (1997) 78 FCR 524 at 531; Rigg v Baker (2006) 155 FCR 531 at 548 [79] (per French J); Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCA 1115 at [7]. Additional considerations are collected in D. A. Hassall, “Annulment of Bankruptcy and Review of Sequestration Orders” (1993) 67 ALJ 761 at 766.”
In Papps v Tapp (1997) 78 FCR 524 at 531, O’Loughlin J said:
“ … the test to be applied when a person comes before the Court seeking an annulment of his or her bankruptcy is one that is akin to “full and true disclosure”. It is incumbent upon such an applicant to place before the Court all relevant material with respect to his or her financial affairs so that the Court may be properly informed and may make a judgment that is based on the full facts and the actual circumstances. A person who seeks an annulment carries a heavy burden.”
In Mulhern v Pearce (No 2) [2014] FCA 805 at [73], Collier J said as follows:
“[73] A sequestration order resulting in bankruptcy is a very serious matter. An order annulling a bankruptcy is an equally serious matter, because it means that the sequestration order, the resultant bankruptcy, and the heavy financial and legal constraints placed on the bankrupt, should never have occurred in the first place. Indeed in Theissbacer v MacGregor Garrick & Co [1993] 2 Qd R 223 at 226 the Court of Appeal of Queensland described annulment as the retrospective annihilation of the sequestration order and its consequences. The power of annulment must be exercised with great caution and should not be exercised unless under special circumstances: Starke J in Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 at 594.”
Application of Principles having regard to the Evidence before the Court
The applicant has failed to satisfy the Court that it should exercise its discretion to annul the applicant’s bankruptcy. Relevantly:
(a)The applicant failed to adduce any evidence of his financial resources or capacity, either at the time of the making of the sequestration order, or from that time until the time of the filing of the application for annulment.
(b)The applicant has adduced no evidence as to why he delayed more than two (2) years in the filing of the application for annulment. In circumstances where the applicant has failed to provide any basis for the Court finding that the applicant was at any time solvent, in the sense of his being able to pay his debts (including the debt owed to ANZ) as and when they fell due, the unexplained delay is telling against the applicant. [2]
[2] Szepesvary v Weston [2018] FCAFC 224 at [68].
The Court has further had regard to the fact that the applicant had failed to complete a statement of affairs, and that he had failed to complete an income questionnaire, thereby resulting in the Trustee being required to undertake a burdensome task of closely examining the applicant’s bank statements so as to allow the Trustee to issue an actual and notional income assessment. The conduct of the applicant evidenced a lack of co-operation which was another factor tending against the exercise of the Court’s discretion in the applicant’s favour.
Additionally, the applicant’s conduct of the proceeding has been unmeritorious in a number of respects. First, the applicant failed to appreciate that he bore the onus of adducing persuasive evidence so as to support his claim as to why the bankruptcy ought to be annulled. Second, the applicant made serious allegations of fraud and criminality against the respondents in circumstances where such allegations lacked any evidentiary basis, and were scandalous. The applicant failed to provide any particulars of fraud able to support the claim. It was a necessary element of a claim of fraud that proper particulars be given. The applicant failed to do so. [3] Third, notwithstanding the many unmeritorious allegations made by the applicant against the respondents, the applicant failed to cross-examine any of the respondents on other than the most rudimentary of points, namely as to whether they ever had possession or control of the original loan agreement documentation, which gave rise to the applicant’s indebtedness to ANZ, which had not already been discovered. In that regard, the applicant admitted, during the course of the hearing before the Court, that he already had knowledge of the existence of the two (2) chattel mortgages granted by him to ANZ, and the two (2) guarantees executed by the applicant in favour of ANZ, each of which had respectively been annexed to an affidavit of Stefan Naumovski filed in the Supreme Court proceedings on behalf of ANZ on 6 April 2017. The applicant’s short cross-examination of each of the respondents was unproductive of anything of evidentiary value to either the applicant, or the Court.
[3] Sgro v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd (2015) 91 NSWLR 325 at [57].
On the question as to how scandalous allegations ought to be dealt with, Gilmour J in Sims v Suda Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 281 at [8], [35], [44] and [47] said as follows:
“[8] Whilst the Court affords some degree of “latitude” to an unrepresented litigant this does not extend to conferring on a litigant a licence to place to one side or to disregard the procedural requirements: Nyoni v Chee Koon Hee (No. 2) [2013] FCA 703 at [4]-[5], citing Underdown (estate of the late Samantha) v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2009) 50 AAR 54 at [17], and SZNFR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 851 at [16]. As the Full Court of the Federal Court observed in Manolakis v Carter [2008] FCAFC 183 at [10]:
Courts do not exist to allow self-represented litigants to make scatter-gun claims against all and sundry and to indulge themselves by using proceedings they have instituted as vehicles for what might be seen to be private ‘Royal Commissions’.
…
[35] The applicant alleges a “Fraudulent Act imposed upon the Applicant by the Respondent” and sets out a number of factual assertions in apparent support of this plea. They do not support it. Allegations of fraud must be distinctly alleged and distinctly proved.
…
[44]Furthermore, the pleading that the alleged conduct constituted a criminal offence by the respondent is scandalous.
…
[47] The unsupported and unsupportable allegations of the commission by the respondent as a criminal offence are scandalous. Further I have found the claims, in part, are an abuse of process. I will, for those reasons, order that the statement of claim, pursuant to r 16.21(2), be removed from the Court file.”
Having found that the allegations of fraud made by the applicant were improper and scandalous, and having accepted the submission made by Mr Shaw on behalf of the first respondent that unsubstantiated references to alleged fraudulent conduct on the part of the first respondent in the affidavit of the applicant filed on 2 June 2021 ought to be struck out, the Court orders that paragraphs 12 and 18 of such affidavit be struck out pursuant to the provisions of r. 15.16(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth). Rule 15.16(1)(a) relevantly provided as follows:
“15.16 Objectionable material may be struck out
(1) The Court or a Registrar may order material to be struck out of an affidavit at any stage in a proceeding if the material:
(a) is inadmissible, unnecessary, irrelevant, prolix, scandalous or argumentative”
The lawyer for the Trustee also submitted that the Trustee was required to be actively engaged in the current proceeding so as to protect his reputation due to the scandalous nature of the allegations made against him. It was submitted that that was so in circumstances where he otherwise would have abided the order of the Court. The Court accepts such submission. Further, the Court accepts the submission made on behalf of the second and third respondents that all of the claims which were made by the applicant to this Court, could have been made to His Honour Judge Vasta when His Honour conducted the review hearing of the Registrar’s sequestration order. In such circumstances, it is appropriate that the Trustee’s reasonable costs and outlays be paid from the net proceeds of the applicant’s bankrupt estate.
The Court finds that the applicant’s claims were entirely unmeritorious and groundless.
The Amended Application filed on 2 June 2021 is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Egan. Associate:
Dated: 29 September 2021
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