Smits v Lillas and Loel Lawyers

Link copied
Case Copied 27 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SMITS v LILLAS & LOEL LAWYERS PTY LTD [2015] FCCA 1092
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice – where benefit of order on which bankruptcy notice issued assigned – where assignee procured the issue of the bankruptcy notice – where assignee did not have leave to enforce judgment pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) – bankruptcy notice not issued in respect of a final judgment or order the execution of which had not been stayed – bankruptcy notice set aside.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.40(1)(g), 40(3), 40(3)(d), 41

Duties Act 2001 (Qld) ss.9, 10, 34, 35, 36, 487
Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006, r.3.02
Uniform Civil Procedures Rules 1999 (Qld), rr.705, 740(1), 740(2), 793, 799(2)

Abigroup Ltd v Abigano (1992) 39 FCR 74
ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Menso [2006] FMCA 1522
Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575
Dudzinski v Kellow [2003] FCAFC 207

Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 18

Franks v Warringah Council (2003) 131 FCR 281

Ivory v Telstra Corporation Limited & Ors [2010] FMCA 123
Scook v Sims Construction Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 306
Smits v Loel [2014] FCA 1341
Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 448
Togito Pty Ltd v Pioneer Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2011] QSC 21

Applicant: LEONARDUS GERARDUS SMITS
Respondent: LILLAS & LOEL LAWYERS PTY LTD
File Number: BRG 985 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Jarrett
Hearing date: 23 February 2015
Date of Last Submission: 20 May 2015
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 25 September 2015

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Edwards, directly instructed by the applicant
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Byrne
Solicitors for the Respondent: Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd

ORDERS

  1. The application filed on 31 October, 2013 is dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application, including reserved costs if any, to be taxed and paid in accordance with the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 985 of 2013

LEONARDUS GERARDUS SMITS

Applicant

And

LILLAS & LOEL LAWYERS PTY LTD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application which principally seeks that a bankruptcy notice caused to be issued by the respondent against the applicant be set aside.  The applicant seeks a number of orders in the alternative if the bankruptcy notice is not set aside.

  2. The bankruptcy notice the subject of this application was issued by the Official Receiver on 14 October, 2013.  The bankruptcy notice asserts that the applicant owes the respondent the sum of $237,415.83 together with interest of $482.96 pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court of Queensland.

  3. Leaving aside the amount claimed for interest, the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice is an amount for costs that arises under an order made by Margaret Wilson J in the Supreme Court of Queensland on 23 February, 2011 in Togito Pty Ltd v Pioneer Investments (Aust) Pty…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Smits v Lillas and Loel Lawyers and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCCA 1092
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Smits v Lillas and Loel Lawyers*, the plaintiff, Ms Smits, brought proceedings against the defendants, Lillas and Loel Lawyers, alleging professional negligence. The dispute concerned the conduct of the defendants in acting for Ms Smits in a previous litigation matter.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the defendants had breached their duty of care to Ms Smits by failing to advise her adequately regarding the prospects of success and the potential costs of continuing the previous litigation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the advice provided by the defendants amounted to a failure to exercise reasonable skill and care expected of a solicitor in their position.

Judge Jarrett found that the defendants had not breached their duty of care. The court reasoned that the advice provided by the solicitors was reasonable in the circumstances, taking into account the information available to them at the time. The judge applied the principles of professional negligence, considering the standard of care expected of a reasonably competent solicitor and the causation required to establish liability. The court was satisfied that the defendants had acted appropriately and that Ms Smits had not suffered loss as a result of any breach of duty.

Background

Background to the litigation

In October 2013, Leonardus Gerardus Smits was issued with a bankruptcy notice by the Official Receiver, on the basis of an order by Lillas & Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd for the payment of costs. The notice asserted that Smits owed the respondent $237,415.83, plus interest, pursuant to a Supreme Court order. Smits applied to set aside the bankruptcy notice and for alternative relief. The key facts leading to the dispute include the assignment of a costs order by Pioneer Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd to Lillas & Loel Lawyers, the absence of a joint creditor's consent, a prior settlement of costs between Smits and another party, and questions over the validity of the assignment and Lillas & Loel Lawyers' standing to enforce the costs order. The bankruptcy notice was based on an order made by a deputy registrar, following a costs assessment, rather than the original Supreme Court order. Smits argued that the costs order was not correctly attached to the bankruptcy notice, that joint judgment creditors had not consented to the notice, and that there had been a compromise of the joint debt. He also claimed that Lillas & Loel Lawyers had no standing to enforce the costs order as it was not a party to the original proceedings and had not given notice of the assignment to him. The case involves complex issues of the validity of the costs order attachment, the nature of the joint creditors' entitlements, the effect of the prior settlement, and the enforceability of the assignment.

This case, Smits v Lillas and Loel Lawyers, came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the respondent against the applicant. The application was filed on 31 October 2013, and the matter was heard on 23 February 2015. The applicant, Leonardus Gerardus Smits, sought to have the bankruptcy notice set aside on several grounds, including formal defects, the need for joint creditors to join in the issue, compromise of the joint debt, and the standing of the respondent to issue the notice. Prior to this application, a costs order was made in the Supreme Court of Queensland in Togito Pty Ltd v Pioneer Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) on 23 February 2011, which was later assigned to the respondent, Lillas and Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd. The bankruptcy notice, issued on 14 October 2013, was based on this costs order, which the respondent claimed the applicant owed. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the correct costs order attached to the bankruptcy notice?
2. Was the costs order a joint entitlement, requiring all judgment creditors to join in the issue of the bankruptcy notice?
3. Did the compromise of the joint debt by one joint creditor prevent the other joint creditor from pursuing the bankruptcy notice against the debtor?
4. Did the assignment of the benefit of the costs order to the respondent make the respondent a creditor entitled to issue a bankruptcy notice?
5. Was the assignment of the benefit of the costs order effective without notice given to the debtor?
6. Did the respondent need leave to issue execution on the costs order, and if so, did the absence of that leave mean the order was not one within s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act?
7. Did the applicant have a set-off, cross-claim, or cross-demand that would equal or exceed the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice?
8. Was the issuance of the bankruptcy notice an abuse of process?

Held
1. The court concluded that it was sufficient to attach only the order made by the deputy registrar, not the initial costs order, to the bankruptcy notice. The attachment of only the deputy registrar's order did not render the bankruptcy notice invalid.
2. The court found that the costs order was not a joint entitlement, but rather a several entitlement to each of Pioneer Investments and Conomos to have their costs separately taxed and paid. Therefore, it was not necessary for all joint creditors to join in the issue of the bankruptcy notice.
3. The court determined that the compromise of the joint debt by one joint creditor (Conomos) did not prevent the other joint creditor (Pioneer Investments) from pursuing the bankruptcy notice against the debtor (Smits). The compromise did not relinquish Pioneer's right to pursue the debt.
4. The court held that the assignment of the benefit of the costs order to the respondent made the respondent a creditor entitled to issue a bankruptcy notice. The respondent became beneficially entitled to the costs order and could enforce it in its own right.
5. The court concluded that the assignment of the benefit of the costs order was effective without notice given to the debtor (Smits). The respondent was not obliged to give notice of the assignment, and only Pioneer Investments could give a good discharge for the liability.
6. The court found that the respondent did not need leave to issue execution on the costs order. The absence of leave did not mean the order was not one within s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, as there had been no change in the enforcement creditor since the order was made.
7. The court determined that the applicant did not have a set-off, cross-claim, or cross-demand that would equal or exceed the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice. The applicant's claims for costs were unquantified, and there was no proper basis for asserting that they exceeded the amount claimed.
8. The court rejected the argument that the issuance of the bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process. The respondent was entitled to enforce the order for costs, and there was no evidence of an improper purpose in pursuing the bankruptcy notice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in Smits v Lillas and Loel Lawyers Pty Ltd [2015] FCCA 1092, delivered by Judge Jarrett, addresses several critical issues regarding the issuance and validity of a bankruptcy notice based on a costs order. The court's analysis is grounded in statutory interpretation, procedural rules, and the principles of bankruptcy law.

First, the court considered whether the correct costs order was attached to the bankruptcy notice. It ruled that the attachment of the order made by the deputy registrar, following the assessment of costs by a costs assessor, was sufficient under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). The court relied on the principle established in Ivory v Telstra Corporation Limited & Ors [2010] FMCA 123, which clarified that the order of the registrar, after the assessment of costs, takes effect as a judgment of the court and is enforceable in its own right. This decision distinguished the current regime from prior authorities that required the attachment of the initial costs order made by the court.

Second, the court examined whether the costs order was a joint entitlement requiring all judgment creditors to join in the issue of the bankruptcy notice. It concluded that the order was a several entitlement to each of the judgment creditors, Pioneer Investments and Conomos, to have their costs separately taxed and paid. This finding was based on the separate representation of Pioneer Investments and Conomos in the proceedings, the different factors concerning their costs, and the form of the order itself. The court applied the principle from Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575, which holds that only one writ of execution can be issued for a judgment debt to which joint judgment creditors are entitled, and a bankruptcy notice can only be effective when issued by or on behalf of all judgment creditors.

Third, the court addressed whether the compromise of the joint debt by one joint creditor prevented the other joint creditor from pursuing the bankruptcy notice against the debtor. It found that the compromise did not prevent Pioneer Investments from pursuing its costs against the debtor as it was not a party to the deed of settlement between the debtor and Conomos. The court applied the principle that a creditor who derives their entitlement to the benefit of a money order through an assignment can enforce that order in their own right, as established in Thomas v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 448 and Francis v Eggleston Mitchell Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 18.

Fourth, the court determined whether the assignment of the benefit of the costs order to the respondent made the respondent a creditor entitled to issue a bankruptcy notice. It concluded that the respondent, as the assignee, was beneficially entitled to the costs order and could enforce it in its own right. However, it also found that the respondent did not need to give notice of the assignment to the debtor to make it a creditor under the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

Fifth, the court examined whether the assignment of the benefit of the costs order was effective without notice given to the debtor. It ruled that the assignment was an equitable assignment until notice was given to the debtor, but the respondent could still pursue the rights transferred in the name of the assignor. The court applied the principle that an enforcement creditor requires a court’s leave to start enforcement proceedings if there has been a change in an enforcement creditor, as provided in UCPR 799(2)(b). However, it concluded that no such leave was required in this case as there had been no change in the enforcement creditor from the point of issue of the deputy registrar’s order.

Sixth, the court considered whether the respondent needed leave to issue execution on the costs order and if the absence of that leave meant the order was not one within s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. It found that the requirement to secure leave before enforcement proceedings did not apply, as there had been no change in the enforcement creditor. The court relied on the principle established in Abigroup Ltd v Abigano (1992) 39 FCR 74, which held that a judgment creditor who requires leave to issue execution on the judgment supporting the bankruptcy notice and has not obtained such leave cannot issue a valid bankruptcy notice.

Seventh, the court assessed whether the applicant had a set-off, cross-claim, or cross-demand that would equal or exceed the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice. It found that the applicant’s claims were unquantified and not sufficient to meet or exceed the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice. The court applied the principle that a debtor must demonstrate a proper basis for asserting set-offs, cross-claims, or cross-demands that would equal or exceed the amount claimed.

Finally, the court addressed whether the issuance of the bankruptcy notice was an abuse of process. It found that the respondent was entitled to enforce the order for costs and that there was no evidence of improper purpose in issuing the bankruptcy notice. The court applied the principle that a bankruptcy notice is not an abuse of process if the respondent has a valid entitlement to enforce the costs order and the debtor has not met his liability.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that a bankruptcy notice can be issued based on a costs order assessed and ordered by a deputy registrar, even if the initial costs order was not attached, provided the costs order is a several entitlement, the assignment of the costs order is effective, and the respondent has the requisite entitlement to enforce the order. The court's decision sets a precedent for the interpretation and application of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules in the context of bankruptcy notices based on costs orders.