Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ

KENNY & GOOD PTY LTD & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

MGICA (1992) LTD  RESPONDENT

Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd [1999] HCA 25
17 June 1999
S66/1998

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

D L Davies SC with G Curtin for the appellants (instructed by Colin Biggers & Paisley)

D F Jackson QC with R W White for the respondent (instructed by Hickson Lakeman & Holcombe)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Kenny & Good Pty Ltd & Anor v MGICA (1992) Ltd

Tort – Misrepresentation – Valuation of property – Representation as to present and future value – Duty of care – Scope of liability of valuer – Causation and remoteness of loss – Whether liability to financier includes losses arising from subsequent fall in property market.

Damages – Negligence – Misrepresentation – Valuation of property – Remoteness and measure of damages – Whether contractual remoteness test applicable.

Trade practices – Misleading and deceptive conduct – Valuation of property – Remoteness and measure of damages.

Valuation – Property – Principles – Efficiency of market – Foreseeable risks – Whether factored into value.

Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), ss 42, 68.
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 52, 82.

  1. GAUDRON J.   The appellants are real estate valuers who, for a fee, were engaged by Macquarie Bank Limited ("the Bank") to value a residential property ("the property") in Hunters Hill, a harbourside suburb in Sydney.  The valuation was required to enable a decision to be made as to the provision of mortgage finance to the owner, Beca Developments Pty Limited ("Beca").  The Bank's request was for a valuation which "extended to include ... Permanent Custodians [and] MGICA Limited".  The respondent to this appeal, MGICA (1992) Limited ("MGICA"), was formerly MGICA Limited.

  2. The appellants valued the property while building work was still in progress.  They assessed its value as it stood on 18 April 1990 at $5.35 million and at $5.5 million on completion.  In May 1990, Permanent Custodians Limited ("Permanent Custodians") lent $3.575 million to Beca, that being 65 per cent of the valuation of the property on completion.  The loan was secured by a first mortgage and insured by MGICA.

  3. It is not now in issue that the value of the property was less than stated by the appellants and that, on 18 April 1990, its true value, on an "as completed" basis, was of the order of $3.9 million to $4 million.  In June 1991, Beca defaulted under the mortgage and, on 2 July 1991, Permanent Custodians entered into possession.  On 6 January 1992, the property was sold for $2.65 million.  It is not suggested that the property could have been sold earlier.  Moreover, it is accepted that $2.65 million was its value when sold, there having been a fall…

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Details
Case
[1999] HCA 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute concerning a property valuation. The plaintiff, Kenny & Good Pty Ltd, had obtained a valuation from MGICA (1992) Ltd for a property that was to be used as security for a loan. Kenny & Good subsequently suffered losses due to a fall in the property market after entering into the loan transaction based on the valuation provided by MGICA.

The central legal issues before the High Court were the scope of a valuer's duty of care, the principles governing the assessment of damages for negligent misrepresentation and misleading or deceptive conduct, and specifically, whether a valuer's liability to a financier extended to losses arising from a subsequent fall in the property market. The court was required to determine the appropriate test for remoteness of damages in such circumstances, considering whether contractual principles of remoteness applied.

The High Court reasoned that the principles of contract law were the proper approach for assessing damages in cases where a valuer's negligent valuation causes loss to a party for whom the valuation was made, irrespective of whether that party was in a direct contractual relationship with the valuer. The court held that a valuer is generally liable only for losses that a reasonable person would consider to flow naturally from the negligent valuation or that were within the contemplation of the parties. This confines damages to the difference between the amount lent and the amount that would have been lent based on a true valuation, along with foreseeable consequential expenses and losses. Crucially, the court determined that such damages do not typically include losses resulting from subsequent market declines.

The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to pay costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Later, his Lordship said:[38]"It is important to emphasise that this is a consequence of the limited way in which the House defined the valuer's duty of care and has nothing to do with questions of causation or any limit or 'cap' imposed upon damages which would otherwise be recoverable. It was accepted that the whole loss suffered by reason of the fall in the property market was, as a matter of causation, properly attributable to the lender having entered into the transaction and that, but for the negligent valuation, he would not have done so. It was not suggested that the possibility of a fall in the market was unforeseeable or that there was any other factor which negatived the causal connection between lending and losing the money."[39] As will later appear, the facts of this case make this appeal an unsatisfactory basis for determining the question of principle which is said to arise. But in any event I do not think that the question turns on choosing between the scope of duty and the reasonable foreseeability of loss approaches. Both approaches are relevant. In my view, where a person has agreed to value property and, as a result of the agreement, a person to whom the valuer owes a duty of care has suffered loss, the proper approach is to apply the principles of contract law in assessing damages. Furthermore, that is the proper approach whether the plaintiff was a contracting party or merely a person for whose benefit the valuation was made. Speaking generally, the valuer is liable only for such losses as a reasonable person would regard as flowing naturally from the negligent valuation or which are of a kind that should have been within the valuer's contemplation. In the absence of a contrary undertaking or special circumstances, the aggrieved party cannot recover any part of the difference between the true value of the property and the price recovered at the time of the sale. The aggrieved party's damages are confined to the difference between the price paid for the property and the price that would have been paid on the basis of a true valuation together with such expenses and other losses that were sufficiently likely to result from the breach of duty to make it proper to hold that they flowed naturally from the breach of duty or that they were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the valuation contract or arrangement. In the case of money lent on a valuation, the damages are confined to the difference between what was lent and what would have been lent on the true value of the property together with such expenses and other losses that were sufficiently likely to result from the breach of duty to make it proper to hold that they flowed naturally from the breach of duty or that they were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the contract or arrangement. In either case, losses do not include the consequences of subsequent market declines.[38][1997] 1 WLR 1627 at 1638; [1998] 1 All ER 305 at 316.[39]See also Platform Home Loans Ltd v Oyston Shipways Ltd [1999] 2 WLR 518 at 533-535 per Lord Hobhouse, 537-538 per Lord Millett; [1999] 1 All ER 833 at 847-849, 851-852.Factual background

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GAUDRON J HUGH J GUMMOW J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAUDRON J, HUGH J, GUMMOW J

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