RD Miller Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services NSW

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Summary available
Medium Neutral Citation: RD Miller Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services NSW [2020] NSWCA 241
Hearing dates: 24 April 2020
Date of orders: 02 October 2020
Decision date: 02 October 2020
Before: Bell P at [1];
White JA at [2];
Preston CJ of LEC at [46]
Decision:

The Court:

(1)   Grants leave to appeal against the decision and orders of Robson J made on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J made on 15 November 2019;

(2)   Dismisses the appeal against the decision and orders of Robson J made on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J made on 15 November 2019; and

(3)   Orders the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings in this Court.

Catchwords:

APPEAL – interlocutory decisions to strike out pleadings and refuse leave to amend pleadings – application for leave to appeal – claim for compensation for loss of access to controlled access road – statutory construction of Pt 4, Div 5 of Roads Act 1993 – entitlement to compensation – access restricted or denied as a result of road “becoming” controlled access road – meaning of phrase “as a result of the road becoming” a controlled access road – whether road becomes controlled access road by the event of the Minister’s order declaring road to be a controlled access road or by a “course of conduct” – assessment of compensation – “market value of land” – whether Pointe Gourde principle applies in assessment of compensation

Legislation Cited:

Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 s 55, 56

Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (UK)

Public Works Act 1912 ss 124, 125

Roads Act 1993 ss 6, 46, 49, 54, 67, 68, 69, 70, 771, 178, 190 and 226

Cases Cited:

Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd [2011] 1 AC 380

Cappello v Roads and Maritime Services [2019] NSWCA 227

Commonwealth v Arklay (1952) 87 CLR 159

Cumerlong Holdings Pty Ltd v Dalcross Properties Pty Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 492; [2011] HCA 27

D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 233 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12

Director of Building and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd [1995] 2 AC 111

Ea v Diaconu [2020] NSWCA 127; 380 ALR 727

El Boustani v The Minister administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (2014) 199 LGERA 198; [2014] NSWCA 33

Emerald Quarry Industries Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (SA) (1979) 142 CLR 351; [1979] HCA 17

Fraser v City of Fraserville [1917] AC 187

Gollan v Randwick Municipal Council [1961] AC 80

Griffith City Council v Polegato (1990) 120 NSWLR 696

Haig v Minister administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (1994) 85 LGERA 143

Housing Commission (NSW) v San Sebastian Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 196; [1978] HCA 28

Housing Commissioner of NSW v Falconer [1981] 1 NSWLR 547

In re Lucas and Chesterfield Gas and Water Board [1909] 1 KB 16

In re South…

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Details
Case
[2020] NSWCA 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

RD Miller Pty Ltd (the appellant) sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales against interlocutory decisions made by Robson J and Duggan J. The dispute concerned a claim for compensation by the appellant against Roads and Maritime Services NSW (the respondent) for loss of access to a controlled access road. The appellant alleged that its land had suffered a loss in market value due to restrictions on access imposed by the respondent.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were the construction of Part 4, Division 5 of the *Roads Act 1993* (NSW) concerning entitlement to compensation, and specifically, the meaning of the phrase "as a result of the road becoming" a controlled access road. The court was required to determine whether this phrase referred to the Minister's order declaring the road a controlled access road, or a broader "course of conduct" by the respondent. Additionally, the court considered whether the *Pointe Gourde* principle was applicable in the assessment of compensation for the "market value of land" in this context.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal. The court's reasoning focused on the statutory construction of the *Roads Act 1993*. It held that the entitlement to compensation arose from the specific event of a road being declared a controlled access road by ministerial order, rather than a continuous course of conduct. The court found that the appellant's claim did not fall within the scope of the statutory provisions for compensation, and therefore, the *Pointe Gourde* principle, which deals with the impact of the acquisition itself on market value, was not engaged in the manner argued by the appellant.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal against the decisions of Robson J and Duggan J, ordering the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Court:

(1) Grants leave to appeal against the decision and orders of Robson J made on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J made on 15 November 2019;

(2) Dismisses the appeal against the decision and orders of Robson J made on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J made on 15 November 2019; and

(3) Orders the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings in this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

RD Miller Pty Ltd (the appellant) commenced proceedings against Roads and Maritime Services NSW (the respondent) seeking compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road following the respondent’s declaration that the road in question was a controlled access road. The appellant, a property developer, had purchased a parcel of land with the intention of developing a residential subdivision. The access to the land was via a road that was subsequently declared a controlled access road by the Minister under the Roads Act 1993. This declaration effectively restricted access to the land, leading to significant financial losses for the appellant as it could no longer proceed with its planned development.

In its statement of claim, the appellant alleged that it was entitled to compensation under Part 4, Division 5 of the Roads Act 1993 for the loss of access to the controlled access road. The appellant contended that the statutory provisions entitled it to compensation if its access was restricted or denied as a result of the road becoming a controlled access road. The respondent opposed the claim, arguing that the appellant’s access was not restricted or denied as a result of the road becoming a controlled access road, and that even if it was, the appellant was not entitled to compensation under the statutory provisions.

The primary judge, Robson J, dismissed the appellant’s claim for want of jurisdiction, holding that the appellant’s access to the land was not restricted or denied as a result of the road becoming a controlled access road, but rather due to the respondent’s course of conduct in progressively restricting access over time. The primary judge also held that the phrase “as a result of the road becoming” a controlled access road meant that compensation was only payable if the road became a controlled access road by the event of the Minister’s order, and not by a course of conduct. Duggan J dismissed an amended statement of claim for similar reasons. The appellant subsequently applied for leave to appeal against the decisions and orders of both judges, which was initially refused but later granted by the Court.

The proceedings in RD Miller Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services NSW originated as a claim for compensation filed by RD Miller Pty Ltd against Roads and Maritime Services NSW. The plaintiff sought compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road following statutory changes. The case first came before Robson J on 12 September 2019, who dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. Dissatisfied, RD Miller Pty Ltd sought leave to appeal against this decision. Duggan J subsequently heard an application to amend the pleadings, which was refused on 15 November 2019. RD Miller Pty Ltd then applied for leave to appeal the interlocutory decisions of both Robson J and Duggan J. The appeal against these decisions was heard before the Court, which granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal, ordering RD Miller Pty Ltd to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the phrase "as a result of the road becoming" a controlled access road in Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993 require that the road becomes a controlled access road by the event of the Minister's order or by a "course of conduct"?

2. Is the Pointe Gourde principle applicable in the assessment of compensation under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993 when determining the market value of land affected by a road becoming a controlled access road?

3. What is the proper interpretation of the term "market value of land" in the context of compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993?

4. Does RD Miller Pty Ltd have a valid claim for compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993?

5. Were the interlocutory decisions to strike out pleadings and refuse leave to amend pleadings made by Robson J on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J on 15 November 2019 correctly decided?

6. Is there sufficient grounds for leave to appeal against the interlocutory decisions made by Robson J on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J on 15 November 2019?

Held
1. The court concluded that the phrase "as a result of the road becoming" a controlled access road in Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993 requires that the road becomes a controlled access road by the event of the Minister's order. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

2. The court held that the Pointe Gourde principle is not applicable in the assessment of compensation under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993 when determining the market value of land affected by a road becoming a controlled access road. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

3. The court determined that the term "market value of land" in the context of compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993 refers to the value of the land before the road became a controlled access road. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

4. The court held that RD Miller Pty Ltd does not have a valid claim for compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

5. The court concluded that the interlocutory decisions to strike out pleadings and refuse leave to amend pleadings made by Robson J on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J on 15 November 2019 were correctly decided. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

6. The court found that there were no sufficient grounds for leave to appeal against the interlocutory decisions made by Robson J on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J on 15 November 2019. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court's reasoning in RD Miller Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services NSW primarily revolves around the statutory interpretation of Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993 and the associated principles governing compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road. The first issue addressed by the court concerns the phrase "as a result of the road becoming" a controlled access road. The court examined whether this phrase necessitates the road becoming a controlled access road through the event of the Minister's order or by a "course of conduct". The court found that the phrase "as a result of the road becoming" a controlled access road is not limited to the event of the Minister's order, but can also encompass a "course of conduct" leading to the road becoming a controlled access road. The court relied on the principle of statutory interpretation that the ordinary meaning of words should be given effect, and that the context in which the words are used should be considered.

The second issue pertains to the applicability of the Pointe Gourde principle in the assessment of compensation under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993. The court considered whether the Pointe Gourde principle, which states that the market value of land should be assessed on the basis of its value immediately before the event giving rise to the claim, applies in this context. The court concluded that the Pointe Gourde principle does apply in the assessment of compensation, as the phrase "market value of land" in the statute refers to the value of the land immediately before the event that caused the loss of access.

In addressing the third issue, the court sought to determine the proper interpretation of the term "market value of land" in the context of compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road. The court considered the ordinary meaning of the term, as well as the context in which it is used in Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993. The court held that the term "market value of land" should be interpreted as the value of the land immediately before the event that caused the loss of access, in line with the Pointe Gourde principle.

The fourth issue concerns whether RD Miller Pty Ltd has a valid claim for compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road under Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993. The court considered the facts of the case and the statutory provisions relevant to the claim. The court found that RD Miller Pty Ltd did not have a valid claim for compensation, as the road did not become a controlled access road "as a result of" the Minister's order, but rather due to a "course of conduct" leading to the road becoming a controlled access road.

The fifth issue pertains to the interlocutory decisions made by Robson J on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J on 15 November 2019 to strike out pleadings and refuse leave to amend pleadings. The court examined whether these decisions were correctly made, considering the applicable legal principles and authorities. The court found that the interlocutory decisions were correctly decided, as the appellant's claims were without merit and the amendment of pleadings would not have altered the outcome.

Lastly, the court considered whether there were sufficient grounds for leave to appeal against the interlocutory decisions made by Robson J on 12 September 2019 and Duggan J on 15 November 2019. The court found that, while the appeal against the interlocutory decisions was dismissed, there were sufficient grounds for leave to appeal, as the questions of statutory interpretation and the applicability of the Pointe Gourde principle were of significant legal importance and merited further consideration. The court also noted that the appellant had demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success on the appeal, and that the appeal raised an issue of general public importance.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the phrase "as a result of the road becoming" a controlled access road in Pt 4, Div 5 of the Roads Act 1993 encompasses a "course of conduct" leading to the road becoming a controlled access road, and that the Pointe Gourde principle applies in the assessment of compensation for loss of access to a controlled access road under the Act. Furthermore, the term "market value of land" should be interpreted as the value of the land immediately before the event that caused the loss of access.