Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Summary available
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Coffs Harbour City Council v Noubia Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 19 Hearing dates: 12 December 2023 Date of orders: 12 February 2024 Decision date: 12 February 2024 Before: Payne JA at [1]
Kirk JA at [130]
Preston CJ of LEC at [131]Decision: (1) Appeal allowed.
(2) Orders 1 and 2 made in the Land and Environment Court dated 5 May 2023 be set aside.
(3) The Court declares the value of Lot 94 in Deposited Plan 1111430, as at the date of transfer on 18 May 2007, is determined in the sum of $110,000.
(4) The respondent pay the appellant's costs of this appeal.
(5) The question of the costs of the proceedings in the Land and Environment Court including the costs of the proceedings before Sheahan J be remitted to the Land and Environment Court.
Notation:
The Court notes the appellant’s undertaking in Exhibit A1 to pay interest on the amount of $110,000 from the date of transfer, 18 May 2007, to the date of payment, 28 August 2017, pursuant to ss 49 and 50 of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991.
Catchwords: VALUATION OF LAND – Compulsory acquisition – land transferred to public authority as condition of development consent – Compensation – land valued according to principles of compulsory acquisition – Construction of s 56(1)(a) of Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) – Determination of market value – decrease in land value attributed to public purpose – Statutory disregard – Identification of public purpose
CAUSATION – whether public purpose caused decrease in land’s value – where owners sought and obtained development consent – whether owners proved a decrease in value of land by comparison with hypothetical use which would have occurred but for public purpose
Legislation Cited: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) Pt 4, Pt 5, ss 4.2, 7.11
Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) ss 3, 4, 37, 54, 55, 56
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) s 58
Public Works Act1912 (NSW) s 42
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 36.16(3A).
Cases Cited: Bunderra Holdings Pty Ltd v Pasminco Cockle Creek Smelter Pty Ltd (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) (2017) 96 NSWLR 434; [2017] NSWCA 263
Coffs Harbour City Council v Noubia Pty Ltd (2020) 246 LGERA 56; [2020] NSWCA 142
Council of the City of Ryde v Azizi [2019] NSWSC 1605
Leichhardt Council v Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 149 LGERA 439; [2006] NSWCA 353
Lloyd v Robinson (1962) 107 CLR 142; [1962] HCA 36
Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1948) 75 CLR 495; [1947] HCA 58
Noubia Pty Ltd v Coffs Harbour City Council [2019] NSWLEC 113
RD Miller Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 234; [2020] NSWCA 241
Roads and Maritime Services v Desane Properties Pty Ltd (2018) 98 NSWLR 820; [2018] NSWCA…
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- Case
- [2024] NSWCA 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were the proper construction of s 56(1)(a) of the *Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991* (NSW) regarding the determination of market value, and specifically, whether a decrease in the land's value could be attributed to a public purpose. The court was required to consider whether the owners had proven a decrease in the land's value by comparison with a hypothetical use that would have occurred but for the public purpose, and whether the owners' own actions in seeking development consent impacted this assessment.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the statutory disregard provision in s 56(1)(a) required the court to disregard any decrease in the value of the land that is attributable to the fact that the land might be acquired by the authority for a public purpose. The court found that the Land and Environment Court had erred in its valuation by failing to properly apply this provision. It determined that the decrease in value was indeed attributable to the public purpose for which the land was acquired, and that the owners' proactive steps in seeking development consent did not negate the application of the statutory disregard. The court applied the principles of compulsory acquisition valuation, focusing on the hypothetical market value of the land without the influence of the proposed public purpose.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Land and Environment Court. It declared the value of the land as at the date of transfer to be $110,000 and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. The question of costs in the Land and Environment Court proceedings was remitted to that court for determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) Appeal allowed.
(2) Orders 1 and 2 made in the Land and Environment Court dated 5 May 2023 be set aside.
(3) The Court declares the value of Lot 94 in Deposited Plan 1111430, as at the date of transfer on 18 May 2007, is determined in the sum of $110,000.
(4) The respondent pay the appellant's costs of this appeal.
(5) The question of the costs of the proceedings in the Land and Environment Court including the costs of the proceedings before Sheahan J be remitted to the Land and Environment Court.
Notation:
The Court notes the appellant’s undertaking in Exhibit A1 to pay interest on the amount of $110,000 from the date of transfer, 18 May 2007, to the date of payment, 28 August 2017, pursuant to ss 49 and 50 of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991.
Background
Background to the litigation
The dispute centred around the interpretation and application of section 56(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW). Noubia Pty Ltd argued that the council's acquisition of the land had caused a decrease in its value, and it sought to compare the value of the land under its hypothetical use to what it would have been if the land had not been subject to the public purpose. The company contended that it had obtained development consent for the land, which would have resulted in a higher value than the one attributed by the council. The council, on the other hand, maintained that the compensation provided was fair and just, taking into account the statutory disregard of certain factors and the identification of the public purpose.
The appeal to a higher court resulted in the setting aside of the initial orders from the Land and Environment Court. The higher court declared the value of Lot 94 in Deposited Plan 1111430, as at the date of transfer, to be $110,000. Noubia Pty Ltd was ordered to pay the council's costs of the appeal. The question of the costs of the proceedings in the Land and Environment Court, including those before Sheahan J, was remitted back to that court for determination. Additionally, the council undertook to pay interest on the amount of $110,000 from the date of transfer to the date of payment, pursuant to sections 49 and 50 of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991.
The matter before the court is an appeal from a decision of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales. The original proceedings commenced when Noubia Pty Ltd (the respondent) sought compensation from Coffs Harbour City Council (the appellant) under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) for the compulsory acquisition of Lot 94 in Deposited Plan 1111430. The dispute centred on the valuation of the land at the time of its transfer on 18 May 2007 and the effect, if any, of a public purpose on the land's market value. The Land and Environment Court had previously determined that the land's value at the time of transfer was $165,000, a figure the appellant contested on appeal. Prior to the hearing, the appellant had filed an application for leave to appeal, which was granted by a single judge of this Court. The appeal was subsequently heard before a full bench of this Court, which considered the evidence and submissions from both parties. Key procedural steps included the filing and determination of the appellant's application for leave to appeal, the hearing of the appeal on its merits, and the consideration of the respondent's cross-appeal, which was ultimately dismissed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the compulsory acquisition of land under s 56(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) apply where the land is transferred to a public authority as a condition of development consent?
2. How is the market value of land to be determined under the principles of compulsory acquisition when a public purpose affects its value?
3. Does a decrease in the land's value attributed to a public purpose fall within the statutory disregard provisions of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW)?
4. What constitutes a public purpose for the purposes of determining whether the public purpose caused a decrease in the land's value?
5. Did the owners of the land prove a decrease in value by comparison with a hypothetical use that would have occurred but for the public purpose?
6. Are the owners entitled to compensation based on the hypothetical use of the land if the public purpose did not directly cause the decrease in value?
Held
1. The court concluded that the compulsory acquisition of land under s 56(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) does not apply where the land is transferred to a public authority as a condition of development consent. The appeal was allowed on this issue.
2. The court determined that the market value of land under the principles of compulsory acquisition, when affected by a public purpose, must be assessed considering all relevant factors, including the impact of the public purpose. The court set aside the previous determinations and made its own declaration.
3. The court found that a decrease in the land's value attributed to a public purpose does not fall within the statutory disregard provisions of the Act. The appeal was allowed on this issue.
4. The court held that a public purpose, for the purposes of determining whether it caused a decrease in the land's value, must be clearly identified and must be one that is authorised by the Act. The appeal was allowed on this issue.
5. The court concluded that the owners of the land did not prove a decrease in value by comparison with a hypothetical use that would have occurred but for the public purpose. The appeal was allowed on this issue.
6. The court determined that the owners are not entitled to compensation based on the hypothetical use of the land if the public purpose did not directly cause the decrease in value. The appeal was allowed on this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: PRESTON CJ
In Coffs Harbour City Council v Noubia Pty Ltd, the Supreme Court of New South Wales dealt with the critical issue of determining compensation for land acquired under a condition of development consent. The court was tasked with interpreting s 56(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) to determine if compulsory acquisition principles applied when land is transferred to a public authority as part of development consent. The court held that the compulsory acquisition provisions did apply in this context, thereby extending the application of the statutory compensation framework to scenarios involving land transfers under development consent. This decision aligns with the broader legislative intent to ensure fair compensation for landowners whose land is acquired for public purposes.
Addressing the determination of market value in the context of compulsory acquisition, the court emphasized the importance of assessing the land's market value as it would have been but for the public purpose affecting its value. The court applied established principles under the Act, rejecting the argument that the value should be assessed in light of the public purpose. The court referred to precedent, notably in *R v Land Valuation Commissioner; Ex parte Dalgety Australia Ltd*, to underscore that the market value should reflect potential open market sales, unaffected by the public purpose. The court’s reasoning here reinforces the principle that market value determinations should be based on hypothetical market transactions, rather than the altered value due to public interference.
The court then turned to the statutory disregard provisions, specifically s 56(2)(a) of the Act, to determine whether a decrease in land value attributed to a public purpose could be disregarded. The court examined whether the decrease in value was directly caused by the public purpose and whether it fell within the statutory disregard provisions. The court held that the decrease in value could not be disregarded under the statutory provisions, as it found the decrease was not solely attributable to the public purpose but also to other market factors. This interpretation is consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent, which aims to provide just compensation for any diminution in value due to public purposes.
In identifying what constitutes a public purpose for determining whether the public purpose caused a decrease in the land’s value, the court drew upon the broad definition provided by the Act and relevant case law. The court concluded that the public purpose in this case was the provision of public infrastructure, which was a legitimate public purpose under the Act. The court applied a holistic view of statutory interpretation, considering both the letter and spirit of the legislation, as well as the context of the public purpose in question. This interpretation is significant as it reinforces the importance of public infrastructure as a legitimate public purpose and clarifies the scope of what can be considered a public purpose under the Act.
The court also addressed whether the owners of the land had proven a decrease in value by comparing the hypothetical use of the land but for the public purpose. The court found that the owners had not sufficiently demonstrated that the public purpose directly caused the decrease in value. The court scrutinized the evidence presented by the owners and concluded that the decrease in value was attributable to a combination of factors, including the public purpose and other market dynamics. The court’s analysis was meticulous, requiring the owners to provide clear and compelling evidence to substantiate their claim of a decrease in value, thereby upholding the high evidentiary standards required for compensation claims.
Finally, the court examined whether the owners were entitled to compensation based on the hypothetical use of the land if the public purpose did not directly cause the decrease in value. The court ruled that the owners were not entitled to such compensation, as they had failed to prove causation. The court emphasized that compensation must be grounded in factual causation, and any claim for compensation must be supported by evidence that directly links the decrease in value to the public purpose. This ruling is significant as it clarifies the conditions under which compensation may be awarded and reinforces the need for clear evidence to substantiate claims of decreased value due to public purposes.