QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Lois Nominees Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   QBE INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LTD -v- LOIS NOMINEES PTY LTD and the persons detailed in the Schedule attached to the Appeal Notice (Civil) [2012] WASCA 186

CORAM:   McLURE P

NEWNES JA
MURPHY JA

HEARD:   13 MARCH 2012

DELIVERED          :   26 SEPTEMBER 2012

FILE NO/S:   CACV 101 of 2011

BETWEEN:   QBE INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LTD

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY
QBE CORPORATE LTD T/AS DA CONSTABLE SYNDICATE 386 AT LLOYDS
Appellants

AND

LOIS NOMINEES PTY LTD and the persons detailed in the Schedule attached to the Appeal Notice (Civil)
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :BEECH J

Citation  :LOIS NOMINEES PTY LTD -v- QBE INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LTD [2011] WASC 208

File No  :CIV 1796 of 2011, CIV 2019 of 2009

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Action for negligence by clients against bankrupt solicitor - Insurers refused to indemnify solicitor for claim - Action by clients against insurer for declaration that insurer liable to indemnify solicitor - Whether clients' claim for declaration arguable - Whether declaration had any utility - Whether declaration would be refused on basis of procedural disadvantages suffered by insurer in the action - Whether defence by insurer to subsequent claim by solicitor's trustee in bankruptcy for indemnity would be abuse of process

Legislation:

Australian Constitution, ch III
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 58, s 82, s 117
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 562
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 16 r 1
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 80

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellants:     Mr S M Davies SC & Mr A J Musikanth

Respondent:     Mr J C Vaughan

Solicitors:

Appellants:     Jackson McDonald

Respondent:     Tottle Partners

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564

Anjin No 13 Pty Ltd v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2009] VSC 371; (2009) 26 VR 148

Arthur J S Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615

Asher v Secretary of State for the Environment [1974] 1 Ch 208

Ashmere Cove Pty Ltd v Beekink (No 2) [2007] FCA 1421; (2007) 244 ALR 534

Astley v Austrust Ltd [1999] HCA 6; (1999) 197 CLR 1

Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 406

Australasian Oil Exploration Ltd v Lachberg [1958] HCA 51; (1958) 101 CLR 119

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256

Bazem Pty Ltd v Bureau of Urban Architecture [2010] NSWSC 978

Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Price Waterhouse (1996) 68 SASR 19

Burton v The President of the Shire of Bairnsdale [1908] HCA 57; (1908) 7 CLR 76

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853

Carob Industries…

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Details
Case
[2012] WASCA 186
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Lois Nominees Pty Ltd, the central dispute involved the liability of an insurer, QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd, to indemnify a bankrupt solicitor for claims made by the solicitor's former clients, Lois Nominees Pty Ltd. The insurer had refused to indemnify the solicitor, leading to the clients initiating a claim against the insurer for a declaration that the insurer was liable to indemnify the solicitor. The appeal was dismissed by a majority, with the key issues revolving around the arguability of the clients' claim for a declaration, its utility, and whether the insurer's defence in subsequent proceedings would be considered an abuse of process.

The court was required to determine whether the clients' claim for a declaration was arguable, if the declaration had any utility, and if the insurer's defence in future proceedings would be deemed an abuse of process. The court considered the conflicting authorities on these points, particularly focusing on the Queensland case of Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd, which dealt with similar issues. The majority found that the clients' claim was not arguable, the declaration had no utility, and the insurer's defence would not be considered an abuse of process. The court also highlighted that on an appeal from a refusal of summary judgment, costs ordinarily follow the event, leading to a decision on costs in favour of the respondents.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the analysis of the arguability and utility of the clients' claim for a declaration. The majority found that the clients' claim did not meet the threshold of being arguable and that the declaration lacked utility because it would not prevent the insurer from contesting liability in future proceedings, even if it would be considered an abuse of process. The court also concluded that the insurer's defence would not be an abuse of process, as it would not be relitigation with an improper motive. The majority opinion was that the insurer's procedural disadvantages in the initial proceedings could be overcome, and the insurer could still defend any subsequent action without it being considered an abuse of process. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the costs of the appeal were ordered to follow the event, with the appellants to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: On 26 September 2012, this court, by a majority (Newnes & Murphy JJA, McLure P dissenting), dismissed an appeal against an order of Beech J, who had refused the appellants' application for summary judgment: QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Lois Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 186. When judgment on the appeal was delivered, counsel for the appellants sought an opportunity to make written submissions on the costs of the appeal. It was ordered that written submissions be filed by both parties and the question of costs be determined on the papers. In their written submissions, the appellants contend that the costs of the appeal should be costs in the cause of the action. They argue that such an order is ordinarily made on an unsuccessful summary judgment application and there was no reason to depart from that practice on the appeal. The appellants further submit that it was relevant to the question of costs that McLure P would have allowed the appeal and that Murphy JA, while he ultimately concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, considered there was an issue as to the joinder of necessary parties. In those circumstances, it was submitted, it would not be appropriate for the appellants to be exposed immediately to the costs of the appeal but any exposure to costs should only crystallise in the event that the appellants are unsuccessful at trial. The respondents' position was simple. They had been successful on the appeal and there was no reason to depart from the usual practice that costs follow the event. The respondents sought an order that the appellants pay the respondents' costs of the appeal (including any reserved costs) to be taxed. There is no substance in the appellants' submissions. The practice as to costs at first instance where an application for summary judgment is refused has no application on an appeal against that decision. On such an appeal, costs will ordinarily follow the event. There is nothing in this appeal which would justify a departure from that. The fact that the court was divided on the outcome of the appeal is beside the point. Nor is it to the point that Murphy JA considered there was an issue as to the joinder of relevant parties. That was not relevant to his Honour's conclusion as to the outcome of the appeal. The appropriate order is that the appellants pay the respondents' costs of the appeal (including any reserved costs) to be taxed. There will be an order accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I turn now to the conflicting authorities. In Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 301, the respondent commenced an action claiming damages for negligence against property valuers. After conducting the defence for some time, the insurer declined indemnity under its insurance contract with the valuers. The valuers did not institute third party proceedings against the insurer. The reason was not known. The valuers had not been made bankrupt or placed in liquidation. In any event there was nothing to indicate that the valuers may contest the insurer's decision. Subsequently, the respondent successfully applied to join the insurer as an additional defendant, seeking a declaration that the insurer was liable to indemnify the valuers. The Queensland Court of Appeal by a majority (McPherson JA & Byrne J, Davies JA dissenting) set aside the joinder of the insurer on the ground that it served no useful purpose. Byrne J (with whom McPherson JA agreed) rejected the respondent's contention that the declaration would have some utility because in later proceedings initiated by a liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy to enforce the policy, a defence that was inconsistent with the declaration would be struck out as an abuse of process. He said:Several considerations combine to show that there is no appreciable prospect that a defence denying liability to indemnify would be treated as such an abuse. In the later proceedings, FAI would not be resisting an obligation to indemnify for an ulterior or collateral purpose … Secondly, the plaintiff[s] in the later case will have elected not to bring third‑party proceedings in this litigation and instead will have waited to see the outcome of Interchase's action against FAI, which is not an immaterial consideration. Next, what would then be challenged as an abuse of process is not the prosecution of a claim but the defence of one. Finally, the subsequent proceedings would probably afford FAI procedural advantages that are not available to it in defending Interchase's action (320). The capacity to interrogate and obtain discovery were identified as advantages. Interchase was referred to with approval in Morrell v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Australia) Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 451. Davies JA in Interchase concluded that the declaration would have utility because the insurer would be prevented from defending any subsequent action by the doctrine of abuse of process by relitigation. That conclusion was based on his assessment that 'there can be no doubt that, in the present case, both [the insurer] and the valuers will have full opportunity of contesting the question in respect of which the declaration is sought' (310). It is apparent from the report that the valuers were represented and playing an active role in the litigation. Davies JA relied on three cases, Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665 (although he noted that mutuality may have existed there if, as seems likely, the respondent and the Bishop were privies); Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; and North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547. It is the case that improper motive or purpose is not a necessary condition of abuse of process by relitigation. Davies JA also concluded that any procedural disadvantages could be readily overcome by the insurer seeking a declaration in the proceedings against the valuers (311).