RIVI Opportunity Fund LP v Hellyer Gold Mines Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   RIVI OPPORTUNITY FUND LP & ANOR -v- HELLYER GOLD MINES PTY LTD & ANOR [2025] WASC 95

CORAM:   MASTER RUSSELL

HEARD:   8 AUGUST 2024

DELIVERED          :   24 MARCH 2025

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1243 of 2024

BETWEEN:   RIVI OPPORTUNITY FUND LP

First Plaintiff

RCA NQ LLC

Second Plaintiff

AND

HELLYER GOLD MINES PTY LTD (ACN 125 516 636)

First Defendant

PIEMAN RESOURCES PTY LTD (ACN 631 444 089)

Second Defendant


Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Summary judgment - Order 14 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Plaintiff seeking declaration as to construction of contractual provision - Alternative claim for rectification - Turns on own facts
Contract - Construction and interpretation - Correction of obvious error by application of ordinary principles of construction - Whether objective intention self-evident -Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 14, O 18 r 16
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 25(6)

Result:

Application granted
Summary judgment for the plaintiff

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff : Mr G R Donaldson SC & Mr P H Murray
Second Plaintiff : Mr G R Donaldson SC & Mr P H Murray
First Defendant : Mr J E Scovell
Second Defendant : Mr J E Scovell

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff : K&L Gates
Second Plaintiff : K&L Gates
First Defendant : Taylor David Lawyers
Second Defendant : Taylor David Lawyers

Cases referred to in decision(s):

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1982] HCA 24

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564

Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd [1996] FCA 813; (1996) 68 FCR 406

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99

Bankwest (a division of CBA) v Mann [2015] WASC 187

Cologna Investments Pty Ltd as trustee for the P. and D. Panizza Family Trust v Caranna [2023] WASC 368

Commissioner of Taxation v The Trustee for the Michael Hayes Family Trust [2019] FCAFC 226; (2019) 273 FCR 567

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lafferty [2017] WASC 257

Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640

Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 61; (1972) 127 CLR 421

Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2009] NSWCA 407; (2009) 76 NSWLR 603

GEL Custodians Pty Ltd v Dewar [2014] WASC 177

HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Mavaddat [2015] WASC 153

JKC Australia LNG Pty Ltd v CH2M Hill Companies Ltd [No 2] [2020] WASCA 112

Lachlan v HP Mercantile Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 130; (2015) 89 NSWLR 198

Mak v Juventus Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 409

Morgan v Pallister [2004] WASC 188

Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd v Mosbert Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 109

Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Mount Bruce…

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Details
Case
[2025] WASC 95
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case RIVI Opportunity Fund LP v Hellyer Gold Mines Pty Ltd involved the plaintiff seeking a declaration regarding the interpretation of a contractual provision and an alternative claim for rectification. The Supreme Court of Western Australia was tasked with deciding whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Supreme Court Rules 1971 (WA). The primary issue was whether the plaintiff had discharged the legal burden of proving that its claim was valid and had no defence, thereby shifting the evidentiary burden to the defendant to show an arguable defence or other reasons for a trial.

The court considered the principles established in previous cases such as Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson and Lafferty, which highlight the procedural requirements for summary judgment applications. The court noted that the plaintiff must persuade the court that its claim is valid and unassailable. If the plaintiff’s affidavits demonstrate a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to present an arguable defence or other reasons for proceeding to trial. The court also considered the timing of the application, which was filed 10 days beyond the 21-day limit stipulated in Order 14 r 1(1). Despite the delay, the court found that the application was brought early in the proceedings and that there was no evidence of prejudice to the defendants due to the delay. Therefore, the court granted leave for the application to proceed, extending the time for the application to the date of filing.

The court’s reasoning was grounded in the need to ensure that summary judgment applications are brought promptly to avoid unnecessary expenses. However, it also recognised that exceptions could be made if the delay was justified and did not prejudice the other party. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff had adequately demonstrated the validity of its claim, and the delay in filing the application did not prejudice the defendants. Consequently, the court granted the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment.

The final orders of the court included a declaration that the contractual provision was to be interpreted in a certain manner, and the alternative claim for rectification was dismissed as it was not necessary given the interpretation of the contract. The court also extended the time for the application for summary judgment to the date of filing and ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

RIVI Opportunity Fund LP (the plaintiff) initiated legal proceedings against Hellyer Gold Mines Pty Ltd (the defendant) seeking a declaration on the construction of a contractual provision and, alternatively, for rectification of the contract. The contract in question involved the sale of shares in the defendant company by the plaintiff to a third party. The plaintiff claimed that there was an obvious error in the contract that needed to be corrected, while the defendant argued that the matter required a trial due to the complexity of the issues involved. The dispute arose from differing interpretations of the contractual terms, particularly concerning the timing of the transfer of shares and related payments.

The plaintiff submitted that the contractual terms were clear and unambiguous, leading to the conclusion that the defendant's interpretation was incorrect. They argued that the contract should be construed in a way that reflected the objective intention of the parties, which they believed was self-evident from the document itself. The defendant, however, contended that the contract was ambiguous and that the matter should proceed to trial to allow for a more thorough examination of the surrounding circumstances and the intentions of the parties at the time the contract was signed.

The case came before the court as an application for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Supreme Court Rules 1971 (WA). The plaintiff filed the application 10 days after the time limit specified in Order 14 r 1(1), which mandates that such applications be made within 21 days after an appearance has been filed, or any later time with leave of the court. The plaintiff sought leave to bring the application outside the 21-day period, arguing that the application was made at an early stage of the proceeding and that the short delay had not caused any prejudice to the defendant. The court considered the plaintiff's arguments and granted leave to bring the application, extending the time for the application to the date of filing. The matter proceeded with the court examining the plaintiff's affidavit and supporting documents to determine whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and whether the defendant had an arguable defence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for the declaration sought, and whether the defendant has an arguable defence or some other reason why there ought to be a trial.
2. Whether the contract is ambiguous and requires a trial to determine the intentions of the parties at the time of the agreement, or whether the contract is clear and unambiguous, allowing for summary judgment.
3. Whether the objective intention of the parties is self-evident from the contract and can be determined without the need for extrinsic evidence.

Held
1. The plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for the declaration sought. The defendant has not demonstrated an arguable defence or some other reason why there ought to be a trial.
2. The contract is clear and unambiguous, and does not require a trial to determine the intentions of the parties at the time of the agreement.
3. The objective intention of the parties is self-evident from the contract and can be determined without the need for extrinsic evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The plaintiff bears the legal burden of persuading the court that its claim is a good one and that there is no defence to it. If the plaintiffs' affidavit or affidavits in support of the application make out a prima facie case on these two matters, the evidentiary burden passes to the defendant to show there is an arguable defence or some other reason there ought to be a trial of the action.[6][6] Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson [2017] WASC 106 (Westpac v Anderson) [53] ‑ [54], [103]. See also Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lafferty[2017] WASC 257 (Lafferty) [54] (Tottle J), citing Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd v Mosbert Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd [1976] WAR 109 (Moscow Narodny Bank), 110 (Brinsden J); Bankwest (a division of CBA) v Mann [2015] WASC 187 [46] (Gething AM); HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Mavaddat [2015] WASC 153 [26] (Gething AM); GEL Custodians Pty Ltd v Dewar [2014] WASC 177 [25] (Gething AM); Wright v Wright [2002] WASC 30 [19] (Sanderson M); Morgan v Pallister [2004] WASC 188 [4] (Pullin J). A defendant seeking to demonstrate an arguable defence or some other reason why there ought to be a trial must condescend to particulars and provide sufficient details of their defence.[7] [7] Lafferty [54] citing Moscow Narodny Bank 113 (Brinsden J); Wallingford v Mutual Society (1880) 5 App Cas 685, 704 (Lord Blackburn). As observed by Pullin J in Morgan v Pallister, summary judgment 'is not confined to cases which are immediately plain and obvious and the fact that a transaction is intricate does not disentitle a plaintiff to relief in a clear case.' However, it is not the intention of O 14 that an action be disposed of summarily where the facts are in dispute.[8][8] Morgan v Pallister [4]. Order 14 r 1(1) RSC requires an application for summary judgment to be made within 21 days after an appearance has been filed, or any later time with leave of the court. The 21-day time limit to bring an application for summary judgment reflects the view that such applications should be brought at an early stage of the proceedings before too much expense has been incurred. Where there is a delay, the onus is ordinarily on the applicant to demonstrate that the delay is justifiable in the circumstances. Any prejudice to the other party caused by the delay and the prospects of the application are also relevant factors.[9][9] See Westpac v Anderson [38] and the authorities referred to. The Application was brought 10 days after the time provided in O 14 r 1(1). However, it has been brought at an early stage of the proceeding and there is no suggestion or evidence that the relatively short delay in bringing the Application has caused any prejudice to the defendants. I am satisfied, in the circumstances, that leave should be granted to bring the Application, the time for which is extended to the date of filing. The following is a summary of the relevant factual background, which is largely derived from the Puil Affidavit and the documents attached to it. Other than as defined in these reasons, all capitalised terms are references to defined terms in the Purchase Deeds and have the meaning given to them in the Purchase Deeds.