FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AMO25 v Administrative Review Tribunal (No 2) [2025] FCA 376
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 376
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court first considered the statutory authority for awarding costs, as per section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. It was noted that the court had broad discretion in awarding costs but had to exercise this power judicially and in accordance with relevant principles and the justice of the particular circumstances. The court also considered the overarching purpose of the civil procedure provisions, which aimed to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. Given the Applicant's self-representation, the court recognised that generally, a self-represented litigant may not obtain recompense for the value of their time spent in litigation. However, the Applicant was entitled to their disbursements.
In this case, the court found that the Applicant was entitled to half of their costs, as a self-represented litigant, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision was based on the Applicant's identification of the Third Respondent as the party against whom they sought costs. The court declined to grant leave for the Applicant to amend her application and seek any costs against the First or Second Respondent, as they had not been heard on the question of costs. Additionally, the court ordered that if no party made any submission to the contrary within seven days of the date of this Order, then the date of the Tribunal's decision would be varied to substitute the date "25 October 2024" for the date "11 October 2024".
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Third Respondent pay half of the Applicant’s costs (as a self-represented litigant) to be taxed if not agreed.
2. If no party makes any submission to the contrary within 7 days of the date of this Order, then pursuant to r 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), Order 2 of the Orders of the Court made on 12 March 2025 be varied to substitute the date “25 October 2024” for the date “11 October 2024”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As a general rule, a self-represented litigant may not obtain any recompense for the value of his or her time spent in litigation: Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow (2019) 269 CLR 333; [2019] HCA 29 at [1]; Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410-411. It has been said that a Court has no power to award costs in favour of an unrepresented litigant: Australian Super Pty Ltd v Woodward (2009) 262 ALR 402; [2009] FCAFC 168 at [60]-[61]. However, such a litigant is entitled to their disbursements: Frost v Sheahan as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Allen Gordon Frost [2012] FCAFC 46 at [76]; P v Child Support Registrar [2012] FCA 1398 at [36]; George v Fletcher (Trustee) (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 71 at [17]-[19]; Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 212 at [9]; Schokker v Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 1311.CONSIDERATION – APPLICANT’S COSTS The Applicant, who can be described as ‘the mother’, originally filed an application for judicial review on 13 December 2024, in relation to the Tribunal's decision dated 11 October 2024, published on 20 or 25 October 2024 (Decision). The Respondents, in that originating application, were identified as follows:(a)First Respondent – Administrative Appeals Tribunal;(b)Second Respondent – Child Support Registrar;(c)Third Respondent – AMP25 (who can be described as ‘the father’). The First Respondent appropriately filed a submitting appearance on 24 January 2025. The Second and Third Respondent each filed a Notice of Address for Service on 23 January 2025 and 3 February 2025, respectively. The matter was first listed for case management on 28 February 2025, wherein the Court was advised, that at least as between the Applicant and the Second Respondent, consent orders proposing the remittal of the proceedings back to the Tribunal had been agreed the day before (Draft Orders). The Third Respondent did not agree to the Draft Orders. Given the lack of substantive agreement from the Third Respondent, I made orders on 28 February 2025 regularising the proceedings (so it was deemed to be an appeal, rather than an application for judicial review) and for the filing of submissions to consider the matter, effectively in a summary way. Submissions were provided by each of the Applicant, the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent. On consideration of those submissions, I was satisfied that the legal error identified by the Applicant and the Second Respondent in the reasons of the Tribunal existed. As such, my Orders of 12 March 2025 set aside the Decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be dealt with according to law. In terms of the form of the Orders which were ultimately made, they were different to that proposed by way of the Draft Orders. This was as a result of the regularisation of the proceedings. However, the effect of the Orders made and those proposed by the Draft Orders was the same. The effect was to quash or set aside the Decision of the Tribunal and to remit the matter back to the Tribunal to be decided according to law.