AMO25 v Administrative Review Tribunal (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AMO25 v Administrative Review Tribunal (No 2) [2025] FCA 376    

File number: QUD 12 of 2025
Judgment of: WHEATLEY J
Date of judgment: 16 April 2025
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Costs – Self-represented litigants – Where appeal allowed – Where Applicant sought indemnity costs only against Third Respondent – Whether Applicant entitled to recover costs on an indemnity basis – Whether there are any special or unusual circumstances to justify a departure from the usual position on costs – Whether Applicant can claim disbursements

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgments and orders – Correction under the slip rule – Where original order was the result of an accidental slip or omission – Where original order does not reflect the intention of the Court  

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N, 43

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ss 220, 299, 300, 316, 307B

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05, r 40.01, r 40.02

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) (2021) 151 ACSR 26; [2021] FCA 246

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v BlueScope Steel Limited (No 7) [2023] FCA 1140

Australian Super Pty Ltd v Woodward (2009) 262 ALR 402; [2009] FCAFC 168

Barrett Property Group Ltd v Metricon Homes Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 74 IPR 52; [2007] FCA 1823

Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow (2019) 269 CLR 333; [2019] HCA 29

Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403; [1994] HCA 14

Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225; [1993] FCA 536

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Registered Organisations Commissioner (No 2) [2021] FCAFC 56

Connollys Lawyers Pty Ltd v Davis [2013] QCA 231

Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 123; [2012] FCA 1404

DSE (Holdings) Pty Limited v InterTAN Inc (2004) 51 ACSR 555; [2004] FCA 1251

Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 6) [2024] FCA 758

Elyard Corporation Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 385; [1995] FCA 943

Frigger, in the matter of Computer Accounting & Tax Pty Ltd (in Liq) (No 2) [2018] FCA 612

Frost v Sheahan as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Allen Gordon Frost [2012] FCAFC 46

George v Fletcher (Trustee) (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 71

Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No. 2) (2015) 237 FCR 127; [2015] FCA 750

Hughes v Western Australia Cricket Association (Inc) [1986] ATPR 40-748; [1986] FCA 511

Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Turnbull Cooktown Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 903

Kennedy v Secretary Department of Industry (No 2) [2015] FCA 884

Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; [1990] HCA 59

LFDB v SM (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 207

Mbuzi v Favell (No 3) [2012] FCA 1078

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 376
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AMO25 v Administrative Review Tribunal (No 2), the Applicant sought indemnity costs against the Third Respondent, AMP25, following the allowance of their appeal against the Administrative Review Tribunal's decision. The Applicant, AMO25, was self-represented throughout the proceedings. The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Applicant was entitled to indemnity costs and whether there were any special or unusual circumstances justifying a departure from the usual position on costs. Furthermore, the court had to determine if the Applicant could claim disbursements.

The court first considered the statutory authority for awarding costs, as per section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. It was noted that the court had broad discretion in awarding costs but had to exercise this power judicially and in accordance with relevant principles and the justice of the particular circumstances. The court also considered the overarching purpose of the civil procedure provisions, which aimed to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. Given the Applicant's self-representation, the court recognised that generally, a self-represented litigant may not obtain recompense for the value of their time spent in litigation. However, the Applicant was entitled to their disbursements.

In this case, the court found that the Applicant was entitled to half of their costs, as a self-represented litigant, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision was based on the Applicant's identification of the Third Respondent as the party against whom they sought costs. The court declined to grant leave for the Applicant to amend her application and seek any costs against the First or Second Respondent, as they had not been heard on the question of costs. Additionally, the court ordered that if no party made any submission to the contrary within seven days of the date of this Order, then the date of the Tribunal's decision would be varied to substitute the date "25 October 2024" for the date "11 October 2024".

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Third Respondent pay half of the Applicant’s costs (as a self-represented litigant) to be taxed if not agreed.

2. If no party makes any submission to the contrary within 7 days of the date of this Order, then pursuant to r 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), Order 2 of the Orders of the Court made on 12 March 2025 be varied to substitute the date “25 October 2024” for the date “11 October 2024”.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 12 March 2025, I made Orders in AMO25 v Administrative Review Tribunal [2025] FCA 365 (First Judgment), allowing the Applicant’s appeal (so deemed to be) and setting aside the decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal. The Applicant, AMO25, made an application for costs. The Applicant’s originating process sought costs on an indemnity basis. The Applicant was self-represented. At the hearing on 12 March 2025, the Applicant stated that the application for costs was against the Third Respondent, AMP25. On that basis, the Second Respondent did not seek to be heard on the question of costs. Relevantly, on the question of costs, I made the following Orders (which were subsequently extended on 18 March 2025):4.By 4:00 pm on 17 March 2025, the Applicant is to file and serve on the Third Respondent any application for costs together with any affidavits in support and an outline of submissions limited to three pages in length.5.By 4:00 pm on 24 March 2025, the Third Respondent is to file and serve on the Applicant any affidavits in response and any outline of submissions in response limited to three pages in length.6.Final orders as to costs will be determined on the papers without a further oral hearing. On 17 March 2025, the Applicant filed an application seeking:Interlocutory orders sought1.That the Third Respondent pay the costs of the Applicant on an indemnity basis. That application for costs identified only the Third Respondent (in accordance with the identification of which respondent against who costs would be sought on 12 March and consistent with the Orders regarding costs). The Applicant has filed two affidavits and submissions in support of her application for costs. In the last paragraph of her second affidavit, it is stated (in handwriting):10.Your Honour may be minded to Order the first or second respondent to pay part of these costs. This is beyond the terms of the application for costs and contrary to the Applicant’s identification to the Court and to the Second Respondent what would be the application for costs. At the hearing, when the Second Respondent could be heard, the Applicant expressly only identified the Third Respondent as being the party against whom she would be seeking costs. Furthermore, at the hearing, when the Applicant was present, because no costs were sought against the Second Respondent, they were excused from further attendance. In so far as the handwritten addition to the affidavit may be an application for leave to go beyond the terms of the application and the other matters mentioned, I decline to grant leave for the Applicant to amend her application and seek any costs against the First or Second Respondent. This is because the Second Respondent has not been heard on the question of costs as it was excused from further appearance. This was on the basis that the Applicant identified at the hearing that costs would only be sought against the Third Respondent. RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES - COSTS Section 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) provides the Court with a “broad and ample” discretionary power to award costs: DSE (Holdings) Pty Limited v InterTAN Inc (2004) 51 ACSR 555; [2004] FCA 1251 at [14]; Tenser v Quigley [2016] FCAFC 178 at [26]. The power “must be exercised judicially, not arbitrary or capriciously or on grounds unconnected to the litigation” but having regard to the relevant principles and justice of the particular circumstances of the case involved: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Mukiza [2022] FCAFC 105 at [4]. The Court must take “into account any failure by a party to comply with the overarching purpose of the civil procedure provisions”, being to “facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”: s 37N(4) and s 37M(1) of the FCA Act; LFDB v SM (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 207 at [7]; also see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) (2021) 151 ACSR 26; [2021] FCA 246 at [6]-[9].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As a general rule, a self-represented litigant may not obtain any recompense for the value of his or her time spent in litigation: Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow (2019) 269 CLR 333; [2019] HCA 29 at [1]; Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410-411. It has been said that a Court has no power to award costs in favour of an unrepresented litigant: Australian Super Pty Ltd v Woodward (2009) 262 ALR 402; [2009] FCAFC 168 at [60]-[61]. However, such a litigant is entitled to their disbursements: Frost v Sheahan as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Allen Gordon Frost [2012] FCAFC 46 at [76]; P v Child Support Registrar [2012] FCA 1398 at [36]; George v Fletcher (Trustee) (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 71 at [17]-[19]; Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 212 at [9]; Schokker v Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 1311.CONSIDERATION – APPLICANT’S COSTS The Applicant, who can be described as ‘the mother’, originally filed an application for judicial review on 13 December 2024, in relation to the Tribunal's decision dated 11 October 2024, published on 20 or 25 October 2024 (Decision). The Respondents, in that originating application, were identified as follows:(a)First Respondent – Administrative Appeals Tribunal;(b)Second Respondent – Child Support Registrar;(c)Third Respondent – AMP25 (who can be described as ‘the father’). The First Respondent appropriately filed a submitting appearance on 24 January 2025. The Second and Third Respondent each filed a Notice of Address for Service on 23 January 2025 and 3 February 2025, respectively. The matter was first listed for case management on 28 February 2025, wherein the Court was advised, that at least as between the Applicant and the Second Respondent, consent orders proposing the remittal of the proceedings back to the Tribunal had been agreed the day before (Draft Orders). The Third Respondent did not agree to the Draft Orders. Given the lack of substantive agreement from the Third Respondent, I made orders on 28 February 2025 regularising the proceedings (so it was deemed to be an appeal, rather than an application for judicial review) and for the filing of submissions to consider the matter, effectively in a summary way. Submissions were provided by each of the Applicant, the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent. On consideration of those submissions, I was satisfied that the legal error identified by the Applicant and the Second Respondent in the reasons of the Tribunal existed. As such, my Orders of 12 March 2025 set aside the Decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be dealt with according to law. In terms of the form of the Orders which were ultimately made, they were different to that proposed by way of the Draft Orders. This was as a result of the regularisation of the proceedings. However, the effect of the Orders made and those proposed by the Draft Orders was the same. The effect was to quash or set aside the Decision of the Tribunal and to remit the matter back to the Tribunal to be decided according to law.