Caporaso Pty Ltd v Mercato Centrale Australia Pty Ltd (Costs)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Caporaso Pty Ltd v Mercato Centrale Australia Pty Ltd (Costs) [2025] FCAFC 29

Appeal from: Caporaso Pty Ltd v Mercato Centrale Australia Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 138
File number(s): SAD 41 of 2024
Judgment of: KATZMANN, WHEELAHAN AND HESPE JJ
Date of judgment: 21 March 2025
Catchwords: COSTS – where appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed, what orders should be made for costs of trial and appeal – whether costs of trial should be apportioned to take account of aspects of cross-claim on which respondent failed – where respondent made offers to compromise both trial and appeal, whether indemnity costs order should be made
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 37M(3), 37N, 43

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss 40, 58, 62(b), 88(1)

Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), O 23 r 11(6))

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 1.35, 1.40, 25.01, 25.14(2), 25.14(3), 40.01, 40.02

Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure Rules) 2015 (Vic), r 26.12

Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth), Sch 1

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 51.47, 51.48

Cases cited:

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 112

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) [2021] FCA 246; 151 ACSR 26

Caporaso Pty Ltd v Mercato Centrale Australia Pty Ltd [2024] FCAFC 156

Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93

Colorado Group Ltd v Strandbags Group Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 160; 67 IPR 628

Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 40

Herning v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 375

IFTC Broking Services Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 31; 268 ALR 1

JMC Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Costs) [2023] FCAFC 95

Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd (2016) 247 FCR 61

Lodestar Anstalt v Campari America LLC (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 118

Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721

PKT Technologies Pty Ltd (formerly known as Fairlight.au Pty Ltd) v Peter Vogel Instruments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FACFC 46

Probiotec Ltd v University of Melbourne (2008) 166 FCR 30

Re Kingsheath Club of the Clubs Ltd (in liq) [2003] FCA 1589

Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2011] FCAFC 53; (2011) 16 ANZ Ins Case ¶61-885

Stead v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCA 65; 386 ALR 237

TCT Group Pty Ltd v Polaris IP Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 284

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Trade Marks
Number of paragraphs: 54
Date of last submission/s: 17 January 2025
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr ECJ Heerey KC and Mr AK Baillie
Solicitor for the Appellant: Piper Alderman
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Gardiner KC and Mr R Maguire
Solicitor for the Respondent: Rigby Cooke Lawyers

ORDERS

SAD 41 of 2024
BETWEEN:

CAPORASO PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:

MERCATO CENTRALE AUSTRALIA PTY…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Caporaso Pty Ltd v Mercato Centrale Australia Pty Ltd, the respondents appealed against a judgment that dismissed their cross-claim, while the appellants cross-appealed against a judgment that dismissed their passing off and Australian Consumer Law claims. The appeal was dismissed, and the cross-appeal was allowed in part, resulting in a variation of the orders made in the primary judgment. The court was tasked with determining the appropriate costs order for both the trial and the appeal. The respondents argued for an indemnity costs order, while the appellants suggested a lump sum award. The court considered the offers of compromise made by both parties, the outcome of the appeal, and the relevant legal principles.

The court held that the costs of the trial should not be apportioned as proposed by the appellants because the cross-claim was not entirely unsuccessful. The court also determined that the appeal's outcome warranted a lump sum award for both the trial and the appeal costs, rather than an indemnity costs order. The court took into account the offers of compromise made by both parties, the nature of the proceedings, and the fact that the respondents had made offers to compromise both the trial and the appeal. The court believed that a lump sum award was appropriate, considering the overall outcome and the parties' conduct throughout the proceedings.

The court ordered that the costs of the trial and the appeal be awarded in a lump sum, and that a Registrar determine the amount of the lump sum in such manner as he or she sees fit, including on the papers if considered appropriate. The court also directed that the question of whether the costs of the trial should be apportioned be remitted to the primary judge for determination. The court's decision balanced the need for a fair and reasonable costs order with the conduct of the parties throughout the proceedings.

The court's final orders included varying the costs orders made in the primary judgment and directing that a Registrar determine the amount of the lump sum costs award. The court also remitted the question of whether the costs of the trial should be apportioned to the primary judge for determination. These orders reflected the court's consideration of the parties' offers of compromise, the outcome of the appeal, and the relevant legal principles.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 3(c) of the orders of the Court made on 6 December 2024 be varied by substituting the following order:

The question of whether the costs of the trial should be apportioned in the manner proposed by the appellant/cross-respondent or at all be remitted to the primary judge for determination.

2. Both the costs of the trial and the costs of the appeal be awarded in a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

3. Pursuant to r 1.37 of the Federal Court Rules, a Registrar determine the amount of the lump sum(s) in such manner as he or she sees fit, including, if considered appropriate, on the papers and make all necessary orders to facilitate the determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

None of the costs submissions filed by the parties in the trial were put before this Court, presumably because the parties accept that the question of the costs of the trial should now be determined on the basis of the outcome of the appeal.The evidence Only Mercato Centrale adduced evidence. In support of its application, it relies on an affidavit of Thomas Hoerner, special counsel in the law firm representing Caporaso, sworn on 13 December 2024. That evidence reveals the following matters. On 6 July 2023, about three weeks before the commencement of the trial, Mercato Centrale, through its lawyers, sent an open letter to Caporaso, through its lawyers, in response to an open letter from Caporaso’s lawyers of 20 June 2023. Both letters contained offers to resolve the proceedings. The details of the Caporaso offer are not fully disclosed and do not matter for present purposes. What does matter is that in its letter to Caporaso, Mercato Centrale made an offer of compromise pursuant to r 25.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) in the following terms:1.The Respondents will, within 7 days of acceptance of this Offer, provide a written undertaking to the Applicant to permanently refrain from using in the course of trade any trade mark containing the word MERCATO except where such marks contain all of the words IL MERCATO CENTRALE, and only in that sequence, without any truncation or abbreviation, and where each of the words IL and CENTRALE is at least as prominent and in at least the same size font as the word MERCATO.2The Respondents will agree to consent orders dismissing this proceeding, including the cross-claim, by consent and with no order as to costs.This offer is inclusive of costs.This offer of compromise is open to be accepted for 14 days after service of this offer of compromise.This offer is made on an open basis In the covering letter sent to Caporaso’s solicitors at the time the offer of compromised was served, Mercato Centrale submitted that it would be unreasonable for Caporaso to reject the offer (referred to as “the MCA Offer”) for “at least the following reasons”:(a)The MCA Offer includes a restriction on our client’s use of the word MERCATO that the Court is unlikely to grant.(b)The marks used, and intended to be used by the First Respondent, are not deceptively similar to or substantially identical with any of your client’s registered trade marks. There are significant differences between the parties’ respective marks including (at least) the words IL and CENTRALE in the First Respondent's marks. The only similarity is the common presence of the word MERCATO which is directly descriptive of the goods and services offered, or intended to be offered, by the First Respondent. Your client’s trade mark infringement case is likely to fail for this reason alone.(c)Your client’s registration of the plain word mark MERCATO (TM 1760112) is likely to be cancelled for its lack of capacity to distinguish (at least) because it is directly descriptive of at least some of the goods and services for which it registered.(d)Your client’s other registered trade marks are likely to be endorsed with the restriction sought by the Respondents because those registrations do not provide a monopoly over the use of the word MERCATO as your client asserts.(e)Your client’s passing off and Australian Consumer Law claims are likely to fail because the evidence does not support any relevant reputation in the trade mark MERCATO alone, either from 1972, as originally asserted, or from 2009, or from any other relevant date.(f)Your client’s passing off and Australian Consumer Law claims are likely to fail for the further reason that descriptive words will generally not support such claims. All traders are entitled to make use of such words and small differences between respective marks incorporating such words are generally sufficient to avoid liability.(g)Your client’s claim against the Second Respondent, Mr Muto, is entirely without foundation, unsupported by the evidence, and is likely to fail.(h)The MCA Offer allows your client’s trade mark registrations to remain on the register and without endorsement which is a better outcome for your client than it is likely to achieve at trial.(i)Our clients have expended very significant costs in defending this proceeding to date. If they are successful at trial, they are likely to obtain a costs order in relation to those costs. The MCA Offer foregoes those costs.If your client does not accept the MCA Offer and your client obtains a judgment that is less favourable than the terms of the offer or your client’s application is dismissed our clients will apply to the Court for costs on an indemnity basis in accordance with r 25.14 of the Rules or, alternatively, the principles in Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established