Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 1590

File number: NSD 2510 of 2013
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 22 December 2017
Catchwords:

TRADE PRACTICES – competition law – restrictive trade practices – cartel conduct – whether Respondent contravened ss 44ZZRK or 45(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – where Respondent and two other manufacturers and wholesale suppliers of laundry detergent in Australia transitioned to ultra concentrated laundry detergent and ceased supplying retailers with standard concentrates at about the same time – whether Respondent entered into an arrangement, or arrived at an understanding, with the other suppliers, in relation to the transition that included exclusionary provisions, or provisions that had the purpose, or had or were likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in the market for laundry detergent in Australia – parallel conduct – exclusionary provisions – Jones v Dunkel inferences

Held: applicant did not discharge its burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the respondent entered into any such arrangement or arrived at any such understanding

Legislation:

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (repealed) ss 4D, 4E, 4F, 44ZZRD, 44ZZRK, 45(2), 45(3), 76

Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 140, 191

Cases cited:

ACCC v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442

Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2005) 159 FCR 452; [2005] FCAFC 161

ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited [2014] FCA 1157; (2014) 319 ALR 388

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 657

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 8) (1999) 92 FCR 375; [1999] FCA 954

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1678; (2004) 141 FCR 183

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Ltd [2007] FCA 794; 160 FCR 321

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 113; 323 ALR 429

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation (No 2) [2015] FCA 1304

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Australian Lending Centre Pty Ltd (No 3) (2012) 287 ALR 693

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar & Ors (2012) 247 CLR 345

Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

British Basic Slag Ltd v Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements [1963] 1 WLR 727; 2 All ER 807

Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239

Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 173

Eastern Express Pty Ltd v General Newspapers Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 385

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

L Grollo & Company Pty Ltd v Nu-Statt Decorating Pty…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1590
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) filed a complaint against Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd, alleging that the company engaged in anti-competitive conduct by transitioning from standard to ultra-concentrated laundry detergent, and thereby substantially lessening competition in the market. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The legal issues in the case revolved around whether Colgate-Palmolive had contravened sections 44ZZRK and 45(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which pertain to restrictive trade practices and cartel conduct, by entering into an arrangement or arriving at an understanding with other suppliers that had exclusionary provisions or aimed to lessen competition in the laundry detergent market.

The Court held that the ACCC had not met its burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that Colgate-Palmolive had entered into any such arrangement or arrived at any such understanding. The Court emphasised the importance of the Briginshaw standard, requiring a close examination and careful weighing of all the evidence and facts proved as a basis for inference, given the nature of the allegations and the gravity of the consequences. The Court found that the evidence, when considered as a whole, did not prove that Colgate-Palmolive made an arrangement or arrived at an understanding that included the alleged provisions. Even if the ACCC had been able to prove such an arrangement or understanding, it still failed to prove that the provisions had the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition in the relevant market.

As a result, the Court dismissed the ACCC's application against Colgate-Palmolive, and ordered that the ACCC pay Colgate-Palmolive's costs. The Court also noted that the time within which the ACCC must file and serve any notice of appeal would commence to run from a specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s originating application filed 12 December 2013 be dismissed insofar as it seeks relief against or concerning the second respondent, PZ Cussons Australia Pty Ltd, or has not otherwise previously been disposed of by order of the Court.

2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs.

3. Pursuant to r 1.39 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), the time within which the applicant must file and serve any notice of appeal pursuant to rr 36.02 and 36.03 of the Rules is to commence to run from 29 January 2018.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The so-called Briginshaw standard is apposite to the circumstances of this case. The Commission did not suggest otherwise. The nature of the allegations and the gravity of the consequences mean that a close examination and careful weighing of all the evidence and facts proved as a basis for inference is warranted. All of the factual issues that require determination by the Court have been approached on that basis. EVIDENCE AND FACTS Many of the primary facts were not significantly in dispute. The critical question is what inferences can and should be drawn from the primary facts. The parties produced and signed an agreed statement of facts for the purposes of s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The facts in the agreed statement of facts, for the most part, concerned the meetings and communications relied on by the Commission and pleaded in the ASOC. The Commission relied on affidavit evidence from eight lay witnesses. Those witnesses were all former officers or employees of Unilever: Mr Sebastian Lazell, who was Chairman of Unilever Australia and New Zealand; Mr Peter Campbell, who was Vice President, Customer Development for Australia and New Zealand; Mr David McNeil, Vice President, Marketing; Mr Ken Basha, who was the Customer Director for Woolworths; Ms Jennifer Moss, who was Regional Design Centre and Technical Management Director; Mr Geoff Bellingham, who was Customer Manager for Woolworths; Ms Michelle Katz, who was Marketing Manager, Homecare; and Ms Amanda Tilley, who was a Customer Director for Coles. As will be seen, the affidavit evidence in chief of those witnesses was to a large extent a chronological excursion through contemporaneous documentation of Unilever’s internal and external deliberations, discussions and dealings concerning its transition from standard to ultra concentrated laundry powder in early 2009. In many respects, their evidence did not greatly travel beyond commentary on the documentation. All of the Commission’s lay witnesses were cross-examined. Ultimately, there was no issue concerning the credit of any of the Commission’s lay witnesses, or the reliability of their evidence generally. Cussons did not submit that any of their evidence should not be believed or accepted. On the whole, each of the witnesses presented as a witness who was endeavouring to give an honest and accurate account of events that occurred some time ago. The Commission also relied on expert opinion evidence from an economist, Professor Philip Williams. The nature of Professor William’s opinion evidence will be addressed later. The Commission also tendered a very large volume of documentary evidence, mainly comprising documents that the Commission was able to obtain from Colgate, Cussons, Unilever and Woolworths in the course of its investigation. The documentary evidence really provided the backbone of the Commission’s case. It should be emphasised that it was and is important to carefully consider the statements in each of the documents relied on by the Commission in context. The relevant context includes the author of the document, the date the document was created, the nature of the document in question and the circumstances in which the document was created. Many of the documents were prepared by sales and marketing people, and comprised either internal presentations to persons involved in considering and making decisions about the transition to ultra concentrates, or external presentations to Woolworths and Coles. There was, it must be said, a tendency in the Commission’s case, to seize on certain statements in some of the documents and consider them in isolation and out of context.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Given that this is a civil proceeding, the Court must find the Commission’s case proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities: s 140(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). There could be little doubt that the nature of the causes of action pleaded by the Commission, the subject matter of the proceeding, namely serious allegations of the Act by Cussons, and the gravity of the matters alleged, are all very serious. If the Commission proves its case, Cussons could be liable for pecuniary penalties of up to $10 million for each separate contravention. These are matters that the Court is required to take into account in deciding whether it is satisfied that the Commission has proved its case on the balance of probabilities: s 140(2) of the Evidence Act. Section 140(2) of the Evidence Act in large measure encapsulates in statutory form the relevant observations of Dixon J (and the equivalent observations of Rich J) in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, including the following frequently cited passage (at 361-362):The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty; and this has led to attempts to define exactly the certainty required by the law for various purposes. Fortunately, however, at common law no third standard of persuasion was definitively developed. Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. The so-called Briginshaw standard is apposite to the circumstances of this case. The Commission did not suggest otherwise. The nature of the allegations and the gravity of the consequences mean that a close examination and careful weighing of all the evidence and facts proved as a basis for inference is warranted. All of the factual issues that require determination by the Court have been approached on that basis. EVIDENCE AND FACTS Many of the primary facts were not significantly in dispute. The critical question is what inferences can and should be drawn from the primary facts.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Given that the Commission failed to discharge its burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that Cussons made an arrangement, or arrived at an understanding, with Colgate and Unilever which included the Aligned Transition Provisions, it must follow that Cussons did not contravene any of s 45(2)(a)(ii), s 45(2)(b) and s 44ZZRK of the Act in respect of the Aligned Transition Arrangement issues.CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION The Commission failed to discharge its burden of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that Cussons contravened s 45(2)(a)(i) and (ii), s 45(b)(i) and (ii) and s 44ZZRK as alleged. The evidence, considered as a whole, does not prove to the requisite standard that Cussons made an arrangement, or arrived at an understanding, with Unilever and Colgate that included the alleged Withhold Supply Provisions, or the alleged Aligned Transition Provisions. Nor does the evidence prove that Cussons gave effect to any such arrangements or understandings. Even if the Commission had been able to prove that Cussons made an arrangement or arrived at an understanding that included the Aligned Transition Provisions, it nonetheless failed to prove that the Aligned Transition Provisions had the purpose, or had or were likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in the relevant market. The appropriate orders are that the Commission’s application, insofar as it related to Cussons, be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established