Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2005] FCAFC 161

TRADE PRACTICES – allegation of understanding for fixing of retail petrol prices – information about price increases provided to appellants – no commitment to act on information – whether appellants party to price fixing understanding

WORDS AND PHRASES – “fixing”, “providing for the fixing”, “understanding”

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45(2)(a)(ii), 45(2)(b)(ii), 45A(1), 75B(c)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 87(1)(c)

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2004) ATPR (Digest) 46-260 reversed in part
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No2) (2005) 215 ALR 281 reversed in part
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301 cited
Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 cited
Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375 at [141] applied
Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 118 FCR 236 at [79] cited
Trade Practices Commission v EmailLtd (1980) 31 ALR 53 at 58 cited

APCO SERVICE STATIONS PTY LTD & ANOR v AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
VID 312 OF 2005

HEEREY, HELY AND GYLES JJ
17 AUGUST 2005
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VID 312 OF 2005

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

APCO SERVICE STATIONS PTY LTD
and
PETER JOSEPH ANDERSON
APPELLANTS

AND:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY, HELY AND GYLES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

17 AUGUST 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeals be allowed.
  2. The orders and declarations of the primary judge made on 17 December 2004 and 17 March 2005, insofar as they affect the appellants, be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the application be dismissed.
  3. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and of the proceeding at first instance, including reserved costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VID 312 OF 2005

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

APCO SERVICE STATIONS PTY LTD
and
PETER JOSEPH ANDERSON
APPELLANTS

AND:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY, HELY AND GYLES JJ

DATE:

17 AUGUST 2005

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

CONTENTS

Par

1.0      INTRODUCTION........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ....... [1]
2.0      THE RETAIL PETROL MARKET IN BALLARAT........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .... [4]

2.1      The price cycle........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ...... [4]
2.2      The participants........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ..... [6]

3.0      ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE JUNE 1999........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ [15]
4.0…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 161
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission involved the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) bringing proceedings against Apco and Anderson for their alleged involvement in a price-fixing arrangement. The primary judge found that Apco and Anderson were parties to a price-fixing understanding, leading to declarations and orders against them. Apco and Anderson appealed the decision, contesting the findings of the primary judge and the applicability of the legal principles used. The legal issues in this appeal included whether Apco and Anderson were indeed parties to the price-fixing arrangement and whether the primary judge correctly applied the legal principles in determining the existence of such an understanding.

The court considered whether the evidence presented by the ACCC was sufficient to establish the alleged price-fixing arrangement. It was found that while there was an understanding among the parties regarding price increases, Apco was not definitively committed to matching the price increases proposed by the initiating respondents. The court emphasised that for an understanding to exist under the Competition and Consumer Act, there must be an obligation or assurance from at least one party to act in a certain way, rather than mere expectations. The primary judge’s findings were scrutinised, and it was determined that Apco did not commit to any specific price level or increase. The court also examined the admissibility of hearsay evidence and its relevance to the case.

Ultimately, the appeals by Apco and Anderson were successful. The court held that Apco was not a party to the price-fixing arrangement as found by the primary judge. Consequently, the orders and declarations against Apco and Anderson were set aside, and the application by the ACCC was dismissed. The court ordered that the ACCC pay the costs of the appeal and the proceeding at first instance, including reserved costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeals be allowed.

2. The orders and declarations of the primary judge made on 17 December 2004 and 17 March 2005, insofar as they affect the appellants, be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the application be dismissed.

3. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and of the proceeding at first instance, including reserved costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As against Apco and Anderson the ACCC relied on the evidence of Zala, Bentley and Carmichael already discussed, and evidence given by Anderson himself both at the trial and in his s 155 examination. As might have been expected, evidence about telephone calls was in general terms and not as to the content of particular calls.5.3 Hearsay evidence The ACCC relied on evidence said to be admissible against Apco and Anderson on the basis of s 87(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which relevantly provides:‘(1) For the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that:…(c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the person or one or more persons including the party.”See also Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1, Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87.6.0 FINDINGS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE6.1 The understanding His Honour found: “330. The parties to the alleged understanding are the corporate respondents. As explained above, the preferable way to view the evidence adduced by the ACCC is to regard the understanding as evolving from the existing arrangements being adapted from time to time to changes in personnel and market forces. On that basis the evidence at trial established that the price-fixing understanding involved a consensus on the part of the participants as to the following course of conduct: § when one or more of the initiating respondents intended to bring a discount cycle in Ballarat to an end by effecting a sudden and significant price increase, those respondents were to make, or cause to be made, price-increase calls to the other participating corporate respondents; § at or about the same time, the initiating respondents intending to effect the price increase were to increase their price to the targeted or proposed price; § price-increase calls, which communicate the proposed or targeted price increase, were to be made to the participating respondents who had not initiated or made the price increases; § the participating respondents were to observe each others´ board prices in order to determine which of those respondents had not substantially matched the price increase; § follow-up calls were to be made to those respondents that had not matched the increase in an endeavour to have them do so quickly in order to prevent the price increase from collapsing; § in the case of a respondent that supplies to independent retailers, the making or matching of a price increase was to be achieved by the withdrawal of, or reduction in, price support; § in the event that the price increase had not been expeditiously matched by the high visibility sites in Ballarat, the targeted or proposed increase would not take effect, with the consequence that the retail increases of the participating corporate respondents may return to the discounted levels they were at prior to the price increase. 331. For present purposes it may not matter if the steps outlined above are framed in terms of an expectation, rather than a commitment, as to what was to be done. However, if it matters I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that the first three steps involved a commitment on the part of each of the initiating respondents who intended to bring the discount cycle to an end and who gave effect to that intention by implementing the understanding.”6.2 Apco and Anderson participation

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, HELY AND GYLES JJ
By s 45A(1) provisions for the fixing of prices are conclusively deemed to have the effect of substantially lessening competition. Relevantly the subsection provides:“Without limiting the generality of section 45, a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding … shall be deemed for the purposes of that section to have the purpose, or to have or to be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition if the provision has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, as the case may be, of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or providing for the fixing controlling or maintaining of, the price for … goods or services supplied … by the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding …”8.0 CONCLUSION ON THE APPEAL The declaration made by his Honour states that in and between June 1999 and December 2000 Triton, Apco, Brumar and Balgee “arrived at the price-fixing understanding outlined in [330] of the reasons for judgment”. The terms of [330] are set out above. In [331] his Honour says that while it “may not matter” if the understanding he has found involves an expectation, rather than a commitment, as to what was to be done, the evidence did establish a commitment on the part of the initiating respondents. Thus his Honour in explicit terms declined to make a finding that Apco (not being an initiating respondent) became committed to any price increase agreed on by the initiating respondents. This is consistent with the later passage at [368] in which his Honour found that there was no expectation by the other respondents that Anderson’s readiness to receive calls from Bentley and Carmichael meant that Apco would substantially match the increased prices. The ACCC did not seek to attack these findings by way of notice of contention. These findings lead to the unavoidable conclusion that Apco was not a party to any understanding that it would fix its prices at the same level as the other respondents or at any particular level or even that it would increase its prices at all. “Fixing” is not used in s 45A in any technical sense. The primary meaning of the verb fix is “to make fast, firm, or stable” (Macquarie Dictionary) or “to fasten, make firm or stable; to set or place and secure against displacement” (Shorter Oxford). Certainly Apco received information about price increases (albeit the fact of an increase rather than the amount) from Bentley and Carmichael, as it did from other sources such as its franchisees, but it reserved to itself the decision, as a matter of commercial judgment, whether to follow those prices up. More often than not (40 occasions out of 69) it did not, or at the very least, there is no evidence that it did. Whilst the appellants attacked the factual finding that the parties arrived at the price-fixing understanding outlined in [330] of the reasons for judgment, they did not dispute that the primary judge had enunciated the correct legal principles which are applicable in determining whether parties have entered into an understanding. In particular, the primary judge referred to the following observations of Lindgren J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375 at [141] (emphasis in original) which were specifically endorsed by the Full Court in Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 118 FCR 236 at [79]:“The cases require that at least one party ‘assume an obligation’ or give an ‘assurance’ or ‘undertaking’ that it will act in a certain way. A mere expectation that as a matter of fact a party will act in a certain way is not enough, even if it has been engendered by that party. In the present case, for example, each individual who attending the Meeting may have expected that as a matter of fact the others would return to their respective offices by car, or, to express the matter differently, each may have been expected by the others to act in that way. Each may even have ‘aroused’ that expectation by things he said at the Meeting. But these factual expectations do not found an ‘understanding’ in the sense in which the word is used in ss 45 and 45A. The conjunction of the word ‘understanding’ with the words ‘agreement’ and ‘arrangement’ and the nature of the provisions show that something more is required.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY, HELY AND GYLES JJ