FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Vector Corrosion Technologies Limited v E-Chem Technologies Ltd [2022] FCA 519
File numbers: QUD 649 of 2018
QUD 117 of 2019Judgment of: JAGOT J Date of judgment: 9 May 2022 Catchwords: COSTS — application for indemnity costs in two related proceedings — where case which proceeded to final judgment was weak but arguable — where applicant unreasonably rejected settlement offer in discontinued proceedings — costs ordered on indemnity basis from date of settlement offers in discontinued proceeding Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 25.01, 25.14(2)
Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) [2021] FCA 246; (2021) 151 ACSR 26
Industrial Galvanizers Corporation Pty Ltd v Safe Direction Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 1612
Palmer v Premiair Aviation Maintenance Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 185
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes Number of paragraphs: 68 Date of last submissions: 14 April 2022 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Counsel for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Craig Smith Solicitor for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Bennett & Philp Solicitors Counsel for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Julian Cooke and Angela McDonald Solicitor for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Maddocks Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 649 of 2018 BETWEEN: VECTOR CORROSION TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED
Applicant
AND: DUOGUARD AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
First Respondent
CONCRETE PRESERVATION TECHNOLOGIES LTD
Second Respondent
MR NIGEL DAVISON (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
AND BETWEEN: DUOGUARD AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Cross-Claimant
CONCRETE PRESERVATION TECHNOLOGIES LTD
Second Cross-Claimant
AND: VECTOR CORROSION TECHNOLOGIES LTD
Cross-Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JAGOT J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MAY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order 3 of the orders made on 19 May 2021 be vacated.
2.The applicant/cross-respondent pay the first to fifth respondents’/cross-claimants’ costs of the proceeding and the cross-claim:
(a)on a party-party basis up to and including 25 June 2019; and
(b)on an indemnity basis on and from 26 June 2019.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
QUD 117 of 2019 BETWEEN: VECTOR CORROSION TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED
Applicant
AND: E-CHEM TECHNOLOGIES LTD
First Respondent
NIGEL DAVISON
Second Respondent
ADRIAN CHARLES ROBERTS (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JAGOT J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MAY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondents’ costs of the proceeding in order 2 of the orders made on 9 March 2022 (order 2) exclude the respondents’ costs of seeking to vary order 2 to claim indemnity costs.
2.The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of seeking to vary order 2, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JAGOT J:
1. Background
In Vector Corrosion Technologies Limited v E-Chem Technologies Ltd [2022] FCA 188 (the principal judgment or PJ) I made orders including an order dismissing Vector’s amended originating application in proceeding QUD 117/2019.
These reasons…
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- AGLC
- Vector Corrosion Technologies Limited v E-Chem Technologies Ltd [2022] FCA 519
- Case
- [2022] FCA 519
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the respondents were entitled to indemnity costs for the entitlement proceeding and whether they were entitled to indemnity costs for the infringement proceeding. Indemnity costs are awarded when a party’s conduct in bringing or persisting in a case is unreasonable, such as bringing a case that should have been known to be hopeless, causing unnecessary costs, or prolonging a hearing. The court had to consider whether Vector’s conduct in bringing and pursuing the proceedings was unreasonable.
The court found that the respondents’ claim for indemnity costs of the entitlement proceeding should be rejected. The court was not persuaded that Vector commenced and prosecuted the proceedings for the ulterior purpose of causing the respondents’ business to fold under the substantial costs of the litigation. The court also found that the mere fact of Vector’s unreasonable delay in commencing the proceedings did not support an inference that Vector knew or reasonably ought to have known its claims were hopeless. However, the court found that the respondents’ claim for indemnity costs of the infringement proceeding should be accepted. The court accepted that the offers of compromise and the Calderbank offer made in the infringement proceeding were reasonable and that Vector’s rejection of these offers was unreasonable.
The court ordered that the respondents’ costs of the proceeding in order 2 of the orders made on 9 March 2022 (order 2) exclude the respondents’ costs of seeking to vary order 2 to claim indemnity costs. The respondents were ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of seeking to vary order 2, as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondents’ costs of the proceeding in order 2 of the orders made on 9 March 2022 (order 2) exclude the respondents’ costs of seeking to vary order 2 to claim indemnity costs.
2. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of seeking to vary order 2, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Vector submitted that its rejection of the offers from the respondents in the infringement proceeding was not unreasonable at that time as:(1)the offers were served on 24 June 2019 after each party had served its first round of evidence, but before they had prepared and filed their evidence in answer;(2)the offers were made on a “walk away” basis which remains relevant to the assessment of the reasonableness of Vector’s rejection of them;(3)the de minimis current point that was addressed above in relation to infringement and referred to in the Calderbank offer was far from hopeless and, at that time, the respondents had not filed their evidence in this regard;(4)the respondents’ invalidity arguments were not bound to succeed and, at the time of the offers, Vector was not bound to have reached that conclusion acting reasonably; and(5)the fact that one party accurately predicts an adverse outcome of a proceeding and notifies that position does not of itself make the pursuit of that unsuccessful claim unreasonable.4. Consideration The relevant principles were not in dispute between the parties. The Court has a broad power to award costs in proceedings, including indemnity costs, under s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). While the purpose of an indemnity costs order remains compensatory, the basis for such an order is a conclusion that the unreasonable conduct of a party (be it bringing or persisting in a case the party should have known was hopeless, causing unnecessary costs to be incurred, prolonging a hearing, bringing or persisting in a case for an ulterior motive, or otherwise) should result in full compensation to the other party for the costs incurred. A detailed explanation of the principles to be applied may be found in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd (No 5) [2021] FCA 246; (2021) 151 ACSR 26 at [6]–[12]. The reasoning in Palmer v Premiair Aviation Maintenance Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 185 does not establish any new or different principle. In that case, the lawyer’s explanation for the discontinuance of the proceeding supported an inference that the applicant should have known the proceeding was doomed. I am not persuaded that I should infer that Vector commenced and prosecuted the proceedings for the ulterior purpose of causing the respondents’ business to fold under the substantial costs of the litigation. In particular:(1)Mr Whitmore’s threat in January 2011 that if the respondents did not pay Vector a licence fee the respondents risked incurring the “the high costs of litigation in faraway places like Australia” does not support the inference the respondents propose. Drawing attention to potential litigation costs is a legitimate negotiating tactic. The relevant issue is not Mr Whitmore’s negotiating tactics but whether it might be inferred that he knew or reasonably ought to have known Vector’s claims were hopeless; and(2)I am unable to infer from the mere fact of Vector’s unreasonable delay in commencing the proceedings that Vector knew its claims were weak. Nor am I able to infer that the delay after 2011 significantly increased the cost of the proceedings given that the most important time period was 2003–2006.