FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Specsavers Pty Limited v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Limited (No 2)
[2013] FCA 807
Citation: Specsavers Pty Limited v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Limited (No 2) [2013] FCA 807 Parties: SPECSAVERS PTY LTD v LUXOTTICA RETAIL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD File number: NSD 446 of 2013 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 13 August 2013 Catchwords: COSTS – “Calderbank” offers made – whether indemnity costs should be awarded – indicative factors relevant to award of indemnity costs Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011Cases cited: Alpine Hardwoods (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 121
Black v Lipovac (1998) 217 ALR 386
Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian Workcover Authority (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 435
Maclean v Rottnest Island Authority [2001] WASCA 323
MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236
Specsavers Pty Ltd v The Optical Superstore Pty Ltd (2012) 208 FCR 78
Specsavers Pty Ltd v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 648Date of hearing: Matter determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 31 July 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 20 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr DB Studdy SC Solicitor for the Applicant: Minter Ellison Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Hall Solicitor for the Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 446 of 2013
BETWEEN: SPECSAVERS PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: LUXOTTICA RETAIL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 AUGUST 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order 2 made on 3 July 2013 is set aside.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding on a party-party basis, save that there be no order for costs in respect of the argument in relation to indemnity costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 446 of 2013
BETWEEN: SPECSAVERS PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: LUXOTTICA RETAIL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE:
13 AUGUST 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
On 3 July 2013, I published my reasons for judgment in this matter (Specsavers Pty Ltd v Luxottica Retail Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 648). Orders were made dismissing the originating application and ordering the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs. Upon delivery of the judgment, the respondent sought an opportunity to make submissions in support of a claim that it was entitled to an order for costs in its favour on an indemnity basis from 27 March 2013. The basis of its position was the applicant’s rejection of two “Calderbank” offers. I made directions for the filing of affidavits and brief outlines of submissions in respect of the costs issue. Both parties took advantage of that opportunity.
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 807
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the respondent was entitled to indemnity costs based on the applicant's rejection of the Calderbank offers. The court considered the timing of the offers, the content, and the reasonableness of the applicant's decision to reject them. The applicant argued that the offers were made too late and did not address the central issues of the case. The court acknowledged that Calderbank offers can be a useful tool for encouraging settlement but emphasized that their use as a tactical weapon shortly before a trial should be discouraged. The court ultimately concluded that the offers were made too late in the proceedings and did not involve any concessions by the respondent.
The court found that it was not reasonable for the respondent to delay making the Calderbank offers until the day before the hearing, especially given the expedited nature of the proceedings. The court also noted that the offers did not involve any meaningful concessions from the respondent. Therefore, the court ruled that the respondent was not entitled to indemnity costs. The original order made on 3 July 2013 was set aside, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding on a party-party basis, except for the costs associated with the argument regarding indemnity costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order 2 made on 3 July 2013 is set aside.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding on a party-party basis, save that there be no order for costs in respect of the argument in relation to indemnity costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant says that its rejection of both the Calderbank offers was reasonable because:(a)both offers were received at a very late stage and shortly before the hearing was to commence. As at 27 March 2013, the applicant was not fully apprised of its position in relation to the respondent’s evidence in answer and it was heavily engaged in considering and preparing its evidence in reply and generally preparing to present its case the following day;(b)the applicant was given only very limited time to consider the offers, namely approximately three and a half hours in the case of the first offer and approximately twelve hours in respect of the second offer;(c)although the applicant itself was imposing similar short time frames on its own offers and counter-offers, the applicant placed no reliance on those offers, nor is there is any evidence to suggest that it would have done so if it had been successful in the proceedings;(d)neither of the respondent’s Calderbank offers involved “giving something away”, whether modestly or otherwise; and(e)it is impermissible to assess the applicant’s prospects of success by reference to the Court’s reasons for judgment because those prospects must be assessed at the date of the offer and it was not unreasonable for the applicant to have proceeded to litigate its claims that the relevant representations were likely to mislead or deceive.Consideration For the following reasons, I consider that this is not an appropriate case to make an order for indemnity costs. First, the two Calderbank offers relied upon were made very late in the proceedings. Both were made on the day before the hearing was to commence. It is true that the proceedings were expedited after having been commenced on 14 March 2013, but I consider that the respondent had ample opportunity before 27 March 2013 to seek to compromise the proceedings. Because the proceedings were expedited in order to accommodate the parties’ respective commercial interests, this necessarily placed a heavy burden on the parties and their legal representatives to have the case ready for a hearing on 28 March 2013. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the pressure on the parties and their legal representatives would intensify as the hearing date approached. In my view, it was not reasonable of the respondent to delay until the day before the hearing to make the first of the Calderbank offers it now relies upon. The same comments apply equally to the second Calderbank offer, which was made later on the same day. I respectfully agree with the following observations of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Maclean v Rottnest Island Authority [2001] WASCA 323 at [35]-[36]:Calderbank letters may be useful in advancing the administration of justice by putting parties pursuing small or doubtful claims on notice and forcing them to review their position.However, the Court should not encourage the use of a Calderbank letter delivered shortly before trial when the other party might reasonably be expected to have their minds on a number of matters. The use of a Calderbank letter is an aid to the administration of justice and should be encouraged. Its use as an indiscriminately wielded tactical weapon should be discouraged.