DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Hanrick v Donsky [2025] QDC 118
PARTIES:
RICHARD HANRICK
(Applicant)
v
TIMOTHY DONSKY
(Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
886/25
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court of Queensland, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
8 August 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
15 July 2025
JUDGE:
Grigg DCJ
ORDER:
Applicant pay the respondent’s costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment on a standard basis
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COSTS – COSTS ORDER – Standard costs – General rule – Costs follow the event – whether the adjournment application could have been made prior to the hearing – whether the applicant’s wish to proceed by way of originating application warranted an indemnity costs order.
LEGISLATION:
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 179
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 11(a), 14, 14(2), 429H, 702, 704(1)
CASES:
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Colgate-Palmolive Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 598
Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
Down v Murray [2017] QDC 313
MA v Qin (No 2) [2025] VSC 364COUNSEL: R McDermott for the Applicant
C Doyle for the Respondent
SOLICITORS: RB Lawyers for the Applicant
Kilmartin Knyvett Lawyers for the Respondent
Introduction
The parties are in dispute about a trench that runs along the cadastral boundary line of their respective properties. The applicant is concerned that the existence of the trench will cause damage to buildings on the applicant’s property if it is not filled in.
It is not controversial that the parties agreed that the respondent could dig the trench in April 2024, to allow the respondent to install a pipe along the length of the respondent’s property. The parties dispute, among other things, is whether it was part of the agreement that the trench would be refilled within a reasonable time.
The applicant commenced the claim by originating application on 17 April 2025, seeking final relief in the form of a mandatory injunction.
At the original hearing for the matter, Counsel for the respondent submitted that the matter should have proceeded by way of claim and statement of claim. The respondent also informed the Court that he objected to the admission of the entirety of a report prepared by a structural engineer, Mr Meng. The applicant was intending to rely on Mr Meng’s report as an expert witness report. The respondent objected to the admission of Mr Meng’s report on the grounds that it:
(a)was non-compliant with the expert evidence rules in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR);[1]
(b)is deficient in that Mr Meng fails to explain how he reaches his conclusions.
[1] See rule 429H Requirements for report.
Following the discussion about these matters raised by the respondent, I adjourned the hearing briefly so the parties could discuss how best to proceed and attempt to agree on directions for the progress of the matter.
After the adjournment, the parties agreed to the following directions being made:
(a)that pursuant to r 14(2)…
Continue reading Hanrick v Donsky
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Hanrick v Donsky [2025] QDC 118
- Case
- [2025] QDC 118
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the adjournment application could have been made prior to the hearing and if the applicant's choice to proceed by way of an originating application justified an indemnity costs order. The court had to consider the principles surrounding the exercise of discretion to order indemnity costs, drawing from various authorities that outline the circumstances under which such orders may be appropriate. These principles include instances where allegations of fraud are knowingly false, proceedings are commenced for ulterior motives, or the proceedings are unduly prolonged by groundless contentions. The court also needed to determine if there was unreasonable conduct that warranted a shift from the usual party and party costs.
In reaching its decision, the court carefully reviewed the relevant authorities and the specific circumstances of the case. It concluded that while the circumstances did not warrant an indemnity costs order, the applicant was to bear the costs thrown away due to the adjournment on a standard basis. This decision reflected the court's assessment that the application for adjournment could have been made prior to the hearing and that the applicant's decision to proceed with the originating application did not meet the threshold for an indemnity costs order. The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles that an indemnity costs order is not the norm and requires evidence of unreasonable conduct or a hopeless case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Applicant pay the respondent’s costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment on a standard basis
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.