FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCAFC 126
Appeal from: Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] FCA 1453
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 120
File number: TAD 2 of 2017 Judges: ALLSOP CJ, RARES AND MCKERRACHER JJ Date of judgment: 18 August 2017 Catchwords: COSTS – where appeal dismissed but partial variations made as to the costs order in favour of appellant – whether usual costs orders should apply – where appellant claims costs on indemnity basis – whether outcome of the appeal equivalent to or better than the terms of offer made by appellant – whether respondent acted unreasonably in not accepting offer – where costs component of the appeal not in existence at the time of offer – where extent of appellant’s success in variation of costs orders a result of reasoning proposed by the Court
Held: respondent awarded two-thirds of its costs on a party and party basis
Cases cited: Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2) (2001) 109 FCR 77
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 526
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (2014) 231 FCR 403
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 26
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCAFC 102
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 31 July 2017 Registry: Tasmania Division: General Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 19 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B McTaggart SC Solicitor for the Appellant: Ogilvie Jennings Counsel for the Respondent: Mr F Parry QC with Mr M Rinaldi Solicitor for the Respondent: Piper Alderman ORDERS
TAD 2 of 2017 BETWEEN: LISA ROMERO
Appellant
AND: FARSTAD SHIPPING (INDIAN PACIFIC) PTY LTD (ACN 105 011 989)
Respondent
JUDGES:
ALLSOP CJ, RARES AND MCKERRACHER JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant pay two-thirds of the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
In Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCAFC 102 (Full Court No 3) this Court dismissed an appeal from Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] FCA 1453 (Romero No 3) and Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 120 (Romero No 4), but made some variations as to the costs order in Romero No 4.
BACKGROUND
It is necessary, in order to address a costs argument, to outline the broad history of the litigation…
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court addressed various arguments made by Romero to support her claim that Farstad acted unreasonably. It found that the primary reason for Romero's offer was to avoid a significant damages claim that was unlikely to succeed, which did not necessarily indicate unreasonableness. The court also highlighted that the costs component of the appeal did not exist at the time of Romero's offer, and any success she had in varying the costs order was due to the reasoning proposed by the Court. The court dismissed Romero's arguments, noting that the offer was made at a time when the appeal on costs was not yet in existence, and her arguments on costs had been rejected both at trial and on appeal. The court concluded that Romero's offer did not take into account these factors, and therefore, Farstad's refusal to accept the offer was not unreasonable.
Given the findings, the court ordered that Farstad be awarded two-thirds of its costs on a party and party basis. The court's decision was based on the reasoning that Romero's appeal did not result in an outcome equivalent to or better than her offer, and the costs component of the appeal was not in existence at the time of the offer. The court emphasised that the variations in the costs order were due to its own reasoning, and not as a result of the merits of Romero's arguments. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to Farstad in accordance with the order made.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant pay two-thirds of the respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Farstad’s offer was also only open for seven days and was not accepted. CONSIDERATION Ms Romero contends that various factors suggest that Farstad acted unreasonably in failing to accept her offer. First, Ms Romero says that Farstad was facing a significant claim for damages and the offer from Ms Romero was to walk away from that claim. This primary assertion does not, taken alone, demonstrate unreasonableness. It is true that Ms Romero was claiming significant damages, but, equally it is true that such claim had little or no merit. It had been rejected once at trial level, for good reason, and was rejected again on appeal. Objectively, there would be little basis for Farstad to be substantially concerned as to any prospect of success by Ms Romero in relation to the damages component of the appeal. As noted, the costs component of the appeal was not in existence at the time of Ms Romero’s offer. The remaining points Ms Romero makes all fail to take into account that there was no appeal on costs at the time her offer was made and also fail to take into account that her arguments on costs below, having been rejected, were also rejected by the Full Court in Full Court No 3. To the extent that she succeeded in a variation on costs, it was as a result of reasoning proposed by this Court. The remaining factors to which Ms Romero alludes are:·given the extensive disputation ongoing since 2011, Farstad was in a good position to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Ms Romero's claim, including in respect of costs. At the time the offer was made to Farstad, Ms Romero was still within time to appeal the costs judgment, which was the subject of a variation in Full Court No 3; ·on 17 January 2017, Ms Romero had written to the primary judge's associate seeking the time fixed by the Rules for an appeal against his Honour's decision on damages be varied to a date after he delivered his then pending decision on costs. Farstad opposed the exercise of that discretion and the primary judge refused to exercise it. Ms Romero had thereby clearly signalled that she was contemplating that she would not proceed with the appeal if the primary judge's decision on costs was favourable to her;·at the time of her offer, Farstad must have known that an appeal against the costs order of the primary judge was open. The offer clearly included an offer by Ms Romero to forego any appeal from the costs decision. Had it accepted the offer, Farstad would have avoided any further liability for its own costs and the costs of Ms Romero; ·when on written notice regarding Ms Romero's intention to appeal the costs order of the primary judge, from on or about 17 March 2017, Farstad did not make attempts to settle the proceedings on the basis that each party walk away; and ·Ms Romero gave Farstad due notice of her intention to rely upon the offer to seek costs on an indemnity basis. Each of the four principal grounds of appeal in relation to damages from Romero No 3 failed. While it is true that Ms Romero succeeded in obtaining a variation of the costs order, and thereby has achieved some relative success on the appeal from a position she was in after Romero No 4, the grounds on which she advanced an argument that the entirety of the costs order in Romero No 4 should be reversed were rejected. Ms Romero had not identified the basis of the costs order on which she sought to appeal the primary judge’s order at any stage, including when she made the offer on 2 March 2017, on which she now seeks to rely.