Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 26

Citation: Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 26
Appeal from: Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439
Parties: LISA CAROLYN ROMERO v FARSTAD SHIPPING (INDIAN PACIFIC) PTY LTD (ACN 105 011 989)
File numbers: TAD 9 of 2014
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, RARES J AND MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 6 March 2015
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 25.01, 25.14, 39.04
Cases cited: Austin Nichols & Company Inc v Lodestar Anstalt (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 506
Autodesk Inc v Dyason [No 2] (1993) 176 CLR 300
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 17 February 2015
Place: Sydney (via video link to Hobart)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 13
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B McTaggart SC
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ogilvie Jennings
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr F Parry QC with Mr M Rinaldi
Solicitor for the Respondent: Piper Alderman

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

TAD 9 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

LISA CAROLYN ROMERO
Appellant

AND:

FARSTAD SHIPPING (INDIAN PACIFIC) PTY LTD
(ACN 105 011 989)

Respondent

JUDGES:

ALLSOP CJ, RARES J AND MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 MARCH 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO HOBART)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Paragraph 3(b) of the orders of the Court made on 22 December 2014 be varied to read as follows:

(b)the costs of the hearing before the primary judge be reserved to the judge to whom the further hearing of the proceeding below is remitted. 

2.Each party bear its own costs in relation to this application. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

TAD 9 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

LISA CAROLYN ROMERO
Appellant

AND:

FARSTAD SHIPPING (INDIAN PACIFIC) PTY LTD
(ACN 105 011 989)

Respondent

JUDGES:

ALLSOP CJ, RARES J AND MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

6 MARCH 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO HOBART)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

  1. On 22 December 2014 the Court made the following orders:

    1.The appeal be allowed.

    2.The cross-appeal be dismissed.

    3.The orders made by the Court dated 6 May and 22 May 2014 be set aside and in partial replacement thereof:

    (a)the Court declares that the respondent breached its employment contract with the applicant;

    (b)the respondent pay to the applicant the costs of the hearing.

    4.The question of repudiation and any associated questions such as affirmation or election and the question of damages be remitted to a judge of the Court for rehearing.

    5.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal. 

  2. By interlocutory application dated 22 January 2015, Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd sought to amend those orders…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 2), the respondent sought to amend the orders of the Court to reserve the costs of the hearing before the primary judge to the judge to whom the further hearing of the proceeding below was remitted. The applicant opposed the application. The central issue before the Court was whether it was appropriate to allow the application to amend, particularly in light of the principle of finality in litigation and the interests of justice. Additionally, the Court considered the adequacy of the respondent's offer to compromise and the potential futility of the variation.

The Court found that while the principle of finality in litigation was relevant, it was not absolute, especially given that the applicant's successful appeal had already disrupted the finality of the original proceedings. The Court emphasised that the variation of the order sought by the respondent would do no more than preserve the right to rely on the offer, and the delay in seeking this preservation had not prejudiced the applicant. The Court further noted that all arguments regarding the inadequacy of the offer would remain available if the respondent made an application. Consequently, the Court concluded that it would be inappropriate to pre-empt the outcome of the further hearing by ordering the costs of the first trial, given the theoretical chance of a less favourable judgment for the applicant than the respondent's offer.

After considering the arguments and the principles of finality and justice, the Court allowed the application to amend the orders. The Court referred to precedents such as Autodesk Inc v Dyason [No 2] and Austin Nichols & Company Inc v Lodestar Anstalt, which underscored the flexibility of the Court in varying orders to ensure just outcomes. The Court made orders varying the original costs order and requiring each party to bear its own costs in relation to the application.

The Court's final orders were to vary the original costs order to reserve the costs of the hearing before the primary judge to the judge to whom the further hearing of the proceeding was remitted, and for each party to bear its own costs in relation to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Paragraph 3(b) of the orders of the Court made on 22 December 2014 be varied to read as follows:

(b) the costs of the hearing before the primary judge be reserved to the judge to whom the further hearing of the proceeding below is remitted.

2. Each party bear its own costs in relation to this application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

ALLSOP CJ, RARES J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ALLSOP CJ, RARES J

The second basis is that the variation would be futile as Farstad’s reliance on the offer to compromise is doomed to fail. This argument is put in various ways. Ms Romero stresses that the offer would be significantly inadequate as her own solicitor/client costs alone at the time the offer was made greatly exceeded the offer. Ms Romero argues that Farstad could not possibly establish that Ms Romero acted unreasonably in rejecting the Farstad offer. Despite the force of this argument, to accept it now would inappropriately pre-empt the outcome of the remitted hearing.CONSIDERATION The notice of appeal sought two orders as follows:(1)“[Farstad] is liable to [Ms Romero] for breach of the employment contract for damages to be assessed.(2)The order of His Honour as to costs is vacated and in lieu thereof [Farstad] pay [Ms Romero’s] costs of the hearing at first instance and the appeal.” Unfortunately, Farstad raised no argument against order 2. Order 2 would be the normal costs order. Order 2 was made. Nonetheless, it does appear that there was some expectation on the part of Farstad that it would have an opportunity to make submissions on costs when the outcome of the appeal was known. There were more than two possible outcomes. The central consideration is the interests of justice. The variation of the order which Farstad seeks would do no more than preserve the right to rely on the offer pursuant to r 25.14 of the Federal Court Rules. Delay (if it be so regarded) in seeking preservation of that right has not in itself caused prejudice to Ms Romero. All arguments she presently advances as to the inadequacy of the offer will continue to be available if Farstad makes an application. It would be wrong for this Court to pre‑empt the outcome of the further hearing by ordering the costs of the first trial when there is a theoretical chance, at least, of a judgment in favour of Ms Romero which is in less favourable terms than Farstad’s offer. As to the argument for Ms Romero that the principle of finality in litigation would be offended by varying the order, there is no finality in the present litigation by virtue of Ms Romero’s successful appeal. Unless the parties can resolve the matter, it will be necessary for the Court to do so. It is therefore appropriate to allow the application to amend, having regard to the principles discussed in Autodesk Inc v Dyason [No 2] (1993) 176 CLR 300 per Mason CJ (at 302) and Brennan J (at 308) and Austin Nichols & Company Inc v Lodestar Anstalt (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 506 per Jacobson, Yates and Katzmann JJ (at [6]-[7]). The following orders are made:1.Paragraph 3(b) of the orders of the Court made on 22 December 2014 be varied to read as follows:(b)the costs of the hearing before the primary judge be reserved to the judge to whom the further hearing of the proceeding below is remitted. 2.Each party bear its own costs in relation to this application.