FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCAFC 102
Appeal from: Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2016] FCA 1453
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 120
File number: TAD 2 of 2017 Judges: ALLSOP CJ, RARES AND MCKERRACHER JJ Date of judgment: 4 July 2017 Catchwords: CONTRACT – employment contract breached by failing to comply with Workplace Harassment and Discrimination Policy (Policy) – nature of the term – whether the Policy was incorporated into the employment contract as an essential term – test of essentiality – whether conduct evinced an intention to only fulfil the contract in a manner substantially inconsistent with contractual obligations amounting to repudiation – whether there was a sufficiently serious breach of a non-essential term to justify termination – affirmation and election – whether conduct consistent with acceptance of repudiation or renunciation
DAMAGES – foreseeability of the consequences of breach – remoteness – whether damages were the natural and probable consequence of the breaches or within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract
COSTS – whether nominal damages warrant an award of costs where claim pursued for substantial damages – where part of claim settled by way of a deed in which sum of money was received – where remaining claims not established after execution of settlement deed – partial costs awarded up to the date of executing settlement deed
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 25.14(1)
Cases cited: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310
Beaumont v Greathead (1846) 135 ER 1039
Byrnes v Jokona Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 41
Champtaloup v Thomas [1976] 2 NSWLR 264
Cohen v iSoft Group Pty Ltd (2013) 298 ALR 516
Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 176 ALR 693
European Bank Limited v Evans (2010) 240 CLR 432
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Aust) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119
Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 156 ER 145
Immer (No 145) Pty Limited v The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) (1993) 182 CLR 26
Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850
Khoury v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1984) 165 CLR 622
Koompahtoo Local Aboriginal Land Council v Sanpine Pty Ltd (2007) 233 CLR 115
Motium Pty Ltd v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 65 (S)
Nikolich v Goldman Sachs JB Were Services Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 784
O’Connor v SP Bray, Limited (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 248
Rhodium Australia Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 17
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 439
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (2014) 231 FCR…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd (No 3) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the terms breached were essential and whether Ms Romero was entitled to any costs. The court considered whether the breach of the Policy constituted a breach of an essential term and whether Ms Romero's primary purpose in pursuing the claim was to recover damages rather than vindicate a legal right. Furthermore, the court examined whether Ms Romero was entitled to any costs awarded against her, despite pursuing the claim for substantial damages.
The court's reasoning involved a detailed analysis of the terms of the Policy and the evidence presented by both parties. The court found that the terms breached were not essential, as there was no evidence to suggest that Ms Romero would not have entered into the contract without the assurance of strict or substantial performance of the promise. The court also held that Ms Romero's primary purpose in pursuing the claim was to recover damages rather than vindicate a legal right, and therefore, the award of nominal damages did not entitle her to any costs. The court ordered that Ms Romero pay 80% of Farstad's party and party costs incurred prior to 18 December 2015, while Farstad would pay the remaining costs.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the orders made on 20 February 2017 were varied to reflect the new cost orders. Ms Romero was ordered to pay 80% of Farstad's party and party costs incurred prior to 18 December 2015, while Farstad would pay the remaining costs. The costs were to be resolved on the papers, unless the Court otherwise ordered.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Subject to order 2, the appeal be dismissed.
2. The orders made on 20 February 2017 be varied by replacing order 1 with a new order 1 as follows:
1. The respondent pay 80% of the applicant’s party and party costs incurred prior to 18 December 2015 and the applicant pay the respondent’s party and party costs incurred thereafter.
3. The appellant file submissions of no more than three pages, if any, in relation to costs on the appeal within 14 days.
4. The respondent file any submissions of no more than three pages in response within 14 days.
5. Costs be resolved on the papers, unless the Court otherwise orders.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Romero also challenges the the award of costs made by the primary judge on the following grounds:5.That [the primary judge] erred in failing to find that [Ms Romero] had been successful on her application and that she should recover her costs.6.That [the primary judge] erred in elevating to the status of a principle fettering the exercise of his discretion on costs the court's statement in Motium that "where the 'primary purpose' of litigation is to recover damages rather than vindicate some legal right, the award of nominal damages will not entitle a party to costs" [at para 56].7.That [the primary judge] erred in finding that [Ms Romero’s] primary purpose "was to obtain an award of substantial damages" [at para 63].8.That [the primary judge] erred in failing to order [Farstad] pay [Ms Romero’s] costs up to and including the hearing before Marshall J on the basis that she was ultimately successful on the breach of contract and jurisdictional issues that [his Honour] and the Full Court determined.9.That [the primary judge] erred in ordering [Ms Romero] pay [Farstad’s] costs from 18 December 2015 when the Full Court had ordered the application be remitted for the hearing of specified questions including damages and the entitlement of [Ms Romero] to receive any damages was not conceded by [Farstad] until during the hearing of the remitted questions and [Farstad] has not offered to pay [Ms Romero] any amount for damages plus her costs.CONSIDERATIONThe damages appealWhether the terms breached were essential As discussed by Jordan CJ in Tramways (at 641–642), whether terms of a contract are essential terms depends upon the intention of the parties as objectively construed in and from the contract and context. The test of essentiality is whether it appears from the nature of the contract considered as a whole or from some particular term or terms that the promise is of such importance to the promisee that the promisee would not have entered into the contract unless assured of strict or substantial performance of the promise. The High Court held in Koompahtoo (at [47], citing Tramways), that if the innocent party would not have entered into the contract assured of a strict and literal performance of the promise, the promisee may in general treat himself or herself as discharged upon any breach of the promise however slight. Ms Romero contends that the reasoning of the primary judge relevant to this ground of appeal involves a finding that Ms Romero’s first involvement with the Policy was after she had commenced casual employment with Farstad. She contends this finding is contrary to the evidence that Ms Romero was made aware of the Policy when first employed as part of her induction process. The relevant finding is at the end of [42] of his Honour’s reasons:There is nothing in Ms Romero’s contract (including the terms of the Policy) or in the relevant terms themselves which supports a conclusion that, had the terms not been incorporated, Ms Romero would not have entered into the contract. They were not “essential” promises. Indeed, it appears from [2]–[3] of Ms Romero’s affidavit of 24 January 2014 that her first encounter with the Policy was during her induction process or aboard the Far Scandia - that is, after she had already commenced casual employment with Farstad.