FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Farrell v Choosewell Health Link Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 910
File number(s): MLG 3163 of 2018 Judgment of: HER HONOUR JUDGE C. E. KIRTON QC Date of judgment: 6 May 2021 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether the First Respondent took adverse action against the Applicant contrary to s.340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether the Applicant exercised a workplace right – whether there was a breach of the Contract Call Centres Award 2010 – whether the First Respondent owes the Applicant unpaid monies in commission – whether the First Respondent failed to pay the Applicant her redundancy entitlements – whether the Second Respondent is accessorily liable for contraventions by the First Respondent pursuant to s.550 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where the First Respondent breached s.45 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – no other breach found – the Application be otherwise dismissed Legislation: Contract Call Centre Award 2010 cls 4, 5, 8 and 22.3
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 50AAA
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 38
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 45, 119, 121, 122, 335, 340, 341, 342 and 550
Cases cited: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Parker [2017] FCA 564
Cigarette & Gift Warehouse Pty Ltd v Whelan [2019] FCAFC 16
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v McCulloch [1946] HCA 27; (1946) 72 CLR 141
CumminsSouth Pacific Pty Ltd v Keenan [2020] FCAFC 204
EZY Accounting 123 Pty Ltd v Fair Work Ombudsman [2018] FCAFC 134
Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1365
Fair Work Ombusdman v Hu [2019] FCAFC 133Morton v Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (No 2) [2019] FCA 1754
National Tertiary Education Industry Union v University of Sydney [2020] FCA 1709
PIA Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v King [2020] FCAFC 15
Romero v Farstad Shipping (Indian Pacific) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 177
Number of paragraphs: 173 Date of last submission/s: 3 April 2020 Date of hearing: 9 & 10 December 2019 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Fuller Solicitor for the Applicant: Pearce Webster Dugdales Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Denton Solicitor for the Respondents: HR Legal ORDERS
MLG 3163 of 2018 BETWEEN: JESSICA FARRELL
Applicant
AND: CHOOSEWELL HEALTH LINK PTY LTD
First Respondent
ANDREW DAVIS
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
HER HONOUR JUDGE C. E. KIRTON QC
DATE OF ORDER:
6 MAY 2021
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.The First Respondent breached s.45 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by contravening cl.5 of the Contract Call Centre Award 2010 (Award) by failing to ensure that a copy of the…
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- Case
- [2021] FCCA 910
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the First Respondent took adverse action against the applicant for a prohibited reason under the FW Act. This involved assessing whether the applicant's complaints constituted the exercise of a "workplace right" and whether the alleged actions, including her termination, were taken because of those complaints. Additionally, the court had to consider the applicant's claims for unpaid redundancy pay, commission, and breaches of her contract and the relevant award, as well as the alleged accessorial liability of the Second Respondent. The respondents contended that the redundancy was genuine and that the applicant was not entitled to redundancy pay as she had refused an offer of redeployment.
The court found that the First Respondent did not take adverse action against the applicant for a prohibited reason. Specifically, the court determined that the exclusion from sales group emails, alleged as the "First Adverse Action," did not constitute adverse action under s 342 of the FW Act because the action was taken by Mr Tsimeris, who was employed by a separate corporate entity (HICC) and not the applicant's employer, the First Respondent. The court reasoned that for adverse action to be established, it must be taken by the employer against the employee. While the entities were related and Mr Davis was a common figure, they were distinct legal entities, and actions taken by an employee of one entity did not automatically constitute adverse action by the other.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the First Respondent had breached clause 5 of the applicable award but not clause 8. The applicant was not entitled to a redundancy payment under s 119 of the FW Act, and her claim for commission was dismissed. The allegations of accessorial liability against the Second Respondent under s 550 of the FW Act were also dismissed. The parties were directed to confer regarding proposed orders reflecting these findings.
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, to succeed the Applicant was required to have a source of entitlement to make the alleged complaints. Only then would the complaints be an exercise of a workplace right. CONSIDERATIONWas Adverse Action Taken? Section 342 of the FW Act defines adverse action as follows:(1)The following table sets out circumstances in which a person takes adverse action against another person. Section 335 of the FW Act provides that:In this Part, employee and employer have their ordinary meanings. The Applicant pleads that adverse action has been taken on three occasions as follows:(a)The Applicant was excluded from sales group emails and this constitutes adverse actions pursuant to s.342(1) items 1(c) and (d) (First Adverse Action);[184](b)The Applicant was directed that she was not to approach Mr Tsimeris for information and this constituted adverse action pursuant to s.342(1) items 1(c) and (d) (Second Adverse Action);[185] and(c)The Applicant's employment was terminated (by reason of redundancy) and this constituted adverse action pursuant to s.342(1) item 1(a) (Third Adverse Action).[186][184] Amended Statement of Claim, [28] to [31].[185] Amended Statement of Claim, [36]-[38].[186] Amended Statement of Claim, [63]-[69].First Adverse Action By the First Adverse Action, the Applicant pleads that she was excluded from ‘sales group emails’ by Mr Tsimeris and that when she asked Mr Tsimeris to be sent ‘sales group emails’ she was refused. The Applicant alleges that this was a prejudicial alteration of her position as she was excluded from becoming notified of relevant work matters which made it difficult for her to perform her duties to a high standard. She also claims that as she was the only sales consultant excluded from the emails, she was discriminated against.[187][187] Amended Statement of Claim, [28] to [31]. On a plain reading of the statute, adverse action has not been taken. Mr Tsimeris was not the Applicant's employer, nor was he employed by the Applicant's employer. As is clear from the Applicant's own affidavit evidence, she was ‘employed’ by the First Respondent. Her contract of employment states as much. Her pay slips indicate that it is the First Respondent who paid her wages. Her statement of claim also pleaded as much. Her ‘employer’ for the purpose of s.342 of the FW Act was the First Respondent. While the Applicant has advanced evidence to the effect that the First Respondent and HICC are related, this does not change the Court's view that the First Adverse Action must fail on the basis that the alleged adverse action was not taken by the employer against the Applicant. They are separate corporate entities. It is clear that Mr Tsimeris was not under the direction or control of the First Respondent. While Mr Davis may have been his ‘boss’ just as Mr Davis was the Applicant's ‘boss’, it remains that Mr Davis was the ‘boss’ of two separate employing entities. The sending of the emails by Mr Tsimeris was an action that arises in the context of his employment with HICC and, therefore, any actions he undertook were representations and actions taken on behalf of his employer.