Mount v Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd

Case [2025] FCA 101


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mount v Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 101

File number: NSD 1099 of 2021
Judgment of: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 21 February 2025
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – whistleblower protections – where applicant employed as Chief Executive Officer – where applicant seeks orders against employer, a company, and three of its four directors – where applicant claimed to have made certain disclosures of information to particular directors of company which qualify for protection under Pt 9.4AAA of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where applicant alleges that respondents contravened ss 1317AAE and 1317AC and applied for declarations and pecuniary penalty and compensation orders – where s 1317J limits the classes of persons who may apply for declarations of contraventions, pecuniary penalty or compensation orders and applicant not included – whether applicant had standing to make application

CORPORATIONS – whistleblower protections – where applicant also applied for an order under s 1317AD of Corporations Act and claimed that respondents had engaged in detrimental conduct by terminating his employment and damaging his reputation — whether applicant had reasonable grounds to suspect misconduct or an improper state of affairs in relation to the company – where respondents accepted that some of the disclosures qualify for protection, whether all of them did –– where a shareholder with corporate governance experience participated in discussions with directors, including at board meetings, whether shareholder also an “officer” as defined in s 9 — where one disclosure made to admittedly “eligible recipients” as defined in s 1317AAC and to another found not to satisfy definition, whether the fact that disclosure made to ineligible recipient deprived the disclosure of protection — whether company dismissed applicant because director respondents believed or suspected he had made a disclosure that qualifies for protection under Pt 9.4AAA – where one of director respondents disparaged applicant to certain shareholders, whether director damaged applicant’s reputation – whether damage to reputation may be presumed – if reputational damage established, whether director engaged in disparagement of applicant because he believed or suspected that applicant had made a disclosure that qualifies for protection – where applicant belatedly admitted he had no entitlement to retain company car after dismissed from employment but company’s requests for return of company car following dismissal went unheeded – where director then reported vehicle as stolen and arranged for it to be towed away, whether director’s conduct caused applicant a detriment – if so, whether when director engaged in detrimental conduct he believed or suspected applicant had made a disclosure that qualifies for protection

INDUSTRIAL LAW – wrongful dismissal – where applicant employed under one year fixed term contract – where applicant summarily dismissed after three weeks –whether dismissal wrongful – whether applicant repudiated contract by engaging in serious misconduct – whether employer entitled to rely on conduct occurring after dismissal – where applicant obtained other work after dismissal – where earnings from other work exceeded amount he would have received if he had remained in employment for duration of…

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Mount v Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 101
Case
[2025] FCA 101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mount v Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1003 involved Mr. Mount, the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd (DCM), who brought claims against DCM and three of its directors. Mr. Mount alleged wrongful dismissal and sought compensation under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and common law. The primary legal issues centred on whether Mr. Mount's disclosures to the company's directors qualified for whistleblower protection under the Corporations Act, whether the respondents contravened sections 1317AAE and 1317AC of the Act, and whether Mr. Mount's dismissal was wrongful. Additionally, the court had to determine if Mr. Mount had standing to bring the claims under the Corporations Act.

The Federal Court found that Mr. Mount's claims under the Corporations Act were unsuccessful. The court held that Mr. Mount did not have standing to bring claims under sections 1317AAE and 1317AC because he was not an "eligible recipient" as defined in section 1317AAC of the Act. Furthermore, the court found that the respondents did not contravene sections 1317AAE and 1317AC of the Act. The court also found that Mr. Mount's dismissal was not wrongful, as DCM had a valid reason to terminate his employment, unrelated to his alleged whistleblower disclosures. The court further held that Mr. Mount did not suffer any loss from his dismissal as his earnings from other work exceeded what he would have earned had he remained in employment for the remainder of the fixed term.

The court dismissed Mr. Mount's application in its entirety. The question of costs was reserved to be determined on the papers unless the Court decided otherwise. Any application for costs had to be filed and served by a specific deadline, supported by affidavit evidence and submissions. The court also imposed strict limits on the length of submissions and set deadlines for any responses and evidence in reply.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The further amended originating application be dismissed.

2. The question of costs be reserved, to be determined on the papers unless the Court decides otherwise.

3. Any application for costs be filed and served by 4pm on 14 March 2025, supported by any affidavit evidence and submissions.

4. Any affidavit(s) and submissions in response be filed and served by 4pm on 4 April 2025.

5. Any evidence and submissions in reply be filed and served by 4pm on 11 April 2025.

6. No submissions may exceed five pages without the leave of the Court.

7. If no application for costs is made within the time fixed by order 3 above, there be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

INTRODUCTION

[1]

BACKGROUND FACTS

[6]

January – February 2021

[12]

DCM engages FTI Consulting

[12]

Mr Nettelbeck is removed as a director

[13]

Mr Perdikaris joins the board of DCM and enlists the assistance of Mr Mount

[16]

Mr Mount introduces Mr Perdikaris to Resolve Litigation Lawyers

[27]

March 2021

[30]

DCM receives reports from FTI Consulting

[30]

DCM considers hiring Mr Mount

[34]

Mr Mount visits the mine site

[36]

Mr Mount has concerns about DCM’s operation

[39]

Mr Mount attends DCM board meeting

[43]

DCM hires Mr Mount

[45]

Mr Haindl and Mr Mount exchange text messages – alleged safety “incident” raised

[49]

Mr Mount sends First Whistleblower report to Mr Perdikaris and Mr Tripp

[53]

Mr Mount instructs Mr Haindl to suspend operations on the mine site

[55]

Mr Mount instructs Mr Haindl to stop all work at the mine site except for “light camp duties”

[58]

Mr Mount sends Mr Stewart, Mr Perdikaris and Mr Tripp the Second Whistleblower Report

[68]

Mr Mount attends his second board meeting, his first as Acting CEO

[71]

Mr Mount complains about insubordination

[75]

Mr Mount attends his final board meeting

[81]

The day before the meeting

[82]

The day of the meeting

[85]

April 2021

[87]

Mr Perdikaris is removed from the board and Mr Mount’s employment is terminated

[87]

Mr Mount brings proceedings in the Fair Work Commission

[91]

October 2021

[93]

Mr Mount commences court proceedings

[93]

THE WITNESSES

[96]

THE CLAIMS

[108]

THE ISSUES

[110]

PROOF

[114]

THE PROCESS OF EVALUATION

[116]

THE CORPORATIONS ACT CLAIMS

[121]

The legislative framework

[121]

The dispute

[153]

The standing issue (agreed issue 1)

[154]

The s 1317AAE claims: disclosure of confidential information (agreed issues 3 to 5)

[168]

Did Mr Tripp disclose the relevant information to Mr Haindl? Did Mr Haindl disclose the relevant information to Mr Arthy?

[175]

Did Mr Tripp read or know of the First Whistleblower Report before Mr Haindl’s conversation with Mr Arthy?

[178]

Did Mr Tripp disclose the confidential information to Mr Haindl?

[194]

Did Mr Haindl disclose the confidential information to Mr Arthy?

[207]

The claims

[236]

Which disclosures qualify for protection?

[242]

Were there reasonable grounds to suspect that all the information in the First Whistleblower Report concerned misconduct or an improper state of affairs or circumstances (agreed issue 3)?

[253]

Was Mr Stewart an eligible recipient? What difference would it make if he were not?

[274]

The disparagement of Mr Mount (agreed issues 8 and 9 and 17 to 20)

[293]

Matthew Azar

[299]

Wayne Clare

[306]

Richard Colreavy

[320]

Freddy Jaja

[330]

Frank Joslin

[346]

Rogan Yates

[348]

Consideration

[352]

The decision to remove Mr Mount (agreed issues 6, 7, 11, and 12 to 14)

[369]

The Issues

[369]

Whose state of mind is attributable to DCM in relation to the decision to terminate Mr Mount contract?

[379]

The evidence upon which DCM relied

[380]

What happened at the 31 March board meeting?

[383]

The termination of Mr Mount’s employment

[436]

Has DCM discharged its onus of proof?

[465]

The demand for the return of the company car and reporting it as stolen (agreed issues 10, 15 and 16)

[545]

Conclusions

[550]

THE CONTRACT CLAIM

[552]

The pleaded case and the dispute (agreed issues 29 to 41)

[552]

The legal principles

[559]

Consideration

[567]

Complicity in removal of Messrs Haindl and Tucker from 31 March board meeting

[568]

The breakdown in the cohesion of the board and senior management

[569]

The Resolve Litigation Lawyers issues (agreed issues 32 to 40)

[570]

The engagement of Resolve (agreed issues 31 to 37)

[570]

Purporting to instruct Resolve on behalf of DCM after Messrs Haindl and Tucker had informed him on 10 April that his engagement had been terminated (agreed issues 38 to 40)

[620]

Disclosing to Mr Perdikaris confidential information of DCM after he knew that Mr Perdikaris had been removed as a director (agreed issue 31)

[630]

Acting at the direction and in the personal interests of Mr Perdikaris in conflict with duties to DCM (agreed issue 41)

[636]

Conclusion

[658]

DAMAGES/COMPENSATION

[659]

The claim for damages for wrongful dismissal

[663]

The scope of the dispute

[667]

The extent of the loss

[671]

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

[699]

DISPOSITION

[701]

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The burden of proving the claims generally rests with Mr Mount. As will be seen, however, with respect to one of the claims under the Corporations Act and the claim in contract on critical questions it shifts to the respondents. As this is a civil matter, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities: Corporations Act, s 1332, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 140(1). In determining whether the burden is discharged, the Court is required to take into account the seriousness of the allegations and the gravity of the consequences flowing from the finding urged upon the Court: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362 (Dixon J). See also Evidence Act, s 140(2). In resolving questions of fact or deciding what inferences should be drawn from undisputed or established facts, a court “must feel an actual persuasion” of the fact or inference in question (Briginshaw at 361 per Dixon J); “[m]ere speculation about possibilities is always insufficient”: Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright (2021) 289 FCR 369 at [60] (Jagot, Katzmann and Banks Smith JJ). In the present case, many of the claims made by both parties are serious. Some of the claims under the Corporations Act expose the respondents to the risk of civil penalties. In these circumstances, it is necessary to keep in mind Dixon J’s aphorism that the satisfaction of the Court “should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences”. As will be seen, I was invited by both sides in this case to make critical findings based on just that.THE PROCESS OF EVALUATION To the extent that the resolution of the issues depends on the recollection of the witnesses, I have taken into account the fact that memory is notoriously “fallible and malleable, especially memory concerning past beliefs”: Dedakis v Deligiannis [2024] NSWSC 1018 at [15] (Leeming JA). The same is true about memory of past conversations. As McLelland CJ in Eq observed in Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319:[H]uman memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience. The respondents did not point to any confidential information Mr Mount disclosed to Mr Perdikaris after he knew that he had been removed as a director. In cross-examination Mr Mount agreed that Mr Perdikaris assisted him “in order to advance the preparation of the ASIC report”. In examination in chief Ms Nygh was asked what role she understood Mr Perdikaris had at the time in relation to the preparation of the report for ASIC and she replied:Perdikaris’ role at that time was to check whether the conversations that he – that were reported in the report that he had had with various people were accurately recorded.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondents’ case rests on strongly held suspicions with insufficient foundations to sustain them.Conclusion The respondents have failed to prove that they were entitled to summarily dismiss Mr Mount from his employment.DAMAGES/COMPENSATION Mr Mount sought:(1)compensation under ss 1317AD and 1317AE of the Corporations Act;(2)damages for wrongful dismissal in the amount of $229,000, being the remuneration he would have received from DCM had he remained in its employment for the balance of the fixed term, “less the amount paid to [him] for his work until 31 March 2021”. together with superannuation and annual leave calculated on that amount, together with;(3)damages for “hurt, humiliation and stress” caused by the manner in which DCM recovered possession of the company car and took possession of his personal items that were in the car at that time;(4)compensation for harm to his reputation and interference with his efforts to mitigate his loss;(5)interest on the above sums;(6)exemplary damages; and(7)pecuniary penalty orders. An additional claim for damages in the sum of $29,337 for the cost of leasing an equivalent vehicle to the company car for 11 months was abandoned by Mr Mount in closing submissions. As the claim for damage to Mr Mount’s reputation was not made out, the claim for compensation for harm to his reputation and interference with his efforts to mitigate his loss on that account must be dismissed. Had it succeeded, given the limited number of people to whom the defamatory comments were made I would have awarded no more than $10,000 in compensation for damage to reputation and hurt feelings. As all the claims under the Corporations Act were unsuccessful and the claim for exemplary damages was made under s 1317AE(1)(f) of that Act, there is no need to consider Mr Mount’s claim for exemplary damages. Nor is there any need to consider Mr Mount’s claims for compensation or pecuniary penalty orders. That disposes of agreed issues 21 to 28.The claim for damages for wrongful dismissal As the claims under s 1317AD of the Corporations Act were unsuccessful and Mr Mount had no standing to bring a claim for compensation under s 1317AC, he is left with a potential entitlement to damages for economic loss resulting from his wrongful dismissal. I say potential because the measure of Mr Mount’s economic loss is “the salary and wages and other contractual benefits of which he has been deprived less the salary or wages and other financial benefits which he received or acting reasonably should have received from the exercise of earning capacity freed up by the dismissal”: Tasman Capital Pty Ltd v Sinclair (2008) 75 NSWLR 1 at [72] (Giles JA, with whom McColl JA and Young CJ in Eq agreed at [76] and [77] respectively). The financial benefits received from the exercise of earning capacity freed up by the dismissal are often referred to as “avoided loss” and those the employee ought reasonably to have received as “avoidable loss”. The general principle was explained by the seven members of the High Court in Talacko v Talacko (2021) 272 CLR 478 at [57] in the following way:[A] defendant’s liability to compensate for loss is usually reduced where a plaintiff takes successful action consequent upon the defendant’s wrong to reduce their loss. In some cases, this principle is described as one of the rules of mitigation, being the usual principle that the claimant cannot recover for avoided loss, even in some cases where a benefit is acquired and the steps taken were not mitigation measures that were reasonably required. In other cases, the principle is described simply as part of the principle of compensation that generally requires compensating advantages that are sufficiently connected to the wrongdoing to be deducted from the damages awarded for consequential loss.(Footnotes omitted.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this proceeding Mr Mount sues both DCM and its then directors. He alleges that he was wrongfully dismissed. He also alleges that numerous of his communications including those relating to safety risks at the mine were protected by Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) which DCM and others disclosed in contravention of s 1317AAE of that Act and that he was victimised for making the allegedly protected disclosures in contravention of s 1317AC. He seeks damages for breach of contract, declarations that DCM and its directors contravened ss 1317AAE and 1317AC, and compensation under ss 1317AD and 1317AE on the basis that his contract was terminated because of his disclosures. He also seeks orders under the Corporations Act for exemplary damages and pecuniary penalties. Most of Mr Mount’s claims were hotly contested and the respondents denied he was entitled to any relief. As originally formulated, the originating application and statement of claim included various claims under Pt 3-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). In their defence the respondents denied that Mr Mount was an employee of DCM and Mr Mount discontinued all those claims. Within a week of the commencement of the trial, however, the respondents filed an amended defence which effectively admitted that Mr Mount was DCM’s employee and in submissions the respondents accepted as much.BACKGROUND FACTS Having regard to the way in which the case was pleaded and conducted, a considerable amount of evidence was adduced. A good deal of it was only of peripheral relevance. Some matters were the subject of agreement or uncontested evidence. At this point I turn to the background facts in order to put the issues in context. I will refer later to other matters of fact upon which the parties agreed only where necessary. Throughout this judgment, where I make factual assertions, they are about matters which were or became uncontroversial, or they result from my resolution of the issues. DCM was incorporated on 2 June 2014. It is involved in the business of mineral exploration. In or about the middle of 2014, it was granted an initial mining exploration licence for a tenement in Far North Queensland. Since then, it acquired additional mining tenements in the same area. I will refer to these tenements as the mine or the mine site. On 15 July 2014 Craig Nettelbeck became a director of DCM. On 16 February 2017 Matthew John Haindl, the second respondent, a project geologist and (like his father, Walter) one of the founders of DCM, was also appointed a director. Additional directors were appointed in 2021. They were George Tucker, Christos Perdikaris (also known as Chris Perdis), Simon Tripp and Philip Christensen. Mr Tucker was appointed a director on 5 February 2021, Messrs Perdikaris and Tripp on 8 March 2021. Messrs Perdikaris, Tripp and Tucker were also shareholders of DCM either directly or as beneficiaries of a bare trust. Mr Christensen served as managing director of DCM from 3 June 2021 until 27 June 2022. From time to time he also provided legal services to DCM through his firm, Christensen Legal.