Hollingsworth v The Master Builders Association of Victoria (Ruling)
[2025] VCC 1553
•28 October 2025
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE COMMON LAW DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
GENERAL LIST
Case No. CI-25-04213
| LISA HOLLINGSWORTH | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| THE MASTER BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF VICTORIA (ACN 004 255 654) | Defendant |
---
JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE PURCELL | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 7 August 2025; 8 and 9 September 2025 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 28 October 2025 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Hollingsworth v The Master Builders Association of Victoria (Ruling) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VCC 1553 | |
RULING
---
| Subject: | PRELIMINARY DISCOVERY |
| Catchwords: | Discovery to identify a defendant – claimed whistleblower protection – discovery from prospective defendant – confidential communication |
| Legislation Cited: | Corporations Act2001 (Cth); Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act2009 (Cth); County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 |
Cases Cited: | Mount Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 101; Kelly v Hilton [No 3] [2023] WASC 235; Fei v Hexin Pty Ltd (2024) 75 VR 581; Waldren Pty Ltd v Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 348 |
| Ruling: | Application refused |
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr T Sedal | Boutique Lawyers |
| For the Defendant | Ms C Currie | Barry Nilsson Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction, background and this proceeding
1What follows has all the ingredients of a John Grisham novel, with a story of boardroom politics, a whistleblower, a skipped breakfast, a secret investigation and a protagonist determined to reveal the truth.
2By further amended Originating Motion dated 8 September 2025, the plaintiff in this proceeding, Lisa Hollingsworth (“Hollingsworth”) makes an application pursuant to Rule 32.03 and/or Rule 32.05 of the County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 (“the Rules”) for the defendant to the Originating Motion, the Master Builders Association of Victoria (ACN 004 255 654) (“MBAV”) to make discovery of certain documents (“the preliminary discovery application”).
3Rule 32.03 provides for discovery to identify a defendant. Rule 32.05 provides for discovery from a prospective defendant; hardly the stuff usually found in a Grisham novel.
4The documents requested by the plaintiff (“the complaint documents”) in accordance with the Rules were described as follows:
“1. The full copy of the letter and/or email received by Mr Tristan Anthony Mosely [sic] for and on behalf of the Defendant on or around 3 April 2024 being the ‘confidential correspondence’ referred to in the email of Mr Mosely [sic] to the Plaintiff on 22 April 2024.
2. Full copies of all other correspondences between the person who sent the email of 3 April 2024 and the Defendant prior to, on or following 3 April 2024 which concern, either directly or indirectly, the Plaintiff.”[1]
[1] Plaintiff’s Further Amended Summons dated 8 September 2025
5This application effectively occupied three sitting days, with multiple affidavits filed by each party, as well as lengthy written and oral submissions. I have considered all the tendered evidence together with all the submissions. I do not intend to deal with the evidence or the submissions in detail beyond what is necessary, where what should have been a relatively simple discovery dispute morphed into something bigger.
6The preliminary discovery application has its genesis in a written complaint to MBAV about the plaintiff by a member of MBAV and a subsequent internal investigation of that complaint. As an oversimplification, Hollingsworth contends that she needs the complaint documents so she can ascertain if she has a cause of action, including an action in defamation against MBAV or the person who made the complaint, or both.
7Again, as an oversimplification, MBAV contends that the complaint documents are not discoverable primarily because of ‘whistleblower’ protection in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“Corporations Act”). Second, MBAV submits that regardless of ‘whistleblower’ protection, the complaint is not otherwise discoverable pursuant to the Rules because it was made as a confidential complaint.
8To understand how this dispute comes before the Court, it is useful to set out in a brief chronology some detail about the parties, the relationship between them and the people caught up in this dispute.
9While the parties appear to have different perceptions about some of the events that underpin this application, broadly the timeline of various interactions between the parties is not in dispute. What follows is extracted from the evidence in affidavits filed by parties and I consider is not in dispute.
The Master Builders Association of Victoria
10The MBAV is an association “that provides services to its members in the construction industry”.[2]
[2] Affidavit of Jane Coventry, affirmed 1 August 2025
11MBAV is a registered organisation for the purposes of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) and is a company limited by guarantee.
12MBAV is a member of the National Association of Master Builders Australia (“MBA”).
13MBAV is governed by a board, comprising of seven directors, together with an executive team.
14The MBAV Board includes a president, who is currently Mr Geoff Purcell (“Purcell”).[3]
[3]No known relation to Judge Purcell
15The company secretary, chief legal counsel and whistleblower officer of MBAV is Mr Tristan Moseley (“Moseley”).
16As of 19 September 2024, the other board members of MBAV included Hollingsworth, Mr Raymond French (“French”), Mr Greg Cole (“Cole”), Mr Mark Phillips (“Phillips”), and Mr Matthew Gilmore (“Gilmore”).
17Hollingsworth was elected to the MBAV board in November 2021 and is currently a deputy president and member of the board. She has held various positions on the board and within MBAV. At some stage she was the MBAV representative to MBA but she no longer holds that position.
18As at mid-2024 Hollingsworth was a councillor and Mayor of the City of Boroondara. She is no longer the Mayor but remains a councillor. The relevance of her municipal responsibilities to this proceeding is not an obvious one.
Relevant MBAV policies, procedures and rules
19It is not in dispute that MBAV has various internal policies, procedures and rules, including board conduct principles, a general code of conduct for members, a code of ethics and a whistleblower policy.
A complaint is made about Hollingsworth
20On 8 March 2024, MBAV held an International Women’s Day Breakfast (“the breakfast”), to which MBAV board members were invited to attend. Hollingsworth did not attend the breakfast. Based on the affidavit evidence, it is unclear if some or all the other (male) board members attended the breakfast.
21On 3 April 2024, a person (“the complainant or so-called whistleblower”) made a complaint about Hollingsworth by an email sent to Moseley and to Mr Giovanni Abelardo (“Abelardo”). Abelardo is the Executive Director of People & Member Services of MBAV.
22On 22 April 2024, Purcell made a phone call to Hollingsworth and informed her that MBAV had received a whistleblower complaint about her.[4]
[4] Affidavit of Hollingsworth affirmed 9 July 2025, 2
23Moseley followed up the phone call by sending an email on 22 April 2024 to Hollingsworth, stating that confidential correspondence from a whistleblower had been received about certain aspects of her conduct. Moseley also described that an investigation to be conducted by a Barrister “into the allegations” and that the Barrister would subsequently prepare a report to MBAV.[5]
[5] Ibid
24Moseley wrote that the independent report was to answer whether, in making statements to the media as reported in three newspaper articles published on 29 January 2024, 23 March 2024 and 13 April 2024 (“the newspaper articles”), the plaintiff acted contrary to MBAV’s Code of Ethics, Board Conduct Principles and/or the Board Charter and/or any other internal policies or procedures.[6]
[6] Ibid
25In addition, Moseley said the enquiry was to consider whether Hollingsworth acted in a way that was detrimental to MBAV’s interests in breach of her duties and obligations as Deputy President of MBAV.[7]
[7] Ibid
26Further, in his email of 22 April 2024, Moseley raised whether Hollingsworth had failed to attend the breakfast without reasonable excuse and, if so, did she act contrary to MBAV’s Code of Ethics, Board Conduct Principles, the Board Charter and/or other internal policies or procedures.[8] Moseley posed as an issue whether the failure to attend the breakfast was in any way detrimental to MBAV’s interests in breach of Hollingsworth’s duties and obligations as Deputy President of MBAV.
[8] Ibid 3
27Based on Moseley’s email of 22 April 2024 and indeed the evidence and submissions filed by MBAV in this proceeding, there appears to be acceptance that the “whistleblower” complaint related only to the newspaper articles and the plaintiff’s non-attendance at the breakfast.
28On 27 April 2024, Hollingsworth engaged solicitors to represent her. There was then a series of emails between the Barrister appointed to conduct the investigation, Hollingsworth’s solicitors and solicitors appointed to act for MBAV. In that back and forth, it was asserted that the complaint was a protected whistleblower disclosure.[9]
[9] Affidavit of Hollingsworth affirmed 9 July 2025, 4-7
29On 5 June 2024, Purcell wrote to Hollingsworth, and said that the investigation had concluded. He said a summary of the findings was that:
“1) [Hollingsworth’s] conduct in making public statements that were highly critical of the State Government and which used inflammatory language was inconsistent with MBAV Board Conduct Principle 1 (“To act in the best interests of Masters Builders Victoria at all times”).
2) [Hollingsworth’s] non-attendance at the MBAV International Women’s Day breakfast did not constitute a breach of any MBAV rules, policies and/or procedures.”[10]
[10] Ibid 8
30Perhaps the tension between Hollingsworth and others associated with MBAV came to a head on 19 September 2024 when, following a vote at a board meeting, Hollingsworth was not re-elected to the position on MBA.
31On 28 March 2025, Hollingsworth’s solicitors again requested that Purcell provide a copy of the whistleblower report and the name of the whistleblower.
32To this point in time, MBAV had refused to provide a copy of the whistleblower report or identify the whistleblower. It maintains that it is a protected complaint or otherwise a confidential document that is not compellable as part of the preliminary discovery application.
33Hollingsworth maintains that she is entitled to the whistleblower complaint and needs it to know the identity of the complainant so she can bring an action in defamation against the complainant or seek advice about any other remedy she might have.
Issues
34Bearing in mind that at the core of this dispute is an application for preliminary discovery, the issues for determination are:
(i) Was the complaint about Hollingsworth that was made to MBAV on 3 April 2024 a whistleblower complaint?
(ii) If the complaint was not a whistleblower complaint, is the plaintiff entitled to the complaint documents by reason of either Rule 32.03 or Rule 32.05?
35If the complaint is a whistleblower complaint, then the parties accept that the plaintiff would not be entitled to have disclosed to her the identity of the whistleblower, or any information which may identify the whistleblower.
36However, the plaintiff contends that she would be entitled to a redacted version of the complaint documents, so that any information that might identify the whistleblower is redacted but the substance of the complaint is otherwise disclosed to her.
37This is a somewhat unusual proceeding in that MBAV contended that because it had received a whistleblower complaint, it could not provide the identity of the whistleblower or provide the complaint to the plaintiff because that would be a breach of the Corporations Act. But instead of adopting a neutral position about the nature of the complaint, MBAV actively contended for it to be categorised as a whistleblower complaint.
38Perhaps because of the somewhat unusual nature of the proceeding, neither party was able to provide the Court with any authority that was directly on point. The authorities to which parties referred in support of contentions were notable for being based on factual scenarios where the identity of the whistleblower was known to the parties and the whistleblower was seeking a remedy.
39In any event, if the complaint is one that attracts the relevant whistleblower protection, then the plaintiff is either not entitled to it, or at best only entitled to a redacted version that does not identify the whistleblower. Either way that would basically resolve the preliminary discovery dispute. Accordingly, it is convenient to resolve that issue first and then, if necessary, move to consider more generally the principles relating to preliminary discovery.
The whistleblower issue
40According to the ‘Merriam-Webster’ online dictionary, one of the exceptions to the semantic realm of ‘snitches get stitches’ is the word whistleblower, defined as “one who reveals something covert or who informs against another”. Perhaps in an Australian schoolyard the whistleblower would be accused of being a “dobber” instead of a snitch?
41The obvious point in a corporate setting is that the whistleblower protections are clearly designed to encourage certain people to ‘blow the whistle’ about suspected breaches of corporations law.
42I pause here to ponder how an allegation of failing to attend a seemingly optional breakfast event could ever be thought to deserve whistleblower protection, by either the so-called whistleblower or the MBAV, under corporations law. The fact that such mud was thrown suggests that there might be more to this dispute than meets the eye.
43Next, regarding the claimed whistleblower protection, I shall first set out the relevant legislative framework, before moving to the general legal principles and such evidence as appropriate.
The whistleblower legislative framework – the Corporations Act
44As mentioned, the claimed whistleblower protection was said by MBAV to arise out of the provisions of the Corporations Act.
45In respect to the relevant legislative framework, one authority to which the Court was referred was the recent decision in the Federal Court of Katzmann J in Mount Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd[11] (“Mount”), which involved a consideration of whistleblower protections in the context of termination of employment, where the identity of the whistleblower was known.
[11][2025] FCA 101 (“Mount”)
46However, for a discussion and analysis of the applicable legislative framework, I can do no better than adopt, with enthusiasm, the comments of Katzmann J in Mount at paragraphs 122 to 153 as follows:
“122Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act provides protection for ‘eligible whistleblowers’ and rights to compensation and other forms of relief in the event of the disclosure of information which qualifies for protection under that Part. The object or purpose of Pt 9.4AAA is to encourage employees, officers and subcontractors engaged by companies to report suspected breaches of the corporations law to either ASIC or internally within the company: Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) at [5.381]. The policy ‘reflects the dual aims of facilitating the early detection and prosecution of corporate misconduct, and promoting improved business practices and standards’: Quinlan v ERM Power Ltd (No 1) [2021] 7 QR 377 at [18] (Bowskill J)
123Part 9.4AAA was inserted in the Corporations Act in 2004. Substantial amendments were made in 2019 by the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Act 2019 (Cth) (the Amendment Act). Those amendments commenced on 1 July 2019. The background to the amendments is explained in detail in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2018 (Revised EM).
124 Disclosures qualifying for protection under Pt 9.4AAA are described in s 1317AA. They relevantly include disclosures about ‘disclosable matters’ made by ‘an eligible whistleblower’ to ‘eligible recipients’ in relation to ‘a regulated entity’: s 1317AA(2). ‘Regulated entity’ is defined in s 1317AAB and includes a body corporate. ‘Eligible recipients’ ‘in relation to a regulated entity that is a body corporate’ are defined in s 1317AAC and the definition relevantly includes an officer or senior manager of the body corporate. An ‘eligible whistleblower’ in relation to a ‘regulated entity’ is relevantly defined in s 1317AAA to include a person who is, or has been (a) an officer of a regulated entity and (b) an employee of a regulated entity.
125 It is an agreed fact that, from his engagement on 18 March 2021 until the termination of his employment, Mr Mount was an ‘eligible whistleblower’ and DCM ‘a regulated entity’. In fact, by reason of the definition, Mr Mount remains an eligible whistleblower.
126 Section 1317AA relevantly provides:
‘Disclosures qualifying for protection under this Part
Disclosure to ASIC, APRA or prescribed body
(1) A disclosure of information by an individual (the discloser) qualifies for protection under this Part if:
(a) the discloser is an eligible whistleblower in relation to a regulated entity; and
(b) the disclosure is made to any of the following:
(i)ASIC;
(ii) APRA;
(iii) a Commonwealth authority prescribed for the purposes of this subparagraph in relation to the regulated entity; and
(c) subsection (4) or (5) applies to the disclosure.
…
Disclosure to eligible recipients
(2) A disclosure of information by an individual (the discloser) qualifies for protection under this Part if:
(a) the discloser is an eligible whistleblower in relation to a regulated entity; and
(b) the disclosure is made to an eligible recipient in relation to the regulated entity; and
(c) subsection (4) or (5) applies to the disclosure.
…
Disclosure to legal practitioner
(3) A disclosure of information by an individual qualifies for protection under this Part if the disclosure is made to a legal practitioner for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or legal representation in relation to the operation of this Part.
Disclosable matters
(4) This subsection applies to a disclosure of information if the discloser has reasonable grounds to suspect that the information concerns misconduct, or an improper state of affairs or circumstances, in relation to:
(a) the regulated entity; or
(b) if the regulated entity is a body corporate—a related body corporate of the regulated entity.
(5) Without limiting subsection (4), this subsection applies to a disclosure of information if the discloser has reasonable grounds to suspect that the information indicates that any of the following:
(a) the regulated entity, or an officer or employee of the regulated entity;
(b) if the regulated entity is a body corporate—a related body corporate of the regulated entity, or an officer or employee of a related body corporate of the regulated entity;
has engaged in conduct that:
(c) constitutes an offence against, or a contravention of, a provision of any of the following:
(i) this Act;
(ii) the ASIC Act;
(iii) the Banking Act 1959;
(iv) the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001;
(v) the Insurance Act 1973;
(vi) the Life Insurance Act 1995;
(vii) the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009;
(viii) the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993;
(ix) an instrument made under an Act referred to in any of subparagraphs (i) to (viii); or
(d) constitutes an offence against any other law of the Commonwealth that is punishable by imprisonment for a period of 12 months or more; or
(e) represents a danger to the public or the financial system; or
(f) is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph.’
127‘Officer’ of a corporation was defined at the relevant time in s 9 of the Corporations Act (and now in s 9AD) to include:
‘(a) a director or secretary of the corporation; or
(b) a person:
(i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or
(ii) who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial standing; or
(iii) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed to act (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person’s professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation)[.]”
128‘Director’ of a company was defined in s9 (now in s9AC – only the note to the definition differs and then not in substance) as:
‘(a) a person who:
(i) is appointed to the position of a director; or
(ii) is appointed to the position of an alternative director and is acting in that capacity;
regardless of the name that is given to their position; and
(b) unless the contrary intention appears, a person who is not validly appointed as a director if:
(i) they act in the position of a director; or
(ii) the directors of the company or body are accustomed to act in accordance with the person’s instructions or wishes (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person’s professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation).
Note: Paragraph (b)—Contrary intention—Examples of provisions for which a person referred to in paragraph (b) would not be included in the term ‘director’ are:
(a) section 205B (notice to ASIC of change of address); and
(b) section 249C (power to call meetings of a company’s members); and
(c) subsection 251A(3) (signing minutes of meetings).’
129‘Misconduct’ is broadly defined in s 9 to include fraud, negligence, default, breach of trust and breach of duty. ‘Improper state of affairs or circumstances’ is not a defined term. I therefore infer that Parliament intended these words to have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meanings of ‘improper’ include ‘not in accordance with truth, fact, reason or rule; abnormal, irregular; incorrect, inaccurate, erroneous, wrong’. Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs [2009] HCA 7; 83 ALJR 494; 252 ALR 619; 71 ATR 23 at [29] (French CJ) For this reason, DCM (and I infer all respondents) accepted that the word ‘has a broad construct’. … .
130‘Suspicion’ is a ‘state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking’: George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 115 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); The Environmental Group Ltd v Bowd[2019] FCA 951;137 ACSR 352 at [180] (Steward J).
131Not all disclosures of information by eligible whistleblowers falling within the scope of s 1317AA qualify for protection. Section 1317AADA excludes from protection certain ‘personal work-related grievances’. It reads as follows:
‘Personal work-related grievances
(1)Subsections 1317AA(1) and (2) do not apply to a disclosure of information by an individual (the discloser) to the extent that the information disclosed:
(a)concerns a personal work-related grievance of the discloser; and
(b) does not concern a contravention, or an alleged contravention, of section 1317AC that involves detriment caused to the discloser or a threat made to the discloser.
Note: A disclosure concerning a personal work-related grievance that is made to a legal practitioner may qualify for protection under this Part under subsection 1317AA(3).
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1), the information disclosed concerns a personal work-related grievance of the discloser if:
(a) the information concerns a grievance about any matter in relation to the discloser’s employment, or former employment, having (or tending to have) implications for the discloser personally; and
(b) the information:
(i) does not have significant implications for the regulated entity to which it relates, or another regulated entity, that do not relate to the discloser; and
(ii) does not concern conduct, or alleged conduct, referred to in paragraph 1317AA(5)(c), (d), (e) or (f).
Examples of grievances that may be personal work-related grievances under paragraph (a) (but subject to paragraph (b)) are as follows:
(a) an interpersonal conflict between the discloser and another employee;
(b) a decision relating to the engagement, transfer or promotion of the discloser;
(c) a decision relating to the terms and conditions of engagement of the discloser;
(d) a decision to suspend or terminate the engagement of the discloser, or otherwise to discipline the discloser.’
132This section implements Recommendation 5.1 of the Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, Whistleblower Protections (Report, September 2017) following the independent review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (PID Act) by the then Integrity Commissioner, Phillip Moss AM, published in July 2016 (Moss Review): Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to the Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower Protections) Bill 2017 (Cth) (Supplementary EM) [1.16]. One of the key recommendations of the Moss Review, as outlined in the Executive Summary at [11] was:
‘[t]o strengthen the PID Act’s focus on significant wrongdoing like fraud, serious misconduct, and corrupt conduct in order to achieve the integrity and accountability aims.’
(Original emphasis.)
133 To this end, Mr Moss explained that:
‘personal employment-related grievances would be excluded from the PID Act, unless they relate to systemic issues or reprisal, and ‘disciplinary conduct’ would be defined as termination or dismissal. Such issues are better investigated or resolved through other existing dispute resolution processes.’
134The view of the Parliamentary Joint Committee was that:
‘5.28 Given the findings of the Moss Review, the committee considers it important to ensure that any changes to whistleblower protections remain focussed on the most serious integrity risks.
5.29 However, the committee remains concerned that the most likely forms of reprisal are employment related. Therefore any amendments should ensure that employment related reprisals can still be dealt with under the PID Act.
5.30In addition, the lack of clear information on what proportion of disclosures are actually related to personal employment matters is of concern. The committee considers the data should be collected and assessed before any legislative changes are made.’
135 Thus, the Recommendation 5.1 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee was that:
‘in implementing the Moss Review recommendation regarding employment related matters care is taken to ensure that:
Ÿallegations of reprisal action taken against a person that has made a public interest disclosure can still be dealt with under a Whistleblower Protection Act; and
Ÿdata is gathered and assessed in a national database on the proportion of disclosures that are personal employment related, but that this not have to occur before any legislative changes are made as recommended in this report.’
136Before any disclosure qualifies for protection, the discloser must have reasonable grounds for forming the relevant suspicion. That ‘directs attention to the information which formed the basis of the particular discloser’s suspicion; rather than, objectively, by reference to other information not known by the discloser, or which becomes known subsequently’. See Quinlan at [33] (Bowskill J). Matters not within the knowledge of the putative whistleblower at the time of the disclosures are irrelevant to the question of whether the disclosures qualify for protection. Quinlan at [34]–[37] (Bowskill J); Bowd at [180] (Steward J). While s 1317AA originally stipulated (in sub-s(1)(e)) that, for a disclosure of information to qualify for protection under Pary 9.4AAA, the disclosure had to be made in good faith, that requirement was removed by the Amendment Act and replaced by the requirement for reasonable grounds. See Revised EM at [2.42]–[2.44].
137 In George v Rockett at 112 the High Court said:
‘When a statute prescribes that there must be “reasonable grounds” for a state of mind — including suspicion and belief — it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.’
138Section 1317AB(1) of the Corporations Act relevantly provides that if a person makes a disclosure that qualifies for protection under Pt 9.4AAA, ‘no contractual or other remedy may be enforced, and no contractual or other right may be exercised, against the person on the basis of the disclosure’. Section 1317AB(2)(b) provides that, without limiting sub-s(1), ‘a contract to which the person is a party may not be terminated on the basis that the disclosure constitutes a breach of the contract’. … .
139 Section 1317AAE relevantly provides:
‘Confidentiality of whistleblower’s identity
(1) A person (the first person) contravenes this subsection if:
(a) another person (the discloser) makes a disclosure of information (the qualifying disclosure) that qualifies for protection under this Part; and (b) the first person discloses any of the following (the confidential information):
(i) the identity of the discloser;
(ii) information that is likely to lead to the identification of the discloser; and
(b) the confidential information is information that the first person obtained directly or indirectly because of the qualifying disclosure; and
(c) the disclosure referred to in paragraph (b) is not authorised under subsection (2) or (3).
Note 1:Failure to comply with this subsection is an offence (see subsection 1311(1)).
Note 2:This subsection is also a civil penalty provision (see section 1317E). For relief from liability to a civil penalty relating to this subsection, see section 1317S.
(2) A disclosure referred to in paragraph (1)(b) is authorised under this subsection if it:
(a)is made to ASIC; or
…
(d) is made to a legal practitioner for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or legal representation in relation to the operation of this Part; or
…
(f) is made with the consent of the discloser.
…
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply if:
(a) the disclosure referred to in paragraph (1)(b):
(i) is not of the identity of the discloser; and
(ii)is reasonably necessary for the purposes of investigating a matter referred to in subsection 1317AA(4) or (5) to which the qualifying disclosure relates; and
(b) the first person takes all reasonable steps to reduce the risk that the discloser will be identified as a result of the disclosure referred to in paragraph (1)(b).’
140Section 1317AC relevantly provides:
‘Victimisation prohibited
Actually causing detriment to another person
(1) A person (the first person) contravenes this subsection if:
(a) the first person engages in conduct; and
(b) the first person’s conduct causes any detriment to another person (the second person); and
(c) when the first person engages in the conduct, the first person believes or suspects that the second person or any other person made, may have made, proposes to make or could make a disclosure that qualifies for protection under this Part; and
(d) the belief or suspicion referred to in paragraph (c) is the reason, or part of the reason, for the conduct.
Note 1: Failure to comply with this subsection is an offence (see subsection 1311(1)).
Note 2: This subsection is also a civil penalty provision (see section 1317E). For relief from liability to a civil penalty relating to this subsection, see section 1317S.
…
Officers and employees involved in contravention
(3) If a company contravenes subsection (1) …, any officer or employee of the company who is involved in that contravention contravenes this subsection.
Note 1:Failure to comply with this subsection is an offence (see subsection 1311(1)).
Note 2:This subsection is also a civil penalty provision (see section1317E). For relief from liability to a civil penalty relating to this subsection, see section 1317S.
…’
141Section 79 defines the circumstances in which a person is ‘involved’ in a contravention within the meaning of the Act. It provides:
‘A person is involved in a contravention if, and only if, the person:
(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; or
(b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; or
(c) has been in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or
(d)has conspired with others to effect the contravention.’
142Section 1317AD relevantly reads as follows:
‘Compensation and other remedies—circumstances in which an order may be made
(1) A court may make an order under section 1317AE in relation to a person (the first person) if:
(a) the first person engages in conduct (detrimental conduct) that:
(i) causes any detriment to another person (the second person); or
(ii) constitutes the making of a threat to cause any such detriment to another person (the second person); and
(b) when the first person engages in the detrimental conduct, the first person believes or suspects that the second person or any other person made, may have made, proposes to make or could make a disclosure that qualifies for protection under this Part; and
(c) the belief or suspicion referred to in paragraph (b) is the reason, or part of the reason, for the detrimental conduct.
(2) A court may make an order under section 1317AE in relation to a person (the first person) if:
(a) the first person is or was an officer or employee of a body corporate; and
(b) paragraphs (1)(a), (b) and (c) of this section apply to the body corporate because of detrimental conduct engaged in by the body corporate; and
(c) the first person:
(i) aided, abetted, counselled or procured the detrimental conduct; or
(ii) induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the detrimental conduct; or
(iii) was in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the detrimental conduct; or
(iv) conspired with others to effect the detrimental conduct.
…
Burden of proof
(2B) In proceedings where a person seeks an order under section 1317AE in relation to another person:
(a)the person seeking the order bears the onus of adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility of the matters in:
(i) if subsection (1) of this section applies—paragraph (1)(a); or
(ii) if subsection (2) of this section applies—paragraph (1)(a), as mentioned in paragraph (2)(b); …
…
(b)if that onus is discharged–the other person bears the onus of proving that the claim is not made out.’
143The effect of sub-s (2B) is to shift the legal burden of proof from the alleged victim to the alleged wrongdoer. Its rationale is apparent from [2.127] of the Revised EM:
‘This reversal of the onus of proof recognises the well documented propensity of organisations that are the subject of a disclosure of wrongdoing to accuse and victimise the whistleblower, citing reasons other than the disclosure for their actions. It also recognises the actual knowledge of the reasons for, and conduct of, any victimising conduct will lie exclusively with the defendant in these cases.’
…
145Section 1317AE sets out the orders a court may make for the purposes of s 1317AD. It reads:
‘Compensation and other remedies—orders that may be made
(1)For the purposes of subsections 1317AD(1), (2) and (2A), a court may make any of the following orders:
(a) an order requiring the first person to compensate the second person, or any other person, for loss, damage or injury suffered as a result of the detrimental conduct;
(b) if the court is satisfied that the first person engaged in the detrimental conduct in connection with the first person’s position as an employee:
(i) an order requiring the first person to compensate the second person, or any other person, for a part of loss, damage or injury as a result of the detrimental conduct, and an order requiring the first person’s employer to compensate the second person, or any other person, for a part of loss, damage or injury as a result of the detrimental conduct; or
(ii) an order requiring the first person and the first person’s employer jointly to compensate the second person, or any other person, for loss, damage or injury suffered as a result of the detrimental conduct; or
(iii) an order requiring the first person’s employer to compensate the second person, or any other person, for loss, damage or injury as a result of the detrimental conduct;
(c) an order granting an injunction, on such terms as the court thinks appropriate, to prevent, stop or remedy the effects of the detrimental conduct;
(d) an order requiring the first person to apologise to the second person, or any other person, for engaging in the detrimental conduct;
(e) if the second person is or was employed in a particular position and the detrimental conduct wholly or partly consists, or consisted, of the termination, or purported termination, of the second person’s employment—an order that the second person be reinstated in that position or a position at a comparable level;
(f) If the court thinks it is appropriate—an order requiring the first person to pay exemplary damages to the second person, or any other person;
(g) any other order the court thinks appropriate.
(2) If the detrimental conduct wholly or partly consists, or consisted, of terminating or purporting to terminate a person’s employment (including detrimental conduct that forces or forced the person to resign), the court must, in making an order mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), consider the period, if any, the person is likely to be without employment as a result of the detrimental conduct. This subsection does not limit any other matter the court may consider.
(3) In deciding whether to make an order under paragraph (1)(b) in relation to the first person’s employer, the court may have regard to the following:
(a) whether the employer took reasonable precautions, and exercised due diligence, to avoid the detrimental conduct;
(b) if the employer has a policy dealing with any or all of the matters referred to in subsection 1317AI(5) (whether or not section 1317AI requires the employer to have such a policy)—the extent to which the employer gave effect to that policy;
(c) any duty that the employer was under to prevent the detrimental conduct, or to take reasonable steps to ensure that the detrimental conduct was not engaged in.
(4) If the court makes an order under subparagraph (1)(b)(ii), the first person and the first person’s employer are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation concerned.’
146 ‘Detriment’ for present purposes is defined in s 1317ADA as follows:
“In sections 1317AC and 1317AD, detriment includes (without limitation) any of the following:
(a) dismissal of an employee;
(b) injury of an employee in his or her employment;
(c)alteration of an employee’s position or duties to his or her disadvantage;
(d) discrimination between an employee and other employees of the same employer;
(e)harassment or intimidation of a person;
(f) harm or injury to a person, including psychological harm;
(g) damage to a person’s property;
(h) damage to a person’s reputation;
(i) damage to a person’s business or financial position;
(j) any other damage to a person.’
147This definition is modelled on the definition in s 337BA(2) the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act2009 (Cth) (‘Registered Organisations Act’), but is intentionally broader in that the definition in that Act does not include ‘damage to a person’s business or financial position’ or ‘any other damage to a person’: Revised EM at [2.100].
148In its ordinary meaning a ‘detriment’ is a disadvantage. In view of the words used in the chapeau to s 1317ADA, it is reasonable to conclude that the intention of the Parliament was to capture any disadvantage and that the list was illustrative only.
149Section 1317AF, which commenced on 1 July 2019, makes it clear that a person may bring civil proceedings for an order under s 1317AE or for a contravention of s 1317AC, even if a prosecution for a criminal offence in relation to the same conduct has not been, or cannot be, brought.
150Section 1317QB, which is in Div 2 of Pt 9.4B, provides:
‘(1) In proceedings for a declaration of contravention or an order under Division 1 against a person for a contravention of a civil penalty provision, it is not necessary to prove:
(a) the person’s intention; or
(b) the person’s knowledge; or
(c) the person’s recklessness; or
(d) the person’s negligence; or
(e) any other state of mind of the person.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the extent that the proceedings relate to attempting to contravene a still penalty provision, or being involved in a contravention of a civil penalty provision;
(3)Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of section 1317QC (which is about mistake of fact).
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to the extent that the civil penalty provision, or a provision that relates to the civil penalty provision, expressly provides otherwise.’
151Section 1317QE provides that, if an element of a civil penalty provision is done by an employee, agent or officer of a body corporate acting within the actual or apparent scope of the employment or authority of the employee, agent or officer, that element must also be attributed to the body corporate.
152The Revised EM describes the context in which the amendments were introduced and the purpose of the new provisions. Existing whistleblower regimes were said to ‘present a confusing web for whistleblowers to navigate, with differences and gaps in the protections available’ ([1.7]) and, in contrast to the position in the public sector, private sector whistleblower laws were rarely utilised ([1.8]–[1.9]). The legislation was introduced following a report of an inquiry by the Senate Economics References Committee into the performance of ASIC, which recommended a review of the corporate sector ‘whistleblower framework’ to bring it closer to the public sector ‘whistleblower framework’: Revised EM at [1.10].
153Part 9.4B deals with the civil consequences of contravening civil penalty provisions of the Corporations Act. Division 1 provides for the making of declarations (s 1317E), pecuniary penalty orders (s 1317G), orders for compensation and other orders not presently relevant. Division 2, which includes ss 1317J–1317S, deals with procedural and other matters relating to court orders.”[12]
[12] Mount at [122]-[153]
Issues arising from the legislative framework
47I do not propose to traverse all of part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act but broadly, in accordance with the contentions of the plaintiff, I accept that in a situation such as the present where MBAV relies on the legislation to prevent disclosure of the complaint, that it bears the onus of proving that:
(a) there was a disclosure of information;[13]
(b) the discloser is an eligible whistleblower with reference to the relevant regulated entity;[14]
(c) the discloser made the disclosure to an eligible recipient in relation to the relevant regulated entity;[15]
(d) ss(4) and ss(5) of s1317AA of the Corporations Act apply to the disclosure.[16]
[13] Corporations Act2001 (Cth) s 1371AA(2)
[14] Ibid s 1371AA(2)(a)
[15] Ibid s 1371AA(2)(b)
[16] Ibid s 1371AA(2)(c)
Issues cannot be considered in a vacuum
48In this proceeding, where MBAV seeks to protect the identity of the complainant and to prevent the release of the complaint documents, it is impossible to consider whether the complaint is a protected disclosure without access to it.
49The dilemma posed on the one hand by the need to keep the complaint confidential, while on the other hand being able to consider it for threshold issues, was canvassed with parties. Ultimately, I made orders, as contended for by the defendant, that Moseley provide a confidential affidavit to the Court which exhibited the complaint documents and some related materials for context.
50In Kelly v Hilton [No 3],[17] a case essentially about an objection to a subpoena and where the identity of the whistleblower was known, Strk J noted that depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary for unorthodox orders to be made. Her Honour further noted that in appropriate circumstances (where the Court thinks it is necessary in the interests of justice), an order might be made restricting access to documents filed in support of the claim to all but the Court, so that the claim can be tested with the benefit of having regard to the documents.[18]
[17][2023] WASC 235
[18] Ibid at [115]
51Accordingly, I made unorthodox orders on 12 August 2025, received the Moseley affidavit and the relevant complaint, based on orders made that the documents remain confidential and are not to be disclosed to any person unless by further order of the Court. In other words, the orders I made preserve the confidential nature of the documents, despite the provision of those documents to the Court.
A consideration of the alleged whistleblower complaint
52Having considered the Moseley affidavit and the complaint documents, in my opinion it fails to satisfy the statutory criteria of a protected whistleblower complaint. I shall briefly explain why I have reached that conclusion, but I shall do so in a way that maintains the confidential nature of the documents provided to the Court, in case this is not the last word on this topic.
53First, the whistleblower contacted MBAV by a communication marked private and confidential.
54Second, by an email sent 3 April 2024, the complainant asked that the confidential complaint be made pursuant the MBAV 2019 Whistleblower Policy. This may raise an issue whether a whistleblower complaint was ever made under the Corporations Act, but as shall hopefully become clear, nothing turns on that for the purpose of the preliminary discovery application.
55Because of communications between parties, Hollingsworth is aware that the complaint related to concerns about her reported comments in the newspaper articles and the failure to attend the breakfast event.
56Third, even if the so-called whistleblower sought whistleblower protection, in my view the complaint documents do not attract whistleblower protection. That is because there was no ‘disclosure’. The comments by Hollingsworth were hardly made under the cover of darkness, having been published in two major metropolitan newspapers, in her capacity as a municipal officer. It begs the question what whistle was being blown by highlighting to Moseley information that was already in the public domain.
57Fourth, bearing in mind the provisions of the Corporations Act the disclosure of comments made by Hollingsworth to newspapers about planning issues, housing development and infrastructure, in her capacity as a municipal officer, with no mention of her involvement in MBAV, could hardly be a breach of the Corporations Act or of Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) requirements.
58Perhaps the comments by Hollingsworth could be considered for whether they were at odds with some other policies of MBAV, but that was not the basis upon which whistleblower protection was asserted.
59Fifth, as should be clear already, failing to attend the breakfast was never going to see Hollingsworth pursued for breaches of the Corporations Act. I note that in fairness to MBAV it did not press the failure to attend the breakfast as a protected disclosure.
60Sixth, even if there was a disclosure, it was not a disclosure of conduct that constitutes misconduct or a breach of legislative requirements. Perhaps it might have been contrary to the MBAV policies, or even the wishes of some of its members, but on the other hand, robust comments about government planning policy might equally be thought by some to be advancing the interests of MBAV members.
61Seventh, there is no need to consider other issues that were ventilated at length in oral and written submissions. The so-called whistleblower complaint reveals itself as nothing more than a vent by one member of the MBAV about the conduct of another member.
62Although not an issue for final determination at this stage, having considered the complaint it is hard to see how it was defamatory of the plaintiff or if it was, how it caused ‘serious harm’ to her. Further, the publication by the complainant was confined to the email to Moseley and Abelardo.[19] Once publicly available information was brought to MBAV’s attention, it was MBAV who escalated things, without any further input from the whistleblower.
[19] Plaintiff’s submissions in reply dated 29 August 2025, para 33
63In short, having considered the complaint documents, and the other evidence, I conclude that it was not a protected disclosure because of the whistleblower provisions of the Corporations Act. Rather, it was a complaint but one that was expressed as confidential.
The application for preliminary discovery
64Turning next to the application for preliminary discovery. The parties each filed written submissions about this issue and made some limited oral submissions, where the focus in the oral submissions had been on the whistleblower issue.
65There is no dispute that MBAV has in its possession documents that can identify the complainant.
66The parties are aware that the complainant is unaware of the discovery application and has not had the opportunity to be heard. In that situation, MBAV contended, with some force, that if the Court was to make an order for discovery, it should refrain from doing so until the complainant has had an opportunity to be heard.[20]
[20] Transcript (‘T’) 138, Lines (‘L’) 1-11
67Pausing here, the opportunity for the complainant to be heard might also be a relevant consideration about the issue of whistleblower protection, although on my assessment of the complaint documents that does not loom large on the facts of this application.
68Having considered the parties contentions, in this proceeding I consider that the applicable legal principles about preliminary discovery are mostly not in dispute. The task of the Court is to make an interlocutory order in the exercise of a discretion in accordance with the applicable Rules.
Rule 32.03
69Rule 32.03 is set out in full as follows:
“32.03 Discovery to identify a defendant
(1) The Court may make an order under paragraph (2) where—
(a) an applicant, having made reasonable inquiries, is unable to ascertain the description of a person sufficiently for the purpose of commencing a proceeding in the Court against that person (in this Rule called the person concerned); and
(b) it appears that some person has or is likely to have knowledge of facts, or has or is likely to have or has had or is likely to have had in that person's possession any document or thing, tending to assist in such ascertainment.
(2) The Court may order that the person, and in the case of a corporation, the corporation by an appropriate officer, shall—
(a) attend before the Court to be orally examined in relation to the description of the person concerned;
(b) make discovery to the applicant of all documents which are or have been in the person or corporation's possession relating to the description of the person concerned.
(3) Where the Court makes an order under paragraph (2)(a), it may—
(a) order that the person or corporation against whom or which the order is made shall produce to the Court on the examination any document or thing in the person or corporation's possession relating to the description of the person concerned;
(b) direct that the examination be held before an associate judge or judicial registrar.”[21]
[21] County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 r 32.03
70There is no real dispute that Hollingsworth has made all reasonable enquiries and cannot identify the complainant, or that MBAV has knowledge of facts that would identify that person. As is obvious, the Court already has possession of the complaint documents.
71Rule 32.03 makes it clear that the Court ‘may’ make an order for discovery. So that even if all the preconditions for an order are met, the power is still a discretionary one.
72In the exercise of that discretion, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case against the complainant. Equally, if the evidence at this stage reveals a paucity of information to assess the prospects of success in an action, then that is a relevant consideration.
73I have already expressed my passing comments about the prospects of a successful action in defamation against the whistleblower, obviously based on the limited information and evidence before me.
74In her written submissions about discovery, Hollingsworth contended that it could be inferred that the allegations in the complaint carried imputations with a tendency to lower her reputation. But that ignores the limited publication, in a document marked as confidential, and ignores the subsequent steps taken by MBAV. It conflates an action against MBAV with an action against the complainant.
75Notably Hollingsworth has a very good understanding of what MBAV alleged she had done, in the context of communications with Moseley, Purcell and others. She will be no better off by the provision of the complaint for the purpose of an action in defamation against MBAV, yet she has not commenced such an application, where, of course, different considerations and different principles about discovery would apply. Equally, as I understand things, she has not issued a concerns notice against MBAV or specified the ‘serious harm’ suffered.
76In short, while Hollingsworth does not know the identity of the complainant, she is aware of the allegations against her. But overall, there is a paucity of information about the potential claim in defamation.
77Although not expressed as bluntly by either party, it is hard to escape a sense that all Hollingsworth wants is the identity of the snitch, which is understandable.
78Overall, Hollingsworth contended that there were no discretionary factors to militate against an order for discovery of the complaint documents. I disagree.
79The paucity of information about the proposed claim against the complainant, the confidential nature of the complaint, the fact that the complainant is not on notice of the application and the public benefit of members of associations such as MBAV being able to raise confidential grievances in the expectation that confidentiality will be respected, mean that in the exercise of a discretion, the complaint documents should not be discovered by the application of Rule 32.03.
Rule 32.05
80Rule 32.05 is set out in full as follows:
”32.05 Discovery from prospective defendant
Where—
(a) there is reasonable cause to believe that the applicant has or may have the right to obtain relief in the Court from a person whose description the applicant has ascertained; 32.05 self-evidently differs from 32.03, because it is directed to preliminary discovery from a prospective defendant, in this case form MBAV.
(b) after making all reasonable inquiries, the applicant has not sufficient information to enable the applicant to decide whether to commence a proceeding in the Court to obtain that relief; and
(c) there is reasonable cause to believe that that person has or is likely to have or has had or is likely to have had in that person's possession any document relating to the question whether the applicant has the right to obtain the relief and that inspection of the document by the applicant would assist the applicant to make the decision—
the Court may order that that person shall make discovery to the applicant of any document of the kind described in paragraph (c).”[22]
[22] County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 r 32.05
81Rule 32.05 self-evidently differs from Rule 32.03, because it is directed to preliminary discovery from a prospective defendant, in this case, MBAV.
82The parties each referred to well-known legal principles as set out in cases such as Fei v Hexin Pty Ltd[23]. In addition, the defendant highlighted the helpful discussion about the relevant principles by Barrett AsJ in Waldren Pty Ltd v Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd.[24]
[23] (2024) 75 VR 581
[24] [2023] VSC 348 at [51] – [54]
83Two things are obvious about Rule 32.05. First, it is not a mechanism to use to identify a prospective defendant, rather it is a mechanism to obtain preliminary discovery from a prospective defendant who has already been identified. Second, Rule 32.05 only has work to do if the applicant, in this case Hollingsworth, does not have sufficient information to enable a decision to be made whether to commence proceedings.
84The affidavits of the plaintiff initially conveyed the impression that it was only an action against the complainant that she was considering, although by her third affidavit that changed to be one where she asserted that an action was also contemplated against MBAV.
85There is a fundamental difference between needing preliminary discovery to ascertain a possible cause of action, as opposed to wanting documents to be fortified about the viability or strength of a cause of action.
86In the current proceeding, Hollingsworth already has a lot of information and potential evidence, including evidence from other MBAV board members, to enable her to decide if she has a potential cause of action against MBAV or even one or the other of its officers such as Moseley or Purcell. The substance of the complaint was disclosed to her, even if the documents were not.
87The defendant in its written submissions of 16 September 2025 highlighted problems with Hollingsworth’s attempt to use Rule 32.05 to ascertain the strength of potential claims against persons other than MBAV, such as Moseley, or the barrister engaged for the purposes of the investigation. I accept the submission of MBAV that Rule 32.05 can only apply to the consideration of discovery for a potential claim against it.
88In that regard, MBAV made extensive and compelling submissions about what it claimed was the weakness of any potential claim in defamation against it such as lack of ‘serious harm’ or lack of publication. It contended that the evidence could not support a conclusion that Hollingsworth had a reasonable belief of a viable claim against it.
89There is no need to go any further down the defamation rabbit hole beyond what I have already said. In my view, even without considering the complaint documents, Hollingsworth has sufficient information to decide if she wishes to commence an action in defamation against MBAV or one of the other characters in this story whose identity she is aware of.
90The interests of justice and the need to avoid the time, expense and inconvenience of applications such as this one mean that the Court should be vigilant to ensure that Rule 32.05 is not used by a party to improperly seek discovery before proceedings are issued.
91But to return to the specifics of this application, if Hollingsworth wants to proceed with an action in defamation against MBAV, or Moseley, or others she knows have been involved, she does not need the complaint documents.
92Accordingly, again, in the exercise of a discretion, the confidential complaint documents are not discoverable by application of Rule 32.05.
Conclusion
93For the reasons expressed, I conclude that:
(a)the whistleblower complaint was not a protected disclosure within the meaning of part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act; and
(b)the confidential complaint documents are not discoverable in accordance with either Rule 32.03 or Rule 32.05.
94The parties are requested to confer to prepare minutes of orders to give effect to this ruling, or if parties cannot agree, to individually prepare minutes of the orders that a party seeks, including orders for costs. Such consent orders, or proposed orders, are to be filed within 21 days of the date of this ruling.
95Should any party wish to be heard as to the appropriate orders to be made, then they are directed to contact my Chambers so that a date can be arranged for such a hearing.
0
8
0