Gore v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gore v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCAFC 13

Appeal from:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (in liq) (2015) 235 FCR 181; [2015] FCA 342

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) (2015) 106 ACSR 302; [2015] FCA 527

File number: QUD 488 of 2015
Judges: DOWSETT, RARES, GLEESON JJ
Date of judgment: 13 February 2017
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – accessorial liability – prohibition on offering securities under s 727(1) and (2) without disclosure document being lodged if disclosure required under Pt 6D.2 – whether alleged accessory without actual knowledge that offer required disclosure capable of being found to be knowingly concerned in principal’s contraventions of s 727(1) and (2) – elements of accessory’s contravention of s 727(1) and (2) – whether necessary for party alleging contravention to prove that no exemption from requirement of disclosure applies to the offer of securities

CORPORATIONS – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – accessorial liability – where civil and criminal penalties apply to offences under s 727 – where offence of contravening s 727(1) and (2) created by s 1311(1) – where s 1308A of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) applied provisions of Criminal Code (Cth) to offences under Act – whether Pt 2.4 of Criminal Code (Cth) required proof of physical and fault elements in respect of contravention of s 727(1) and (2) – proof of physical and fault elements under the Criminal Code (Cth) necessary to establish accessory’s contravention of s 727(1) and (2)

CORPORATIONS – accessorial liability for misleading or deceptive conduct under s 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s 12DA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) – elements of an accessory’s contravention of s 1041H and s 12DA – whether accessory had actual knowledge that disclosure document made representation that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive

EVIDENCE – Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) – admissibility of transcript of examination under s 19 – where transcript not admissible in criminal proceeding or proceeding for imposition of a penalty – where examinee claimed privilege against self‑incrimination or exposure to a penalty in examination – whether application for injunctions pursuant to s 1324(1) of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to prevent examinee from engaging in lawful conduct by which she previously had earned livelihood was proceeding for the imposition of a penalty for the purposes of s 68(3)(b) of Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)

CORPORATIONS – injunction ordered under s 1324(1) of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) after finding that accessory knowingly concerned in principal’s contravention of s 727(1) and (2) – whether purpose of injunction under s 1324(1) protective or punitive – where principal contraveners received lesser penalties than accessory – whether principle of parity in sentencing or imposing penalty correctly applied – whether primary Judge erred in exercise of discretion in setting length of injunction restraining…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Gore v Australian Securities and Investments Commission involved a dispute concerning the accessorial liability of Mrs Gore under sections 727(1) and (2), and 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) sought to hold Mrs Gore accountable for her involvement in alleged contraventions of these provisions by her husband, Mr Gore. The matter was heard and determined by the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the Court included the elements required to establish accessorial liability under sections 727(1) and (2) and 1041H of the Corporations Act. The Court also had to consider the applicability of the Criminal Code (Cth) in determining the physical and fault elements of the offence, and whether ASIC needed to prove that no exemption from the requirement of disclosure applied to the offer of securities. Additionally, the Court was required to determine the admissibility of a transcript of an examination under section 19 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) and the appropriateness of the injunction ordered under section 1324(1) of the Corporations Act.

The Court found that the Criminal Code applied to the elements of the offence, although the impact of the Code on the proceedings was not raised at first instance. The Court also held that the primary judge had correctly found Mrs Gore to be knowingly concerned in the contraventions of section 727 and had exercised their discretion appropriately in setting the length of the injunction. The Court further concluded that the primary judge's decision to order Mrs Gore to pay 80% of 95% of ASIC's costs was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed with costs in each case. The Court's decision upheld the primary judge's findings and orders, with the exception of the duration of the injunction, which was considered to be appropriate given Mrs Gore's involvement in the contraventions of section 727.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2. The cross appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It seems that in isolating the physical and fault elements of the s 39 offence, the prosecution submitted that whether proceedings were “federal” was a question of law for the judge, not the jury to determine. The Court rejected that proposition, holding that the Criminal Code necessarily applied to the elements of the offence as identified in the provision which established it. Although the decision has some similarity to the exercise which we have performed with respect to Ch 2 of the Criminal Code, it has no real present relevance.CONCLUSION The impact of the Criminal Code upon these proceedings was not raised at first instance, and so was not considered. Although we are able to identify the physical and fault elements of the relevant offences, it would be difficult for this Court to relate the evidence to those elements. The matter would almost certainly have to be remitted for further hearing. It is also possible that, with knowledge of the matters to be proven pursuant to the Criminal Code, Ms Gore would choose to give evidence. The present options are:·to uphold the finding at first instance, notwithstanding the failure to have regard to the Criminal Code; or·to remit the matter for determination in accordance with the law. If these proceedings were for a criminal offence, we would send the matter back for reconsideration. Notwithstanding the fact that the parties conducted the case in a particular way, it would be inappropriate for a conviction to have been recorded for an offence which was, in effect, unknown to the law. However proceedings alleging accessorial “liability” pursuant to s 1324 are not of that nature. Given the purely civil nature of the proceedings, we see no obstacle to allowing the result to stand, based as it is upon the way in which the parties chose to conduct the case at first instance. We would dismiss grounds 1 to 6 of the amended notice of appeal. As to the duration of the injunction, we have concluded that the primary Judge correctly found that Ms Gore was knowingly concerning in contraventions of s 727. Hence a primary basis for Ms Gore’s appeal concerning that matter disappears. To the extent that Ms Gore submitted that the period was otherwise excessive, we agree with the reasons and conclusions reached by Rares J. We consider that the question depended upon the view of the primary Judge as to how the public could best be protected, having regard to the totality of her misconduct. The accessorial findings concerning s 727 would have had little impact on that question. As to the cross‑appeal, we also agree with his Honour’s reasons and conclusions. In our view, Ms Gore’s conduct in connection with the contraventions of s 727 was part of a larger scheme. We consider that the primary Judge’s decision adequately reflected her overall culpability. As to the costs at first instance, our conclusions concerning the s 727 issues dispose of a primary basis for Ms Gore’s attack on his Honour’s orders. His Honour was in a better position, than are we, to determine the question. No basis has been demonstrated for varying such orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mrs Gore argued that it was manifestly unreasonable for the primary judge to order her to pay 80% of 95% of ASIC’s costs. She contended that there were 18 defendants, and that she had only been found liable in respect of two categories of contraventions. Further, there was other conduct in issue, involving other defendants in relation to the US Realty matter. She argued that, at the trial, ASIC had failed to establish that she was knowingly concerned in contraventions of s 911A. Mrs Gore submitted that, first, his Honour estimated that the trial had taken an extra 12 days because she, Mr Gore and Mr Stonehouse contested ASIC’s allegations, and that his Honour then apportioned those costs to arrive at his costs order. She argued that ASIC still had to prove its case against Mr Gore and Mr Stonehouse (against whom it failed) as well as the many defendants who did not appear, and that it was not appropriate to treat her and Mr Gore as being in substantially the same positions. She contended that the liability for costs should have been divided severally between all liable defendants.The costs issue – consideration While costs will usually follow the event, the outcomes on distinct issues in the litigation may make it appropriate to depart from that general rule: Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (No 2) (2015) 327 ALR 192 at 193 [6] per French CJ, Kiefel, Nettle and Gordon JJ. However, where there are competing considerations, the order for costs will be decided so as to “reflect a broad evaluative judgment of what justice requires”: Gray v Richards (No 2) (2014) 315 ALR 1 at [2] per French CJ, Hayne, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ. ASIC’s case at trial against Mr Gore appeared superficially to be broader than that against Mrs Gore, and ASIC failed in its claim against her under s 911A. However, the Full Court is not in the position of the primary judge. That makes it difficult to assess with any degree of confidence how any such apparent differences could reveal that his Honour’s discretionary apportionment was erroneous. Although I have some concern that his Honour may not have sufficiently distinguished the liability for costs of Mrs Gore from that of her husband, I am not persuaded that he erred. I would dismiss this ground of appeal.The costs of the appeal and cross appeal The appeal and cross appeal each failed. Costs should follow the event in each.