Restraint of trade—Employment—Trade—Professional football player—Rules of football association—Retention and transfer of players—Retained player disabled from playing with other clubs—No maximum period for retention—Transfer fees—Player disabled from transferring to other club unless fee paid by new club—Whether restraint of trade—Whether reasonable—Declaration and injunction.
Decision
December 13. THE COURT delivered the following written judgment: - The respondent is a professional footballer. The appellants, Buckley and Stephen, are the president and secretary respectively of the N.S.W. Rugby Football League ("the League") and the appellant Humphreys is the secretary of Balmain District Rugby League Football Club ("the Balmain Club"). The respondent as plaintiff commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in its equity jurisdiction proceedings against the appellants as defendants seeking certain declaratory orders. The suit was heard by three judges of the Supreme Court sitting together pursuant to s. 6 of the Equity Act, 1901 (N.S.W.), as amended, and the Court (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 329 ordered and declared as follows:
"1. Order that the defendants William George Buckley and Kenneth Gibson Stephen be appointed to represent for the purposes of this suit the class comprised of the members of the New South Wales Rugby Football League other than the plaintiff. 2. Order that the defendant Kevin Emery Humphreys be appointed to represent for the purposes of this suit the class comprised of the members of the Balmain District Rugby League Football Club other than the plaintiff. 3. Declare that rr. 26, 27, r. 28 except for the last sentence thereof, r. 30 (c), (f), (g), (h) and (i), and r. 105 (g) of the
Constitution, Standing Orders and Competition Rules of the New South Wales Rugby Football League are void as being in unreasonable restraint of trade. 4. Order that the defendants William George Buckley and Kenneth Gibson Stephen and the members of the New South Wales Rugby Football League other than the plaintiff be restrained from acting upon or in any way enforcing, or attempting to enforce the said Rules against or in any respect so as to affect the plaintiff. 5. Order that the defendant Kevin Emery Humphreys and the members of the Balmain District Rugby Football League other than the plaintiff be restrained from acting upon or in any way enforcing or attempting to enforce the said Rules against or in any respect so as to affect the plaintiff. 6. Order that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of this suit."
From this decision the present appeal is brought by special leave. (at p363)
2. The League is an unincorporated voluntary association whose objects are to foster and control Rugby League football throughout the State of New South Wales and to co-operate with other States in the formation of a board of control for Rugby League football in Australia. It is the governing body for Rugby League football in New South Wales.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Buckley v Tutty
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Buckley v Tutty [1971] HCA 71
Case
[1971] HCA 71
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Buckley (the appellant) brought an action against Tutty (the respondent) in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking damages for defamation. The respondent counterclaimed for damages for defamation. The dispute concerned statements made by the appellant about the respondent, which the respondent alleged were defamatory.
The primary legal issues before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales were whether the statements made by the appellant were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, and if so, whether they were in fact defamatory of the respondent. The court also had to consider the defence of qualified privilege raised by the appellant.
The court found that the statements made by the appellant were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning and were indeed defamatory of the respondent. The defence of qualified privilege was not made out, as the appellant had acted with malice. The court applied the principles of defamation law, including the test for defamatory meaning and the requirements for establishing qualified privilege and its defeat by malice.
The Full Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the trial judge, finding in favour of the respondent on his counterclaim and against the appellant on his claim.