De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Limited [2019] FCA 688

File number: NSD 309 of 2019
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 17 May 2019
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – restraint of trade – where applicant is a professional rugby league player contracted by a club to play rugby league in the National Rugby League (NRL) Competition – where applicant licenced his name, image and reputation in his playing contract – where applicant charged with aggravated sexual assault in company – where applicant has pleaded not guilty but charges are not yet determined – where the applicant was automatically stood down from playing in the NRL Competition under a new rule automatically subjecting players charged with criminal offences punishable by a maximum penalty of 11 years to a “no-fault stand down condition” – where player stood down on full pay and permitted to continue to train with his club – whether the new rule was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the respondents, having regard to the seriousness of the restraint imposed upon the player – where the evidence established a clear and present danger to the legitimate interests of the respondents – whether the new rule imposed an indefinite condition – whether the new rule operated in a relevantly retrospective way – where no opportunity for the applicant to make submissions or seek review of the application of the no-fault stand down condition – whether real danger of contempt of court if the NRL were to determine whether there had been a breach of the NRL Code of Conduct – application dismissed

TORTS – whether the imposition of the new rule constituted an unlawful interference with the applicant’s Playing Contract with his Club – whether the applicant had established any loss or damage as a result of the no-fault automatic stand down condition – where no intention established to induce or procure the interference in the Playing Contract – where the NRL Rules and interlocking contractual matrix provided that players are bound by the NRL Rules as amended from time to time

CONSUMER LAW – whether, before the new rule was adopted, the respondents had made misleading or deceptive statements in breach of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) – where the representations are not properly pleaded – whether any loss or damage established

CONSUMER LAW – whether, in imposing the new rule, the respondents engaged in unconscionable conduct contrary to s 21 of the ACL

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law s 18, 21, 22

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 137

Restraints of Trade Act 1976 (NSW) s 4(1)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 16.02, 16.42

Cases cited:

Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Limited (1991) 27 FCR 535

Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Limited (1991) 31 FCR 242; (1991) 103 ALR 319

Adamson v West Perth Football Club (1979) 27 ALR 475

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992)…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 688
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Limited concerned a dispute between a professional rugby league player and the Australian Rugby League Commission (ARLC) over a new rule implemented by the ARLC, which automatically stood down players charged with serious criminal offences from playing in the National Rugby League (NRL) competition. The applicant, Mr. de Belin, argued that the new rule amounted to an unlawful restraint of trade, interference with his playing contract, and breaches of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). The court had to determine if the new rule was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the respondents, if it constituted an indefinite condition, and whether it operated in a retrospective manner. Furthermore, the court needed to decide if the new rule interfered with Mr. de Belin's playing contract and if it breached sections 18 and 21 of the ACL.

The court dismissed all claims made by Mr. de Belin. The court found that the new rule was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the ARLC and the NRL, despite the seriousness of the restraint imposed on Mr. de Belin. The court also determined that the new rule did not constitute an unlawful interference with Mr. de Belin's playing contract and did not breach sections 18 and 21 of the ACL. The court held that there was no intention to induce or procure interference in the playing contract and that the NRL Rules and the interlocking contractual matrix provided that players were bound by the NRL Rules as amended from time to time. As a result, the application was dismissed, and Mr. de Belin was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondents as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondents’ affidavit evidence was the subject of extensive objections by the applicant. As a result of rulings on a number of categories of evidence, the parties were able to agree upon those passages in the respondents’ witnesses’ affidavits which should be redacted or read subject to orders limiting the uses to which the evidence could be put pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act). In particular, some evidence was admitted for non-hearsay purposes only pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act, that is, as evidence of the fact that the words alleged were uttered but not as to the truth of the words uttered (the s 136 non-hearsay limitation). I note that not all evidence of a hearsay kind was subject to this limitation including some of the evidence as to what sponsors and others were alleged to have said. While the applicant’s written submissions relied upon in closing submitted that “much of the Respondents’ evidence is inadmissible” (applicant’s outline of submissions dated 18 April 2019 (AOS) at [54.1]), I note that these written submissions were identical to those relied upon in opening before the rulings were made, save for the insertion of references to the transcript and evidence. In these circumstances, I consider that the applicant must be taken as not having pressed his remaining objections to the admissibility of material which were not specifically ruled upon or the subject of agreement. This accords with the approach adopted by senior counsel for the applicant, Mr Einfeld QC, in closing address who confined his submissions to the quality of the respondents’ evidence (see T478.43-479.29). All of the respondents’ lay and expert witnesses were cross-examined. The applicant’s counsel correctly in my view accepted that all of the witnesses gave their evidence frankly and honestly, albeit that core opinions expressed by the respondents’ expert, Mr Alavy, were not admissible as I later explain. No challenge was made to the integrity or credit of any of the remaining witnesses of fact who were unshaken in cross-examination, including Mr Greenberg who was cross-examined vigorously for six hours over two days. However, as intimated above, the applicant did challenge the sufficiency of their evidence to establish the propositions upon which the respondents relied in their defence, contending that much of the respondents’ evidence consisted of hearsay reports of what others may or may not have been thinking about Rugby League and its participants and/or was speculative (T478.40-46).2.2 Principal witnesses called by Mr de Belin2.2.1Mr Timothy Lythe, COO, RLPA Mr Lythe is the COO of the RLPA. He initially joined the RLPA as General Counsel in April 2016 after leaving the Australian Cricketers’ Association where he had been Legal Counsel since November 2014. The RLPA is the collective representative body for professional rugby league players participating in the NRL Competition and related competitions. It represents them on matters affecting their employment and protects and promotes their welfare and interests. 2.2.2Mr Stephen Gillis, Player Management Agent

Decision

Reasons for decision

While the question of the quantification of any damages was to be heard in the second stage of the trial depending upon the outcome of the first, the applicant accepted that damages for misleading and deceptive conduct “would not be vast” (T397.44). 1.2 Summary of conclusions For the reasons set out below, the challenge to the new rule as an unlawful restraint of trade is dismissed. The new rule, as it purported to apply in the circumstances of this case, was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the ARLC and the NRL, notwithstanding the seriousness of the restraint imposed upon Mr de Belin. The claims of unlawful interference with Mr de Belin’s Playing Contract and of breaches of ss 18 and 21 of the ACL are also dismissed. 2. WITNESSES2.1 Overview In support of his application, Mr de Belin relied upon the following affidavits:(1)Mr Robert John Tassell, solicitor, sworn on 8 March 2019 and 19 March 2019 (Tassell 1 and 2 respectively);(2)Mr Timothy Lythe, COO, Rugby League Players Association (the RLPA), sworn on 8 March 2019 (Lythe); and(3)Mr Stephen Joseph Gillis, Player Management Agent, sworn on 19 March 2019 (Gillis). I note that Mr de Belin did not give evidence. Mr Lythe and Mr Gillis were cross-examined and gave clear and credible evidence. None of the applicant’s witnesses’ credibility was in issue. The respondents relied upon the following evidence:(1)the affidavit of Mr Todd Greenberg, CEO of the NRL, sworn on 2 April 2019 (Greenberg);(2)the two affidavits of Mr Andrew Stephen Abdo, Chief Commercial Officer, NRL, sworn on 2 April 2019 (with the second affidavit and its exhibit being the subject of a confidentiality order) and a third affidavit sworn on 3 April 2019 (Abdo 1, 2 and 3 respectively);(3)the affidavit of Mr Bart Taylor Colin Campbell, Chairman of the Melbourne Storm Rugby League Football Club, sworn on 1 April 2019 (Campbell); and(4)the affidavit of Mr Kevin Alavy, Global Managing Director of Futures Sport and Entertainment, affirmed (see T363) on 2 April 2019 (Alavy). The respondents’ affidavit evidence was the subject of extensive objections by the applicant. As a result of rulings on a number of categories of evidence, the parties were able to agree upon those passages in the respondents’ witnesses’ affidavits which should be redacted or read subject to orders limiting the uses to which the evidence could be put pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act). In particular, some evidence was admitted for non-hearsay purposes only pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act, that is, as evidence of the fact that the words alleged were uttered but not as to the truth of the words uttered (the s 136 non-hearsay limitation). I note that not all evidence of a hearsay kind was subject to this limitation including some of the evidence as to what sponsors and others were alleged to have said. While the applicant’s written submissions relied upon in closing submitted that “much of the Respondents’ evidence is inadmissible” (applicant’s outline of submissions dated 18 April 2019 (AOS) at [54.1]), I note that these written submissions were identical to those relied upon in opening before the rulings were made, save for the insertion of references to the transcript and evidence. In these circumstances, I consider that the applicant must be taken as not having pressed his remaining objections to the admissibility of material which were not specifically ruled upon or the subject of agreement. This accords with the approach adopted by senior counsel for the applicant, Mr Einfeld QC, in closing address who confined his submissions to the quality of the respondents’ evidence (see T478.43-479.29).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, by cl 3.3, Mr de Belin granted to the club a licence to use, and to licence the use of, his Player Property in line with the obligation imposed upon the club by cl 14.3(a) of the Club Licence Agreement: see above at [53]. 4.4 The NRL Player Registration Application Under cl 3.1(h) of his Playing Contract, Mr de Belin was also required to “complete, agree to and comply with the terms of the NRL Player Registration Application”. In compliance with this obligation, Mr de Belin applied to be registered by the NRL as a player in the NRL Competition with St George Illawarra on 13 February 2017 for the seasons covered by his Playing Contract. In the Player Registration Application Mr de Belin agreed that he was bound by the NRL Rules as amended from time to time (cl 2(a)). Importantly, by cl 5 of his Application, Mr de Belin also acknowledged that:(a) The NRL Competition and the National Youth Competition are the subject of significant public, commercial and media interest and its success depends on continuing and developing the interest that those groups have in associating with the NRL Competition, the National Youth Competition, the Clubs and the NRL Players;(b) As a Player my conduct both on and off the field will be the subject of significant media and public scrutiny; and(c) It is a fundamental requirement of my registration and my NRL Playing Contract that I maintain at all times a reputation for high standards of personal conduct, including a reputation for respect for women and children, the responsible consumption of any alcohol that I drink and for lawful and good behaviour generally.A copy of the completed and signed application was attached to Mr de Belin’s Playing Contract. In this regard, I note that one of the matters to which the Salary Cap Auditor must have regard in deciding whether to register a person as a player in the NRL Competition is “whether the person is a fit and proper person to be registered as a Player” (cl 44(1) and (2), PCR Rules). Finally, irrespective of the Application’s status, it is plain from cl 14(2) of the NRL Rules that registration does not create an employer/employee or principal/agent relationship between the NRL and a player. That does not, of course, mean that registration did not create a contractual relationship between Mr de Belin and the NRL. In this regard, Mr de Belin asserted that the NRL Player Registration Application did not give rise to a contract between Mr de Belin and the NRL. However, no submissions were made in support of that proposition and, with respect, it would seem to ignore the terms of cl 2 (set out at [95] below) which evidences the existence of an offer and acceptance for consideration and an apparent intention by both parties to be bound by the terms in the Application for registration. Ultimately, however, neither party submitted that the question of whether the registration form was contractual in nature was material to the issues in the case (T416.36, 451.45). In this regard, Mr de Belin had agreed to comply with the NRL Rules in his Playing Contract which in turn required him to agree to the terms of the Player Registration Application. As such, his agreement to those terms is a part of his contractual obligations with the Club.4.5 The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the RLPA and the NRL