Avenia v Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 84 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Avenia v Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd [2017] FCA 859

File number: NSD 334 of 2017
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 4 August 2017
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – contract of employment – right to direct employee not to work so as to provide for a temporary "suspension" pending a preliminary investigation – consideration of whether there is an implied duty to undertake investigative and disciplinary processes fairly – whether obligation to exercise contractual powers in accordance with principles of procedural fairness

CONTRACTS – principles of construction – entitlement to payment under an asset sale agreement – where two instruments alleged to be part of one transaction – implied duty of co-operation in employment contract – relationship with terms allegedly implied as a matter of fact into the contract

CONTRACTS – whether summary dismissal and termination of employment contract lawful

Legislation:

Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth), s 32

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 131(2)(h), 160

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 360, 361, 570, 789FD(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 53A

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), s 19(1)

Cases cited:

Adami v Maison De Luxe Limited [1924] HCA 45; (1924) 35 CLR 143

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall [2017] FCA 274

Bartlett v Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation [2016] NSWCA 30; (2016) NSWLR 639

Bartucciotto v Euro Printing Company Pty Ltd, unreported, IRCA 72/96, 21 February 1996

Beaufort Developments (NI) Ltd v Gilbert-ASH NI Ltd [1999] 1 AC 266

Blyth Chemicals v Bushnell (1933) 49 CLR 66

BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings [1977] UKPCHCA 1; (1977) 180 CLR 266

Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17; [2015] 1 WLR 1661

Bruce v AWB Ltd [2000] FCA 594; (2000) 100 IR 129

Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253

Charltons CJC Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald [2013] NSWSC 350

Collier v Sunday Referee Publishing Company Ltd [1940] 2 KB 647

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker [2014] HCA 32; (2014) 253 CLR 169

Council of the City of Sydney v Goldspar Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 472; (2006) 230 ALR 437

Dissanayake v State Transit Authority [2016] NSWIRComm 10

Downe v Sydney West Area Health Service (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 159; (2008) 71 NSWLR 633

Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 12; (2017) 91 ALJR 486

EDWF Holdings 1 Pty Ltd v EDWF Holdings 2 Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 78; (2010) 41 WAR 23

Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640

Fishlock v The Campaign Palace Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 531; (2013) 234 IR 1

Goldman Sachs JBWere Services Pty Ltd v Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120; (2007) 163 FCR 62

Gooley v Westpac Banking Corporation [1995] IRCA 658; (1995) 59 IR 262

Hannover Life re Australasia Limited v Sayseng

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Avenia v Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 859
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Avenia v Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd involved a dispute between Dr Avenia and the Railway & Transport Health Fund Ltd (RTHF). The primary issue was whether RTHF breached a contractual obligation to investigate and discipline Dr Avenia fairly and whether RTHF had a duty to pay Dr Avenia under their Agreement for Professional Activities (APA). The dispute arose out of RTHF's decision to suspend Dr Avenia pending an investigation and his subsequent termination. Dr Avenia argued that the suspension and termination were unlawful and amounted to adverse action and a breach of contract. RTHF contended that Dr Avenia breached his duty of fidelity by attempting to redirect his mail without authorization, justifying the suspension and termination.

The court had to determine the legal issues surrounding the contractual obligations of RTHF to investigate and discipline Dr Avenia fairly and whether the actions taken by RTHF constituted a breach of contract. The court also needed to assess the implications of Dr Avenia's actions, such as the attempted redirection of mail, on his contractual obligations and the fairness of the disciplinary process. Additionally, the court examined the procedural fairness in the investigation and disciplinary processes and whether RTHF's actions were consistent with the principles of natural justice.

The court found that RTHF had a duty to investigate and discipline Dr Avenia fairly, but it did not find that RTHF breached this duty. The court held that Dr Avenia's actions, such as the redirection of mail, did not constitute a breach of his duty of fidelity. The court also determined that RTHF was not required to pay Dr Avenia under the APA. Consequently, the adverse action claim failed, and the breach of contract claim did not succeed. The court emphasized the importance of resolving the litigation consensually and ordered a further mediation to address the remaining issues. The court reserved the question of costs until the conclusion of all issues in the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. By 4pm on 11 August 2017 the parties provide to the Associate to Lee J agreed (or, failing agreement, competing) short minutes to give effect to these reasons.

2. The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing for the making of orders giving effect to these reasons and for any further directions at 9.30am on 14 August 2017.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As part of the process of readying this matter for an expedited final hearing, the issue of damages or compensation was deferred until after determination of liability questions. Accordingly, this issue will be deferred and can be determined, if necessary, at a subsequent hearing. J CONCLUSION AND ORDERS These reasons are lengthy. The primary reason for their length is that the parties were at issue concerning characterisation of almost all of the events that happened during the term of Dr Avenia’s relationship with RTHF. Additionally, despite the attempts to facilitate an early hearing date by narrowing and defining issues, this was largely unsuccessful and the cases of the parties evolved and developed during the course of the proceeding. The adverse action case fails for the reason identified in [113] above and the pleaded breach of contract case has only had success in a way unrelated to the termination of the employment of Dr Avenia. The price paid for the interlocutory relief obtained by Dr Avenia was the provision, through his Counsel, of the usual undertaking as to damages. Absent resolution of the underlying controversy, it will be necessary, following the publication of these reasons, to proceed to a quantification of the damages, if any, which were suffered by RTHF as a consequence of the granting of the injunction. As to the breach of contract by RTHF as to payment pursuant to the APA, this ought to be the subject of declaratory relief and, subject to hearing from the parties, may be the subject of the entry of judgment. It has often been observed that the protection against adverse costs contained in s 570 of the FWA has the benefit of promoting access to justice by trying to reduce the prospect that fear of a costs order will discourage a genuine litigant from pursuing a case with reasonable cause. Speaking generally, however, in some cases, it can have the unintended effect of encouraging the perpetuation of litigation that would be settled in circumstances where a party was at risk of adverse costs in the usual way. Returning to the present circumstances, the unnecessary prolongation of this litigation is not in the interests of either remaining party and although I propose to list the matter for a further case management hearing to make orders consistent with these reasons and to make any further necessary directions, I trust that, consistent with the overarching purpose, the parties and their lawyers will give further consideration as to whether it is not too late to bring this unhappy litigation to an end consensually. As presently advised, subject to hearing from the parties, I would propose to make an order under s 53A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) referring the balance of this proceeding to a further mediation. I am conscious that I reserved the costs of the proceedings that were abandoned against Ms Tregeagle. If any application was to be made in relation to the issue reserved, or as to the costs of the hearing generally, I would usually order that any material in support of that application be filed prior to the case management hearing. I am, however, conscious that the parties may wish to rely upon otherwise privileged communications in support of any such application or applications: see McDonald v Parnell Laboratories (Aust) (No 2) [2007] FCA 2086; (2007) 164 FCR 591 at 598-9 per Buchanan J; Melbourne Stadiums Ltd v Sautner [2015] FCAFC 20; (2015) 229 FCR 221 at [166]-[168] per Tracey, Gilmore, Jagot and Beach JJ. Of course, I have no idea whether this will be the case, but I mention it because given the deferral of the question of damages it seems to me, at present, that it would be inappropriate that I receive any material on any costs application under the exclusion contained in s 131(2)(h) of the Evidence Act. Accordingly, my present view, subject to hearing from the parties, is to reserve the question of costs generally until the conclusion of all issues in the proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this light, the aggressive approach taken by Ebsworths, presumably on the instructions of Dr Avenia, is put into some context. It appears that, by the day before the 16 February Letter (and at the time he had formed the view following what he perceived to be the breach of RTHF), Dr Avenia no longer had an interest in upholding his end of the agreement. On 15 February 2017, Dr Avenia completed an Application to Redirect Mail form and lodged it online with Australia Post. The form that Dr Avenia filled out contained the following declaration:6 Declaration by the person lodging this form – I have authority to include the people listed above. I understand it is a criminal offence to redirect a person’s mail without their authority or to give Australia Post false or misleading information. (emphasis added) The application sought to redirect mail from the address of the Brisbane Clinic (Edward Street, Brisbane City) to a new address (being an address at Norman Park) from 21 February 2017, for a period of three months. On 16 February 2017, Australia Post sent a letter addressed to Dr Avenia at the address of the Brisbane Clinic. The letter noted that an application for a mail redirection service had been made and indicated that if a request to redirect mail was not authorised, the recipient should contact Australia Post. On 20 February 2017, the Australia Post Customer Recovery Team was told by RTHF that the mail direction was unauthorised and that the redirection, scheduled to commence the following day, ought not to occur. On 21 February 2017, Australia Post contacted Dr Avenia by email informing him that Australia Post had received an ‘inquiry’ in relation to the mail redirection application and that they “have an obligation to investigate”. Accordingly, Dr Avenia was advised that he needed to speak urgently with a representative of Australia Post so that it could determine whether the redirection ought to occur. In the interim, the mail addressed to the Brisbane Clinic had “been placed on hold from 21 February 2017”. Ms Tregeagle gave evidence (T 224) that the view within RTHF was that it was “felt that the business that [RTHF] purchased was being effectively stolen back by virtue of mail trying to be redirected, phones stopping being redirected and emails stopping redirecting”. This allegation of ‘stealing the business back’ was never put to Dr Avenia in terms and I do not make any such finding. As noted above however, Dr Avenia, after suspension, “didn’t feel” that any of his obligations to RTHF were subsisting and he had no further intention to be bound by the Employment Contract. No complaint was pressed in final submissions as to email and telephone redirection, but I will deal, in Section I (Issue Six) below, with the allegation made by RTHF that the attempted mail redirection by Dr Avenia constituted a breach of his duty of fidelity and constituted serious misconduct. Returning to the narrative of the communications between RTHF and Dr Avenia, on the same day that Ms Tregeagle wrote to Dr Avenia complaining about the redirection of mail (on 21 February 2017), she also wrote a letter to Dr Avenia referring to the 16 February Letter. Again, the terms of this letter are not ideal.