Peters (WA) Ltd v Petersville Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

PETERS (WA) LTD   APPELLANT

AND

PETERSVILLE LTD & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Peters (WA) Ltd v Petersville Ltd [2001] HCA 45
9 August 2001
P64/2000

ORDER

1.   Amend the style of the appellant to read "PB Foods Ltd".

2.   Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

W S Martin QC with S M Standing for the appellant (instructed by Freehills)

T F Bathurst QC with A I Tonking for the respondents (instructed by Minter Ellison)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. The respondents, Petersville Ltd ("Petersville") and Peters Foods Australia Pty Ltd ("Peters Foods"), in litigation instituted by them in the Federal Court in 1996, sought a declaration that a contractual restraint imposed upon them in favour of the appellant, Peters (WA) Ltd ("Peters WA")[1], is unenforceable at common law because it is in restraint of trade. The respondents also contended that in threatening to enforce that restraint Peters WA had contravened or attempted to contravene s 45(2)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Trade Practices Act")[2] and that Peters WA had engaged in the practice of exclusive dealing contrary to s 47 of that statute.

    [1]In 1997, after the institution of the present litigation, Peters WA changed its name to PB Foods Ltd, but this change was not reflected in the record in the Federal Court.  It will be necessary for an appropriate order to be made in this Court correcting the identity of the appellant.

    [2]Section 45(2)(b) of the Trade Practices Act forbids a corporation to:

    "give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether the contract or arrangement was made, or the understanding was arrived at, before or after the commencement of this section, if that provision:

    (i)            is an exclusionary provision; or

    (ii)has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition."

    The term "exclusionary provision" is defined in s 4D so as to require, in particular, a contract, arrangement or understanding between competitors with the purpose of either restricting the supply of goods or services by all or any of those competitors to particular persons or classes of persons, or restricting the acquisition of goods or services by all or any of those competitors from particular persons or classes of persons. There are definitions respectively in s 45(3) and s 45(4) of "competition" and of what is meant by the substantial lessening of competition. The term "competition" refers to activity in any "market", a term which in turn is defined in s 4E so as to include notions of substitutability of goods and services.

  2. Peters WA denied these claims and, in particular, defended the common law claim on two grounds. The first was that the restraint was not one to which the common law doctrine applied. The second was that, in…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCA 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned Peters (WA) Ltd and Petersville Ltd, arising from a dispute over a sale agreement for an ice cream business in Western Australia. Peters (WA) Ltd, the appellant, manufactured and sold ice cream under the "Peters" marks in Western Australia. Petersville Ltd, the respondent, manufactured and sold ice cream nationally under the "Pauls" marks and under the "Peters" marks in all states except Western Australia. The core of the dispute involved a covenant within the sale agreement that restrained Petersville Ltd from selling ice cream products in Western Australia. This restraint was coextensive with the duration of licensing arrangements but extended to products not covered by those arrangements. The High Court of Australia was required to determine whether this restraint was subject to the common law doctrine of restraint of trade.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the restraint of trade doctrine applied to the covenant in question, and if so, whether it was reasonable. Specifically, the court considered circumstances where the restraint of trade doctrine might not apply, including the potential adoption of a "sterilisation of capacity" test in Australia. The court also examined the development of common law concerning restraints of trade, the considerations of public interest, and the relationship between the common law doctrine and the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth).

The High Court's reasoning focused on whether the restraint fell outside the scope of the common law doctrine, rather than requiring justification under it. While the appellant did not argue that the restraint fell into established categories excluded from the doctrine, such as those relating to land purchases or leases, it relied on broader reasoning from *Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd*. This reasoning suggested that certain restraints might be outside the doctrine altogether. The court noted that the *Esso* decision indicated that covenants given on the sale or lease of land generally do not fall within the doctrine. However, the present case did not involve such a scenario. The court ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The style of the appellant was also amended to read "PB Foods Ltd".

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Amend the style of the appellant to read "PB Foods Ltd".

2. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to consider the submissions by which Peters WA seeks to show that the common law doctrine does not apply in this case, it is convenient further to consider the relevant circumstances.The facts The various businesses of the parties in ice cream and related products had lengthy histories. The Peters WA business began trading in Western Australia in 1929. It obtained a trade mark registration for "Peters" for ice cream and frozen confectionery, but the registration was limited to Western Australia. Petersville had its origins in Victoria in the same period and its operations expanded to New South Wales, South Australia and the Northern Territory. In Queensland, the brand name "Pauls" was chosen in the 1930s by Pauls Ltd which was in competition in that State with Peters Arctic Delicacy Co Ltd. In 1960, these two companies and another Queensland company amalgamated to form a company which, in the 1970s, became QUF Industries Ltd ("QUF"). By 1980, QUF manufactured ice cream products in Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia. In Queensland, it used the "Peters" and "Pauls" brands and elsewhere marketed its products under the "Pauls" brand. In 1980, Petersville formed a partnership with QUF under the name "Australian United Foods" ("AUF"). The partnership manufactured and sold ice cream products under the "Pauls" brand nationally and under the "Peters" brand in every State except Western Australia. There is an agreed fact that:"Peters was positioned as a dependable, trustworthy but contemporary brand. Pauls was positioned as an exuberant and different brand, expert in providing novel treats."At the time of the AUF merger, it was Peters WA which manufactured and sold ice cream products in Western Australia under the "Peters" brand and it still does so. On 15 February 1983, QUF and Petersville entered into a written agreement with Peters WA ("the Agreement"). The Agreement provided for the sale by the partners in AUF of their Western Australian ice cream business to Peters WA. The text of the Agreement gives rise to a number of questions of construction which, for present purposes, it is unnecessary to answer. Carr J summarised the effect of the Agreement as follows[5]:[5](1999) 160 ALR 359 at 361‑362."(a)QUF sold several parcels of land in Western Australia, on which the ice‑cream business of AUF was conducted, to [Peters WA] for $1,164,500 [Art 1];(b)AUF sold the plant, equipment, motor vehicles and chattels used in its Western Australian ice‑cream business to [Peters WA] for $519,000 [Art 2];(c)AUF sold the stock in trade of its Western Australian ice‑cream business to [Peters WA] for $752,000 [Art 2];(d)AUF sold the right to use various Pauls and other associated trade marks in Western Australia, and the goodwill of AUF's Western Australian ice‑cream business, to [Peters WA] for $1,054,500 [Art 2];(e)AUF agreed to grant, or procure the grant, to [Peters WA] of the exclusive right and licence to use the Pauls marks in Western Australia [Art 5];(f)as payment for the exclusive right and licence to use those marks, [Peters WA] was required to pay a royalty of 2.5% on sales of all products bearing the Pauls marks (the licensed products) in Western Australia and on ice‑cream products sold by [Peters WA] to Coles for resale as house brands as if they were licensed products [Art 5.4]. There was a minimum royalties provision [Art 5.6];(g)[Peters WA] was entitled to market products and use advertising or promotions acquired or developed by AUF under the 'Peters' mark on the basis that such products were to be considered as licensed products [Art 7.3];(h)AUF agreed to provide [Peters WA] with access to AUF's manufacturing know‑how, product development and technical marketing information in relation to ice‑cream products marketed by AUF, in return for reimbursement of expenses [Art 7.2];(i)QUF and Petersville covenanted not to sell, supply or distribute to any person in Western Australia ice‑cream or frozen confections manufactured or distributed by either of them [Art 7.1]; and(j)the total purchase price was $3,490,000."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND HAYNE JJ CALLINAN J (dissent)
We were referred to the decision of Parker J in the Chancery Division of the English High Court in Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd[14]. That decision may suggest that what Parker J called the "clear public interest in upholding genuine and proper compromises" applies to a "genuine and proper" compromise of a dispute respecting an alleged restraint of trade with the result that a later claim that the compromise itself is in restraint of trade falls outside the scope of the restraint of trade doctrine. The result would be that the subsequent restraint did not require justification under the common law doctrine[15]. It is unnecessary on this appeal to express any conclusion upon that matter.[14][1994] Trading Law Reports 532.[15][1994] Trading Law Reports 532 at 570‑572.The decision in Esso In Esso, all members of the House of Lords who took part in the decision agreed that the common law doctrine does not apply to a covenant given by a purchaser or lessee restricting the use to which the land purchased or leased may be put[16]. However, for the reasons given by each of them, all of their Lordships concluded that the two "solus" supply agreements came within the doctrine because both of them were naked covenants not arising out of the sale or lease of land[17]. In Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd[18], Bray CJ pointed out that what had been said in Esso respecting sales and leases was obiter. His Honour said[19]:"In the Esso Case[20] itself there was no question of the sale or lease of any land. There were two separate restraints under consideration in contracts relating to two separate garages, one for four and a half years and one for twenty‑one years, but the one for twenty‑one years was supported by a mortgage. Their Lordships held the first restraint valid and the second unenforceable. The fact that some of the objectionable covenants were contained in a mortgage did not save them."Nevertheless, in Australia, Quadramain Pty Ltd v Sevastapol Investments Pty Ltd[21] appears to have established the same position with respect to the non‑applicability of the doctrine to purchases and leases of land.[16][1968] AC 269 at 298 per Lord Reid, 308‑309 per Lord Morris of Borth‑y‑Gest, 316‑317 per Lord Hodson, 325 per Lord Pearce, 332‑335 per Lord Wilberforce.[17]See Robinson v Golden Chips (Wholesale) Ltd [1971] NZLR 257 at 264.[18](1972) 7 SASR 268; affd (1973) 133 CLR 288 and, on other issues, by the Privy Council (1975) 133 CLR 331; [1975] AC 561.[19](1972) 7 SASR 268 at 333.[20][1968] AC 269.[21](1976) 133 CLR 390 at 394, 396‑399, 401, 405, 406. The speeches in Esso are important for the present case because they have been seen as offering various rationales by which it may be determined whether particular categories of restraint fall outside the doctrine and do not require justification by considerations of reasonableness. Peters WA does not submit that the restraint imposed by Art 7.1 falls within any one of the categories, such as those respecting purchases and leases of land, which have been taken in past authorities to fall outside the scope of the doctrine. However, Peters WA does rely upon some of the more generally expressed reasoning in Esso, in particular that in the speech of Lord Pearce, as supplying a doctrinal basis marking the limits of the common law doctrine.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND HAYNE JJ,

Full text does not contain this section.