HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ.
QUADRAMAIN PTY. LTD. v. SEVASTAPOL INVESTMENTS PTY. LTD.
19 March 1976
Restraint of Trade
Restraint of Trade—Restrictive covenant running with land—Tulk v. Moxhay—Whether restraint of trade doctrine applies—Whether doctrine applies as between assigns of covenanting parties—Whether "contract in restraint of trade or commerce" within s. 45(1) of Trade Practices Act (Cth)—Whether section applies to equitable or other non-contractual proprietary rights—Significant effect on competition between parties to contract or on competition between those parties or any of them and other persons—No effect on competition where neither party to restrictive covenant retains interest in lands affected by covenant—Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s. 45(1), (4).* * Section 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) provides, so far as is material: "(1) A contract in restraint of trade or commerce that was made before the commencement of this sub-section is unenforceable in so far as it confers rights or benefits or imposes duties or obligations on a corporation ... (4) A contract, arrangement or understanding that is not of the kind referred to in sub-section (3) is not in restraint of trade or commerce for the purposes of this Act unless the restraint has or is likely to have a significant effect on competition between the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding or on competition between those parties or any of them and other persons."
Decisions
1976, March 19.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. I have has the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared in this matter by my brother Gibbs. I agree with his conclusion that the order sought by par. 1 of the plaintiff's summons should be made. (at p394)
2. I would do so for the single reason that no restraint of trade is involved, as between the parties to this case, in the restrictive covenant noted on the relevant certificate of title. The first named defendant, Sevastapol Investments Pty. Ltd., was not a party to that covenant or a privy of the actual covenantor. The land which the second named defendant, Metropolitan Investments Pty. Ltd., acquired by transfer from the then registered proprietor was at the time of acquisition subject to the covenant. The second named defendant's purchase was made subject to the covenant. The conclusion of the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd. (1968) AC 269 supports the conclusion that an existing covenant, to which the purchaser of the land subject to the covenant is not a party or a privy, is not a contract in restraint of trade. For my part, I prefer the reasoning of the majority for that proposition. It seems to me certain and free of ambiguity. Its application should not give rise to any difficulty. (at p394)
3. Being clearly of this opinion, I have no need to consider other questions which might have arisen had I taken a different…
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- Case
- [1976] HCA 10
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the special condition constituted a condition precedent to the respondent's obligation to complete the sale, or whether it merely granted the respondent an option to terminate the contract if finance was not obtained. Central to this determination was the question of whether the condition imposed a positive obligation on the respondent to take all reasonable steps to obtain finance, or if it simply provided an escape clause. The court also considered the implications of the respondent's conduct in relation to its efforts to secure finance.
The majority of the High Court held that the special condition did not impose a positive obligation on the respondent to take all reasonable steps to obtain finance. Instead, it was interpreted as a condition subsequent, or an option to terminate, which the respondent was entitled to exercise if finance was not obtained by the stipulated date, regardless of whether it had made reasonable efforts. The court reasoned that the language of the condition did not create a binding obligation to procure finance, but rather a right to withdraw from the contract if that eventuality did not occur. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Ratio Decidendi