Crown—Royal Commission—Inquiry and report into malpractices in handling of meat—Person charged after establishment of Commission with offences relating to export of meat—Person charged giving evidence before Commission—Questions about matters relevant to charge—Interference with course of justice—Contempt of court—Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), ss. 6, 6DD, 7—Evidence Act 1958 (Vict.), ss. 16 (b), 29, 30. Evidence—Privilege against self-incrimination—Whether abrogated by statute—Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), s. 6DD—Evidence Act 1958 (Vict.), ss. 16, 19, 29, 30.
Decisions
August 6. The following judgments were delivered: - GIBBS C.J. In September 1981 two Commissions were issued to the Hon. Sir Albert Edward Woodward, a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia ("the Commissioner"), one by the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia and one by the Governor of the State of Victoria, to inquire into a number of matters including whether malpractices have occurred in the handling of meat. The Commonwealth Commission directed inquiry into malpractices in the handling of meat for export; the Victorian Commission directed inquiry into malpractices in the handling of meat for human consumption in Victoria. (at p192)
2. In each case, the letters patent authorized the Commissioner, at his discretion, "to defer (his) inquiry into any matter that is the subject of a police investigation or of criminal proceedings in a court" and required him to furnish a report not later than 1 September 1982 or such later date as might be fixed, although he might, if he thought it appropriate, furnish an interim report. (at p193)
3. On 19 October 1981 an information was laid against Maxwell John Hammond ("the plaintiff") charging that between 1 December 1980 and 31 July 1981 at Richmond and Langwarrin, in Victoria, he did conspire with Richard Vincent Hammond and other persons known and unknown to commit an offence against the law of the Commonwealth, to wit the export of a prohibited export. So to conspire would constitute an offence under s. 86(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) for which the plaintiff, if convicted, would be liable to be imprisoned for three years. Committal proceedings were heard in the Melbourne Magistrates Court. The plaintiff pleaded not guilty. In the course of the committal proceedings, evidence was given on behalf of the informant by one Vern Kennedy which, if accepted, would implicate the plaintiff in the alleged conspiracy. The evidence of Mr. Kennedy was the main evidence against the plaintiff. On 23 April 1982 the plaintiff was committed to be tried for the alleged offence at the County Court in Melbourne. The date for the trial has not, as yet, been fixed. (at p193)
4. Meanwhile, the Commissioner has been conducting hearings in pursuance of his commissions under the letters patent. On 9 June 1982 Mr. Kennedy was called to give evidence before the Commission and evidence was received from him in respect of the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Hammond v The Commonwealth [1982] HCA 42
Case
[1982] HCA 42
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the case of *Hammond v The Commonwealth*, brought by the applicant, Hammond, against the respondent, The Commonwealth. The dispute concerned the validity of certain actions taken by the Commonwealth in relation to the applicant's property.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Commonwealth had lawfully exercised its executive power under section 61 of the Constitution to acquire or interfere with the applicant's property rights. This involved an examination of the scope of the executive power and its limitations, particularly in relation to the acquisition of property and the requirement for just terms.
The Court reasoned that the executive power under section 61 is not unlimited and must be exercised in accordance with the law. It was held that the acquisition of property by the executive government requires legislative authority and must be on just terms, as stipulated by section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The Court found that the actions of the Commonwealth in this instance lacked the necessary legislative basis and did not satisfy the requirement for just terms, rendering them invalid.
Consequently, the High Court made orders in favour of the applicant, Hammond, quashing the impugned actions of the Commonwealth and declaring them unlawful.