Helicopter Resources Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Helicopter Resources Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2018] FCA 991

File number: NSD 629 of 2018
Judge: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 29 June 2018
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – inquest by the Chief Coroner of the Australian Capital Territory – where subject matter of inquest has a measure of overlap with pending criminal charges against the corporate applicant and the Commonwealth – application to restrain the Coroner from requiring the applicant’s employee to give evidence – whether requiring the employee to give evidence would pose a real risk of interference with the administration of justice and constitute a contempt of court – whether the Coroner has statutory power under the Coroners Act 1997 (ACT) to require the applicant’s employee to give evidence if it would otherwise constitute a contempt of court – principle of legality – consideration of principles in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; 251 CLR 196 – Held: application dismissed with costs  
Legislation:

Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954 (Cth), ss 6, 10

Coroners Act 1997 (ACT), ss 13(1), 40, 51B, 52, 56(6), 58

Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 28BA(1)(b), 98(4A)

Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth), s 8

Evidence Act 2011 (Cth), s 128

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth)

Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), s 31D(1)(a)

Criminal Code (Qld)

Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 87, 128

Civil Aviation Order 82.0, Appendix 1, cll 1.1, 2.1, 3

Cases cited:

Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139

Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate vConstruction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 47; 323 ALR 294

Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Limited (1983) 178 CLR 477

Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1

Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486

Hammond v the Commonwealth (1982) 152 CLR 188

Helicopter Resources Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 595

Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc [2017] FCAFC 111; 350 ALR 216

Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531

Lamb v Moss (1983) 49 ALR 533

Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; 251 CLR 196

Lee v The Queen [2014] HCA 20; 253 CLR 455

McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73

NSW Food Authority v Nutricia Australia Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCCA 252; 72 NSWLR 456

R v Kneebone [1999] NSWCCA 279; 47 NSWLR 450

R v OC [2015] NSWCCA 212; 90 NSWLR 134

Royal Commission Into Certain Crown Leaseholds (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 239

Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1

Victoria v Australian Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation (1982) 152 CLR 25

X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; 248 CLR 92

Date of hearing: 29 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 991
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Helicopter Resources Pty Ltd sought an injunction to prevent an employee from giving evidence at an inquest being held by the Chief Coroner of the Australian Capital Territory, on the basis that it would interfere with pending criminal proceedings against the company. The Commonwealth opposed the application and argued that the Coroner had statutory power to require the employee to give evidence if it would otherwise constitute a contempt of court. The court had to determine whether the Coroner had the power to require the employee to give evidence if it would constitute a contempt of court and whether requiring the employee to give evidence would pose a real risk of interference with the administration of justice. The court found that the Coroner did have the statutory power to require the employee to give evidence and that requiring the employee to give evidence would not pose a real risk of interference with the administration of justice. The application was dismissed with costs. The court's decision was based on the principle of legality and the consideration of principles in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; 251 CLR 196. The court held that the Coroner's decision to require the employee to give evidence was consistent with the objects of the Coroners Act and that the potential for prejudice to the company in the criminal proceedings was not sufficient to warrant an adjournment of the inquest.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating application be dismissed.

2. Order 1 made by Griffiths J on 30 April 2018 be discharged.

3. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to this proceeding, including:

(a) the costs of the interlocutory application heard and determined by Griffiths J;

(b) costs of the second respondent that have been, or will be, paid by the first respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Helicopter relies on the above statutory responsibilities to contend that, on those matters, Mr Lomas is, in effect, its guiding mind, although it cannot and does not go so far as to contend that he would be giving evidence other than in his personal capacity and does not suggest that he would be formally authorised to give evidence on its behalf, that being a matter within its control. Rather, reliance is placed by Helicopter on the terms of s 87 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), which provide that admissions by a person made with the authority of a party are to be admissible against that party, which may be based upon general authority rather than specific authority. As discussed further below, it is far from clear or certain that s 87 would render the evidence of Mr Lomas admissible against Helicopter without him being given authority to speak on its behalf. However, it is probably enough for Helicopter’s present purposes that it may be directly or vicariously responsible for Mr Lomas’ past actions or omissions arising in his official capacity. On any view, Mr Lomas ultimately being compelled to give evidence at the inquest may reveal to the Commonwealth at least details of what he did or did not do at the relevant times prior to Captain Wood’s death. That is at least likely to be an advantage to the Commonwealth in deciding whether – and, if so, how – to defend the criminal charges against it. Mr Lomas has not been charged and does not bring any proceeding to prevent him being called to give evidence at the inquest. There is no evidence that charging him is in contemplation, but also no evidence that this has been ruled out. As is emphasised by the Commonwealth, it is unclear what exactly will happen at the point at which Mr Lomas would, if permitted, be called as a witness. There is no evidence as to his attitude towards giving evidence. The Commonwealth points out that he may enter the witness box and refuse to answer any questions on the ground that the answers may tend to incriminate him. In those circumstances, there is then a question of whether he will nonetheless be required to give evidence. That possibility gives rise to consideration of the operation of s 51B of the Coroners Act, considered in some detail below at [134]. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the conclusion of the inquest would be left in abeyance pending the completion of the criminal proceedings, especially given that Mr Lomas has already provided a reasonably detailed statement that is before the Coroner. The practical effect of Helicopter’s application succeeding may therefore be that Mr Lomas would never give evidence at the inquest. The Coroner would therefore lose the benefit of any additional evidence that Mr Lomas could give that might be relevant to the manner and cause of Captain Wood’s death and, to that extent, would be impeded in fully performing her Honour’s functions under the Coroners Act. It is not possible to readily ascertain how important that evidence would be to the inquest, but it may be inferred that the Coroner considered it important enough to accede to the Commonwealth’s request that he be called as a witness to answer questions, rather than to simply rely upon his statement already in evidence. The decision of the Coroner

Decision

Reasons for decision

As a practical matter, it is unlikely that the conclusion of the inquest would be left in abeyance pending the completion of the criminal proceedings, especially given that Mr Lomas has already provided a reasonably detailed statement that is before the Coroner. The practical effect of Helicopter’s application succeeding may therefore be that Mr Lomas would never give evidence at the inquest. The Coroner would therefore lose the benefit of any additional evidence that Mr Lomas could give that might be relevant to the manner and cause of Captain Wood’s death and, to that extent, would be impeded in fully performing her Honour’s functions under the Coroners Act. It is not possible to readily ascertain how important that evidence would be to the inquest, but it may be inferred that the Coroner considered it important enough to accede to the Commonwealth’s request that he be called as a witness to answer questions, rather than to simply rely upon his statement already in evidence. The decision of the Coroner The Coroner’s reasons for declining to grant the adjournment sought by Helicopter warrant reproduction in full, as they are not especially lengthy and are, in any event, important in understanding and considering aspects of the present proceeding as pleaded and argued. After receiving detailed written submissions on behalf of Helicopter, the Commonwealth and Captain Wood’s widow, her Honour made her decision on 12 April 2018, and provided reasons on 16 April 2018. A key part of the Commonwealth’s case in opposing the adjournment, which Helicopter relies upon in this Court, was that Mr Lomas was an important witness for reasons that included his capacity to ventilate the contribution, if any, of acts or omissions on the part of Helicopter to Captain Wood’s death. Plainly enough, that is likely to be an issue in the criminal proceedings. After briefly outlining the history of the inquest, her Honour said in her reasons:5.Helicopter Resources makes application for an adjournment pending resolution of the criminal prosecution against it. Captain Wood’s wife, Ms Mary Macdonald, and the Commonwealth submit that the hearing should continue to finalisation.6.For the reasons which follow, I refuse the application for an adjournment.7.Section 36 of the Coroners Act 2011 (ACT) gives the Court a general discretion to adjourn in the following terms:A Coroner may, by order made in or outside the court, adjourn a hearing from time to time and from place to place.This is a broad general discretion, to be exercised consistent with the objects of the Act, and otherwise fettered only by common-law principles of fairness.8.Section 58 of the Act provides the circumstances in which the inquest must be suspended having regard to the likelihood of prosecution for an indictable offence. In the Commonwealth context, an indictable offence is one that carries a maximum of 12 months imprisonment. This section is therefore not applicable in that the prosecution commenced in related to the death of Captain Wood is for a summary offence which attracts a financial penalty only, albeit one of up to $1.5 million.9.Helicopter Resources submitted that there is a further general discretion in s58(6) which provides:A coroner must not continue holding an inquest or inquiry if satisfied that the inquest or inquiry should not be continued.However, given its context, I am satisfied that this subsection relates only to the coroner’s decision as to whether to continue at all with an inquest on inquiry which was adjourned pursuant to s58 and does not create a general discretion beyond that provided for in s36.10.Helicopter Resources makes further submissions on a number of grounds:a.that the statutory prohibition on proceeding with an inquest where party is subject to a prosecution for an indictable matter should, in appropriate cases, be extended as a matter of principle to cases in which criminal prosecution attracts a potentially significant penalty, such as this one;b.that this should be the case because of the risk of inconsistent findings between the inquest and the criminal Court which risks bringing the administration of justice into disrepute;c.running parallel proceedings creates the risk of potential prejudice to the defendant in the criminal prosecution, particularly in circumstances where the corporation, as opposed to its employees, is unable to exercise a right to silence;d.That Helicopter Resources is financially and practically disadvantaged in being required to participate in the coronial hearing as well as respond to a criminal prosecution having regard to its small size.11.Ms Macdonald opposes the application for an adjournment on what I discern to be three bases:a.that Helicopter Resources and the Commonwealth were aware of the potential for criminal prosecution having regard to their knowledge of Comcare’s investigation into the circumstances of Capt Wood’s death well before commencement of the coronial hearing and made no objection prior to commencement of the hearing;b.that those Helicopter Resources employees who gave evidence at hearing were entitled to avail themselves of the statutory protection in relation to self-incrimination when they gave evidence; andc.that suspension of the inquest would cause a delay which would undermines that object of the Act which requires regard to the interests of Capt Wood’s children in having all reasonable questions about the circumstances of his death answered in a reasonable and timely manner.12.The Commonwealth also opposes the application for an adjournment on the following bases:a.an adjournment is likely to lead to lengthy delay in finalisation of the inquest which may impact upon cost to the parties and the quality and accuracy of findings;b.it is consistent with the objects of the act that the interests of the deceased’s immediate family be recognised, those interests having been addressed in Ms Macdonald’s submissions;c.that s.58 of the Coroners Act does not apply and in fact recognises an important distinction between indictable and summary offences;d.any summary matter will be determined by magistrate as trier of fact obviating the risks that the outcome of the prosecution may be infected by publicity about the coronial hearing in the same way it might if a jury were required to determine an indictable matter;e.it is significant that the defendant in the criminal prosecution is the corporation not the remaining employee witness, Mr Lomas. Helicopter Resources would not be required by a continuation of the hearing to put forward any information which might prejudice its defence of the criminal prosecution and Mr Lomas has the right to access protection against self­incrimination in both proceedings;f.the Commonwealth concedes that significant hardship to Helicopter Resources is a theoretically relevant consideration in the application for an adjournment but denies that there is evidence of such. Costs relating to the inquest had largely been incurred and would if anything be increased by further delay and there is no significant overlap of timetabling in respect to the coronial and criminal matters;g.Helicopter Resources has failed to identify how it is disadvantaged by continuation of the hearing.13.Historically, in the Coroners Courts of England and Wales, the coroner would consider the question of criminal responsibility for the death other than in situations where charge of murder or manslaughter had been preferred and it was desirable practice that no criminal prosecution commence, or at least not conclude, until the Coroners Court had decided the question of criminal responsibility. This was to avoid the possibility of two jurisdictions arriving at “incongruous results” (re Beresford (1952) 36 Cr. App. R 1 per Devlin J). The traditional position has been refined in the Australian Capital Territory in sections 58 and 58A of the Coroners Act but does not require that any particular approach is to be taken in relation to summary only criminal prosecutions.14.I accept that even when section 58 of the Act does not apply, that summary criminal proceedings are instituted against one of the parties is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the Court’s general discretion in relation to adjournment of an inquest. I have considered that issue. The remaining witness is Mr Lomas. He is not subject to a criminal prosecution nor has there been any suggestion that he will be. His interests and those of Helicopter Resources are not the same. He is a compellable witness in both jurisdictions. His interests, as opposed to those of his employer, insofar as they may be affected by being required to give evidence in both fora, can be protected by asserting his rights in respect to self-incrimination. I reject the submission that Helicopter Resources’ defence will be compromised by Mr Lomas giving evidence.15.In the event that the inquest findings are delivered before the outcome of the criminal prosecution is decided, they will not bind the magistrate deciding the criminal prosecution.16.As to the impact of any further delay in finalisation of the inquest, I note that there has already been a significant delay since Capt Wood’s death arising from both the complexity of the matter and court resourcing limitations. Whilst further delay is likely to have some impact on the cost of proceedings, parties will in any event need to reacquaint themselves with evidence already given. Witness impressions have already been compromised by the passage of time although they may be compromised further with additional delay. By far the greatest impact of any delay is that on the family of Capt Wood. Such impact has been asserted and could in any event be inferred. In so far as it can be ameliorated, consistent with fairness to the parties, it should be.17.The hearing in this inquest will resume on 1 May 2018 at 10 AM.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established