FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Taylor [2023] FCAFC 189
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- Case
- [2023] FCAFC 189
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that the statutory scheme did not require a showing of prejudice beyond that which arose from the coexistence of criminal proceedings to grant a stay, and section 1292(11) did not abrogate the common law rights of an accused. The Board's decision to refuse the stay was based on the premise that the statutory scheme abrogated Mr Taylor's common law right of the privilege against self-incrimination and the associated right to silence. However, the Court found that the statutory scheme only abrogated these rights "in respect of...the actual product of a compulsory examination" under section 19 of the ASIC Act, and not in relation to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court found that the Board failed to give primacy to the criminal process and did not adequately consider the prejudice to Mr Taylor of the proceedings continuing. The Court also found that the Board erred in finding prejudice to the public interest, as any such prejudice would be averted by Mr Taylor's undertaking not to perform the duties of an auditor offered by him.
The appeal was dismissed, and the Court ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed. The Court's decision highlights the importance of considering the interplay between statutory and common law rights in disciplinary proceedings, particularly in cases where there are concurrent criminal proceedings. The Court's decision also underscores the need for disciplinary boards to give primacy to the criminal process and to adequately consider the prejudice to the accused of the proceedings continuing.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MORTIMER CJ
The Board refused to grant the stay because Mr Taylor’s common law right of the privilege against self-incrimination (with the related right to silence) was abrogated under the statutory scheme. That accords with the position advanced by ASIC before the Board, and in this Court. If that construction is incorrect, the appeal must necessarily fail. Consideration Mr Taylor had been informed by the CDPP before the second stay application that criminal charges would be laid against him, and by the time of the decision of the primary judge, they had been. It was accepted that the criminal proceeding concerned the same subject matter as the disciplinary proceeding, the same audit of the same company in the same year, and it was brought at the behest of the same regulator. It was also accepted that although Mr Taylor had been examined pursuant to s 19 of the ASIC Act, he was not questioned in relation to the subject matter the basis of the proceedings. Mr Taylor’s application for a stay of proceedings was not confined to the fact he might wish to give evidence and might then be compelled by the Board to answer questions. Mr Taylor’s concern was that he could not take any steps in defending the disciplinary proceeding without telegraphing his likely defence of the criminal proceeding which would thereby risk assisting the prosecution in its criminal proceeding against him, undermining his fundamental rights as an accused. Those steps include revealing his defence, adducing lay and expert evidence, cross-examining ASIC’s lay and expert witnesses, and taking objections to evidence and the tender of examination transcripts. The respondent submitted that the disciplinary proceeding could be used as a “dress rehearsal” or “test run” for the criminal trial for the prosecution to test and potentially improve the case it would rely on in the criminal proceeding, particularly given ASIC’s reliance on the same expert witness in both the disciplinary and criminal proceedings. The common law rights referred to by the Board, and by the primary judge, are the privilege against self-incrimination, and the associated right to silence. It is important to appreciate that underpinning those concepts is that the prosecution cannot compel a person charged with a criminal offence to assist in the discharge of its onus of proof: see for example, Lee v The Queen [2014] HCA 20; (2014) 253 CLR 455 (Lee v The Queen) at [33]. A fundamental principle of the common law is that it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person as “an aspect of the accusatorial nature of a criminal trial in our system of criminal justice”: Lee v The Queen at [32]; see also X7 at [46], [101]-[102], [159]-[160]; IBAC at [44]. This is referred to as the companion principle; it is a companion of criminal trials: IBAC at [46] and is engaged when there is a prosecution pending: IBAC at [48]. Parliament may enact legislation which abrogates a person’s common law rights. The principles applicable to statutory construction are well established. The starting point for statutory construction is the text of the provision, having regard to its context and purpose: SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 (SZTAL) at [14], citing Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]-[71]; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47]. Common law rights are to be regarded as abrogated by statute only by language which manifests a clear intention to do so: see for example R v Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commissioner [2016] HCA 8; (2016) 256 CLR 459 (IBAC) at [40]. Therefore, whether a common law right is abrogated or limited is determined by considering whether the statutory language does so “by express words or by necessary intendment”: X7 at [125].