Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Taylor

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Taylor [2023] FCAFC 189  

Appeal from: XY v Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board [2022] FCA 1583
File number(s): VID 163 of 2023
Judgment of: MORTIMER CJ, O'BRYAN AND ABRAHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 6 December 2023
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – where there is a disciplinary proceeding against an auditor – where there are concurrent criminal proceedings regarding the conduct the subject of the disciplinary proceeding – where the auditor makes an application for a stay of the disciplinary proceeding – where the Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board refuses the stay – judicial review of decision not to stay by primary judge – where there is an undertaking given by auditor not to perform the duties of a registered company auditor in the interim

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – section 1292 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether s 1292(11) modifies or abrogates the common law rights of an accused – whether prejudice more than arises from the co-existence of criminal proceedings is required to establish that a stay should be granted

Held: appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1, 19, 21, 63, 68, 76, 79, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219

Companies Act 1981 (Cth) s 27

Companies Bill 1981 (Cth)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1285, 1292, 1292(11), 1294, 1294A(4), 1296

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) ss 319, 319A

Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) s 63

Medical Practitioners Act 1938 (NSW) s 32W

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384

Clough v Leahy [1904] HCA 38; (1904) 2 CLR 139

Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Zhao [2015] HCA 5; (2015) 255 CLR 46

Edelsten v Richmond (1987) 11 NSWLR 51

Hamilton v Oades [1989] HCA 21; (1989) 166 CLR 486

Hammond v The Commonwealth [1982] HCA 42; (1982) 152 CLR 188

Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246

Impiombato v BHP Group Limited [2020] FCA 350

Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; (2013) 251 CLR 196

Lee v The Queen [2014] HCA 20; (2014) 253 CLR 455

Masson v Parsons [2019] HCA 21; (2019) 266 CLR 554

McGuinness v Attorney-General (Vic) [1940] HCA 6; (1940) 63 CLR 73

McMahon v Gould (1982) 7 ACLR 202

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV [2009] HCA 40; (2009) 238 CLR 642

Onley v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police [2019] NSWCA 101; (2019) 367 ALR 291

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

R v Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commissioner [2016] HCA 8; (2016) 256 CLR 459

Re a Solicitor (1938) 55 WN (NSW) 110

Re Levy; Ex parte Incorporated Law Institute…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 189
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Taylor, the Court was called upon to consider an appeal against the Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board's refusal to stay disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, Mr Taylor, pending the outcome of criminal proceedings against him. Mr Taylor, an auditor, was facing allegations of misconduct in relation to an audit he conducted, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) had initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. Concurrently, Mr Taylor was facing criminal charges related to the same audit. The legal issues before the Court were whether the statutory scheme under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) required a showing of prejudice beyond that which arose from the coexistence of criminal proceedings to grant a stay and whether section 1292(11) of the Act modified or abrogated the common law rights of an accused.

The Court held that the statutory scheme did not require a showing of prejudice beyond that which arose from the coexistence of criminal proceedings to grant a stay, and section 1292(11) did not abrogate the common law rights of an accused. The Board's decision to refuse the stay was based on the premise that the statutory scheme abrogated Mr Taylor's common law right of the privilege against self-incrimination and the associated right to silence. However, the Court found that the statutory scheme only abrogated these rights "in respect of...the actual product of a compulsory examination" under section 19 of the ASIC Act, and not in relation to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court found that the Board failed to give primacy to the criminal process and did not adequately consider the prejudice to Mr Taylor of the proceedings continuing. The Court also found that the Board erred in finding prejudice to the public interest, as any such prejudice would be averted by Mr Taylor's undertaking not to perform the duties of an auditor offered by him.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Court ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed. The Court's decision highlights the importance of considering the interplay between statutory and common law rights in disciplinary proceedings, particularly in cases where there are concurrent criminal proceedings. The Court's decision also underscores the need for disciplinary boards to give primacy to the criminal process and to adequately consider the prejudice to the accused of the proceedings continuing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below, we do not accept that the relevant statutory scheme is to be construed in the manner contended for by ASIC. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed.Factual background The primary judge accurately summarised the factual background at PJ [25]-[39], from which the following summary is taken. The respondent audited the accounts of an ASX-listed company for the year ended 30 June 2018: PJ [25]. In 2019, the respondent was examined under s 19 of the ASIC Act in relation to an investigation into suspected contraventions by the company of its continuous disclosure obligations: PJ [25]. In November 2020, ASIC commenced a disciplinary proceeding against the respondent before the Board under s 1292(1)(d) of the Corporations Act: PJ [26]. The Board is a statutory disciplinary body, established under Part 11 of the ASIC Act, which may cancel or suspend the registration of an auditor if it is satisfied that the auditor has failed to perform his duties: PJ [26]. ASIC, as the moving party in the disciplinary proceeding before the Board, seeks the cancellation or three years suspension of the respondent’s registration: PJ [27]. ASIC alleges he failed to carry out or perform his duties in respect of the relevant audit for the 2018 financial year: PJ [27]. In around June 2021, ASIC referred a brief to the CDPP in relation to the respondent: PJ [28]. In August 2021, the respondent applied to the Board for a temporary stay of the disciplinary proceeding pending the conclusion of any criminal prosecution against him: PJ [29]. On 25 October 2021, the Chairperson dismissed that application and provided written reasons (First Reasons): PJ [30]. In November 2021, the disciplinary proceeding was listed for a hearing commencing 16 May 2022: PJ [31]. On 14 April 2022, the CDPP confirmed that it was in the process of issuing charges which would be served on the respondent, relating to the same subject-matter as the disciplinary proceeding: PJ [33]. On 5 May 2022, the respondent made a further application to the Board for a stay of the disciplinary proceeding pending the conclusion of the criminal prosecution: PJ [36]. The application was dismissed, with the Chairperson publishing reasons on 10 May 2022 (Second Reasons): PJ [36]. The Second Reasons encompassed the First Reasons: PJ [36]. On 9 May 2022, an originating application for judicial review was filed by the respondent in this Court inter-alia challenging the principal decision and the ancillary decision: PJ [37]. On 22 December 2022, the primary judge allowed the application: PJ [212], ordering the disciplinary hearing be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceeding. The primary judge found that: the statutory scheme only abrogated a person’s privilege against self-incrimination and the associated right to silence “in respect of...the actual product of a compulsory examination” under s 19 of the ASIC Act: PJ [107]; s 1292(11) of the Corporations Act did not direct the Board to refuse a stay: PJ [108]; the Board was required to, but did not, give “primacy to the criminal process”: PJ [123]; the Board had failed to take into account the prejudice to Mr Taylor of the proceedings continuing: PJ [124]; and the Board made a finding of prejudice to the public interest in circumstances where any such prejudice would be averted by the undertaking not to perform the duties of an auditor offered by Mr Taylor: PJ [125].Statutory scheme

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MORTIMER CJ
Finally, the respondent submitted that ASIC’s reliance on Onley was misplaced. The respondent observed that the relevant provision in Onley expressly directed how the stay discretion was to be exercised and forbade the staying of a proceeding on the ground of overlapping criminal proceedings. Board decision As explained above, ASIC accepted during the hearing that to succeed on the appeal it must establish that the construction of the statutory scheme it contends for is correct, even if error is otherwise established in the reasoning of the primary judge as to the construction of s 1292(11) of the Corporations Act. The Board concluded that an application for a stay must establish prejudice over and above that inherent in the statutory scheme and which flows from criminal proceedings; and, absent any such prejudice, the prejudice to Mr Taylor did not outweigh the public interest in the expeditious resolution of the disciplinary proceeding. This is seen, for example, at [32] of the Board’s Second Reasons: The effect of ss1294(11) is that the Respondent does not have the right to a stay of these proceedings. Further, there must be a circumstance beyond the effect of the provisions of the Statutory Scheme on the Respondent to justify the Board deviating from its usual business of hearing disciplinary matters that come before it in the usual course. It is seen again at [37] of the Second Reasons:…I do not conclude that this development does alter the balance in favour of exercising my discretion to stay the CADB proceedings. I have formed this view because when viewed in its proper context, which is to take into account the operation of the Statutory Scheme, the Respondent, who has the onus of showing why a stay of these proceedings is warranted, has not done so. The prejudice to which he points is a consequence of the Statutory Scheme which has displaced the common law rights to which he refers. The fact Mr Taylor must make a choice as to whether or not to actively participate in the CADB proceedings is a natural consequence of what flows from Parliament’s intention expressed in s1292(11) that proceedings before the Board may be maintained in the face of potential or actual criminal proceedings and is the proper context for weighing (i) and (j) of the McMahon Guidelines in this matter. The Board refused to grant the stay because Mr Taylor’s common law right of the privilege against self-incrimination (with the related right to silence) was abrogated under the statutory scheme. That accords with the position advanced by ASIC before the Board, and in this Court. If that construction is incorrect, the appeal must necessarily fail. Consideration Mr Taylor had been informed by the CDPP before the second stay application that criminal charges would be laid against him, and by the time of the decision of the primary judge, they had been. It was accepted that the criminal proceeding concerned the same subject matter as the disciplinary proceeding, the same audit of the same company in the same year, and it was brought at the behest of the same regulator. It was also accepted that although Mr Taylor had been examined pursuant to s 19 of the ASIC Act, he was not questioned in relation to the subject matter the basis of the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MORTIMER CJ

The Board refused to grant the stay because Mr Taylor’s common law right of the privilege against self-incrimination (with the related right to silence) was abrogated under the statutory scheme. That accords with the position advanced by ASIC before the Board, and in this Court. If that construction is incorrect, the appeal must necessarily fail. Consideration Mr Taylor had been informed by the CDPP before the second stay application that criminal charges would be laid against him, and by the time of the decision of the primary judge, they had been. It was accepted that the criminal proceeding concerned the same subject matter as the disciplinary proceeding, the same audit of the same company in the same year, and it was brought at the behest of the same regulator. It was also accepted that although Mr Taylor had been examined pursuant to s 19 of the ASIC Act, he was not questioned in relation to the subject matter the basis of the proceedings. Mr Taylor’s application for a stay of proceedings was not confined to the fact he might wish to give evidence and might then be compelled by the Board to answer questions. Mr Taylor’s concern was that he could not take any steps in defending the disciplinary proceeding without telegraphing his likely defence of the criminal proceeding which would thereby risk assisting the prosecution in its criminal proceeding against him, undermining his fundamental rights as an accused. Those steps include revealing his defence, adducing lay and expert evidence, cross-examining ASIC’s lay and expert witnesses, and taking objections to evidence and the tender of examination transcripts. The respondent submitted that the disciplinary proceeding could be used as a “dress rehearsal” or “test run” for the criminal trial for the prosecution to test and potentially improve the case it would rely on in the criminal proceeding, particularly given ASIC’s reliance on the same expert witness in both the disciplinary and criminal proceedings. The common law rights referred to by the Board, and by the primary judge, are the privilege against self-incrimination, and the associated right to silence. It is important to appreciate that underpinning those concepts is that the prosecution cannot compel a person charged with a criminal offence to assist in the discharge of its onus of proof: see for example, Lee v The Queen [2014] HCA 20; (2014) 253 CLR 455 (Lee v The Queen) at [33]. A fundamental principle of the common law is that it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person as “an aspect of the accusatorial nature of a criminal trial in our system of criminal justice”: Lee v The Queen at [32]; see also X7 at [46], [101]-[102], [159]-[160]; IBAC at [44]. This is referred to as the companion principle; it is a companion of criminal trials: IBAC at [46] and is engaged when there is a prosecution pending: IBAC at [48]. Parliament may enact legislation which abrogates a person’s common law rights. The principles applicable to statutory construction are well established. The starting point for statutory construction is the text of the provision, having regard to its context and purpose: SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 (SZTAL) at [14], citing Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]-[71]; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47]. Common law rights are to be regarded as abrogated by statute only by language which manifests a clear intention to do so: see for example R v Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commissioner [2016] HCA 8; (2016) 256 CLR 459 (IBAC) at [40]. Therefore, whether a common law right is abrogated or limited is determined by considering whether the statutory language does so “by express words or by necessary intendment”: X7 at [125].